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ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLICY ISSUES OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE (AN INTRODUCTION) 
It  is a generally accepted fact that  the  world has  become more and more 
internationalized. This is evident from the eve r  increasing interaction of nations 
and nation states. These interactions are mainly in t h e  political, economic, and 
cultural domains. Recently, however, concern f o r  t h e  natural environment has 
become a n  important issue f o r  closer interaction. 
The economic problems of the last decade, but particularly the attempts made 
to remedy them on a national scale, exposed the  international dimension of t he  
recent  economic decline and the  interdependence of national economies (Kdddr in 
this volume). It  was not always so, a t  least f o r  the "big powers", as H. Kissinger 
(1984), pointed out for the USA: 
Economically, as late as 1950 w e  produced 52% of all t he  goods and ser- 
vices of the en t i re  world. In those circumstances foreign policy w a s  
analogous to domestic policy; it w a s  a challenge of identifying problems 
and then overwhelming them with resources.  
No country can ciaim tha t  at present.  
Interdependence became an  important feature of many economies in the  ear ly  
1980s (and is expected to be even more s o  in t he  1990s). Interdependence has 
many facets which are not easily identified, nor  is i t  possibie to understand the i r  
impact and dynamics. Y e t  i t  will be a n  increasingly important component of national 
economic policy in general and of industrial policy in par t icular  (Ballance in this 
volume). 
Numerous countries are finding it necessary to make interdependence the  
core of their  economic and industrial policies, as a considerable part (often more 
than 50 percent) of t he i r  GNPs (GNI) is subject to foreign traae (see d e  Wolff in 
this volume). This is the  case of open economies. Among these, as a specific case, 
are the  small economies. These economies are engaged in complex economic, tech- 
nological, and financial relations with o ther  aountries, t he  pattern of which is dif- 
ficult to control nationally (Saito, Nashimiya in this  volume). And yet these pat- 
terns must meet cer tain criteria if manageable international economic relations 
are to emerge. This may be t he  reason why the  Seventh Congress of t he  Interna- 
tional Economic Association selected interdependence and s t ruc tura l  change as 
one of its main topics in it's 1983 Conference. 
Symptoms of interdependence are not always recognized and labeled by this  
term. In Marxist l i t e ra ture  internationalization is often used instead of inter- 
dependence (Bogomolov , 1983). By interdependence w e  understand a mutual 
t ransborder  involvement by economic agents located in different nation-states. 
Agents act in a d d  transnational capacity as buyers and sellers of assets, ser- 
vices o r  rights. 
There have been suggestions toward a metrics of interdependence - to m e a s  
u r e  it, for example, by the  cost of avoiding interdependence. This allows f o r  the  
measurement of the  symmetry of interdependence (if the  cost of avoiding involve- 
ment t o  both actors is equal) and asymmetrical if t he  costs are different. To con- 
tinue the  semantics one can distinguish between vertical economic interdepen- 
dence, (between nations with different resource-endowments) and horizontal, (when 
transactions are in goods of a similar kind) because of economies of scale, special- 
ization, intra-sectoral exchanges, etc. (Dunning, 1983). 
Integration is seldom seen as a proxy f o r  interdependence, r a t h e r  integration 
means agents interacting as if they were in t he  same country. 
Regarding the  responses to interdependence, the restructur ing of a natural 
economy o r  industry is of paramount importance. The new interpretation of t h e  
term "restructuring" is explained by Hamilton (in this  volume). 
OEGANIZATIONS AND POLICIES 
There are many well known regional institutions like the  CRC, EEC, CMEA. 
OECD, and in specialized fields like IMF or GAR, as wel l  as ad hoc or temporary 
organizations, all of which are in action. With the  turbulent economic develop- 
ments of the  1980s these institutions are revising the i r  roles and policies and are 
working on new measures (see for example, The Fast Report, 1984; Positive Adjust- 
ment Policies, 1983). 
A t  the Thirty-Sixth session of CMEA in Budapest (June 8, 1982), the  Premier 
Minister of the  USSR, M r .  Tichonov, s t ressed tha t  f o r  an  intensification of t he  
economies of the  socialist countries, it will be necessary to radically restructure 
production on progressive scientific and technical bases, keeping in mind the  
mutual complementarity of t he i r  economies. A t  about t he  same time President Mit-  
terand (in Versailles) proposed a "concentrated" development of world economy, to 
be achieved by cooperative measures in R&D, investments, finance, and trade. 
These two events i l lustrate t he  importance of this topic. Thus complementarity 
emerges as a dual problem f o r  interdependence, (see Pelkmans in this  volume), 
coordination being the  recommended algorithm f o r  solving both problems. 
The arsenal for making t h e  activities more coherent consists of more impres- 
sive expressions (technical terms) than, sometimes, t h e  real tangible results. A s  
iIlustrations, (Gordon, Pelkmpms, 1979). it is possible to mention: 
unification (the combination of two or more national policy s t ruc tures  
into a common one). An example, not with overwhelming success, i s  t h e  
Common Agricultural Policy of Western Europe; 
coordination (internationally negotiated adaptation of domestic policy 
intentions to improve the  impact of these policies f o r  all participants). 
Coordination has many meanings and has also been mathematically formal- 
ized (for example, in t he  theory of multi-level multi-goal systems). I t  can 
be anticipatory (ex ante) and responsive (ex post); 
harmonization (attempts to remove inconsistencies in l a w s  and pro- 
cedures); 
consultation (helps information flows among participants and is a confi- 
dence building activity). 
There are o the r  terms used with slight differences in t he  meaning (concentration 
often used in France, orchestration, etc.). A11 these mechanisms have a cer tain 
political sensitivity and are sometimes (not explicitly) related to what is termed as 
national economic security (von Geusau, Pelkmans, 1982). 
These measures are usually part of national industrial policies, but could also 
be used on the  sectoral or corporation levels (see Pelkmans in this volume). The 
case in point is multinational enterprises  whose activities are superimposed on the  
endeavors on a national level (for case study illustrations see Dokopoulou and 
Hamilton in this volume). 
SOME OF THE IRESEBBCH NEEDS 
During our meeting a lively discussion on further  research needs took place. 
Among others, the following topics were singled out: 
Old Versus New Indus t r i e s  
A shift in the branch structure of industry is seen as a rewarding issue, it has 
already been widely covered in the literature. However, the knowledge obtained 
f r o m  this shift, which is available to policy makers, is neither conclusive or con- 
structive, and can not be used to guarantee success in the  future. Several con- 
cepts, such as diversification, leading industries, sun-rise industries, etc., though 
generally valid, can not easily be applied, as the many failures indicate. These 
concepts are the functions of the  size of the  economy, size of the  enterprises, 
availability of venture oapital, entrepreneurship, etc. 
New Tschnologies a n d  the Labor Force 
As macroeconomic indicators are not responsive to individual and even less so  
to inventions, but r a the r  to their  wide-scale diffusion, therefore support for  R&D 
o n ly  is not a sufficient policy measure to endogenously generate economic growth 
(see Millendorfer, Hussain in this volume). Important factors are attributed to the 
labor force, its qualification and mobility. Also, the availability of entrepreneurs 
willing and able to put new ideas into operation are seen as sinequa-non condition 
as the history of several 'high-tech highways" indicate. In this case many other  
regional issues are important, as pointed out by Hafkamp and Nijkamp, and also 
Forssel (in this volume). 
?he Role 4f Market Size 
Even if the economies of scale under the impact of new technology deserve t o  
be revisited in several sectors the size of the market has its importance. Here 
again interdependence has its influence as several commodities (steel, automo- 
biles, ships, etc.) have, in real i ty ,  become a world commodity. This means that  
opportunities, and also saturation, on the market in one pa r t  of the world are felt 
elsewhere, upsetting the economic and monetary balance of the impacted national 
industries (Krelle, in this volume). The consequences of this impact depends on 
many factors - the size of the  industry, national economy, openness of the econ- 
omy, the responsiveness and innovativeness of the industry. A case in point is the  
Japanese TDK Corporation. I t  makes enough profit f r o m  magnetic materials (tapes, 
discs) to cover the aggregate deficit of the big five steel companies (Makino, 
1985). 
THE MPACT OF INDUSTEIdL RIGIDITY 
I t  is perhaps a general property of complex systems that  they respond to any 
disturbance and change by activating internal mechanisms to counteract the dis- 
turbance, thus achieving a certain degree of homeostasis. This phenomenon comes 
into play when the changing impact of new technology hits established institutions. 
Some researchers m a k e  these interactions responsible for generating the long 
term up and down swing in economic activity. The m o s t  recent  depreciation is 
explained as a structural crisis caused by the mismatch between the techno- 
economic subsystem and the  socio-institutional framework. In fact w e  are witness- 
ing the reversal of the  former positive interaction between these two spheres 
(Perez-Perez 1985). 
Other potentially rewarding areas singled out were (van Duijn in this volume): 
investigation of the ro le  of the investment r a t e  in relation t o  economic 
performance; 
t he  sho r t  and long term impact of protectionist measures; 
capital and labor  market allocative efficiency; 
debt  problems, its international, national and enterprise  ramifications; 
the  problem of the  implementation of international anticipative versus 
responsive measures. 
These problems are, in pa r t ,  addressed in the  selected papers  included in this 
volume. Participants had a chance to hea r  several  o the r  interventions. 
I t  is generally acknowledged tha t  the  importance of interdependence is by f a r  
not identified in all i ts  forms. This is also t r u e  of the  knowledge necessary to dev- 
ise active economic policy measures. Quite often the  essence of international 
interdependence is circumvented by theories of foreign trade which are not always 
relevant (Krelle in this  volume). 
So  the  approaches to interdependence form a wide s p e c t r u m  starting from 
active and positive acceptance, f o r  example, Naisbitt 1982 
Instead of resisting increased economic interdependence, w e  should be 
embracing it wholeheartedly. In my view, it is our  g rea t  hope f o r  peace. 
If w e  get  sufficiently interlaced economically, w e  w i l l  most probably not 
bomb each o the r  off the  face of the  phne t .  
But t h e r e  are those who have second thoughts about it, perhaps best illus- 
t ra ted  by Matouk, 1979. 
Today the  choice is between an  attitude open to the world, with the  r i sks  
which this entails, but also the opportunities which i t  offers,  and a pro- 
tectionism which, limited t o  t h e  national level, can only lead to a failure 
t o  satisfy consumers who are deprived of some imported goods and 
obliged to change drastically t he i r  life-style, if only to reduce the i r  con- 
sumption of energy. However. such a change, painful at present  time 
might eventually lead t o  a life-style more harmonious with the  ecosystem, 
more natural,  and which ultimately guarantees more efficiently the  sur- 
vival of the species. 
So the  positions towards interdependence range from threa ts  through chal- 
lenges, to opportunities. I t  is t he  behavior of different actors tha t  may make the  
difference. The policy response of each country looks for national optimum and so  
the  sum of policies has little chance to be  close t o  the overall optimum of t he  com- 
munity. I t  is  a challenge t o  the  analysts to show what t he  optimum is and make the  
sum of individual policies as close as possible to the  overall  optimum. There are 
many indications tha t  this  optimum drifts more and more toward a global one 
(Bogn4r 1984). 
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ON POLICY MAKERS AND INDUSTRY STRATEGY* 
Robert H. BatLance** 
Statistics and Survey Unit 
Division for  Industrial Studies 
UNIDO 
Vienna International Centre, Austria 
There is general agreement that the period 1950-70 w a s  one of exceptional 
economic progress in western countries, pariicularly in the manufacturing sec- 
tor.' Rapid growth brought many changes in world industry. However, i ts full 
impact on the field of industrial policy has only recently emerged. This paper 
begins with an examination of growth-induced trends which have altered the inter- 
national environment relating to  industrial policy. Some consequences of these 
trends for  the  formulation of national strategies (or policy mixes) a r e  noted and a 
tentative framework fo r  characterizing national strategies is suggested. A brief 
survey of national strategies in two industries - steel and advanced electronics - 
provides the basis fo r  some tentative generalizations. 
k THE CHANGING MAP OF WORLD INDUSTRY 
Since 1950, policy makers in various capitals have witnessed a relative 
decline in the international role of their  country's manufacturing sector.  The 
decline was marked in the case of the US, although similar trends occurred in the 
UK and elsewhere. For instance, during 1963-78, the combined share  of world 
manufacturing value added in eight western countries declined from 46 to  33 per- 
cent.' A different set of circumstances applies to  other  countries, notably Japan 
and West Germany. The industrial importance of both countries steadily increased. 
These gains were matched by a corresponding expansion in the two countries' 
share  of world exports. 
The redistribution of industrial capabilities led t o  modifications in the  opera- 
tion of a loose international framework which, heretofore, had guided policy mak- 
ers' deliberations in the field of industry, t rade,  finance and investment. Experi- 
ence suggests that  the  operation of such a system usually requires a powerful 
leader o'r regulator. In o ther  words, the internationalization of economic relations 
will proceed more rapidly if one nation has a near  monopoly of power.3 However, 
'This paper w a s  not p resen ted  ora l ly  a t  t h e  meet ing but  was  prepared espec ia l ly  a s  a con- 
t r ibu t ion .  
==The v iews  expressed  i n  t h i s  paper a r e  t h o s e  of t h e  au thor  and do not  necessar i ly  r e f l e c t  
t h o s e  of t h e  organizat ion wi th  which he is af f i l i a ted .  
 he scope of t h e  following discussion is l imited t o  w e s t e r n  countr ies .  I t  p e r t a i n s  t o  t h e  
manufacturing s e c t o r  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  and t o  se lec ted  i n d u s t r i e s  within t h a t  s e c t o r .  
' ~ i ~ u r e s  were  compiled f rom nat ional  accounts  data ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n  US dol lars  and a t  con- 
s t a n t  pr ices .  Count r ies  include Belgium, Prance,  Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, t h e  United Kingdom and t h e  United S t a t e s .  S e e  R.Ballance and S. Sinc la i r ,  Collapse 
and Surutual: Indus tv  SYratepies i n  a Chanptng World (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1983), p.14. 
3Kindleberger h a s  descr ibed  how t h e  UK performed t h i s  funct ion pr io r  t o  t h e  1930s. S e e  
C.P. Kindleberger, The World i n  &presston, 2929-99 (Berkley: U n i v e r s i t y  of California  
as the global distribution of industrial capacity has begun to converge, many pol- 
icy decisions have come t o  be fashioned by negotiation between countries o r  coali- 
tions of countries. In shor t ,  this redistribution of industrial activity makes i t  
increasingly difficult t o  achieve the  political consensus between countries tha t  is 
necessary t o  deal with emerging problems. 
There are other ,  related, reasons f o r  t he  sometimes hesitant attempts to sus- 
tain t he  post-war network of policies, programmes and  institution^.^ The gradual 
spread of new industrial capacity has accentuated the  importance of foreign mark- 
ets and suppliers at the  expense of the i r  domestic counterparts.  Under such cir-  
cumstances, policy makers are faced with a grea t e r  margin of uncertainty when 
making decisions. These dilemmas derive from actual problems: (a) a n  unfamiliar- 
ity with the  character is t ics  of foreign markets and suppliers and t h e  inability t o  
influence these firms through domestic policies; (b) the emergence of large tracts 
of competitive capacity in foreign countries, particularly in industries where 
adjustment pressures  a r e  already evident; (c) t he  f ea r  tha t  external  suppliers may 
impose constraints on domestic firms by cutting deliveries, raising pr ices  o r  
enforcing embargos; (d) t he  prospect tha t  reliance on imported capital  goods may 
relegate  domestic users  t o  an  inferior technology o r  lessen the i r  ability t o  influ- 
ence the  na ture  of technological advances. One resul t  has  been a growing number 
of industry-specific disputes which often pit t he  US against Japan, t he  European 
Community o r  i ts  individual members. 
The policy consequences of realignment are re-enforced by another,  more 
specific, type of convergence. For a wide range of manufactures, relative fac tor  
abundance in western countries has gradually become more similar. Thus, several  
of t he  traditional determinants of comparative advantage - relative differences in 
national endowments of capital, unskilled and skilled labour - may no longer dom- 
inate while others ,  such as resource  endowment, may not be germane.5 Under these 
circumstances the  pat tern of specialization in production and t r ade  may depend 
heavily on fac tors  such as non-competitive firm behavior and government inter- 
vention. 
These subtle, but basic, shifts in worid industry have al tered both the  objec- 
tives and the  process  of policy making in western countries. A s  t he  strength of 
international guidelines has  waned, national differences in the  choice of industry 
s t rategies  have taken on added significance. Given these trends, i t  is  perhaps 
appropriate  t o  search  f o r  common threads in the  national strategies.  Such an  
exercise  can be  dealt with on many levels but, in any case,  can not be conclusively 
examined in so  brief a paper  as this one. The following discussion suggests one 
rationale f o r  generalizing about national s t rategies  which might be  useful f o r  
Press, 1973). O t h e r s  h a v e  po in ted  t o  t h e  s i m i l a r  r o l e  p l ayed  by t h e  US u n t i l  mid 1 9 7 0 s  and 
t h e  r e s u l t a n t  vacuum i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p  t h e r e a f t e r .  See I n t e r f u t u r e s ,  k d n g  the 
f i ture:  Wastertng the Probable and Managing the h p r e d i c t a b l e  (Paris: OECD, 1979),  
pp.77-78. F ina l ly ,  Aho and B a y a r d  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  pos t -war  changes  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  economic and p o l i t i c a l  power  h a v e  hampered t h e  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  s y s t e m  t o  d e a l  w i t h  problems. See C.M. Aho and T.D. Bayard ,  "The 1980s: 
Twl igh t  of t h e  Open T r a d i n g  Sys tem" ,  The h r l d  Economy, December. 1982, p.399. 
4 ~ r e a t i o n  of t h e  post -war  economic s y s t e m  began w i t h  t h e  Marsha l l  Plan and inc luded  t h e  
B r e t t o n  Woods Agreement ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  t h e  IMF, t h e  World Bank and GATT. 
5 ~ h e  R ica rd ian  i n f l u e n c e  of n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  is of l imi t ed  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t r a d e  i n  manufac- 
t u r e s .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  steel is n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  produced m o s t  e f f i c i e n t l y  w h e r e  i r o n  o r e  and 
c o a l  a r e  found, g i v e n  modern t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of m a r k e t  locat ion.  Similar- 
ly ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of  Heckscher-Ohl in  t r a d e  is l a r g e l y  conf ined t o  l abour - in t ens ive  pro-  
d u c t s .  T h e s e  a s p e c t s  h a v e  been  examined b y  William Cline,  Reciprocity: A New Approach to 
World n u d e  h l i c y  (Washington DC: I n s t i t u t e  f o r  l n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economics,  1982),  p.9 and 
pp.38-40. 
analytical purposes. 
B. INDUSTRY STRATEGIES IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
It  would be a simple process t o  distinguish between national strategies if each 
were characterized by a single o r  well-defined line of policy emphasis. If so, coun- 
t r ies  might be depicted as subscribing t o  a strategy giving an overriding emphasis 
to R and D and associated industries (computers, advanced electronics, aerospace) 
o r ,  perhaps, a strategy of preserving sunset industries (steel, textiles and 
footwear). Other examples which come to mind include policy-oriented strategies 
reflecting the traditional dichotomy between open and closed economies, export 
promotion and import substitution, o r  a strategy of emulating technological 
leaders. 
Unfortunately, national strategies are neither so  simple nor coherent as t o  
permit this type of generalization. First, they a r e  seldom consistent over time and 
may be altered abruptly - by voters, by changes in the approach of top-level 
bureaucrats or by major shifts in global economic circumstances. Second, the real 
priorities underlying an industrial strategy are rarely obvious and are not always 
clearly defined even in the minds of policy makers6 Third, no country follows an 
industrial strategy which is common to the entire manufacturing sector. An 
emphasis on 'high-tech' industries may be pursued simultaneous1 with a 'defensive 
strategy' t o  delay o r  de ter  the contraction of mature industries! In brief, national 
strategies a r e  neither ciear cut nor sufficiently broad to permit a simple charac- 
terization which is applicable t o  the entire manufacturing sector.  
If a sector-wide interpretation of national strategies offers little basis for  
generalization, can more useful insights be gained by focusing on industry-specific 
policies and strategies? A t  this level of disaggregation an additional simplification 
would s e e m  t o  be appropriate. Briefly stated, in most countries - including the 
technologically advanced - a large portion of total manufacturing output will 
probably always consist of traditional standardized activities, fo r  example, the 
production of building materials, food, clothing and 'ordinary' consumer durables.' 
Transport costs, national differences in consumer preferences and declining 
returns t o  scale (e.g. fo r  natural-resource-based products) are among the reasons 
why most countries produce a similar set of goods. While such industries may be 
the frequent subject of domestic policy debates, they are not of primary impor- 
tance for  the formulation of industry-specific strategies in an interdependent 
world. Rather, the industries which are the main focus fo r  national strategies - 
and thus tend t o  be the  focal point of international disputes - typically seem t o  fall 
into one of the following groups: 
'1" any c a s e ,  t h e  content  o f  nat ional  s t r a t e g i e s  can  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  be judged f rom t h e  pro- 
nouncements o f  a country ' s  po l i t i ca l  leadership. For instance ,  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan's c a l l  t o  
"re- industr ia l iee  America" h a s  subsequent ly  proved t o  be more o f  a po l i t i ca l  e v e n t  than a 
po l i cy  s ta tement .  
' ~ o v e r n m e n t  in tervent ion  des igned t o  f a v o r  one set o f  i n d u s t r i e s  impl i c i t l y  d i scr iminates  
a g a i n s t  o thers .  Thus, po l i cy  makers  may eventua l ly  f ind t h e m s e l v e s  under s t r o n g  pres-  
s u r e  t o  a s s i s t  i n d u s t r i e s  o t h e r  than t h o s e  which w e r e  i n i t i a l l y  accorded t h e  h i g h e s t  
p r i o r i t y .  The r e s u l t  may be a nat ional  s t r a t e g y  which borders  on t h e  schizophrenic  but,  in  
any  c a s e ,  is not  co-ordinated. 
' ~ s s a r  Lindbeck, 'Industrial  P o l i c y  a s  an I s sue  i n  t h e  Economic Environment,' The World 
Econmny, December, 1981, p.393. 
i) The industry is a relatively large one in terms of its capital investment 
and/or employment. Thus, significant and prolonged adjustment pres- 
sures (reflected in low rates of capacity utilization, depressed levels of 
domestic demand, rising import penetration, overinvestment, etc.) could 
alter the prevailing international hierarchy in the  industry. The con- 
traction of these industries, which are euphemistically known a s  'mature' 
o r  'sunset' industries, poses economic and/or political problems. 
ii) The industry is a highly specialized one, often regarded as technology- 
intensive. In the opinion of some policy makers, international leadership 
in these fields (often refer red  t o  as 'sunrise' industries) depends upon 
"who gets there  first". Once established, technological pre-eminence is 
thought t o  provide a lasting competitive advantage in international mark- 
ets. 
Examples of industries falling in the first category are steel, autos and, 
perhaps, bulk petrochemicals along with various supplier industries. The reasons 
fo r  contractive pressure may include significant over-capacity, resulting from 
previous misjudgments about present levels of demand,g o r  the establishment of 
new capacity in developing countries (e.g. petroleum refining in the  Middle East 
and Mexico and new steel mills in many developing countries). Related explana- 
tions are widespread obsolescence (as in the American steel industry) o r  poorly 
t i m e s  expansion programmes which were soon undercut by new technological 
advances.1° Here the  major issues confronting policy makers is how t o  accommo- 
date a contraction in industry size. A related, but secondary, concern is to  find 
the means to rejuvenate the  industry and to res tore  some m e a s u r e  of international 
competitiveness. 
The prominence which policy makers attach to the  second cluster of indus- 
tries derives from thei r  belief that  comparative advantage may be achieved artifi- 
cially. In general, any advanced country may aspire to technological leadership in 
a t  least some phase of manufacturing - especially if government intervention 
occurs. Moreover, technological pre-eminence in a particular phase (e.g. semi- 
conductors and integrated circuits) may help to confer leadership in related pro- 
duct lines (computers, automated machine tools) and the i r  applications (computer- 
aided design and computer-aided manufacture). Thus, f o r  technology-intensive 
goods the argument would s e e m  to  be that  comparative advantage is made, not 
given. National strategies t o  foster these types of activities are regarded warily 
by foreign competitors since the establishment of a pre-eminent position could 
affect a much wider range of industries on an international scale. 
C. A TALE OF TWO INDUSTRIES 
Further generalizations as t o  the objectives and forces that shape a national 
strategy are difficult without a closer look at the actual policies and strategies. 
Two industries - steel and advanced electronics - were chosen for this purpose. 
Steel is a mature industry, typical of the  f i r s t  group of activities noted above while 
advanced electronics is representative of the  second group. A thorough examina- 
tion of ei ther  industry is beyond the scope of this paper; instead the  purpose is 
'A r e l e v a n t  example is t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  B r i t i s h  Steel Corporation: i n  1971, t h e  Covern- 
ment  endorsed plans t o  expand c a p a c i t y  t o  a lmost  40 mil l ion t o n n e s  b y  1980. Ironically,  
1980 began w l t h  a t r i p a r t i t e  d i spute  between government,  i n d u s t r y  and labour regarding a 
production l e v e l  of 15-16 mil l ion tonnes .  S e e ,  The Economist, 12 April, 1980. 
'O~he  pl ight  o f  'mature' i n d u s t r i e s  may be f u r t h e r  complicated b y  rapid i n c r e a s e s  i n  hour- 
l y  w a g e s  which o u t s t r i p  t h e  g a i n s  recorded i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  countr i e s .  
merely to  illustrate similarities and differences in national strategies as w e l l  as 
some of the  forces and conditions that  influence the choice of a strategy. 
STEEL - AN ACEING INLWSTKY;. Prior  t o  the 1970s, the  world steel industry's growth 
w a s  steady. Bouyant domestic demand meant that producers were not plagued by 
prolonged contractions giving r i se  to  problems of excess capacity, by the  threat  
of substitutes fo r  steel, o r  by declining rates of profit. The eventual transition 
from a rapidly growing industry to a m a t u r e  one changed all this. World consump- 
tion of crude steel grew steadily until the mid 1970s and thereafter  fluctuated 
erratically. l1 
Basic changes in long-term patterns of demand and production provided the  
impetus fo r  this aging process. Because steel requirements depend on the demand 
f o r  steel products. structural changes within the  manufacturing sector  w e r e  
reflected in the industry. Today's major growth areas are telecommunications, 
energy, aerospace and computers. Unlike the  industries that  led the field during 
the  f irs t  two thirds of the  century, these new industries are not intensive users of 
steel. Thus, steelmakers are dependent on user  industries which, themselves, are 
losing ground relative to overall economic activity. Other, economy-wide struc- 
tural changes have had a similar effect. For instance, the  service sector 's share  
in GDP has tended t o  grow relative to the  production of material products, and 
investment has given way to consumption in the  expenditure of national income. 
Because both services and consumption are less steel-intensive than investment in 
the production of material oods, the  industry's share  in output and employment is 
likely t o  decline further." The following discussion focuses on the  major stra- 
tegies observed in the  US, the  EEC and Japan developed during this period. 
W e n s i v e  strategies - the US approach: The US firs t  became a net importer of 
steel in 1959 during the  course of a prolonged strike. Since that  time a prominent 
policy objective has been to  restrain the growth of imports. A s  imports rose, pro- 
tectionist sentiments grew stronger and, in 1969, voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) w e r e  negotiated with the European Community and Japan. Although these 
restraints were abolished with the  passage of the Trade A c t  of 1974, protectionist 
pressures soon re-emerged. The new campaign occurred in the  midst of the  worst 
recession since 1930 and thus benefited greatly from public support. There w a s  
also a change in tactics which took into account the  new test fo r  dumping contained 
in the  Trade A c t  of 1974. This shift w a s  said to  be on the advice of the Carter 
Administration which w a s  anxious to deflect a new drive fo r  import quotas.13 The 
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) played a leading role in this period. It  
filed a petition in 1976 charging that  Japanese producers had unfairely diverted 
shipments of steel t o  the  US as a result of an agreement to  res t r ic t  imports to the  
European Community. The AISI also attempted to document charges of unfair prac- 
tices and forcefully advocated the need f o r  stronger import restraints. 
''producers did not restrict their capacity expansion during this period, apparently anti- 
cipating only a brief downswing. Until 1974, the world's steel industry operated at over 90 
percent of effective capacity. Afterwards. utilization rates plummeted to less than 60 
percent. See Interfutures, h c i n g  the f i tuse:  Mastering the AobabLe and Managing the 
UnpredfctabLe (Paris, OECD, 1979), p.369. 
l%'hese contractive effects of demand have been reinforced by basic changes in produc- 
tion processes and, in particular, by technical advances that have dramatically reduced 
steeluserss requirements. 
131i. Mueller and H. van der Ven, 'Perils in the Brussels-Washington Steel Pact 1982', The 
WorLd Economy, November 1982, p.263. 
A t  the  height of t he  protectionist drive, a steel  caucus of about 150 Represen- 
tatives and Senators demanded tha t  the  Administration produce a n  effective means 
of import restr ic t ion by the  end of 1977. Significantly, the  Car te r  Administration 
introduced a t r igger  pr ice  mechanism (TF'M) in ear ly 1978. The mechanism set a 
minimum pr ice  f o r  imports based on 'constructed costs' using Japanese data. 
Foreign steel could be  sold in the  US at prices above t h e  minimum, but imports at 
prices  below these levels would prompt a preliminary review to determine whether 
the  government should launch a full-scale investigation of dumping practices.  
Minimum prices  were periodically raised at t he  government's discretion. However, 
American s teel  interests  remained dissatisfied with the levels of protection 
accorded by the  TPM. They called f o r  a two-tier system of constructed costs - one 
based on Japanese data and another  derived from European figures. The proposal, 
which w a s  not accepted, would have led to much higher t r igger  pr ices  f o r  Euro- 
pean expor te rs  whose costs exceeded those of Japanese producers (although the i r  
Landed American pr ices  were sometimes lower). 
Firms subsequently resor ted  to litigation in a n  attempt to fo rce  the  Adminis- 
tration to replace the  TPM with a stronger  form of import restraint .  In 1980 US 
Steel Corporation filed and extensive anti-dumping petition against several  Euro- 
pean producers which led to the  suspension of the  TPM. The suit violated a n  
agreement whereby the  Administration had established the  mechanism in r e tu rn  f o r  
an  industry pledge not t o  file anti-dumping charges.  After fu r the r  negotiations US 
Steel withdrew i ts  petition and the  Administration reinstated the  TF'M with a 1 2  per-  
cent increase in the  minimum prices  of imports and new quantitative restrictions.  
In January 1982 several  firms again filed anti-dumping suits and appealed f o r  coun- 
tervailing duties to equal the  subsidies received by foreign competitors. This s tep 
led t o  a second suspension of t he  TPM. The accusations implicated a host of sup- 
pliers and included product categories tha t  were new t o  the  dispute. The legal 
cases affected most of the  steel exported t o  t he  US by the  European Community. A 
compromise with European suppliers w a s  reached in October 1982 just hours 
before a deadline tha t  would have brought,penalties into force.  Governments and 
industries alike agreed to a quota system, tha t  would limit Europe's exports,  on 
average,  t o  5.4 percent  of t he  American market. 
Throughout this en t i re  period the  effor ts  of l a w  makers and s teel  producers 
were actively supported by the  United Steelworkers Union. Because producers  
had traditionally offered only minimal resistance to the  union's demands, the  gap 
between steel wages and the  average f o r  manufacturing widened from 30 percent  in 
the  mid 1960s to 70 percent  by 1980.14 Viewed in this  light, t he  union had very good 
reasons f o r  endorsing the  protectionist drive. All these circumstances led t o  a 
paradoxical situation in which steel producers, while offering some of t he  highest 
wages and benefits of any American industry, were appealing f o r  government inter- 
vention t o  shield them from international competition. 
The protectionist campaign did not proceed without opposition. A t  least some 
p a r t s  of t he  US bureaucracy w e r e  reluctant to endorse these measures. They were 
concerned with wider ranging t r ade  relations with the  Economic Community; retali- 
ation in the  form of t r ade  restrictions on American exports  of chemicals, textiles 
o r  agricultural products was feared. In contrast,  representatives of steel users  
managed only token opposition to protectionist efforts.15 Generally, American 
1 4 ~ .  Kawahito, 'Japanese Steel in the American Market: Conflict and Causes,' The WmLd 
Economy, September 1981, p.248. 
1 5 ~ h e  American Institute for Imported Steel, for example, has stressed the fact that 
demand for specific products, notably pipes and tubes, often exceeded domestic supply 
capabilities. 
steel users  have demonstrated a lack of unity and have failed t o  marshal1 a n  effec- 
tive response to t he  industry's p ressure  groups. The zeal with which firms sup- 
ported the  protectionist campaign also varied. Several,  f o r  example, had long- 
term commitments t o  import specific types of s teel  tha t  w e r e  in sho r t  supply and, 
as a result ,  w e r e  opposed t o  at least some aspects  of t he  campaign. A f e w  firms 
had begun to diversify - into oil refining, chemicals o r  activities outside the  
manufacturing sec to r  - and the i r  enthusiasm f o r  protective measures w a s  
lukewarm. 
European cartelisation and the Davignon Plan: Beginning in 1976, the  EEC 
adopted a strategy of cartelisation which w a s  reminiscent of t he  tactics followed in 
the  1920s.16 The ca r t e l  w a s  a voluntary one intended to promote market stability 
by fixing levels of c rude  steel production, minimum prioes f o r  imports and duties 
t o  prevent dumping. In re turn ,  producers w e r e  expected t o  reduce excess capa- 
city with the  help of cash payments f o r  t he  EEC. The cartel's operation has been 
plagued by a continued fall in demand which contributed t o  a series of internal 
disputes. These included intra-EEC pr ice  w a r s  and dumping allegations, objections 
t o  the  public subsidies t o  specific steelmakers and disagreement on the  need f o r  
compulsory r a t h e r  than voluntary controls to enforce the  cartel. An additional 
handicap w a s  the  heterogeneity of the European steel industry resulting from 
differences in (a) t he  extent  of public ownership, (b) the  degree of specialization 
in bulk steel,  speciality steel and steel products and (c) the  extent t o  which steel 
makers w e r e  integrated into the  country's industrial s t ructure.  
While t he  disputed issues are mainly couched in national terms, the  underlying 
problems are common to most European countries. They include the  existence of 
considerable excess capacity and, t o  a lesser extent, t he  failure of several  major 
producers  t o  modernize the i r  steel-making capacity. Moreover, t he  Davignon Plan 
faces a third difficulty which is new t o  the  1980s: t he  overall  effectiveness of t he  
strategy is greatly influenced by the  EEC's changing fortunes in t he  'steel w a r '  
waged against American producers. Most European producers would probably 
have prefer red  t o  see t h e  continuation of t he  original American TPM, provided 
tha t  t r igger  pr ices  were not set too high. This would have allowed them access t o  
the  US market without any formal investigation of the  extent to which the i r  opera- 
tions are subsidized. However, as protectionist pressures  mounted in the  US, 
voluntary expor t  restraints  (VERs) became more at t ract ive t o  the  Europeans. Clo- 
su re  of the  American market would have meant tha t  six million tonnes of steel being 
exported to t he  US would be diverted back t o  Europe. 
A consensus strategy - the Japanese approach: In contrast  the  the  internal 
differences tha t  have plagued the  European cartel, t he  homogeneity of t he  
Japanese steel industry facilitated a consensus strategy. During the  1970s five 
producers accounted f o r  70 percent  of Japan's output and all had similar cost 
s t ructures .  Although the  product mix of t he  major firms differed, t he  market 
s h a r e  of each producer  w a s  relatively constant. 
The framework f o r  consultation included the  provision of monthly voluntary 
guidelines by MITI and weekly meetings attended by executives of t h e  five com- 
panies and MITI officials. Many r a w  materials were bought through joint negotia- 
tions between the  five firms and the i r  suppliers. Investment programmes and plans 
f o r  modernization were also closely co-ordinated. These tactics enabled the  indus- 
t r y  t o  weather t he  global slump in steel in t he  1970s without serious cutbacks in 
16see KJones, 'Forgetfulness of Things Past: Europe and t h e  Steel Cartel,' The W d d  
Economy, vol. 2, no. 2, 1979, pp.139-54. 
capacity. Japan soon became the  world's leader  in t he  use of continuous castings 
as the  proportion of output accounted f o r  by this technology rose from 20 to 80 
percent  between 1973 and 1983.17 
Falling steel prices  and new capacity in developing countries have subse- 
quently led to a deterioration in t he  Japanese industry: in 1983, all five major 
steel producers repor ted  losses f o r  the  f i r s t  time in decades. Like the i r  American 
counterpart ,  some steelmakers have proposed tha t  the i r  government fi le dumping 
charges against foreign expor te rs  in Brazil, South Korea and ~aiwan." However, 
such a defensive s t rategy i s  not likely to gain wide acceptance. Unlike the  Us 
industry which exports  very little, most Japanese steelmakers are reluctant to ban 
imports since - unlike the  US industry - they ship so much steel abroad them- 
selves. 
The in ternat ional i za t ion  of steelmaking: In comparison to o the r  industries - 
consumer electronics, autos o r  petroleum products - steelmakers have tradition- 
ally eschewed international commitments through joint ventures, technology- 
swapping agreements o r  capacity-sharing arrangements. Recently, however, t h e r e  
is mounting evidence tha t  such tactics may eventually become a dominant s t rategy 
in both Japan and the  US. Despite criticism within the  industry, some American 
firms have begun t o  search  f o r  foreign technical assistance leading t o  'a multitude 
of agreements ... between Japan's big five and the  USA's top ten.'lg This option also 
opens up the  possibility f o r  traditional steelmakers to concentrate on those pro- 
duct lines where they are m o s t  competitive while importing semi-finished s teel  from 
abroad." The recent  purchase of a modest sha re  in Wheeling Pittsburgh by Nisshin 
Steel  suggests another  dimension to the  strategy. Heretofore,  foreign investors 
have been discouraged from similar moves by the  antiquity of t he  US industry but 
American-based production has  gradually become more at t ract ive as a means of 
avoiding protectionist p ressure  in tha t  country. 
R o d u c t  d i v e r s ~ c a t i o n :  A strategy of product diversification ref lects  a desire  t o  
lessen the  firm's dependence on crude steel production. One alternative is to shift 
into the  production of higher quality steels. Another i s  t o  move downstream from 
crude  steel, through integration, into steel-using operations tha t  are more closely 
related t o  engineering activities. A third version, diversification into non-steel 
producing activities, has  been observed among American firms and is tantamount t o  
a par t ia l  exi t  from the  s teel  industry." 
1 7 ~ h i s  advance y ie lds  s i g n i f i c a n t  reduc t ions  i n  energy  use and o t h e r  improvements  in  ef- 
f ic iency.  In c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  Japanese  s i t u a t i o n  continuous c a s t i n g  accounted f o r  only 31 
percen t  of US s t e e l  production i n  1983 while, t h e  EEC, t h e  corresponding f i g u r e  w a s  ap- 
proximately 50 percent .  
''wages a r e  c i t e d  a s  one of t h e  main r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  p r i c e  advantage  of new competi tors .  
In t h e  US, t h e  s h a r e  of wages i n  t o t a l  c o s t s  is about  24 percent ;  i n  J a p a n  t h a t  s h a r e  is 18 
percen t  but i n  South  Korea  t h e  corresponding f i g u r e  is 4-5 percent .  Subs id ies  a r e  though 
t o  be ano ther  i m p o r t a n t  explanation. E s t i m a t e s  pu t  t h e s e  s u b s i d i e s  a t  40 percen t  of pro- 
duction c o s t s  i n  Braz i l  and 10-20 percen t  i n  South  Korea  and Taiwan. Far Eastern Econom- 
i c  Rev iew,  17 November 1983. 
l 9 ~ a l l a n c e  and S inc la i r ,  op. c i t . ,  p.122. 
'US s t e e l m a k e r s  have r e c e n t l y  a t t empted  t o  complete such  agreements  wi th  f i r m s  i n  Bra- 
z i l  but  t h e  dea l s  have no t  gone through. 
2 1 ~ o r  example, i n  1980 s t e e l  opera t ions  accounted f o r  only 11 percen t  of opera t ing  income 
a t  U.S. S tee l .  Others ,  notably Annco and National S t e e l ,  s t e a d i l y  moved ou t  of steel a s  
t h e i r  f inancial  posi t ion permit ted.  S e e  R. Reich, 'Making Indus t r ia l  Policy, '  Foreign qf- 
fairs, Spring,  1982, pp.851-81. 
The popularity of a diversification strategy reflects the consequences of the 
slump in demand and the  r i se  in production costs which occurred during the 1970s. 
Diversification into higher quality o r  speciality steels offers be t ter  demand pros- 
pects and a lesser threa t  from competitive substitutes. Some Japanese steelmak- 
ers have followed this tactic by specializing in the production of 'high-strength' 
steels that  compete with aluminium in the  manufacture of automobiles, containers 
and other  mass-produced items. Alternatively, producers that  choose to move 
downstream into engineering activities are usually par t  of large, integrated, firms. 
Their steel-using operations are of a sufficient size to  absorb demand fluctuations 
and to subsidise losses in the steel-producing activities. This arrangement works 
t o  the benefit of the firm because the engineering and metalworking phases of the 
operation are assured tha t  they will obtain the  types of steel required. 
In conclusion, the prevailing American strategy has been a defensive one 
designed to  control the  level of imports. A s  the  domestic market has become more 
fragmented - through competition from US-based mini-mills as wel l  as foreign sup- 
pliers - a variety of policy tools have been employed to  reduce the  pressure to  
contract. The European strategy has focused on the problems of excess capacity 
and obsolescence while, in Japan, modernization and an increased reliance on 
exports helped to  stave off the  effects of the global slump. The European and 
American strategies are interrelated owing to  the former group's dependence on 
exports. Moreover, there  is mounting evidence to link the American and Japanese 
strategies as firms in the Latter country attempt t o  circumvent the defensive tac- 
tics adopted in the US. 
All these strategies share  one common feature, however. They were not dev- 
ised and implemented solely by policy makers but were assembled through negotia- 
tion involving government officials, industry representatives, t rade unions and, 
sometimes, the importers and domestic users  of steel. 
ADVANCED ELECTRmICS - AN EhfERGING INDUSTm The advanced electronics 
industry is defined here  to  include electronic applications equipment such as com- 
puters and automated machine tools as wel l  a s  the main components - semiconduc- 
tors  and integrated circuits - used in such equipment. Beginning from a negligible 
base the industry has expanded rapidly and, in several countries, has overtaken 
consumer electronics as the  predominant sub-sector in the electronics field. Thus, 
by 1978. the value of industrial products and components accounted f o r  68 percent 
of all electronics production in the US. The corresponding figure f o r  the  EEC w a s  
53 percent while the  share  in Japan w a s  lower but w a s  rising rapidly ." 
There are several reasons why governments have actively sponsored the 
industry's development. First, the industrial applications of advanced electronics 
are expected to  improve greatly the reliability and quality of products. Manufac- 
turing activities consist mainly of making materials, forming them into various 
shapes, joining the bits together and then assembling these par ts  into finished pro- 
ducts. A product's quality and reliability are mainly dependent on the perfor- 
mance of these tasks - whether welding, brazing, soldering, glueing o r  riveting - 
and electronic capital goods and computer control of manufacturing processes are 
expected to perform more consistently than workers in this regard. Second, the  
cost of a manufactured product largely depends on the level of efficiency attained 
in the joining and assembly phases and the  use of electronic capital goods is 
expected to  lead to  improvements. In general, many government officials 
apparently hope that  new systems of electronic capital goods wi l l  eventually serve 
2 2 ~ n s t i t u t e  of Developing Economies, The Electronics Indust-  in Japan (Tokyo: Institute 
for Developing Economies, 1980), p.11. 
as t he  basis around which o the r  industries may reorganize. 
Promoting a national  champion: In most western countries the  state's involve- 
ment began with the  development of the  computer industry which w a s  an  ear ly 
choice f o r  a national champion.23 The provision of state funds f o r  R and D, prefer-  
ences in public procurement f o r  domestic firms, government-assisted mergers and 
favourable loan terms were only some of the  policies employed by t h e  governments 
of Euro e and Japan t o  spu r  t he  take-off of computer firms in t he  late 1960s and 
1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~ A s  international competition has mounted, governments have become more 
generous in t he  provision of public funds. In March 1984 the  West German Govern- 
ment has announced a four-year programme of $1.2 billion t o  assist t he  micro- 
electronics, communications and computer industries by reducing r isks ,  improving 
training and developing applications. Subsequently, t h e  British government 
unveiled a $170 million addition t o  a n  existing programme f o r  t h e  same reason. 
And France has embarked on a five-year project  costing $17.5 billion t o  boost com- 
petitiveness in t he  electronics industry. 
Governments also played an  indirect role  in fostering the  industry's develop- 
ment. In t he  US, stringent regulations on fuel economy and emission controls 
promise t o  make tha t  country's auto industry one of t he  largest  markets f o r  chips 
and, eventually, microprocessors. More subtle forms of government intervention 
a r e  typified by the  Japanese Government's decision in 1965 to subsidize research  
on integrated circui ts  while simultaneously preventing US manufacturers from 
establishing a domestic presence before local producers  were ready t o  compete. 
The EEC has attempted t o  formulate an  overall  plan f o r  t h e  development of 
computers, microelectronics and telecommunications as wel l  as a common policy on 
public procurement. Plans call f o r  direct financial assistance t o  aid European 
firms engaged in t he  production of computers and microchips and indirect support 
through the  creation of a European network f o r  advanced communications. In 
addition, public procurement policies would provide f o r  all 'qualified' EEC firms t o  
have the opportunity t o  tender  bids and calls f o r  governments t o  allocate a small 
percentage of t he i r  annual equipment purchases t o  suppliers in o the r  EEC coun- 
t r ies .  
A major f l a w  is t he  inability of European governments t o  ag ree  on the  t rea t -  
ment of US subsidiaries. European countries, having no domestic computer indus- 
try of the i r  own, a rgue  tha t  foreign subsidiaries should qualify as home producers. 
In contrast ,  t he  French Government opposes t he  involvement of foreign subsidi- 
aries in any EEC-wide programme. Substantial public funds are devoted t o  t he  
computer and microelectronics industry, chiefly f o r  t h e  development of large- 
scale capacity to produce integrated circuits using t h e  most advanced technolo- 
gies. 
In o r d e r  t o  boost its home market f o r  industrial robots,  t he  Japanese Govern- 
ment adopted to a leasing scheme similar t o  tha t  employed in t he  ear ly  1960s t o  
help fledgling computer companies. Because robots  have made f e w  inroads in most 
fields of manufacturing, Japanese producers have been forced to expor t  t he i r  new 
inventions. Under t h e  auspices of MITI and with the  support of t he  Japanese Indus- 
trial Robot Association, a robot-leasing company w a s  established in 1980. The 
230hlin defines a national champion as a new i n d u s t r y  of advanced technology which is fos- 
tered by government and business  i n  i n t e n s e  competition w i t h  similar partnerships i n  oth- 
er countries. See C. Ohlin,  'Subsidies  and Other Industr ial  Aids,' i n  In ternat ional  R a d e  
and  Industr ia l  Policies, S.J. Warnecke (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp.320. 
2 4 ~ e e  C. de Carmoy, 'Subsidy Policies i n  Britain, France and W e s t  Germany: An Overview,' 
i n  Warnecke (ed.), qp. d t . ,  pp.35-57. 
Government hopes that  this step will encourage more - and smaller - firms t o  
accept automation by providing the rsbots  t o  users at subsidized rates. With this 
financial assistance, the purchasers of sophisticated robots can depreciate 53 
percent of the  total cost in the first year.25 In addition to cheap leasing, the  
Government has directly funded much research by the  larger  electrical companies 
and has accepted money from potential users of robots to set up research projects 
at government laboratories. 
Joint ventures  and the acquisi t ion of &reign know-how: Their heavy depen- 
dence on American and Japanese suppliers has spurred many European govern- 
ments to take more aggressive steps t o  promote home production in key a reas  of 
advanced electronics. This dependency is apparent in the  market for  computers 
where EEC accounts fo r  26 percent of world usage but only 15 percent of produc- 
tion in western countries. The industry's fragmented condition has consistently 
frustrated efforts t o  devise an EEC-wide strategy. Their weak position has forced 
various European governments and producers to look to the Japanese fo r  
technology-swapping agreements in order  to  withstand the  American competition. 
A similar pattern of dependency prevails in the field of semiconductors where 
firms in the EEC supply about 40 percent of the  Europeans'  requirement^.^^ There 
are sound commercial reasons fo r  European firms and governments t o  be con- 
cerned about the extent of dependence on foreign suppliers of components. First, 
there  is  a history of sudden shortages of key micro-electronic components and the 
vulnerability of users  in third markets is great.  Second, American and Japanese 
customers a r e  thought t o  enjoy commercial and technological advantages because 
they participate extensively in the design of new semiconductor products. Finally, 
some Europeans a r e  fearful that  a US embargo on high technology exports will be 
imposed for  political reasons. 
Most governments carefully control the  activities of foreign firms within their 
borders. The French strategy, designed to  encourage joint ventures with the 
specific intent of acquiring foreign technologies, is one of the most distinctive. 
Because the leading French firm lacked the  latest technologies t o  produce 
integrated circuits, the Government stipulated that partnerships with local firms 
were a precondition fo r  American producers t o  manufacture in France. The Ameri- 
can participants are expected t o  contribute the  technology and process expertise 
and to train French engineers. In exchange, they are not required to  put up any 
cash and are offered 49 percent of equity in the  new ventures which receive sub- 
stantial government funding. These new companies, plus the major French produc- 
ers, wi l l  be the preferred suppliers of chips and circuits fo r  the telecommunica- 
tions and defense industries. 
Co-operative strategies: A t  a time when many industrial applications are still a t  
the conceptual stage, access t o  the results of R and D is  crucial. Simultaneously, 
the heavy and continually rising costs associated with research spending can be  
prohibitive to all but the  largest f i r m s  and most generous governments. Under 
these circumstances, there  have been various attempts t o  spread the cost burden 
and t o  share  the results of R and D. Two Japanese programmes were successful in 
pooling the  resources and research interests of the public and private sector.  
Begun in the mid 1970s, the  programmes were funded by Nippon Telegraph and 
25~as  Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 1981. 
261n 1980, two of t h e  world's t e n  largest producers of semiconductors were European. By 
1983, t h e  t e n  largest firms were all American or Japanese. See, The Economist, 10 March 
1984. 
Telephone (NTT) and MITI, respectively, and were intended t o  develop new genera- 
tions of advanced integrated circuits,  microwave systems and computers. 
Engineers from NTT worked jointly with exper t s  from large pr ivate  companies tha t  
received no public funds t o  cover  the i r  participation costs. Instead, firms expect 
large o r d e r s  f r o m  NTT once the  programme yields results. The MITI project  broke 
new ground by the  creation of a co-operative research  laboratory where some 120 
r e sea rche r s  from five companies worked together f o r  four  years  to develop 'very 
large-scale integrated circuits'.  The project  resulted in more than 1,000 new 
patents. Pr ivate  participants are obligated t o  repay MITI's financial outlay if they 
e a r n  income from the  patents but must f i r s t  convert the  basic know-how into mark- 
etable products. 
American attempts at collaboration are at a more incipient stage.27 One pro- 
gramme, initiated in 1982, is a consortium known as Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Enterprises.  In addition to spreading the  costs  of R and D, the  consor- 
tium would be  a means of sharing scarce talents and of avoiding duplication of 
research .  A helpful Justice Department removed a major obstacle by granting 
anti-trust c learance to the  new undertaking. Another initiative is a joint venture 
between American firms and universities. The non-profit organization, which is 
sponsored by the  Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), w a s  crea ted  t o  fund 
long-term research  at universities. 
There is fu r the r  evidence tha t  mounting Japanese competition has led Ameri- 
can firms into more aggressive forms of collaboration. In the  field of semiconduc- 
t o r s  and competitive position of several  major suppliers has deter iorated as 
Japanese firms cu t  pr ices  and moved into the  US market. One response has been 
IBM's purchase of a modest stake in Intel, a producer of chips tha t  has  been par-  
ticularly hard-hit by Japanese competition. The move w a s  prompted by concern 
tha t  the commercial failure of domestic suppliers would make IBM dependent on 
foreign producers of chips. This is only one latest in a series of joint ventures, 
technology exchanges and ownership agreements involving IBM, Burroughs, Digital 
Equipment, Texas Instruments and Sperry.  Closer co-operation between producers 
of sophisticated electronic products and the i r  suppliers is fu r the r  suggested by 
the observation tha t  "contracts f o r  chips no longer go automatically t o  the  lowest 
bidder, especially if the  lowest bidder is a Japanese company."28 
In tegra t ion  s t ra teg ie s :  A twofold integration movement is underway and is 
expected t o  continue in the  future.  Firms concerned with the  design and produc- 
tion of electronic components have begun t o  move downstream. One at t ract ion of 
vertical integration is tha t  chip makers a r e  able  t o  specialize and, consequently, 
enjoy g rea t e r  economies of scale. A second advantage is t ha t  the skills acquired 
in the  production of chips and integrated circuits are valuable in o ther ,  more pro- 
fitable, pa r t s  of t he  market. Despite declining profits,  both American and 
Japanese companies have maintained semiconductor operations in the hopes of 
using tha t  knowledge more profitably in downstream activities. 
Integration in t he  opposite direction - upstream - has occurred among the  
users  of electronic components. Computer manufacturers take up t o  40 percent  of 
all the  chip makers' output. Because the i r  operations are dependent on adequate 
2 7 ~ n  Europe, concrete efforts to foster inter-European research are just beginning. 
Through programmes such as ESPRIT, the EEC hopes to spur co-operative research between 
companies of all sorts - public and private, academic and commercial. Projects in mi- 
croelectronics, computerized manufacturing and advanced information technologies are 
scheduled to begin in May 1984. 
28~usiness Week, 1 October 1982. 
supplies, these firms have become major producers of 'captive' semiconductors f o r  
internal use. Thus, IBM has spent huge sums on research  and claims t o  be one of 
the  world's largest  producer  of semiconductors. Similar moves are being made by 
o ther  users  of chips and integrated circuits in t he  automobile industry, in consu- 
m e r  electronics and office equipment. The large revenues accruing to  these 
conglomerates permit them to concentrate R and D expenditures on technology 
development f o r  advanced  electronic^.^^ Although captive operations run t he  r isk 
of failing t o  keep ab reas t  of t he  rapidly changing state of technology, t h e r e  are 
good reasons f o r  t he  growing emphasis on in-house chip design and production. 
Very large-scale integration has means tha t  virtually en t i re  systems are implanted 
on a chip, leading many equipment makers t o  p r e f e r  in-house development in o r d e r  
to protect  proprietary designs. Although, these new system-wide chips must be 
customized f o r  specific applications, t he  volumes produced f o r  each design will be  
low. 
Defensive s trategies:  Under pressure  from the  Japanese, various p a r t s  of t he  
American industry have turned t o  Washington f o r  relief .30 Their effor ts  have been 
complicated, however, by significant differences in t h e  two countriess legal sys- 
tems and by t h e  far-flung nature of the  industry. For instance, producers of sem- 
iconductors have lon hoped f o r  government action on the i r  claim tha t  Japanese 
firms w e r e  dumping. 3k The Justice Department initiated an  investigation of US sub- 
sidiaries of six Japanese companies f o r  possible violation of anti-trust laws.  The 
charges included conspiring t o  fix the  pr ice  and t o  limit the  quantity of 64K-RAM 
chips exported t o  the US. Thus, t he  investigation focused on alleged effor ts  t o  
steady, o r  even boost, pr ices  r a t h e r  than anti-dumping allegations. The approach 
of the  Justice Department was regarded as a n  attempt t o  open a more general 
investigation of Japanese l a w s  tha t  permit industries t o  establish car tels ,  to fix 
pr ices  and allocate markets and to eliminate smaller competitors within the i r  home 
market. The complications introduced as a resul t  of t h e  international cha rac t e r  of 
the  industry are reflected in t he  reaction of t he  SIA t o  the  dispute. The position of 
the industry association, which represents  nearly 50 producers  and users  of chips, 
w a s  ambivalent since several  of i ts  members buy chips from Japan and, therefore,  
benefit from the  low prices.  The Association's position w a s  fu r the r  complicated by 
the  fact tha t  t he  two leading producers  of semiconductors, IBM and Texas Instru- 
ments, have operations in Japan but nei ther  are members of t he  SIA. 
D. SUMMARY AWD CONCLUSIONS 
The changing configuration of world industry has al tered the  objectives, 
means and guidelines f o r  policy making. When operating in this new collegial 
framework, governments have found i t  possible - o r  have deemed i t  necessary - t o  
assume more d i r ig i s t e  approaches in the i r  dealings with industry. But as t he  legi- 
timacy of state intervention has gained wider acceptance, policy specialists have 
often found tha t  they no longer retain the  degree of independence which they once 
enjoyed. In fact,  t h e  growing involvement of government has c rea ted  g rea t e r  
29~apan's diversified electronics firms are thought to  devote nearly 30 percent of their 
sales revenues t o  R and D or to  new plants. 
30~efensive tactics may eventually emerge in Japan as well. Currently, MITI i s  drafting a 
law that would limit foreigners to  no more than 20 percent ownership in telecomrnunica- 
tions networks. New copyright laws on computer software are also under consideration. 
3 1 ~ h e  unit price of one particular type of chip, the 64K-RAM, had fallen from $20 in 1980 to  
$5 in mid-1982. U S  producers regarded this development as a Japanese attempt to buy 
market share. However, shipments from Japan subsequently slowed down and prices sta- 
blized. 
scope for  influencing i ts  decisions; there  a r e  simply more decisions to  influence. 
Ironically, the re  have been few attempts t o  establish the  institutional 
arrangements needed to  co-ordinate the many decisions that began to fall within 
the government's purview. Once the willingness to accept an  enlarged mission fo r  
government became apparent,  special interest groups in various industries found 
the  dispersion of authority much t o  their  liking.32 When writing of the US,  their  
growing influence prompted one observer to conclude that,  "while the whole of 
government w a s  certainly impervious to control by any group, the man separate 
par ts  proved t o  be uniquely susceptible to special-interest pressures. r13J 
The existence of such groups is not unique t o  the policy debates of the  1970s 
and 1980s. However, the re  are several reasons to believe that  policy makers must 
currently operate in an environment that,  more than ever,  is  subject to pressure 
from interest groups within a particular industry. First, the redistribution of 
industrial and political influence among western countries has hampered govern- 
ments' ability to  resist pressures to deter  o r  to delay the contraction of mature 
i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~  Furthermore, a convergence of factor  proportions has led t o  the 
impression that comparative advantage - at least fo r  sunrise industries - may be 
malleable through industrial policies.And where i t  is, special interest  groups will 
redouble their  efforts. 35 
One consequence of these trends is a gradual blurring of the 'public' and 
'private' charac ter  of many industrial enterprises. More than ever,  decisions 
involving pricing, production, and even public policy are arrived at through 
interaction between corporate strategists, government officials and pressure 
groups within the industry. Once the influence of forces outside the  traditional 
confines of government is recognized, the task of accurately specifying industry- 
specific strategies becomes more complex. But as the evidence from the case stu- 
dies suggests, non-governmental factions cannot be ignored when identifying and 
characterizing these strategies. Similar trends have been observed in other  
industries including autos, petroleum refining, machine tools, textiles and consu- 
m e r   electronic^.^^ However, in the international sphere the choice of a national 
strategy seems crucial fo r  only a select number of industries: (i) those which are 
3 2 ~ u c h  groups may c o n s i s t  of p roducers  o r  producer  assoc ia t ions ,  t r a d e  unions, t h e  opera- 
t o r s  of publicly owned e n t e r p r i s e s  o r  o t h e r s  whose i n t e r e s t s  a r e  l inked t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  in- 
dus t ry .  
3 3 ~ . ~ .  Ladd, 'How t o  Tame t h e  Spec ia l  I n t e r e s t  Croups,' Fortunes, 20 October 1980, p.66. 
34Murre11 and Olson a rgue  t h a t  t h e  influence of p r e s s u r e  groups i n c r e a s e s  wi th  t h e  a g e  of 
t h e  i n d u s t r y  and t h a t  heavy  i n d u s t r i e s  would be more suscep t ib le  t o  t h e s e  'organizat ional  
r i g i d i t i e s '  than  l igh t  indus t r ies .  S e e  P. Murrell ,  'The Comparat ive S t r u c t u r e  of Growth i n  
t h e  Major Developed C a p i t a l i s t  Nations', Smrthem Economic Journal, April 1982 and M. 01- 
son, The Rise and Lkcline qfNations (New Haven: Yale Univers i ty  P r e s s ,  1982). 
3 5 ~ o r  t h e s e  reasons,  even  a r o b u s t  economic r e c o v e r y  m y  no t  s e r v e  t o  reduce t h e  inten-  
s i t y  of i n t e r e s t  group p r e s s u r e  t o  t h e  comparat ively innocuous l e v e l s  of t h e  past.  
3 6 ~ o r  an a n a l y s i s  of a u t o s  and petroleum refining, see Ballance and S inc la i r ,  pp.79-103 and 
pp.160-177; t h e  machine t o o l s  i n d u s t r y  is analyzed i n  UNIW, Indust- in a Changing 
World (United Nations: s a l e s  no. E. 83,II.B.6, 1984) pp.288-302 and UNIW, Wmld Non- 
Electrical Machinery: An Empirical Study qf the Machine Tool Indust- (United Nations: 
s a l e s  no. E.83.II.B.5, 1984). The t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y  is discussed i n  R. Ballance, J. Ansari  and 
H. Singer ,  The International Economy and Industr ia l  Lkvelopment (Harves te r  Press: 
Brighton, 1982), pp.194-205 and in I. Walter and K. Jones,  ' Industr ia l  Adjustment t o  Com- 
p e t i t i v e  Shocks: A Tale of T h r e e  Industr ies ' ,  paper submitted t o  t h e  In te rna t iona l  Sympo- 
sium on Indus t r ia l  Po l ic ies  f o r  t h e  '80s, Madrid, 5-9 May 1980. F o r  an examination of t h e  
consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y ,  s e e  UNIDO, Indust ty  in a Changing Wmld, up. cit.,  
pp.304-12. 
already dominant in the domestic scene and therefore determine existing interna- 
tional hierarchies, o r  (ii) those which have ye t  t o  develop but promise to  alter 
several of these industrial hierarchies in the future. For each of these two groups 
there  wil l  be some repetition in strategic themes. Defensive strategies will fre- 
quently be prominent. But competitive pressure, the international diffusion of 
technologies, the degree of internationalization, etc. should give rise to sufficient 
options fo r  other strategies to  evolve and, eventually, to dominate. Perhaps a 
major objective of government officials should be to preserve the variety of cir- 
cumstances and flexibility that would permit alternative strategies to emerge. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper has a modest aim: to discuss the role of national macro-economic 
measures in the process of the industrial restructuring of interdependent 
economies. 
Modesty is called for for a number of reasons. Firstly, macro-economic 
measures are not the only way to tackle the restructuring problem industrial 
economies are facing - other types of measures (e.g. those usually summarized 
under the heading of 'industrial policy') might perhaps be far more important 
and appropriate. Secondly, supranational measures might be preferable to 
national ones, but the former are not discussed here. Thirdly, this paper 
is a discussion paper, and nothing but a discussion paper. It does not give 
a thorough and detailed analysis of the relation between macro policy mea- 
sures and industrial restructuring, but rather attempts to provide a framework 
for a discussion of some of the issues involved. 
Perspectives for the industrialized world - structural tendencies 
In my view, the recession of the early 1980s - which in most countries of the 
industrialized world was the longest and most serious recession of the post- 
World War I1 era - has marked the end of almost ten years of generally slow 
growth. In the terminology of long-wave theory (cf. Van Duijn [19833), this 
period can be considered the depression phase of the long wave. The main 
characteristics of such a period are: demand saturation in most former growth 
industries, a lack of new growth industries of sufficient size, overaccumulat- 
ion of capital stock, modest productivity gains, a low utilization rate of 
productive resources and an accumulation of government debt. 
Depression periods are the end of an era. They force economies into new 
directions. That, in fact, has been the one positive effect of the recent 
1980-82 recession: the shedding of labour and the reduction of excess capacity 
have brought about a mental change among industrialists, labour unions and 
governments. I would say that economic decision-makers are more forward- 
looking than they have ever been during the past ten years. Industrial re- 
structuring is not just talked about - it is being implemented now. 
In this world in transition, a number of tendencies are developing which I 
think will be dominant tendencies in the years to come. Without pretending 
that it is complete, I would argue that the following list presents a number 
of important characteristics of the economic environment during the remainder 
of the 1980s: 
A. Low inflation 
B. Structurally increasing factor productivity 
C. A greater emphasis on quality control 
D. A rather rapid diffusion of product and process innovation 
E. A 'make1-orientation rather than a 'distribute1-orientation 
F. Greater production process flexibility 
G. A redirection from mass-production towards individualized production 
H. Industrial concentration through unification of homogeneous units 
rather than through diversification. 
It should be noted that all these changes mark distinct breaks from the recent 
past. A number of them exemplify rediscoveries of orientations pursued a num- 
ber of decades ago; others are new in that they may become characteristics of 
highly-advanced industrial societies. 
Let me briefly elaborate each of these tendencies: 
A. Low inflation 
In the face of high real interest rates and accelerating inflation, many 
economists are not convinced that an era of low inflation lies ahead of us. 
My argument would be, however, that all structural determinants of inflat- 
ion point at average rates in the industrialized countries, which are more 
comparable to the rates prevailing in the 1950s and early 1960s than to 
those of the inflationary 1970s. These structural determinants include: 
- demand-supply conditions in labour markets 
- demand-supply conditions in commodity markets 
- the relative size of the government sector. 
B. Structurally increasing factor productivity 
'Factor productivity' is meant to include all production factors: not just 
labour, but also capital and raw materials. There are various reasons why 
factor productivity can be expected to go up: 
- technological innovation (notably the application of micro-elec- 
tronics) is already improving efficiency in a number of sectors; its 
impact will widen in the years ahead; 
- with the baby-boom generation getting older, the labour force will be- 
come a more experienced one; 
- scarcities of raw materials in the early 1970s are now forcing pro- 
ducers and users of raw materials to make a more efficient use of 
them; the productivity revolution which occurred in postwar agricul- 
ture may be succeeded by a similar revolution .in raw material usage. 
C. A greater emphasis on quality control 
Slow growth in the past decade has forced producers to put greater emphasis 
on controlling and improving the quality of products. In general, it could 
be agreed that wealth increases in the years ahead are more likely to come 
from better quality products than from a larger quantity of products. Con- 
sumption increases in the highly-developed societies are restricted by the 
one scarcity economists cannot escape, viz. the fixed amount of time con- 
sumers have. Even a continued decrease in the length of the workweek will 
not solve that problem. 
D. A rather rapid diffusion of product and process innovations 
During the mid-1970s it was observed that the process of technological in- 
novation had slowed down. Since then, however, many developments have 
occurred which are now beginning to bear fruit. In retrospect it will 
become evident that many innovations actually took place in the 1970s, 
whose impact, however, was not noticeable until the 1980s. Innovations 
often have a long introduction phase; only when they enter the (rapid) 
diffusion phase does their growth start to have an impact on the economy 
as a whole. In the remainder of the 1980s we are likely to see a repitit- 
ion of the early postwar experience: strong growth in 'new' industries, 
based on innovations which were introduced some ten to fifteen years before. 
E. A 'make1-orientation rather than a 'distribute1-orientation 
In the course of a long-wave upswing a shift in emphasis from production 
problems to distributional problems is generally noticed. When economic 
growth comes to be taken for granted, the distribution of it among classes 
of the population, among regions and sectors is considered a more pressing 
issue. Now a reversal of priorities is noticeable. Once again, the in- 
crease of national wealth is considered more important than attaining the 
proper distribution of existing wealth. In other words: priorities on the 
efficiency-equity trade-off are shifting towards more efficiency. 
F. Greater production process flexibility 
With the increased emphasis on efficiency, it is becoming more important 
for producers to create greater flexibility in the organization of their 
production processes. There is a tendency to lengthen the number of op- 
erating hours of machinery, which is accomplished by abolishing fixed work 
hours and instead operating with various shifts. This tendency is in ac- 
cordance with a development towards shorter workweeks per worker. 
Greater flexibility is also accomplished by reducing labour market rigidity 
in general, viz. by reducing the number of tenured positions and by liberal- 
izing rules and regulations for hiring workers. 
G. A redirection from mass-production towards individualized production 
One of the positive aspects of the introduction of micro-electronics in 
the production process is that it allows for greater flexibility in product 
design, without driving up the cost of production to an excessive degree. 
There is also a tendency among consumers to demand individualized products 
and services. One of the consequences of this tendency will also be that 
production units will become smaller, either through the break-up of exist- 
ing plants into smaller components, or through the creation of new small 
and medium-sized firms. 
H. Industrial concentration through unification of homogeneous units rather 
than through diversification 
The tendency described here may seen to run counter to the one discussed 
under G. However, the two are quite compatible. By concentration through 
unification, I refer to the nature of corporate mergers, which is likely 
to be different from the one in the 1960s and 19709, when larger corporat- 
ions were created through diversification, i.e. by bringing together, in 
one holding company, various unrelated entities with the purpose of spread- 
ing product and industry risk. Acquisitions in these years were also made 
to accomplish sales growth when the product package of the acquiring com- 
pany did not provide much growth any more. Recent corporate acquisitions 
have been of a different nature. They combine firms which are active in 
the same area, and are made to strengthen the potential for technological 
innovation in that area. 
3. Perspectives for the industrialized world - short cycles and long cycles 
Actual economic developments always reflect long-term structural tendencies 
as well as short-run cyclical and one-time accidental changes. In practice, 
it is very difficult to separate these forces. What may seem to be a favour- 
able structural development could turn out to be the effect of a temporary 
cyclical upturn. Recessionary forces, on the other hand, could easily give 
the impression that a favourable structural tendency is not a tendency after 
all. 
The present economic upturn provides a case in point. My view is that the 
industrialized world is in a recovery phase, which is not just cyclical, but 
- more importantly - structural. I expect this phase to continue through 
the rest of the 1980s. The tendencies described in the previous section will, 
therefore, not be temporary changes, but more fundamental ones. 
Even so, it is not to be expected that the gradual improvement of economic 
conditions, along with the restructuring processes which are occurring at 
present, will continue in an uninterrupted way during the coming years. More 
precisely, some form of economic slowdown is likely to develop around 1986. 
At present, economic signals point at a rather mild slowdown, not comparable 
to the severe recessions of 1974175 and 1980182. Yet it will be recognized 
as a slowdown, and as such it could be seen by many as a breakdown of the 
favourable tendencies described above. The point I should like to make here 
is that structural processes under way now will only be temporarily inter- 
rupted by a downturn of the short cycle. 
1 should emphasize that the word 'structural', as used here, is not meant to 
refer to tendencies which will persist for decades. Economic structures 
change over time, but these changes themselves will induce economic agents 
to adjust their behaviour. To illustrate this statement: a high rate of 
technological innovation in a particular phase will by itself reduce the rate 
in a subsequent stage of economic development, as more and more producers 
will turn their attention to existing growers rather than to the development 
of even more new products and processes. In that respect, I view the process 
of economic development as a very 'Schumpeterian' one. 
4. Policy responses : export-oriented policies 
Structural change can be accomplished in many ways: through macro-economic 
measures, through sector-specific measures and through micro-economic policies. 
It is probably fair to say that macro-economic policy was the dominant type 
of policy during the years of high growth. During recent years, however, the 
emphasis has shifted to micro-measures, as many economists feel that macro- 
economic policy is an inappropriate instrument for accomplishing structural 
change. Thus the increasing popularity of the micro approach is very much 
related to the phase of economic development we are in. In years of rapid 
growth, the macro economy is the appropriate level of interference; during 
years of recession and depression, when structural adjustments have to be 
made, it is necessary to descend to the micro-level in order to directly in- 
fluence the behaviour of economic decision-makers. In terms of economic 
theory: Keynesian economics had its heyday during the 1960s. Recently we 
have seen economists turning their attention to the micro-economic notions 
of classical economics. 
Despite this shift from macro to micro, in this paper I will restrict myself 
to a discussion of macro-measures. While their importance and effectiveness 
may have been overestimated in the past, they should not be underestimated 
today. Also, traditional macro-economic measures taken by one country may 
have a considerable impact on other countries, and a discussion of macro- 
measures thus allows us to illustrate the interdependence of national 
economies. 
At present, it would seem that macro-policies as conducted by various nat- 
ions can be separated in two categories: 
- those emphasizing the role of the export-oriented sector of the 
economy ; 
- those emphasizing the domestic sector. 
In simple demand models, export demand (E) is one of the 'basic' expenditure 
components, together with government expenditure (G) and investment outlays 
(I). An increase in each of these components has a multiplier-effect on the 
economy, the size of the multiplier depending on the savings rate, the tax 
rate and the rate of imports. 
Export-oriented policies have traditionally been an important tool for small 
economies. The smaller an economy, the more open it usually is. In a country 
such as Belgium, for instance, export demand exceeds domestic consumption, 
and a promotion of exports will have an enormous impact on the national 
economy. In a large country such as the United States, on the other hand, 
export demand accounts for less than one-fifth of private consumption, and 
for that reason alone, domestic policies will have a far greater importance 
than export-oriented policies. 
It is understandable, therefore, that small countries tend to emphasize 
export promotion more than large ones do. They have various macro-economic 
measures at their disposal, the most important of which are: 
A. Currency devaluation; 
B. Subsidies to export industries; 
C. Cost control in order to increase price-competitiveness. 
From a national perspective, countries deal with the 'rest of the world'; if 
we take a systems view, however, somebody's exports must be somebody else's 
imports. Gains made by one country, become losses absorbed by other coun- 
tries. If all countries in the system subsidize their shipyards, nobody 
gains and all citizens in all countries end up paying for ships. If all 
countries control wages in order to increase price-competitiveness, again 
nobody gains. For the system as a whole, therefore, export-oriented policies 
could turn out to be a zero-sum game. This is especially true in a system of 
countries comparable in size. 
This is not to say that there can be no 'system' justifications for export- 
oriented policies by individual countries: 
1. a country's competitiveness may have deteriorated over time, e.g. due 
to excessive wage cost increases; cost control may be warranted if a 
country is to regain its former relative cost position; 
2. a higher rate of inflation than the 'system rate' will put pressure on 
a country's currency; a devaluation is a means to correct the imbalance, 
provided the devaluation is followed up by measures to keep domestic 
inflation in check; 
3. an 'infant industry' may need temporary support in order to establish 
its position on export markets. 
In all three cases, the justification for export-oriented policies comes from 
the fact that temporary imbalances exist, which need correction. The search 
for permanent export gains, at the expense of other countries' positions, may 
well start a process of action and reaction, from which nobody gains. 
In the real world, systems of countries usually do not consist of countries 
of equal size. The industrialized world has a small number of large countries, 
and a large number of small countries, whose exports are often oriented to- 
wards one or two of the large industrial powers. In those instances, the 
volume of trade between 'small' and 'large' has a far greater impact on the 
economy of the small country than on the economy of the large one. This dif- 
ference in relative importance could provide another justification for the 
pursuance of export-oriented policies by small countries. If conducted suc- 
cessfully, their relative benefit is likely to be far greater than the losses 
imposed on the large country. Even so, actual practice has shown that even 
large countries with low imports/GNP-ratios may feel threatened by the growth 
in imported goods and services and retaliate. 
Another factor which determines the international trade flows is the stage of 
development of countries and the production structure associated with a parti- 
cular stage. The history of industrialization has produced a sequence of 
product groups which countries go through as they move along their life cycle 
of development: from textiles to steel, shipbuilding, automobiles and eventu- 
ally micro-electronics. The existing differences in stage of development 
produces a trade pattern in which the bilateral trade relations between two 
countries can be greatly imbalanced, without giving rise to corrective mea- 
sures. 
The recognition that the world consists of countries which are at different 
stages of development, and which specialize in different product groups, leads 
to the view that international trade for the world as a whole is - and should 
be - a positive-sum game. Gains from international trade are the result of 
specialization. They are accomplished by combining national markets into 
larger, international ones. For some products, markets have already become 
world markets. In the current phase of industrial restructuring, gains can 
be made by creating large international markets for products which are in the 
early phases of their life cycles. This problem is especially urgent for the 
countries of Europe, which lack a large national market of sufficient size. 
Creating a large market for technologically-advanced products, however, re- 
quires supranational, rather than national policies. 
5. Policy responses: domestic-oriented policies 
In the previous section I have argued that export-oriented policies can in 
some cases be justified as attempts to correct imbalances which have arisen 
in previous years. The imbalances are imbalances with respect to other 
countries. But in an entirely closed economy, too, the production structure 
changes and may become imbalanced. In fact, industrial restructuring is 
nothing but the search for a new balance: between production and sales, 
between growing industries and maturing industries, between demand for 
labour and supply of labour, etc. 
Closed economies or relatively closed economies have to solve their imbal- 
ances through domestic measures. Again, these measures can be directed at 
the macro-level, the meso-level and the micro-level of the economy. I will 
restrict myself to the macro-measures. But before getting to the policy 
issue, it is necessary to specify the type of imbalances which are typical 
for a long-wave downswing - or, if one likes: industrial restructuring phase. 
The following would seem to be of importance: 
1) Wage increases which, for a number of years, have tended to outpace 
productivity increases; 
2) a change in the life-cycle profile of industries: towards an over- 
abundance of older industries and a relative lack of younger industries; 
3) a tendency towards institutional rigidity; 
4) a relative increase in the size of debt; 
5) a growing tax burden, signalling a relative reduction of the size of 
the private sector; 
6) an increase in the consumption-investment ratio, indicating in fact a 
shortening of the time-horizon of society. 
Nearly every industrial society has to cope with one or more of these pro- 
blems. It is also fair to say that they are being addressed now, whether 
through active policy measures or through the mere fact that imbalances in 
themselves are causing reactions by economic decision-makers. That is to 
say: the parameters of economic systems are not fixed. They change over 
time, in response to structural developments. In fact: long-wave theory is 
built on the premise that economic systems contain endogenous corrective 
mechanisms. Even without the insertion of an exogenous policy-maker into the 
system, structural adjustments will take place. 
But we could go one step further by noting that governments are not exogenous 
themselves. They too react to imbalances when they appear to be 'structural' 
rather than temporary deviations from a balanced growth path. Considering 
the well-known lags in economic policy (recognition lag, implementation lag, 
economic-impact lag) it is understandable that a transition phase is inevit- 
able before restructuring policies start to have an effect on the structure 
of the economy. 
The point is, however, that - regardless of the interdependence between 
economies - no single country can afford not to put its own economy in order. 
No country can solely rely on external forces to bring about structural ad- 
justment, if the domestic economy is an imbalanced one. That this is true 
can be amply illustrated by the recent developments of the various European 
economies, some of which have taken major steps in the restructuring process, 
others of which are lagging behind. When - to give an example - government 
debt has become excessive, sooner or later the size of this debt has to be 
reduced, regardless of whether the world economy is recovering or not. 
The main consolation at this point in time comes from the fact that this con- 
dition is now widely recognized as a pressing one. While most of the smaller 
countries do look at exports as one way to alleviate their problems, they all 
recognize that increases in exports alone cannot do the trick. 
Macro-economic policies can speed up the process of adjustment in a number of 
ways : 
- by gradually reducing the size of the government budget deficit to the 
size of the structural savings surplus of the private sector of the 
economy; 
- by measures which encourage savings in the private sector; these will 
include tax incentives, but also policies aimed at controlling inflat- 
ion; 
- by government investment outlays, aimed at improving the industrial and 
social infrastructure of the economy; 
- by implementing measures which increase the flexibility of the economic 
process (i. e. through deregulation) ; 
- by reducing the overall tax burden, while shifting the emphasis from 
direct taxation to indirect taxation. 
The impact of domestic-oriented macro-economic policy measures should not be 
exaggerated. As stated above, I view them as means to speed up a process of 
adjustment, which may be taking place already. Only when it comes to control- 
ling its own expenditures, can a government act autonomously. Other expend- 
iture components, however, can only be influenced in an indirect way. In- 
vestment outlays are a case in point. Here the position of a stable political 
environment may do more than attempts at fine-tuning through investment 
premiums. Other examples are wage and price controls. In their extreme 
application, i.e. through freezes, they have a history of being only tempor- 
arily effective, often unleashing new inflationary forces after the freeze has 
ended. Wage controls only work to the extent that all parties involved - 
workers, firm management, government - share the desire to keep wage changes 
in line with the development of other economic variables, such as product- 
ivity. 
This latter comment points at the importance of commonly shared goals in a 
national economy. Historically, periods of economic progress have usually 
been periods of social harmony, at the national level, but often also at the 
international level. They may be intangibles in quantitative economic ana- 
lysis; industrial restructuring, however, cannot be accomplished without 
conditions such as 'social harmony ' being met. 
6. Conclusion 
The subject of this contribution has been the role of macro-economic policies 
in the process of industrial restructuring in a world of economic inter- 
dependence. By restricting the discussion to macro-policies, important tools 
and measures of restructuring policy have remained untouched. The most far- 
reaching category of these would seem to be those policy measures which 
require cooperation between nations, and which can, therefore, be labelled 
as being supranational in character. 
Yet it was also emphasized that supranational measures cannot take away the 
need for countries to correct imbalances which have arisen within national 
economies. National restructuring policies are indispensable. Interdepend- 
ent as industrial economies may be, they cannot solely rely on the outside 
world to cure their problems. While a rising tide raises all ships, history 
shows us that the domestic conditions of countries can vary greatly at a 
particular point in time. 
Similarly, export-oriented policies can only go some way towards solving the 
problem of industrial restructuring. Small, open economies are, of course, 
dependent on the development of world trade. For them, the pressure to cor- 
rect imbalances vis-2-vis other countries is greatest. But this is the same 
as saying that their openness will force them to tackle the restructuring 
problem even quicker and with greater intensity than less open economies must 
do. For export-oriented policies only tend to be effective if they are 
matched by domestic measures. Also, export-oriented policies conducted by 
all countries in a system of small and medium-sized economies (as is the case 
in Europe), may turn out to be a zero-sum game. Here, the need for cooperat- 
ion at the supranational level presents itself again. 
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The t r a n s i t i o n  from growth t o  s t agna t ion  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economy has  made i n d u s t r i a l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  more e s s e n t i a l ,  y e t  
harder  t o  achieve.  Competition between t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
coun t r i e s  i s  changing t h e  p a t t e r n  of t h e i r  comparative advantages,  
s h i f t i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  l o c a t i o n  wi th in  t h e  North, a  t r e n d  supported 
by t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of mul t ina t iona l  e n t e r p r i s e s .  This  i s  more 
important  than compet i t ion from less developed c o u n t r i e s  i n  
most i n d u s t r i e s .  While c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  i n d i c a t e  more s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  
of  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  i n  h i g h - s k i l l ,  c a p i t a l -  and knowlege- 
i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  and of newly i n d u s t r . i a l i z i n g  and developing 
c o u n t r i e s  on labour- in tens ive  and raw mate r i a l - in t ens ive  i n d u s t r i e s ,  
t h i s  t r e n d  is  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n e v i t a b l e  o r  d e s i r a b l e .  
THE TRANSFORMED WORLD INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT 
The phrase ' i n d u s t r i a l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g '  has  come i n t o  
f requent  use only very r e c e n t l y ,  p a r t i a l l y  d i sp lac ing  t e r m s ,  
common earl ier ,  such a s  i n d u s t r i a l  ' change ' , ' adapta t ion  ' and 
' ad jus tment ' .  These l a t t e r  imply r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l ,  smooth, 
spontaneous, even slow, a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  manufacturing products ,  
processes  and p l a c e s ,  and i n  m a t e r i a l s  procurement o r  marketing,  
a s  i n d u s t r i a l  o rgan iza t ions  respond - perhaps ' p a s s i v e l y '  a s  
dec is ion- takers  - t o  stresses from t h e  economic, s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  environment which t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  cont inued,  e f f i c i e n t  
1 
o r  p r o f i t a b l e  opera t ions .  ' ~ e s t r u c t u r i n ~ ' ~  sugges ts  t h e  
adoption of nore  conscious and ' a c t i v e '  s t r a t e g i e s  by organi-  
za t ions  and governments, a s  decision-makers, t o  r ea r range ,  
reorganize and r e d i r e c t  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  more fundamentally 
t o  c r e a t e  new s t r u c t u r e s  and p a t t e r n s .  It imp l i e s  d e l i b e r a t e  
and concer ted e f f o r t  t o  s h i f t  resources  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  ways 
between types  of a c t i v i t y ,  s e c t o r s  o r  p l a c e s ,  t o  o b v i a t e ,  remove 
o r  f o r e s t a l l  environmental  s t r e s s e s .  This change i n  terminology 
i s  rooted i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s/early 1970s' watershed between two 
d i s t i n c t i v e  g loba l  economic e r a s .  
Growth 1950-1970 
Once post-Second World War r econs t ruc t ion  was complete 
(c .  1950) ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d u s t r i a l  co re  reg ions  i n  n o r t h e a s t  
America, northwest Europe, no r th  I t a l y ,  south and sou theas t  
Honshu - joined by i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
Eas te rn  Europe (Hamilton, 1968, 1970) - began t o  experience 
n e a r l y  20 y e a r s  of ' i n d u s t r i a l  boom almost without  precedent '  
(OECD, 1983, p .14 ) .  Severa l  f a c t o r s  combined t o  b r ing  t h i s  
about;  major improvemen.ts i n  t r a n s p o r t  and communications; 
p rogress ive  removal of n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a r r i e r s  t o  
l i b e r a l i z e  flows of c a p i t a l ,  technology and t r a d e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
w i t h i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  world; t h e  se t t ing-up  of arrangements t o  
s t a b i l i z e  currency exchange r a t e s  and t r a d e ;  rearmament; and t h e  
rise and spread of m u l t i n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e  (LINGE and HAMILTON, 
1981) .  
Growth a l s o  f a c i l i t a t e d  r e l a t i v e l y  smooth and q u i t e  r a p i d  
changes by f i rms  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of manufacturing employment 
1. According t o  t h e  1982 Supplement t o  t h e  Oxford Engl ish 
Dict ionary t h e  f i r s t  recorded use i n  t h e  English language of 
t h e  word ' r e - s t r u c t u r e '  was by K.S. Lashley i n  L.A. J e f f r e s s ,  
Cerebra l  Mechanisms i n  ~ e h a v i o u r  , 1958. 
- 
in the industrialized countries, though state planning achieved 
restructuring in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Overall, numbers 
of jobs in labour-intensive industries (such as textiles, 
clothing or shoes) began to stagnate or disappear while those 
in capital/raw material-intensive industries (e.g. metallurgy, 
chemicals) and in capital/machinery-intensive industries 
(e.g. vehicles, appliances, electrical/electronics) expanded 
rapidly, though important differences occurred in the pace and 
scale of change between countries. Qualitative shifts raised 
labour productivity in most manufacturing activities as firms 
introduced mass-production in their industrial facilities; all 
industries became less 'labour-intensive' and more 'capital- 
intensive' whether they produced clothes, steel or cars. 
Broadly, however, this was either not detected or not 
recognized at. the time as a 'restructuring' problem, mainly for 
three sets of reasons: 
Demographic. Rapid expansion in the demand for labour 
confronted a deficit of people of working age which 
had been caused by altered demographic behaviour in the 
1930s depression - delayed marriages and restricted 
births - and by the decimating effects on population of 
the Second World War. Labour markets in industrialized 
regions would have been very severely strained had it 
not been for: 
(a) the increasing participation rates of women in 
the labour force; and 
(b) large scale migrations of workers, both 
(i) from rural areas (especially in the socialist 
countries) and, in the USA, from the 'Deep 
South' or Gulf sunbelt states; and 
(ii) immigration of ethnic minorities from the 
'South', from the Gulf of Mexico into the 
USA, and from the Caribbean, Mediterranean 
and Asia into Western Europe. 
Women and imigrants filled the unskilled jobs, so 
releasing indigenous male workers to move between 
occupations and locations to the semi-skilled and 
skilled jobs being generated in new growth industries 
and in the expanding non-manufacturing functions in 
all industries. External labour supplies thus helped 
industrial 'restructuring' seem like 'change' or 
'adjustment' and, in any case, were part of deliberate 
policy to maintain stable profit rates for capital and 
lower labour costs. Had international migration been 
restricted, relocation of labour-intensive industries 
to LDCs might have begun earlier, speeding up restruc- 
turing in developed countries into capital-intensive 
production methods. 
2. Politico-economic. Decolonialization after 1946 led to 
the formation of 100 newly independent countries. Many 
sought industrial development despite the enormous ranges 
in their size, real sovereign power, historical experience, 
social organization and natural resources. Industri- 
alization of the world's less developed countries and 
regions became the problem that preoccupied both research 
and policymaking during the UN 'decades of development' 
(1960-80). And, for historic politico-economic reasons, 
and the legacy of possibilism in geography, there were 
large numbers of geographers about with research experi- 
ence and interest in Third World countries; with some 
important exceptions, industrialized countries attracted 
little interest until the late 1960s. 
3. Research and Policy. Elaboration and diffusion of 
Perrouxian ideas in the late 1950s concerning the 
creation of growth and development poles were greatly 
accelerated by various UN organizations and international 
conferences. Such an apparently authoritative global 
seal of approval easily convinced policymakers in many 
countries that growth or development poles offered a 
mechanism by which, in effect, polarization of Myrdalian 
processes of cumulative causation (MYRDAL, 1957) could 
be diverted, transferred or relocated from industrialized 
to less developed countries to implement the development 
desired (for a recent discussion see DALY, 1983); growth 
poles were seen as a method of greatly accelerating the 
advent of 'polarization reversal' that HIRSCHMAN (1958) 
had predicted would eventually occur. 
Stagnation and Recession 1970-1985 
A wide range of forces shape industrial structures and 
their dynamics at any geographic scale of analysis. The 
traditional classification of factors by origin into internal 
(i.e. national, e.g. demand, competitiveness, investment) and 
external (i.e. international, e.g. competition, commodity 
markets) is only satisfactory insofar as it recognizes: 
(a) significant regional variations in economic and 
social conditions within many countries; 
(b) very close interaction of internal and external 
factors, with a distinctive strengthening of the 
international impulses and components in recent years 
with particularly marked trends towards 'globalism' 
in transport and communications, technology, and 
capital markets related to: 
(c) the increased importance of firm-specific transnational 
environments created within larger multinational 
enterprises able to internalize and manipulate a range 
of local, national and international conditions. 
Since 1970 the world economic environment has been de- 
stabilized (Figure 1): more frequent changes in currency 
exchange, interest rates and commodity prices have led industrial 
organizations to make decisions at shortening intervals with 
respect to changes in investment, stocks, wages and labour 
requirements. These trends were being built up or their 
preconditions were being created already in the 1960s. Seven 
trends in the economic, political and social environment 
converged and intensified to make restructuring a global 
necessity for industrial organizations by the late 1970s: 
Interest Rates Commodlty Prlcee A Wage Negotlatlone Stock Levels 
Exchange Rates 0 Product Prlces A Investment Declslons 0 Labour Force c h ~ n q e  
Source: ECONOMIST 24.9.1983 
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Figure 1. The De-stabilization of the World Economic Environment 
since 1963 
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First, the slowdown in economic growth was worldwide, although 
most marked in the OECD countries (which accounted for 80 per 
cent of the non-Communist world's industrial output in 1982) in 
which growth in GDP dropped from an annual average of 5 to 6 
per cent (1963-73) to 24 (1973-8) and less than 1 per cent 
(1979-82). Depressed markets introduced greater uncertainty; 
reduced world trade in materials and manufactures; delayed 
investments; and severely curtailed demand for certain capital 
good, especially transport, building, mining and factory equipment 
(e.g. ships, vehicles, machinery, machine tools) and hence for 
steeel . 
Second, higher inflation rates have had far-reaching effects. 
Profits or accumulation have been squeezed, though differentially 
between industries, at best throwing industrial enterprises into 
greater dependency on outside capital borrowing (so enhancing 
the role and power of the banking sector) or at worst indebtedness 
or bankruptcy. High interest rates have made capital expensive, 
delaying modernization, hindering competitivess; in shrinking 
markets this has meant surplus capacity and hastened plant closures, 
rationalization or mergers, especially in capital-intensive 
industries (e.g. steel, shipbuilding) and in some industries with 
big research-and-development ( R  & D) commitments (e.g. chemicals, 
vehicles) or long investment lead times (e.g. mineral extraction). 
Similarly, inflation has raised labour costs, pricing some labour- 
intensive operations out of the industrialized countries 
(encouraging their relocation by firms in countries with cheap 
labour) and stimulating automation to reduce labour intensity 
in other operations retained by firms at home. 
Third, increased international monetary instability has 
taken two major forms: 
(i) The transition from fixed to floating currency 
exchange rates - intended to reflect real national 
differentials in prices and costs more closely and 
quickly (and so encourage adjustment of national 
industrial structures to changes in comparative 
costs) - in fact led to prolonged 'over-shooting' 
/ 
(under- or over-valuation) of exchange rates. 
Under-Valuation of the D-mark, Swiss franc and 
Japanese yen has probably prolonged industrial 
exports from, and hence industrial production in, 
West Germany, Switzerland and Japan at various times 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Over-valuation of the 
currencies of oil- or gas-producers such as the 
Netherlands, Norway and the.UK, has contributed to 
weakened competitiveness, among other factors, and 
has hastened their 'de-industrialization' following 
severe import penetration of manufactur'es (Figure 2). 
(ii) Huge petrodollar surpluses created after 1974 in the 
OPEC countries initially helped to finance industri- 
alization in newly-industrializing countries (NICs) 
and large-scale technology transfers to Eastern 
Europe and the USSR. In 1980 such recycling had led 
to the deep indebtedness of some countries (e.g. Brazil, 
Mexico, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia), with the result 
that: 
the demands of debt servicing and repayment are 
causing these countries ... to expand their sales 
to solvent markets. This increases competition 
in OECD and third-country markets without 
necessarily creating a corresponding increase in 
outlets in the selling countries, given their 
limited absorption capacity (and) potential 
solvency constraints .., (OECD, 1983, p.22). 
Fourth, the rise of new human values. The growth era 
sowed the seeds of an upsurge in human demands for (a) 
protection of environment and (b) improved welfare and 
working conditions. Although (a) has often raised some 
industrial costs through the need toinstallexpensive recycling, 
filtering or purification equipment, both (a) and (b') have 
created markets for new products such as filters, leisure and 
sports equipment, or medical machinery. 
Fifth, innovation and technological change. Although 
stagnation and recession discouraged R & D, inflation combined 
with shrinking markets after 1974 made firms in many industries 
make technological changes to cut costs. Escalating energy 
costs induced energy-saving innovations and their wider 
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Figure 2. Forces in the De-industrialization of the U.K. 
manufacture, e.g. in engines for all forms of transport, in 
heating equipment or energy-intensive processes; it also 
encouraged more compact or lighter products to save on energy- 
intensive materials with feedback effects reducing demand, for 
instance, steel. Rising labour costs stimulated introduction of 
automation and robotics in factories and warehouses and computer- 
ization in the office. These inflationary trends and soaring 
capital costs seem to be hastening the 'in-filling' of the 
innovation trough between Kondratiev long waves as electro- 
mechanical technologies are phased out and replaced by micro- 
electronics which yield big cost savings in energy, labour, 
capital and very flexible production systems. Sharpening 
competition between firms located in industrialized countries 
and from the NICs and socialist countries in standardized 
manufactures, is necessitating innovation in the 'North' of 
more sophisticated consumer durable, intermediate and capital 
goods often incorporating new or improved materials. 
Sixth, political volatility. Figures on world trade in 
manufactures suggest that East-West detente and OP.EC unity 
~rovided stable environments which enabled manufacturers in 
Western Europe, North America and Japan during the 1970s to 
cushion some effects of recession by diverting capital and 
consumers goods to CMEA and OPEC countries. Since 1979, 
however, escalating military activity in many parts of the 
world has both cut back such markets and deflected investment 
to meet expanded demand for weapons, armaments and space- 
technology. It is unclear how far improved relations between 
OECD countries and the Chinese People's Republic, and any stable 
policy within the latter for imported technology, can or will 
compensate for reduced business with the CMEA. 
Seventh, increasing international competition has arisen 
from: past trade liberalization which enormously expanded 
trade of the ~ecksher-Ohlin type based on factor endowments; 
industrialization in many countries; and the recent stagnation 
of world markets. It has often been aided by state intervention 
in production subsidies for exports or vigorous export-orientated 
policies in some industrialized and newly industrializing countries 
(LINGE and HAMILTON, 1981) . 
THE CHALLENGES OF RESTRUCTURING INDUSTRY 
Paradoxically, a reawakening of the geographer's interest 
in industry has occurred when advanced economies appear to be 
becoming 'post-industrial' following relative and, increasingly 
absolute decline in manufacturing. The foregoing trends shaping 
industrial structure are stimulus enough to such revived research 
interest, yet other reasons of a practical nature are no less 
compelling. Industrial geography has been reborn in a new guise 
because of the awareness of its wider production-system and 
welfare implications in a world which has reached an industrial 
'crossroads' (HAMILTON and LINGE, 1983). 
The decisions to be made at the crossroads are for 
enterprises, governments and people to choose which direction 
lest the direction be chosen for them. Not to restructure 
industry could mean manufacturing suicide, but the choice of 
what kind of restructuring, why, how, and how fast, presents 
enormous challenges and will involve high economic, political 
and social risks. The most critical problem in the non-Communist 
world is that it is firms that are restructuring in their own 
interest to survive; and as a result of world economic de- 
stabilization (Figure 1) and intense competition in stagnant 
markets, they are making more drastic decisions more frequently 
and involving major investment and labour force changes which 
can sharply alter the fortune of people living in patticular 
cities and regions. 
Industrialized Countries 
Employment appears to be the most intractable problem in 
these countries, where current market conditions and the intro- 
duction of job-replacing technologies to raise labour productivity 
and lower costs has made manufacturing (and related or dependent 
non-manufacturing) the major source of unemployment creation 
amongst unskilled and semi-skilled workers (Figure 3). Whereas 
in the 1963-1973 decade most advanced OECD countries boasted 
unemployment rates of 1-2$ per cent, most today suffer rates of 
7+-15 per cent. An overall result - used by some to identify 
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Figure 3. Job Losses in Manufacturing and Employment Change 
in Scotland, 1970-1982 
the arrival of the 'post-industrial erav - is that manufacturing 
in the 15 most industrialized OECD countries2 in 1982 generated 
only 15-32 per cent of their GDP and 18-33 per cent of their 
employment compared with 25-42 and 25-40 per cent respectively 
in 1960. The new wave of technologies will almost certainly not 
create much new 'compensatory~ employment in the short or medium 
term; indeed, their job-replacing capabilties in the factory, 
warehouse and office could be devasting. Services will become 
still more important in these countries than they are today, 
partly because new manufactures - though actually to be produced 
by numerically-controlled machines and robots - will require far 
more 'knowledge-intensive' inputs, after-sales servicing and 
application-adaptation than the present generation of industrial 
products. The danger is that the current wave of service expansion 
into profitable but low-paid activities will contract the per 
capita market for manufactures in industrialized countries, 
contributing to further de-industrialization in some of them 
(e.g. the U.K.). 
Less-Developed Countries (LDCs:) 
These face quite different problems. Despite two 'decades 
of development' and the Lima Declaration (1974) for the creation 
of a 'new international economic order', little of the world's 
industry is located in the LDCs. As far as one can establish, 
in 1982 17 industrialized OECD countries produced 56 per cent 
of the world's industrial output, the CMEA 30 per cent, and the 
LDCs only 14 per cent. Almost half of the latter, however, was 
concentrated in six NICs. Except for the 'city statest of Hong 
Kong and Singapore (Figure 4), and localized areas in Brazil, 
Mexico, Taiwan and Korea, manufacturing has hardly provided more 
than a very marginal solution to the Third World's problems of 
unemployment, underemployment and poverty. Indeed, dependency 
on the international banks has certainly increased the latter as 
the LDCs have had to pay high interest rates on large per capita 
foreign debts; and in 1983 these repayments to banks in developed 
countries began to exceed capital receipts as a whole. Often, 
These countries include the USA, Japan, Canada, West Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. (Data were unavailable for 
Switzerland: see OECD, 1983, pp.178-180). 
indebtedness should not be blamed on manufacturing per se but 
rather, on the increased dependency of industrial firms in general 
on banks for capital and on the type of industrialization 
experienced in many LDCs: 
(1) the large, capital-intensive, resource-extractive/ 
refining operations that create few jobs and drain 
away materials for the overseas addition of high value; 
and 
(2) small, usually sub-optimal, often technologically- 
outdated and mainly assembly operations set up to 
supply restricted LDC markets at high cost under the 
'protective umbrella' of national import-substitution 
policies but which usually involve substantial overseas 
backward linkages; although this industrial activity 
tends to be labour-intensive, and hence has traditionally 
been viewed as more 'appropriate' to LDCs, it generates 
limited value added and jobs are thus low-paid. 
It is a moot point, however, whether LDCs might not be better off 
had their governments encourged multinationals - or at least not 
been so hostile to them - and attracted better capability to 
repay capital transferred than they now have. 
Some LDCs - especially the Southeast and East Asian NICs - 
underline the relevance of this latter point for, since the late 
1960s, they have attracted substantial sections of the labour- 
intensivelinesof production priced out of North America, Western 
Europe and Japan, especially in the textile, clothing, shoes, 
plastic-goods, electrical and electronics (Figure 4) industries 
(see HAMILTON and LINGE, 1981, chapters 1, 7, 13, 14, 15; 
HAMILTON and LINGE, chapter 19). This might be the beginning 
of a long-term cumulative industrial relocation trend as the 
world 'economic equator' moves southward and eastward; and as 
intermediate and capital-goods' industries are also attracted 
to the LDCs by the advantages of much cheaper labour in proximity 
to NICs with expanding regional markets. And it could augur 
'better' (if not 'well') for employmentprospects in more (though 
clearly not all) LDCs, thoughfurther de-industrialization would 
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Figure 4. The Industrialization of Singapore 1960-1982 and the Importance 
of Investments by Foreign-owned Multinational Firms 
occur in the advanced economies. Yet it could be that the days 
of industrial relocation to cheap labour locations in NICs and 
LDCs are numbered by the rate of the innovation, adoption and 
diffusion of the new technologies in industrialized countries. 
For a considerable period into the 1990s the early stages of 
the product cycle connected with the new and sophisticated 
labour-replacing technologies will possibly reconcentrate 
industry in, or 're-industrialize', the older industrialized 
countries and their regions. So manufacturing could not continue 
to hold out significant job-creating prospects in either LDCs 
or NICS. 
Relationships between technological change and- employment are 
complex and should not ignore productivity, value creation or 
social satisfaction. A spin-off of the rise in concern for the 
quality of environment and life in the early 1970s was the 
campaign to halt capital-intensive projects in LDCs and base 
development on more 'appropriate' (usually labour-intensive) 
technologies. These latter may undoubtedly serve social needs 
in that they involve small-scale operations and can thus preserve 
family and community structures (rather than commuting, migration 
and urbanization linked to large industries breaking up such 
structures). But 'appropriate technology' is of dubious 
economic utility: high labour intensity means low value added, 
low surplus value creation, and thus stunts accumulation for 
development (EMMANUEL, 1982). This is an argument in support 
of early adoption of up-to-date techniques of production in the 
LDCs to generate high productivity and accumulation. The problems 
of accomplishing this are many: 
(a) modern technologies are mostly controlled by multinational 
enterprises headquartered outsidethe LDCs and reluctant 
to lose that control either as a matter of principle 
or because it might shorten the product cycle too 
rapidly for their own 'comfort' or for the welfare 
of developed country workers and government; 
(b) few LDCs possess the politico-economic bargaining power 
to prise up-to-date technologies out of multinational 
firms (or in some cases governments) based in the North, 
unless those organizations perceive clear advantages in 
yielding them; 
(c) even if LDCs obtain the technology, they may be 
unable to retain a significant part of the earnings, 
and profits or royalties and these will flow out to 
the industrialized world; and 
(d) up-to-date technologies may create a few jobs directly, 
at least in relation to LDC employment needs, although 
the job multiplier effects will depend on the success 
of the LDCs in bargaining to retain a significant part 
of the profits within their territories. 
Centrally-managed and socialist economies. These were 
able toachieve substantial industrialization insulated in large 
measure until the 1979s from growing global economic inter- 
dependencies. Once they began to import OECD technology, the 
small East European economies in particular became partially 
locked into international capital and product markets. This 
exposed several problems impinging on their need for industrial 
restructuring: 
(a) comparatively labour-intensive industry of all kinds, 
a legacy of the so-called 'extensive' industrialization 
during the acute capital scarcities of the 1950s; 
(b) this and a tendency for many industrial plants to produce 
ranges of finished products (and their components) in 
relatively small batches offset the efficiency that 
could potentially come from their larger scale of 
operation (cf. many OECD industries); 
(c) relative dominance of industrial structures by 'traditional' 
industries such as steel and electro-mechanical 
products with insufficient production of consumers! 
or electronics-based goods; and 
(d) continued duplication of industrial products between 
CMEA member countries despite substantial progress 
towards rationalization, specialization and integration 
in their industrial systems since 1965, and collaborative 
R & D with respect to newer technologies. 
For a time in the 1970s, the centrally-managed economies 
were able to offer 'intermediate technologies' or cheaper 
standarized manufactures to the LDCs, sometimes in conjunction 
with Western firms (GUTMAN and ARKWRIGHT, 1981) and to pay for 
their own Western technology imports by 'compensation trade' 
and 'intermediate technology' trade came in for severe competition 
in price and quality from the NICs; and governments have found 
their planning and institutional structures too rigid to cope 
with the challenges of contemporary economic change. 
RECENT TRENDS 
Clearly, then, the needs and capabilities for industrial 
restructuring vary between the four groups of countries out- 
lined - the industrialized OECD, the CMEA, the NICs and the 
LDCs. The extent and character of industrial problems and 
prospects, however, differ between countries within these groups. 
Variations in the rates, directions and timing of manufacturing 
change between all OECD countries since 1970 illustrate this: 
relatively sustained growth in the European periphery (Ireland, 
Mediterranean countries) at least until 1980; quite rapid pulling 
out of the short 1973-75 and 1979-82 recessions in the USA and 
Canada; considerable growth in Japan after 1975; longer 
depression in western Europe, though with the EEC 'Six' and 
Austria recovering up to 1980 when recessionbeganto hit West 
Germany and France again; sustained decline in Australia, Norway, 
Switzerland and especially the UK. 
These differences are outward expressions of variations 
between countries in adjustment and restructure to aggregate 
world market trends. Such processes are in the hands of multi- 
national firms, governments and indigenous firms. In the 
industrialized countries this very broadly means some combination 
of: 
(a) success or failure of firms or state organizations 
to rationalize, modernize or close down facilities 
in six groups of industries which, according to 
CEPII (19801, suffered from contraction in world 
aggregate demand which, by 1978, was 13-30 percentage 
points below the 'line of cyclical peaks' of 1960s 
demand, i.e. building materials, metals (including 
steel), engineering products, wood and paper, chemicals, 
textiles and clothing;(for illustration see Table 1) and 
(b) success or failure of organization to introduce, develop 
and expand those industries whose products were in 
rising demand, particularly all products making use 
of electronics applications (intermediate goods, e.g. 
components; capital goods, e.g. data-processing and 
telecomnunications equipment; electronically-controlled 
consumer goods, etc.), organic chemicals, plastics and 
pharmaceuticals. 
International Competition: Some Myths and Realities 
These processes in advan.ced countries have been influenced 
by the increasing competitive strength of at least some NICs in 
some industrial sectors. But this should not be exaggerated for 
much of the restructuring in the North - closures, rationalization, 
new facilities - has been and is being carried out by multinational 
enterprises. Contrary to popular belief, their major operations 
are in the North and it is there that they are inter-linked by 
most intra-firm (international) trade in manufactures. 
The increasing participation of the NICs in the international 
trade displays several facets: their penetration of developed- 
country markets in a widening range of products; the entry of 
new producers and competitors; and the growth of markets in the 
NICs for plants and equipment manufactured in industrialized 
countries: 
It is not so much that the emergence of new competitors 
has impeded industrial development in the developed 
countries; on the contrary it has been stimulated. 
Rather, this competition has increasingly affected the 
OECD area's industrial structure via shifts in 
comparative advantage. There is, therefore, the need 
for adjustment, the cost (including the social cost) of 
which may be high for some countries, industries and/or 
regions (OECD, 1983, p.31). 
Industrialization in NICs and some LDCs in aggregate, though not 
necessarily in individual countries, has passed through three 
stages to date: 
Table 1. Restructuring by U.K. chemicals corporations: a response to chronic overcapacity in 
West European plastic production, 198311984 
Restructuring processes 
Plant New Known/planned 
Corporation closures plant opening Swapping job impacts 
Shell 1 petrochemicals 
and plastics plant, 
Carrington 
(N.W. England) 
ethylene, 
Mossmoran 
(Scot land) 
British 3 plants: 
Petroleum chlorine - 500 
(B.P.) ethylene dichloride 
vinyl chloride monomer, 
Baglan Bay (S. Wales) 
3 PVC plants, - 600 
Barry (South Wales) 
1 PVC plant, 
Barry - I.C.I. + lSO? 
(S. Wales) 
Imperial 1 polyethyline 
Chemical plant, - 700 
Industries Wilton (N.E 
(1.C.I.) England) 
1 polythylene- B.P. + lSO? 
Consumption 
- c 8001 
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Figure 5. Global Shifts in the Location of the Steel Industry, 
1955-1990 
(1) import substitution of simple manufactures, mainly 
by developing textile and metal industries, to create 
conditions from which to begin to pay off overseas 
debts followed by: 
(2) export of manufactures with a high content of 
either cheap unskilled labour (e.g. clothing, shoes) 
or local materials (e.9. non-ferrous metals) and then: 
(3) development of industries requiring more skills, 
capital and relatively modern techniques; this also 
involved the relocation of the relatively labour- 
intensive segments of the production chains of multi- 
national corporations from their home countries. 
Industrialization in Singapore illustrates this 
(Figure 4). 
Each of these stages has involved an increasing scale and 
complexity of manufactured exports from industrialized countries, 
though the latter have not shared equally in this process 
(e.g. Japan, West Germany and the USA have been far more successful 
than the UK) . 
This progression can be related to the stages of economic 
development (ROSTOW, 1959); but it is, of course, most often 
cited as support for the product life cycle modelinwhich, as the 
skilled labour content in a product decreases with standardization 
of production techniques, the comparative advantage shifts from 
locations in more advanced to those in less developed countries. 
However, because there are very many LDCs with abundant labour, 
only some will be able to share in this process. They will be 
the countries with the best international transport access, 
greatest political stability, most adept labour, strong or 
supportive government industrialization policies and hence those 
most favourably regarded by international bankers (LINGE and 
HAMILTON, 1981). 
Except for Iran and Nigeria in the earlier 1970s, the above 
three stages do not typify the oil-rich OPEC countries, where 
very recent industrial construction is heavily concentrated in 
the downstream processing of oil and gas into refined products 
and various chemicals or in energy-intensive metallurgy such as 
alumina-aluminium production. This generally reflects the 
* shifting comparative advantage in energy costs to countries 
which which, in the case of the Middle Eastern OPEC countries, 
do not have significant labour reserves (or therefore labour 
advantages) . 
Intensified international trade in manufactures is revealing 
that the advanced economies may suffer comparative disadvantages 
and rising production costs in industries with mature technologies 
(in which labour costs are thus significant - textiles, clothing, 
woodworking, leather, footwear, rubber, plastics and some 
electrical equipment) and in industries dependent on scarce or 
costly natural resources. The closure of an increasing number 
of oil refineries and chemicals plants in coastal areas of 
Western Europe, for instance, reflects the shift of cost advantages 
to the Middle East and Singapore (though expanding Asian markets 
are more critical for the latter). Shutdown in older European and 
American steel industries express a similar shift southwards and 
eastwards in advantages to the materials sources in Latin America, 
the socialist countries and Asia (Figure 5). 
The rapidity with which changes like this are occurring in 
vehicles, chemicals and petrochemicals in particular reflects 
the dominance of these industries by large multinational 
corporations more able and willing to restructure and relocate, 
in part by *swappingn facilities between themselves to achieve 
rationalization, lower costs and remove surplus capacity. In 
the U.S. economy, merger activity as a means to restructuring 
by firms seems, since 1979, to be producing the 'fourth great 
merger wave' since 1895. Adjustment in steel, which is largely 
state-owned, has been slower; it has, too, in labour-intensive 
sectors where small family firms unable (or unwilling) to 
borrow capital to restructure but having access to immigrant 
labour and can (often illegally) continue to operate using 
"sweated labourn conditions. The industrialized OECD countries, 
however, will retain their major advantages in knowledge- and 
skill-intensive industries, in part supported by the needs of 
multinational firms in these activities. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that at least five factors 
can slow down the locational shift of advantages from industrialized 
countries to the NICs and LDCs: 
(a) increased protectionism in some developed countries 
(e.g. EEC in the form of quotas) to reduce or restrict 
import penetration which might cause problems of 
contraction in highly localized or labour-intensive 
industries; but experience tends to show that protection 
does not work in the long-term and merely makes the 
need for future closure or rationalization more drastic; 
an example is the U.K. textile industry, in which 
jobs declined between 1970 and 1932 and production 
declined by 4.5 per cent yearly (1973-81). 
(b) for a time, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
regional-aid policies by governments, particularly 
in the EEC and EFTA countries, retained branch plant 
operations with higher labour intensities in the 
countries concerned, albeit involving an interregional 
shift from core metropolitan-industrial to peripheral 
areas, so slowing down overseas relocation to NICs and 
LDCs. Availability of cheaper rural and non-unionized 
labour, and plentiful land, in these regions has tended 
to have the same effect (.e.g. Italian Mezzogiorno; 
U.S. sunbelt states); but it can similarly delay 
(or introduce the need for later) drastic adjustment 
(e.g. Figure 3). 
(c) management innovation, rationalization, modernization/ 
automation, and specialization on high quality products 
with a high demand-income elasticity and low demand- 
price elasticity, have enabled developed countries to 
improve, maintain or lose less even of the labour- 
intensive or materials-intensive activities than might 
have been expected (e.g. introduction of special steel- 
reinforced rubber conveyor belts in Akron, or special 
alloys production in Pittsburgh, U.S.A.); 
(d) that few NICs have been able to attract industries 
requiring more advanced know-how and higher skills 
(mainly in South-East and East Asia and Latin America) 
is not due only to the comparative advantages of 
their local (often metropolitan) environments. It 
also results from real or perceived political instability, 
hostility or military conflict - widespread in many 
other countries of Central and Caribbean America, 
Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia - which 
deters both multinational industrial corporations from 
seeking to establish facilities and international 
banks from being prepared to finance projects 
there; and 
(e) some large West European firms have been able to continue 
to supply LDC markets with capital and consumer goods 
from their home-country base by cooperating in various 
ways with enterprises located in Eastern Europe which 
can offer them components or intermediate products at 
low cost (GUTMAN and ARKWRIGHT, 1981; LINGE and 
HAMILTON , 1981) . 
These aspects help to explain further the persistence of the 
overwhelming industrial dominance of the North throughout the 
1970s. Clear evidence of this is the rise in the trade surplus 
on OECD-produced manufactures with the LDCs from US$ 37.7 billion 
in 1973 to US$ 121 billion in 1978, though OPEC countries, which 
accounted for a third of the 1973 surplus, took more than half 
of the surplus in 1978. By contrast, industrial progress in 
some non-oil producing NICs is demonstrated by the fact that in 
the same period the share of electrical engineering products in 
total LDC-manufactured exports rose from 24 to 35 per cent. Such 
a trend seems to express very clearly the locational shift in 
comparative advantage to the Third World for the output of 
products nearing the end of their life cycle. 
Much publicity is givato the effects of import penetration 
of products from LDCs on employment in the older industrialized 
countries. This is often misplaced, BALASSA (1979) demonstrated . -  
that 1.5 million net jobs in industry had been created in the 
industrialized countries by 1976 as a result of trade in 
manufactures with LDCs. Such change involved major adjustments 
and restructuring, redeployment of workers and resources between 
firms and industries. In absolute terms the trade created 520,000 
new jobs. cf. 370,000 job losses in the U.S.A., about 1 million 
new industrial jobs cf. 290,000 job losses in the EEC, and 
570,000 new jobs cf. 70,000 losses in Japan. These average net 
increases in industry employment resulted because, in aggregate, 
manufactured exports to the Third World rose faster than imports, 
so offsetting the higher labour intensity of job loss per unit 
value of imports (cf. the job gain per unit value of exports). 
Such trends bear out at international level what much growth 
pole development achieved at regional level - greater growth 
in developed areas. But gains and losses are usually in different 
areas within countries, posing spatial adjustment and restructuring 
problems. 
BALASSA'S work shows that the industries hardest hit by 
competition from LDCs are those employing highest proportion 
of unskilled and female labour and localized in less industrialized, 
inner-city or other industrially declining areas. Thus trade 
with LDCs had caused more job losses than gains in 6 industry 
groups in the U.S.A. by 1976: textiles, clothing, timber 
products, furniture, rubber and plastic goods, leather and foot- 
wear; in 4 of them in the EEC and in 2 of them in Japan. Such 
differences reflect a combination of industrial 'maturityv and 
competitiveness of the 3 respective areas, By the early 1980s, 
however, the most advanced NICS, especially Korea (LINGE and 
HAMILTON, 1981, pp.23-35) and Singapore (Figure 4) had sped up 
their industrialization sufficiently to begin competing with the 
industrialized countries in high value-added and more capital- 
intensive products (e.g. ships, machinery), so that more industry 
groups are likely to show a shift from net gains to net losses 
of jobs from trade in manufactures with LDCs. 
Yet, it is competition from within the industrialized 
world, and especially from Japan with its huge manufactures 
trade surplus with the U.S.A. and Western Europe, which combines 
with productivity gains from management and technology innovations 
and changing market conditions - in the industrialized world to 
create more net job losses in manufacturing in the older 
industrialized countries - and hence to redistribute manufacturing 
jobs in the North - than does trade with LDCs. 
TOWARDS 2000 
Recession has made industrial restructuring a greater 
necessity for regions and nations, but at the same time more 
difficult for them to achieve. Increased foreign trade impacts 
on industrial structures everywhere inevitably require definitive 
change in the international division of labour. Specialization 
by firms in industrialized nations on up-market, high value-added, 
knowledge-intensive products incorporating advanced technology and 
substantial labour skill is becoming more pronounced, especially 
in a wide range of capital goods, chemicals and sophisticated 
consumers' goods. Meanwhile, enterprises located in, or relocated 
to, LDCs exhibit increasing penetration of world markets in 
mass-produced standardized goods. 
Such an evolving pattern of international division of labour 
is neither inevitable nor desirable. It is not inevitable 
because vigorous government policies in some countries (e.g. Korea) 
demonstrate that LDCs - can become NICs which develop quite advanced 
capital-intensive industries capable of low cost, good quality 
output. It is not desirable because it maintains or widens 
the economic gap in value-added between North and South. 
The Need for Realism: ~ e c h n o l o ~ ~  vs. Jobs 
Even so, current trends indicate that the industrialized 
countries should expect their firms in labour-intensive industries 
to contract substantially; so too will steel, shipbuilding and 
vehicles enterprises or divisions as both cost and market advantages 
shift relatively to the NICs and LDCs. Firms in developed 
countries poor in energy resources, or with high-cost energy 
resources, will suffer significant disadvantages in all 
metallurgical fields, paper, basic chemicals, petrochemicals 
and non-metallic minerals while those in resource-rich countries 
such as Australia or Canada, and some areas in Latin America 
and the Middle East, may be expected to expand such industries. 
Nevertheless, as firms make technological changes in various 
industries and production stages at differential rates there 
will be more (and a different pattern of) spatial separation 
within industries between the stages located in industrialized, 
and those located in developing countries than at present. It 
might be expected, for instance, that while more basic ferrous 
and non-ferrous production will become localized in the NICs 
and LDCS, the demand for sophisticated capital equipment for 
use in the factories of the future, in undersea developments and 
in space technology will require special metals and alloys to be 
produced in the advanced economies. 
The task of government is seen by many businessmen to be to 
create the conditions for industrial organization to adjust and 
restructure by promoting the widest possible technological 
progress and applications. The community, on the other hand, 
may see the tasks of businessmen in partnerships with government 
as fostering dialogue, cooperation and the creation of conditions 
for a smoother human experience in coping with restructuring for 
a new society. Undoubtedly electronics and microelectronics 
will enter the management, R & Dl manufacturing processes, 
transport, warehousing and uses of the products of more enterprises 
and industries (e.g. data-processing, robotics, new chemicals 
and energy) and to strengthen the competitive position of their 
older industries (e.g. textiles, shoes, electrical products, 
vehicles, metals) currently experiencing severer LDC and socialist- 
country competition, surplus capacity or. the threat of it 
in the near future. 
Technological innovation, application and adoption, however, 
generally require large, and rising, investments. At present 
the very high profitability of information-processing is stimulus 
enough to the rapid growth of business machinery, computer and 
microelectronics industries as technology is applied, often in 
'learning' fashion, to cope with the explosion of data and 
information. ~abour-substituting office automation will be 
further encouraged by the present high labour intensity of more 
routine administration functions in most economic activities. 
High profits mean high rates of entry, especially in the U,S.A., 
where new firm foundation is now running at double the rate of 
the 1960s. But the huge costs of developing some new industries - 
especially robotics, biotechnology, aerospace and lasers - are 
forcing competing firms and governments to collaborate in joint 
R E D and co-production on an intercontinental scale. This is 
involving a marked trend towards integration of operations 
between facilities located in North America, Western Europe 
and Japan. 
If investment in technological innovation in the still 
large metal, engineering and consumer goods industries is 
allowed to flag in the industrialized countries - for reasons 
of depressed demand, ~q~eezdprofit margins, or government 
'non-interventionist' or monetarist unwillingness to support 
long-term technological progress - then the life cycles of 
present productsand their methods of manufacture could be 
prolonged and give LDCs greater opportunities to expand their 
penetration of world manufacturing. Continued recession would 
also force more firms headquartered in developed countries to 
merge, rationalize at home - and to relocate production in LDCs 
with lower labour costs if they are to survive in the world 
market. Indeed, currently the world's motor vehicle manufacturers 
are engaged in a massive global beshufflew with every region, 
country and corporation competing fiercely to place itself 
among 'the winnersv, with countries such as the U.K. under 
threat of very substantial 'flight' by multinationals like 
Ford, G.M. and Peugeot-Citroen, while other countries like 
Spain or Brazil can attract new specialized capacities from 
these firms (Figure 6). Because LDC markets would also become 
relatively more important, governments of LDCs - insofar as 
bankers could be persuaded to provide credits and loans to them 
or to the relocating firms - would be able to insist more 
forcefully on the technology transfers they require to industrialize 
(further). And this might better sustain North-South trade in 
manufactures. Undoubtedly these trends will have differential 
impacts amongst both developed and developing countries, 
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Even if sufficient capital is forthcoming for wide 
technological change, it is not expected to generate many - net 
jobs in manufacturing in developed countries in the 1990s. Full 
automation and robotization could probably sustain present (even 
peak 1970s) levels of manufacturing activity (though composed 
differently) while reducing the proportion of the labour force 
working in manufacturing in many advanced countries by the year 
2000 to the current levels of employment in agriculture in those 
countries (c. 2-15 per cent). This is no't surprising, despite 
the OECD (1983, p.149) prediction of considerable industrial 
employment expansion -in Australia, Canada and Japan and a 
'moderate' increase in the U.S.A. in the 1980s. For one thing, 
there will be time and sector leads and lags in technology 
impacts on job loss and job gain. For another, significant 
geographic shifts are likely to occur in the location of 
industrial jobs within the developed world (as well as between 
it and developing countries), particularly with the possible 
strengthening of the Pacific-centred, and concomitant weakening 
of the North Atlantic-centered, manufacturing 'belts'. 
Integral parts of this process are the phenomenal development 
and restructuring of Japanese industry and the rapid 
'de-industrialization' of the U.K. The latter was induced by 
a legacy of poor manufacturing competitiveness and exacerbated 
after 1978 by an overvalued currency and by government monetarism 
which claimed average net job losses of 1,000 per day in 
the 1979-82 period. Despite a sustainedll982-84 level of 
more khan. 3 ndllvion unemp.loyed. (a rate of 13 per cent), the U.K. 
currently has record manufactured exports and rising output due 
to relative international improvements in productivity and 
competitiveness from technological modernization. The U.K. 
experience warns against expecting much net job creation from 
manufacturing in developed countxies. Moreover, similar and 
intensified efforts being made in most countries in the North 
to raise productivity may tend in the long term to neutralize 
the benefits of such gains in individual countries, to 
re-establish pre-existing (i.e. early 1970s) international 
productivity differentials (though at a much higher, capital- 
intensivelevel) and thus to contribute to further industrial 
redistribution (concentration) in favour of the more competitive 
industrialized countries. This is what Japan, on the other hand, 
is achieving through high investment in restructuring (Figure 7). 
Not without reason, then, the OECD (1983, p.151) concludes that 
'the very nature of competition makes any net growth in industrial 
employment very hypothetical'. 
Market Constraints 
Marketconditionsare thus crucial to the processes and 
patterns of industrial restructuring into the 21st century, 
Evolution to a highly populous world with high incomes for all, 
permitting growth-induced adjustment in the manner of the 1960s, 
is very unlikely. Indeed, market trends are complex, predictions 
confusing. Wide variations in national experience are likely, 
leading to sharper economic differentiations both within and 
between the First, Second and Third Worlds. Even the broad 
generalizations on market conditions and international trade 
seem to be inconclusive: 
(1) Indebtedness or failure to attract capital could 
seriously limit the ability of many LDCs and some 
socialist economies to purchase capital goods for 
further industrialization, so stunting their 
manufacturing development and having serious feedback 
effects on firms in industrialized countries where 
competition and restructuring in the production of 
such goods will be fiercer. Latin America's current 
import squeeze"il1ustrates this (The Economist News- 
paper, October 1, 1983). 
Such a scenario could be modified by another market 
trend. United States and United Kingdom experience 
is showing an increasing tendency for the mass consumer 
market in industrialized countries to become polarized. 
This is resulting from the displacement of the more 
'middle-income' distribution of manufacturing jobs 
(when industry was a mass employer of labour) both 
by higher-paid business-service and industrial R 6 D 
or management jobs and by burgeoning lower-paid 

retailing service jobs, a trend deepened at the lower- 
income end by unemployment, 'de-unionizationt and 
ageing population. Such 'market-splitting' could 
confine restructuring in the operations of firms in 
developed countries to the up-market, high-value 
industrial products while shaking out larger segments 
of their production chains of standardized manufactures 
to locations in LDCs whence low labour costs would 
still permit manufacturers to supply the demand for 
cheap goods from the growing body of the lower-paid 
unemployedandretired in the industrialized countries. 
Again, however, the pattern varies: West Germany, for 
instance, still obtains a much higher proportion of GDP 
from, and employment in, manufacturing and hence 
polarization is expected to be less than in the U.K. 
or U.S.A. with positive effects on the country's 
market attractiveness. 
(3) Stronger state industrialization policies in some LDCs 
might involve greater protecionism to foster import 
substitution, so modifying (1) above, but many LDCs 
suffer severe home market constraints imposed by 
economic dualism and by social and political polarization - 
as the Brazilian experience testifies. Other LDCs 
may alter their industrial structures to exploit 
market trends outlined in (2) above, but this requires 
further trade liberalization on the part of developed 
:'. 
countries. 
(4) Emphasis on North-South interaction in international 
trade tends to obscure the potential for greater 
international division of labour within the South, 
Limitation on Third World industrialization set out in 
(1) above could be partially circumvented by transfers 
of lower-priced, 'more appropriatet technology, but 
it requires much more inter-LDC cooperation. Clearly 
such developments could strengthen the industrial role 
of the NICs in the global system, stimulate more 
LDCs to become NICs, and put pressure on industrialized 
countries through competition to restructure faster. 
Yet pressure on organizations there to restructure 
does not only emanate from economic sources. 
(5) East-West power struggles make military and space spending 
very powerful forces in the functional and spatial 
pattern of industrial change. The course this takes 
can have untold consequences for the greater sharing 
or concentration of global manufacturing. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
Industrial restructuring undoubtedly requires a much improved 
international environment of peace and greater cooperation, 
understanding and stability, particularly if it is to be orderly 
and to benefit the world at large through more productive 
deployment of resources. Significant institutional change is 
necessary in East and West to achieve this. Restructuring 
demands far more vision and leadership by governments in consortia 
if it is not to be merely the result of the will of multinational 
firms, cut-throat competition, nationalism or militarism. Currently 
there is a very real danger that the governments of the 
industrialized OECD countries are stimulating (or allowing) the 
restructuring by their firms in the same industrial directions, 
so creating the pre-conditions for devasting future competition 
between them in a range of newgeneration industrial products. 
The 'micro-chipwars' of the early 1980s should warn us that 
satisfying world demand in new products may require far fewer 
manufacturers and facilities operating economically than, say, 
the current manufacturers of 'world cars' (though fewer of them 
will be needed in future, too).. 
Restructuring,therefore, should be channelled, with 
enlightened government stimulus, in several parallel directions, 
with very careful attention being paid to the detailed potentials 
for, and dynamics of, international specialization, cooperation 
and complementarity. Key amongst these directions must be 
efforts to: develop, diversify and use more efficiently all 
natural resources, especially energy and metals; improve the 
productivity, and greatly raise the social utility and environmental 
quality of capital goods; innovate and use a variety of new 
technologies with far greater commitment to non-military, 
cultural, educational, medical and scientific uses; and to 
bring the location of industry more into line with the geographic 
distribution of natural and human resources, involving more 
equitable sharing of value added between countries at different 
stages of economic and social development. The roots of the 
restructuring problem lie in making governments and productive 
enterprises, especially multinational enterprises, socially 
and internationally more responsible; otherwise restructuring 
will create problems for the many in the interests of the power 
and profit of the few. 
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I. THE ISSUE 
The long-term t rends  of post-war international economic development had dis- 
continued by t h e  mid-seventies. International reali t ies of the  last  ten years  have 
revealed tha t  growth rates cannot be  considered as yardst icks  of economic per- 
formance, economic dynamism has  increasingly become a function of s t ructural  
transformation of t h e  rate of s t ruc tura l  adjustment. 
Emerging new pat terns  of international development are of a global nature ,  
and do not s t e m  from and cannot be  interpreted with t he  traditional business cycles 
but ref lect  cumulative and complex s t ruc tura l  changes in t he  world economy. The 
accelerating s t ruc tura l  transformation of the  world economy has been  increasing!^ 
affecting the  externa! conditions of development fo r  t he  majority of the  nation 
s ta tes ,  c rea ted  new challenges fo r  and requires  new responses from economic 
theory and development s t ra tegy.  
Naturally not all  t he  challenges of t he  eighties are of a s t ruc tura l  nature.  On 
the  o ther  hand, t he  process  of international s t ructural  transformation i s  a multidi- 
mensional one, i t  i s  motivated not only by economic but also social, political, tech- 
nologica! and s t ra tegic  driving forces .  
This sho r t  paper  s t r ives  t o  underline t he  most important new structura! 
changes which created new conditions f o r  t he  socio-economic development of the  
majority of t he  nation s ta tes .  
1. Changes in t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  supply-demand condi t ions  are a primary 
fac tor  in s t ruc tura l  transformation. On the  demand side changes in income leve!? 
relative prices,  technological progress,  t a rge t  system are fellow t rave le rs  of 
long-term economic growth. S t ruc tura l  changes in international demand can be  
characterized by a diminishing specific use of energy, r a w  materials, semi- 
products of the  modern growth process.  In high income countries a re la t ive 
saturation on the  market of t he  traditional nondurable and many durable consumer 
goods does not provide f o r  economic dynamism in t he  present  industrial s t ruc-  
tures .  Dynamism of demand has  been shifting t o  technology sensitive new products 
and services.  
Though changes in international demand are far from being inconsequential, 
new international challenges have been and will be  more vigorous on the  supply 
side. In t he  seventies supply constraints and supply securi ty  conscious s t ra tegical  
responses emerged in t he  energy economy. Increasing oligopolization on the  mark- 
ets of modern technologies, increasing relative importance of t he  technology fac- 
t o r  in the  modern growth process,  as well as strengthening s t ra tegic  considera- 
tions in t he  international technology t ransfers ,  explain t he  rising constraints on 
t h e  market of up-to-date technologies. 
On the o ther  hand, the  rapid expansion and uncoordinated cha rac t e r  of 
postwar industrialization created excess capacities in the production of primary 
goods, semi-products, light-industrial and durable consumer goods, and vehicles. 
Postwar industrialization in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and the  Third World 
has concentrated considerable on the  traditional growth industries, whiie many 
European (OECD) countries have lagged behind in streamlining the i r  industrial 
s t ructures .  A s  a consequence an  international oversuppLy of a s t ructural  kind 
emerged by the  seventies on the  international and national markets of most tradi- 
tional industries. This oversupply generated sha rp  competition, unfavorable 
dynamism of prices,  s t ruc tura l  unemployment and adjustment tensions. 
2. The increasingly visible consequences of an  international s t ructural  
oversupply are sectorally correlated t o  the  considerabie regionaL or geographic 
shifts of economic dynamism. In the  production of many price-sensitive light indus- 
t r ia l  goods, energy-intensive semi-products and labor-intensive semi-products and 
labor-intensive as well as technologicaliy more mature aurabie  consumer goods, 
comparative advantages shift rapidly towards late-comer industrial expor te rs ,  and 
recently newly industrializing developing countries. This sectoral  and sub- 
sectoral  dimension a p a r t  from geographic shifts in economic dynamism, and gradu- 
ally in gravity centers ,  a r e  also motivated by the above-the-average iong-term 
economic dynamism of the  Far  East, the  western p a r t  of the USA, as well as t he  
Eastern Siberian pa r t s  of the  Soviet Union. The previously Europe - and Atlantic- 
centr ic  international economic dynamism is increasingly giving way t o  a Pacific- 
centr ic  international growth process. The g rea t  Pacific area, where the  politicai 
and economic interests of four  international powers meet in a d i rec t  geographic 
neighborhood, affects increasingly the  pat terns  and conditions of internationai 
growth. A t  t he  same time institutional rigidities and t a rge t  systems in Europe, pol- 
itical tensions as well as pr ice  pat terns  in the  Near and Middle-East, endowment 
problems in Africa represent  serious obstacles t o  the  objectivity necessary f o r  an 
adjustment process. 
3. Economic history has reveaied tha t  the  driving forces  as well as the i r  
relative importance and consequences are subject t o  changes in time. Structural  
challenges induce responses, behavioral adjustments of economic agents and as a 
resul t  of these responses may fade away o r  modify. International income distribu- 
tion tends t o  show a close correiation with the  relative importance of hierarchy of 
the  various growth factors .  During the  qua r t e r  of century following the  end of the  
Second World War i t  w a s  t he  labor,  during the  seventies the  energy which indicated 
the  relatively highest international appreciation, highest pr ice dynamics and 
represented the  most important channel in the  internationaL income redis tr ibu-  
t ion. A s  countries fel t  the  resul t  of increasing over  supply on the  international 
labor and energy markets and the  growing demand f o r  capital and technology, the 
bargaining positions as well as incomes of the  capital and technology owners were 
increased considerably. A t  present and in the  foreseeable future the  owners of 
these fac tors  realize e x t r a  incomes and growth stimulants in international rela- 
tions. 
Periods of high capital costs requi re  t he  priorization of the income-earning 
capacities of the  enterprises  and nation-states as compared to  the  distribution- 
centr ic  previous approaches. Capital-importing countries, facing very soft  capital 
constraints in t'ne seventies, are compelled t o  apply very severe  c r i te r ia  and 
curbs  as f a r  as capital-intensive development projects  are concerned. Rising 
costs of capital, the high level of s t ructural  unemployment, and the  diminished bar-  
gaining power of labor tend t o  affect  adversely the  internationai economic posi- 
tions of countries exporting capital-intensive products without favorable capitai 
endowment, labor-intensive products containing high inputs of not specially quali- 
fied labor. 
4. International pat terns  of s t ructural  transformation ra i se  in a modified way 
and relevance t h e  s i z e  issue in international growth and t rade.  Small-sized coun- 
t r i e s  and microeconomic units have been traditionally compelled on a r a t h e r  nar- 
r o w  speciaiization in o r d e r  to improve the i r  income earning capacities. Postwar 
industrial growth has  increases gradually t h e  s h a r e  of economies of scaie- 
sensitive industrial activities where big countries and big organizations enjoy 
organizational advantages. The gradual s t ruc tura l  worsening of t h e  small coun- 
t r ies '  positions w a s  part ly  compensated by the  growing miniaturization of modern 
technologies diminishing the  specific costs of small scale production. 
Experiences of the  last  5-10 years  reveal  tha t  t h e  relevance of t h e  size issue 
has  increasingly been linked t o  the  growing importance of the  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
b a r g a i n i n g  power  in t h e  economic process. During the  last  twenty years  t h e  ro le  
of the  state has radically increased in the  centralization and redistribution of t h e  
national income in all countries. A s  a consequence of s t ronger  and frequently dom- 
inating government presence in economic life costs,  wages, pr ices ,  incomes, 
interests,  etc. re f lec t  not only impacts of market mechanisms but increasingly 
interests  and pressures  of political par t ies ,  regional or religious interest  groups 
having the  relatively biggest organizational bargaining power. Similarly, t he  last  
twenty years  regis tered t he  highest expansion of the  big transnational corpora-  
tions relying not only on market but power mechanisms as well. Finally, from the  
beginning of the  seventies strategical considerations, "economic weapons", 
penetrated t he  international flows of products, technologies and capitals, much 
more than eve r  before.  
In an international context,  where organizational bargaining power affects  a 
widening range of economic processes,  the  relative positions of small enterpr ises  
and countries, "ceteris paribus", tend t o  ae te r iora te .  I t  is not by chance that  t he  
growth rates, equilibrium positions, incremental capital-output ra t ios  of the  small 
OECD countries during t h e  las t  decade were in most cases less favorable than t h e  
OECD average,  t he i r  relative positions deter iorated on the  markets of t h e  power 
sensit ive engineering products. 
Increasing losses due t o  insufficient economic size and organizational bar- 
gaining power leave different options for t he  small countries: 
evacuation of t h e  more power-sensitive fields of t he  international and 
domestic economy and a n  eve r  growing specialization in activities iess 
affected by the  consequences of organizational power, 
concentration of t he  resources  on some activit ies and building up organi- 
zational power congiomerates enjoying considerable market positions and 
bargaining power, 
lasting coexistence with and toleration of t he  higher economic costs of 
t he  uneven bargaining power. 
II. THE APPROACH 
1. N e w ,  long-term pa t te rns  of international economic growth reflect t he  
increased importance and more rapidly changing impacts of exogeneous factors in 
the  development process.  Economic thinking, modeling activities, economic poli- 
cies not recognizing or reflecting adequately t he  increased importance of exo- 
geneous factors and changing giobal conditions of growth cannot cope adequately 
with t he  new development issues e i ther .  Externally vulnerabie or r a t h e r  sensitive 
national economies have no rational alternative t o  a quick and intensive adjustment 
t o  changed international real i t ies  and have t o  consider correspondingly t he i r  
theoretical and economic policy approaches.  National economic therapies ,  
although unavoidable and objectively necessary, can,  however, be  r a t h e r  
expensive in social terms, if they are not supported by an  improvement of global 
cooperation. Small economic units without economic hinterland find it particularly 
difficult t o  compensate fo r  the  losses of increased international fluctuations, 
rapidly changing prices,  costs, interests,  exchange r a t e s ,  etc. If international 
cooperation is regulated purely by market impacts, relative adjustment costs are 
higher in smaller countries. On the  o the r  hand, increasing the  presence of organi- 
zational bargaining power in the  international division of labor affects also nega- 
tively development pat terns  and chances of small economies. International mark- 
ets and division of labor regulated by a global cooperation, international standard 
rules of the  game based on a consensus of the  nation-states c rea tes  the  relatively 
best conditions fo r  the  healthy and socially less expensive development and struc- 
tural  transformation of t he  small countries. 
2. In the  present international organizational set-up more than one forum 
(GATT, UNCTAD, etc.)  has been shaped t o  analyze and handle problems connected 
with international t r ade  flows. Urgent financial problems are handled, although 
not with a global cha rac t e r  and perfect  solutions by the  IMF and the  banking world. 
It is not unjustified t o  reckon with a ripening recognition that  an  intensive interna- 
tional division of labor increasingly needs the  creation of an  international 
central-bank (o r  equivalent forms of financial and stability cooperation) regulat- 
ing international liquidity problems. Disequilibria in t rade  and financial flows, 
however, ref lect  s t ructural  issues, the  proper  consideration and handling of which 
has not as yet found a p rope r  in ternat ional  in s t i tu t i ona l  forum. The lack of 
adequate research  capacities, ear ly warning systems, cooperation with respect  t o  
s t ructural  transformation and adjustment policies has contributed in many coun- 
t r i e s  and on a world scale t o  parallel developments, t o  t he  emergence of scarcity 
phenomena ana international oversupply as well as the  concomitant aisequilibria, 
excess capacities, and the  high social-political costs of economic development. 
The reduction and elimination as far as possible of the  present internationai 
s t ructural  disorders,  losses and tensions is in t he  interests of all  countries and is 
becoming a more and more urgent requirement at the  given stage of t he  interna- 
tional growth and division of labor. The handling of international s t ructural  issues 
o r  the elimination of a highly important missing link in t he  chain of international 
organizations suggests the  creation of an  international forum (organization) fo r  
research, information-exchange, consul tat ion and in a la ter  stage harmoniza-  
t i on  on development decisions affecting medium o r  long-term pat terns  of invest- 
'ments, production, specialization, markets, e tc .  
3. I t  is needless t o  emphasize tha t  adequate research  activities with a scien- 
tific basis can also be considered as a prerequisite f o r  this  new type of interna- 
tional cooperation. A larger-scale international research  would be necessary on 
the  pat terns ,  causes  a n d  consequences of in ternat ional  s t ruc tura l  transfor-  
mation, as well as the e z p e r i a c e s  of the ad jus tment  processes a n d  s trategies  
in o r d e r  t o  identify the  most important present and future s t ructural  ohalienges 
and the  most convenient responses. 
When shaping the  cha rac t e r  of such a research  one has t o  consider that  pure 
theory always has a limited capacity to  ref lect  accurately human and organiza- 
tional behavior. Changed realit ies of o u r  present  urge certain reconsiderations in 
traditional economic theories,  both market and planning theories. The diminishing 
relevance of traditional economic theory and the  growing need of i ts reconsidera- 
tion are due to: 
changes in t he  relative importance, functions of the driving forces .  of 
economic development, 
the  increasing interrelations of economic and non-economic (institu- 
tional, political, cultural, social, etc.)  factors  in the development pro- 
cess,  
the  growing interactions between the  interdependence of national 
economies. 
Under these circumstances the  aforementioned research  should not rely on 
previous theoretical assumptions, but r a t h e r  on the analysis of socio-economic 
processes. From this constraint i t  follows tha t  such a research  project  cannot 
aspire  t o  developing a comprehensive new economic theory, but concentrates on 
such lasting s t ructural  changes, interrelations of economic and non-economic 
spheres  which might be  instrumental in understanding and managing be t te r  t he  
deveiopment process  in the  nation-state, as well as on a world scale. Correspond- 
ingly, such a project  has  t o  be  f i t u r e  oriented, in t e rd i sc ip l inary ,  and 
impLementation-centric in t he  broader  sense. 
A successful research  would not resul t  in new theoretical models, but would 
contribute, in a modest way, t o  a quicker adapta t ion  of economic thinking t o  t he  
changed and future realit ies,  as well as to  the  emergence of a conceptual frame- 
work, which would promote the  healthy restructuring of international relations and 
also the  development of a less conflictive but more dynamic system of cooperation 
among nation-states. 
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In an increasingly thightly knit world economy t h e  dynamics of t h e  international  
division of labour will make itself f e l t  more  and more  upon t h e  part icipating 
economic agents. This s t ra ightforward s t a t e m e n t  i s  on t h e  lips of every  s t a t e s m a n  
nowadays i r respect ive  of t h e  country's continent,  level  of development, s i z e  o r  
s o c i ~ e c o n o m i c  system. Paying l ipservice t o  t h e  exigencies of permanent  exposure 
t o  what continues t o  be a highly dynamic set of shift ing and emerging product and 
process cycles  with varying re la t ive  prices and changing leadership in expor t  
growth, however, usually fo rms  t h e  introduction t o  a staunch defense  of t h e  
country's political preference  t o  b e  in control  of i t s  industrial  'destiny'. Lots  of 
reasons a r e  advanced to justify industrial autonomy. Prominent  among them a r e  
national  secur i ty  (especially in bigger countries), t h e  level  and/or skill-profile of 
employment,  t h e  expor t  position, t h e  'dependence' (in o the r  words, t h e  import  s h a r e  
in apparent  domest ic  consumption; ac tua l  or potential)  in ce r t a in  products, or ,  
indeed, more  indirect  but  also highly valued goals such as rapid income growth and 
technological or  'economic' leadership in t h e  world. An even more  extensive  se r i e s  
of ins t ruments  a r e  employed, including in te r  alia, imperat ive  planning on a national  
basis, public procurement,  public R & D programmes, public inves tment  aid, public 
enterprener~rship  in a national  m a r k e t  environment, public incentives f ~ i  af f i l ia tes  
of or  joint ventures  with multinationals, expor t  aid, various price- o r  volume 
re la ted  import  restr ict ions,  d i rec t  inves tment  controls, public s e c t o r  regulation, 
international  long t e r m  supply contracts ,  specialisation agreements ,  R dc D 
cooperation among f i rms  and countries or among countries,  in ternat ional  
production agreements ,  t ied  development aid and reciprocal  purchasing in 
international  defense  contracts ,  as well as more  indirect  ins t ruments  such as 
patenting laws and procedures, and anti- trust  policies (with discretion fo r  
exceptions). 
Therefore,  I en te r t a in  not  hope whatsoever t h a t  a genera l  t r e a t m e n t  of t h e  
international  inconsistencies can be fruitfully developed beyond wha t  is  a l ready 
known f rom t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on international  economic interdependence,  and t h e  
policy conf l ic ts  i t  tends  to g e n e r a t e  I). 
In delimiting t h e  subset  of countr ies  t o  a small  and fair ly homogeneous group (in 
t e r m s  of t h e  economic sys tem prevailing, and also, at leas t  largely, in t e r m s  of t h e  
level  of development), one  might t r y  t o  c o m e  t o  grips with t h e  mult i-variate na tu re  
of t h e  tension between international  marke t  integration and national  industrial 
autonomy. The European Community in a subset  tha t  mee t s  these  criteria. More 
important,  however, is t h e  ambitious and unique ex ten t  t o  which EC Member S ta tes  
have .  commit ted themselves t o  in tegrate  their  product markets,  thereby 
constraining not  only legally and politically but also economically via t h e  behaviour 
of producers, t raders  and consumers, t h e  range of policy measures and t h e  modes 
of implementation with respect  t o  national industrial policy. Indeed, put simply, 
t h e  EC has Communitarian product markets and national industrial policies. I t  can 
therefore  serve  as an  example  par excellence t o  study a spectrum of policy 
instruments a l l  aiming t o  reconcile l eg i t imate  concerns about  national industrial 
autonomy with market  integration. Finally, t h e  EC provides an  interesting 
experience industrial cooperation aiming at a hoped-for joint benefit  of improved 
competi t iveness in world markets. 
The purpose of t h e  paper is t o  analyse how t h e  E C  copes with t h e  multiple conflicts  
t h a t  ar ise  from a unified internal  EC product marke t  and t h e  absence of t h e  unified 
industrial policy (in other  words a desi re  for national industrial autonomy). I shall 
deal  both with legal and political means of co-operation on t h e  one hand and 
managing t h e  conflict  potential on t h e  o ther  hand. I shall present a bird's e y e  view 
of a variety of policy instruments t h a t  t h e  E C  has, e i the r  exclusively or  jointly 
with t h e  Member S t a t e s  themselves, in part icular positive co-ordination (steel), 
negative co-ordination ( the  surveil lance of national aid t o  industry), harmonization 
(mat te r s  of t h e  so-called internal  market), and  unification ( t rade policy). In t h e  
final  p a r t  I shall address t h e  problem of how t o  make offensive industrial policies 
of t h e  Member S t a t e s  consistent, whether by negative co-ordination or  by joint 
programmes. Although EC arrangements  a r e  undoubtedly more  ambitious than t h e  
s e t  of understandings and agreements  t h a t  could possibly be reached in GATT, 
ECE, UNIDO, UNCTAD, or between t h e  EC and other  regional grouping or  indeed 
within Comecon, i t  is hoped t h a t  they provide insights in t h e  s t rengths  and 
weaknesses of those  negotiated international agreements  t h a t  might be thought 
feasible ones in t h e  current  process of international restructuring. 
84 
I. Marke t  in tegra t ion  in t h e  Communi ty  
With t h e  possible exception of t h e  economic  relat ions between Canada  and t h e  
United S ta te s ,  t h e r e  seems  t o  be  no economic  grouping in t h e  world economy t h a t  
has achieved a degree  of marke t  in tegra t ion  as advanced as t h a t  of t h e  European 
Community. This holds for  m a r k e t  in tegra t ion  "from below" (i.e. by t h e  marke t  
part icipants,  through thei r  economic  ac t iv i t i e s  as t raders ,  consumers,  investors, 
etc.) as well as for  m a r k e t  in tegra t ion  "from above" (i.e. by negat ive  and positive 
measures of E C  and national  public authorities). 
A few indicators may se rve  as useful  reminders  of how la rge  t h e  s o  cal led 'Internal 
(product) Market '  of t h e  E C  looms in t h e  economies  of t h e  Member States.  To ta l  
intra-EC expor t s  in 1982 amounted t o  $ 325 billion ( % of world trade),  of which 
$ 205 billion was in manufactured products. T h e  weighted E C  average  of - intra-EC 
t r a d e  in manufactured products (exports  plus imports)  per head of t h e  a c t i v e  
working population fo r  1980 w a s  (3126ECU) , which provides a rough 
approximation of t h e  g r e a t  s t a k e  everyone in industry has  in industrial marke t  
integration. Also in t h e  ranking order  of fore ign marke t s  t h e  EC looms much larger  
fo r  eve ry  Member S t a t e  than any o the r  country  o r  group market:  in 1980 t h e  E C  
took approx. 50% of all E C  industr ial  exports ,  whereas  EFTA (as a whole) took only 
12.6%, OPEC 8.2%, t h e  USA 6% and  all o the r s  even  less. In 1980, 17.4% of E C  
industrial production (not counting Greece ,  here)  was  expor ted  t o  o the r  E C  
countries,  up f rom 11% in  1970. In addit ion i t  ought not b e  fo rgo t t en  t h a t  intra-EC 
cross-frontier d i r ec t  inves tments  have become substantial  in t h e  Communi ty  
(Pelkmans, 1983), implying other  means  and modes of marke t  integrat ion,  not 
always visible in t r a d e  flows. Finally i t  should b e  observed t h a t  intra-EC services  
t r a d e  is growing rapidly, and a number of such services  are actual ly  compl imentary  
t o  t r a d e  in industrial products. 
In such a configurat ion it will b e  c l e a r  t h a t  mutual  sensi t ivi ty about  economic  
ac t iv i ty  in o n e  another's marke t s  is g rea t ly  heightened. Although st i l l  falling shor t  
of t h e  virtually comple te  marke t  in tegra t ion  t h a t  cha rac te r i zes  t h e  intra-USA 
economy, i t  is nonetheless becoming increasingly ar t i f ic ia l  t o  view "national" 
marke t s  in t h e  E C  as s e p a r a t e  enti t ies.  This is  part icularly s o  because t h e  ac tua l  
pervasiveness of in terpenet ra t ion  is  even  g r e a t e r  than  t h e  m e r e  t r a d e  flows can 
indicate,  because  price and non-price compet i t ion  ex tends  to t h e  s a m e  or  
substi tute goods t h a t  a r e  t raded domestically. In t e r m s  of market  behaviour of 
economic agents,  what determines t h e  ex ten t  of marke t  integration is t h e  
compet i t ive  conduct of enterprises, t raders  and consumers over t h e  e n t i r e  range of 
so called 'tradeables' (i.e. imports, and their  domestic substi tutes,  and exports,  and 
their  domestic substitutes), which implies a magnification of t h e  influence of in t ra  
EC trade. 
Market integration 'from above' (for industrial products) is also ra the r  advanced. 
Excluding some technical  complications in transport ,  industrial marke t  integration 
is achieved by t h r e e  general  sets of policies ( t h e  so called Internal  Market 
measures, Competit ion Policy and Trade Policy) and one  amalgam of specifically 
'industrial' policy tools ( le t  us call  this t h e  Community's Industrial Policy; however, 
i t  does not  really compare  with t h e  Member Sta tes '  industrial policies). T h e  four 
domains a r e  dist inct  only up t o  a degree; i t  i s  impossible and indeed misleading t o  
disentangle them entirely. 
The EEC (1957) and ECSC (1951) Treat ies  aim t o  achieve genuine product marke t  
integration. T h e  Spaak repor t  (1956), laying t h e  foundation for t h e  EEC Treaty ,  
even spoke of t h e  'ffusion" o f  markets, a metaphor leaving no doubt whatsoever of 
t h e  disappearance of 'economic f rontiersl between t h e  originally 'national' markets. 
This g rea t  ambition has not fully been achieved, however, despi te  t h e  s t rong 
political commitments  of Member S t a t e s  and t h e  uniquely powerful in tegrat ive  
instruments t h e  Trea ty  and subsequent case  law of t h e  European C o u r t  have 
provided. Genuine product marke t  integration will be hindered by two  types  of 
national public interventions, those  at borders and those  in t h e  domestic economy. 
The  range, na tu re  and intensity s f  such interventions will differ  among countr ies  
according t o  t h e  role t h e  state has been assigned in t h e  economy. The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
EC is f i r s t  of all a customs union (in t h e  sense, defined by GATT, art.  24) and hence 
can be expected t o  remove intra-EC tar i f fs  and quota's is a necessary but (very) 
insufficient condition t o  real ize  - one EC market. Genuine product marke t  
integration requires two  demanding conditions: 
- product must enjoy ful l  and f r e e  market  access 
- t h e  (national) public influence on compet i t ive  conditions ought t o  be 
approximately uniform. 
Contrary  t o  what is somet imes claimed, i t  is not at al l  necessary t o  abolish 
government intervention in t h e  Member S t a t e s  and return t o  a 19th century type  
'nightwatch' state for market integration t o  come about. Product markets may be 
influenced, controlled or ex  post corrected; what is required is  t h e  uniformity of 
such inteiventions over t he  en t i re  EC so  t ha t  t h e  competit ive conditions for 
producers, t raders  and consumers - though deviating from f r ee  market  
arrangements - a r e  everywhere alike and do not discriminate in t he  opportunities 
offered. 
A comprehensive scheme of the  Community's approach t o  product market 
integration is provided in Table  1 (see p. 6) ( the  ra ther  special  provisions of t h e  
ECSC Treaty  have been l e f t  out  here, because they apply only t o  coal and steel). 
Although there  a r e  e lements  of t rade  policy (4.2) and competit ion policy (8.1; 10) 
included in Table 1, a complete  view can only be obtained by considering t h e  full 
scope of these  two common policies. The complexity of this EC market  'regimet is 
a consequence of t h e  f a c t  t ha t  t h e  Community comprises 'mixed economies", 
having a strong tendency t o  intervene nationally and reassert  influence on market  
outcomes for soci*political reasons. The overall aim of EC market integration is  
inconsistent with an independent reassertion of national market  interventions, so  
t h a t  t h e  Community must (and does) play a role in all ten  of t h e  policy a reas  
distinguished fo r  t h e  purpose of this Table. The EC does so, however, with different 
degrees of stringency (and success). 
The upshot is  t ha t  product market  integration - no mat te r  how fa r  i t  has advanced 
by 1984 - sti l l  leaves ample  room for  national policies a t tempting t o  engender a 
more favourable performance for their  industry. I t  i s  important  t o  understand t ha t  
al l  national policy-makers in t h e  EC usually recognize a number of EC constraints - 
both legal and economic - in their  search for  'industrial autonomy'. But t h e  
"borderlinet1 beyond which their  national policy discretion begins is energetically 
defended. And where t h e  " b ~ r d e r l i n e ' ~  is hazy, they a t t e m p t  t o  shif t  it t o  their  
discretionary ' advantage. Where problems of industrial restructuring a r e  
particularly pressing, however, t h e  recognition of EC legitimacy can be severely 
challenged, and inconsistencies may actually endanger t h e  market  integration 
achieved. 
Table 1 
Towards EC product market integration 'from above' 
L Intra-EC Market access - financial physical 
1. tariffs: abolished 
2. other charges: prohibited (or a t  costprice) 
3. VAT: 3.1 indirect t ax  s s tems a r e  harmonized (into VAT) 
-+- 3.2 t ax  base sti l l  d d  ers (exemptions; excises) 
3.3 duties; ra tes  differ 
4. quotas 
4.1 ordinary quotas abolished 
4.2 t rade  deflection controls authorized (ex. art. 115) 
5. measures equivalent e f f ec t  t o  quotas 
5.1 prohibited with exceptions (health, public order; industrial 
property) 
5.2 harmonization of technical product specifications (incomplete) 
or 
-judicial review (Cassis de  Dyon and Dassonville law cases) 
6 .  exceptions outside t he  normal reach of a customs union: 
- exchange controls; safeguards (still existing) 
- transport (regulated sector) 
+ rationing 
+ no cabotage 
I. Uniform Public I n f l k x e  (only micro) 
7. regulated sectors  
7.1 EC regulated (positive integr.): CAP only 
7.2 liberalisation only (without pos. integr.): transport 
8. industrial policy 
8.1 public aid: EC prohibition (except R & D) but - no common EC 
aid 
8.2 public procurement policy: formal liberalisation 
9. regional policy 
aid, EC surveillance, but permitted 
10. public firms 
10.1 public firms, general: see 8.1 
10.2 'entrusted' undertakings: public regulation, plus monopoly, plus 
public ownership 
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2, Posi t ive  ~ ~ t d i ~ t i O t I :  t h e  case of steel 
As def ined  in ea r l i e r  work (Pelkmans,  1979, p. 1161, coordina t ion  among  coun t r i e s  
"involves t h e  in terna t ional ly  nego t i a t ed  adap ta t ion  of d o m e s t i c  policy in tent ions  in 
o rde r  t o  improve  t h e  f ina l  i m p a c t  of t h e s e  policies f o r  all part icipants .  Policy 
coordina t ion  i s  concerned  with t h e  e f f ec t iveness  of na t ional  policies  t h a t  a r e  
potent ia l ly  incons is ten t  in  t he i r  objec t ives  o r  conf l ic t ing  in t h e i r  instruments.' '  
Thus, t h e  f ina l  i m p a c t  of a coordina ted  policy i s  n o t  l ikely to be  b e t t e r  t han  t h e  
envisaged policy o u t c o m e  in case t h e  coun t ry  would have  been  fu l ly  au tonomous  
and would have  had i t s  own, bu t  it will c o n s t i t u t e  an improvemen t  ove r  t h e  a c t u a l  
o u t c o m e  of t h e  policy, had it been imp lemen ted  in t h e  in t e rdependen t  sys t em,  wi th  
t h e  in imica l  cha in  of nega t ive  policy f eedbacks  by o t h e r  count r ies  d u e  to follow. 
Coordina t ion  i s  a funct ional  response  t o  t h e  recognit ion of interdependence.  
Especial ly (but not  only) in  mixed economies  wi th  r ep resen ta t ive  sys t ems  of 
government ,  funct ional  responses en ta i l ing  domest ica l ly  painful concessions t o  
sther count r ies  a r e  ha rd  to come by. Domes t i c  nar row cons t i t nency  po!liicsi or 
occasionally even  t h e  broader  e l e c t o r a l  pol i t ics  m i l i t a t e  aga ins t  t h e  'd ic ta tes '  of 
in terna t ional  accomoda t ion  over  t h e  back  of spec i f i c  nat ional  i n t e r e s t  groups, 
wi thout  worrying abou t  t h e  overa l l  economic  'welfare '  espec ia l ly  beyond t h e  very  
sho r t  run. T h e  poli t ical- inst i tut ional  f r amework  f o r  economic  policy coordina t ion  
t h e r e f o r e  has  t o  b e  a s t rong  one,  espec ia l ly  when i t  i s  conce rned  wi th  t h e  highly 
sens i t ive  problem of industr ial  restructuring.  Because  i t  is  only when industr ial  
r e s t ruc tu r ing  i s  n o  longer solved 'invisibl'y by t h e  m a r k e t  - a l though t h a t  s t i l l  
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happens  much m o r e  than  t h e  poli t ical  'noise' i n  t h e  med ia  would m a k e  us be l ieve  - 
but  guided, aided or  cont ro l led  by t h e  na t ional  gove rnmen t ,  t h a t  in terna t ional  
coordina t ion  i s  mos t  needed and,  alas, t he reby  much m o r e  d i f f icu l t  to realize. 
T h e  European Coa l  and  S t e e l  Communi ty  T r e a t y  enab le s  t h e  use  of unprecedented  
powers  f o r  in terna t ional  economic  coordinat ion,  and  i s  probably t h e  s t ronges t  
ins t i tu t ional  machinery  f o r  industr ial  r e s t ruc tu r ing  in a c o n t e x t  of i n t e rna t iona l  
m a r k e t  interdependence.  Curiously enough, t h i s  does  NOT m e a n  t h a t  t h e  ECSC i s  
basical ly interventionist .  Art. 5, ECSC, s t i pu la t e s  t h a t  t h e  'Communi ty  sha l l  c a r r y  
o u t  i t s  t a s k  . . . with  a l imi ted  measu re  of in tervent ion '  whilst art.  2, ECSC speaks  
of t h e  bringing abou t  of 'condit ions which will of t hemse lves  ensu re  t h e  mos t  
rational distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity' 
(emphasis added). The Treaty i s  plain in  prohibiting national public subsidies to coal 
and steel (art 4,c, ECSC). The crux i s  that, as art. 5 puts it, "only when 
circumstances so require" a direct influence upon production or the market can be 
exerted. However, i n  the more important competences it i s  Council of Ministers 
(rather than the supranational Commission 2)) that is indispensable for the decision 
to take legal force. This renders the ECSC management of the steel crisis a case of 
positive coordination: coordination among ten national Ministers holding the 
industry portfolio it surely is i n  the sense defined above; positive in the sense that 
one transcends the mere removal of unilaterally introduced inconsistencies 
('negative coordination') and agrees about common measures what to do. 
The ECSC steel crisis persists now for nine years. It started out as a price collapse 
i n  the f irst half of 1975, after an exceptionally good 1974. The sequence is 
important because investments in  new capacity, coming on stream in  the late 
19701s, have frequently been defended with the prospects of the year 1974 as the 
basis for the decision. Oligopolistic industries with large economies of scale (i.e. 
large fixed physical capital costs) and fairly homogeneous products tend to  show an 
extremely volatile market pricing picture. Of course this is exacerbated if 
enterprises (modern or old; high cost or low cost; land based or coastal based) 
invest i n  new capacity on the basis of a record year of supply with record high 
prices, st i l l  apart from a host of other factors. These other factors included that 
the EC's export position i n  simple steel products came to be eroded due to  rise of 
steel production i n  the NIC's and that i ts  export position in specialty steels 
(especially i n  the US) came to be threatened by the Solomon plan (with an ingenious 
coupling of trigger prices aiTd dumping procedurers) and later by plain 
protectionism. Moreover the small but rising EC imports of steel only added to the 
problem. 
In  1975 and 1976 the EC Commission decided to take a series of 'soft' measures to 
increase the 'transparency1 of the market (compulsory provision of figures for 
monthly supply, forecasted supply and employment figures) so as to  preempt new 
waves of uncoordinated decisions by enterprises based on simple extrapolation of 
short run trends and on 'Cournot behaviour' (i.e. ignoring oligopolistic 
interdependence by assuming that one's own entrepreneurial decision wi l l  not ignite 
other firms to change their course). The measures did not suffice. The price 
collapse caused severe  losses and employment s t a r t ed  t o  fal l  rapidly; however, in a 
few EC countries capaci ty  was st i l l  coming on s t ream in highly modern coasta l  
plants. The older plants were  usually inefficient  and concentra ted in regions tha t  
were  e i ther  relatively poor (Wallonia in Belgium) or  relat ively strongly oriented t o  
heavy industries (Ruhr a r e a  in Germany; Saar a r e a  in Germany; Lorraine in France; 
mid-England zones; Liguria a r e a  in Italy). Closures were  considered socially and 
regionally impossible; yet, reconversion and rationalisation would be very expensive 
in these  old industrial areas while st i l l  requiring substantial  reductions in 
manpower. Meanwhile, national government t r ied  t o  gain t i m e  by covering t h e  
(heavy) losses of t h e  nationalized f i rms without being very firm in asking capaci ty  
reductions in return. In t h e  ECSC con tex t  a l l  hoped f o r  be t t e r  prices soon, and 
bet ted on exports. And what  is crucia l  for  an  insight in t h e  potential of positive 
coordination, every national industry minister refused t o  be f i r s t  in pursuing 
capaci ty  reduction, fearful  for  t h e  marke t  share  of 'his' f i rms a f t e r  t h e  crisis  would 
be over. One  might also put i t  differently: every  minister hoped t h a t  a sufficient  
number of his colleagues would be  prepared or forced t o  impose capaci ty  
reductions at home s o  t h a t  he  would be spared t h e  political and social agony. This 
s t ra teg ic  ' f ree  rider1 behaviour cannot, of course, be overcome by measures 
improving t h e  information about market t rends  and forecasts.  The  upshot was a 
continuation of depressed prices without any prospect of a re turn  t o  t h e  production 
levels of 1974 (in millions tons: 1974: 156; 1975: 126; 1976: 134; 1977: 126). 
In t h e  course of 1976 a ser ies  of more far-reaching but voluntary measures were  
implemented by t h e  EC Commission. They included a more  str ingent application of 
art. 54, ECSC, t h e  announcement of (non-binding) t a r g e t  prices and t h e  request  t o  
t h e  s teel  f i rms t o  reduce su&lies voluntarily ( the  beginning of t h e  Eurofer 
recession ca r te l ,  under EC supervision). Art. 54, ECSC, contains powers fo r  t h e  EC 
Commission t o  influence t h e  financing of (individual firms1) investment 
programmes, in accordance with t h e  periodically drawn up 'general objectives' of 
t h e  E C  s tee l  industry (ex. art.  46, ECSC). I t  i s  not possible for t h e  Commission t o  
block t h e  investment but i t  can  block subsidies (and use heavy fines as sanctions; 
since t h e  ECSC has a modest taxing power from which scrapping and social 
programmes a r e  paid, t h e  f ines can be a f fec ted  immediately) and refuse  ECSC 
loans or reduce t h e  g ran t  e lement  in them. In a period of heavy losses this power is 
a considerable one. Moreover, these  decisions must be published and hence will 
influence t h e  coordination negotiations. 
Agian, t h e  1976 package  did not  suffice. P r i c e s  were  not  k e p t  a t  t h e  t a r g e t  levels  
(due t o  l a rge  discounts),  voluntary supply reduction in t h e  Eurofer  c a r t e l  did not  
work (due t o  pressures t o  inc rease  capac i ty  utilisation and  s o  curb  losses) and s o m e  
governments  wen t  ahead in f inancing both t h e  losses and t h e  new capac i ty  coming 
on s t r eam (due  t o  heavy socia l  pressures). In mid-1977 t h e  f i r s t  minimum pr ices  had 
t o  b e  imposed, ex tended  t o  m o r e  (simple) steel products  in l a t e  1977. As a 
consequence a quan t i t a t ive  impor t  r eg ime  had t o  be established 3), connec ted  in 
ea r ly  1978 with ' t r igger prices'  and a more  s t r i c t  anti-dumping survei l lance  4). Also 
t h e  social  p rogramme for  re t ra in ing  of workers was  strengthened.  This package  
eased  t h e  tensions a l i t t le ,  pr ices  improved marginally and E C  supplies increased  
both  in 1978 and  1979 (although remaining f a r  below t h e  1974 l eve l  (1979: 140 
million ton). Moreover, 1979 w a s  a mini-boom and was  bound t o  be fol lowed by a 
renewed shrinkage of demand (if only because  of t h e  macroeconomic  r e s t r a in t s  
imposed by president  C a r t e r  and  Fede ra l  Rese rve  cha i rman  Volcker). Alas, t h e  
second oil c r i s i s  m a d e  th ings  dras t ica l ly  worse, especial ly because  E C  governments  
w e r e  no longer willing t o  provide accomodat ing  mone ta ry  financing: t h e  recession 
turned in to  something l ike  a depression. E C  s t e e l  production fe l l  by 10% within a 
year. That it did not  fa l l  m o r e  was due t o  recWess na t ional  subsidizing of s tocks  
t h a t  were, in  f ac t ,  no t  saleable.  New c a p a c i t y  had now c o m e  on s t r e a m  (in F r a n c e  
and Italy), loss c o v e r a g e  and  o t h e r  subsidies had reached very  high levels  (despi te  
t h e  prohibition in a r t .  4, ECSC !!), employment  continued t o  fal l ,  a n d  t h e  E C  expor t  
position eroded f u r t h e r  in t h e  l ight  of rapid output  increases  in t h e  NICs (and 
s t eady  volumes in  Eas te rn  Europe). The  'general  object ives '  as a set of f o r e c a s t s  
had ,to be  revised downwards t i m e  and again; t h e  gap  be tween  EC steel c a p a c i t y  
and i t s  an t ic ipa ted  o u t l e t s  widened yea r  a f t e r  year. T h e  ' immanent  crisis '  (ar t .  
61.b, ECSC), being t h e  basis  of The Davignon package  of 1978, had turned in to  a 
'mani fes t  crisis' (art.  58, ECSC). An even s t ronger  fo rm of posi t ive coordination 
had become inescapable. 
Art. 58 empowers  t h e  Commission t o  impose  production quota's. Tn f a c t ,  i t  
in t roduces  a publicly author ized  c a r t e l ,  with extens ive  en fo rcemen t  powers, with a 
view t o  ove rcome  t h e  'manifes t  crisis1. The  production quota 's  a r e  in f o r c e  s ince  
l a t e  1980 a f t e r  months  of haggling in t h e  Council. Pa r t i cu la r ly  Germany  had t w o  
problems: i t  had g r e a t  inhibitions t o  g ive  up a market-based mechanism of 
al locat ion,  and, i t  p ro te s t ed  aga ins t  t h e  a c t u a l  a l lo tmen t  of quota's. T h e  second 
quest ion a rose  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Germany  - as t h e  only coun t ry  - had an t i c ipa ted  
some of t h e  capaci ty  reductions t h a t  (in abst ract )  a l l  governments agreed were  
badly necessary. I t  insisted t h a t  quota's should not ' freeze'  t h e  present market  
shares but t a k e  into consideration t h e  adjustment already carr ied out. I t  also 
insisted t h a t  price competi t ion was 'most unfair1 (despite t h e  minimum prices) 
because some EC Member S t a t e s  subsidized t h e  s teel  f i rms so heavily t h a t  thei r  
marke t  shares  would never been so high (cost - ineffect ive  as these  f i rms were), had 
these  aids not enabled t h e  f i rms t o  reduce t h e  prices t o  prescribed levels. Of 
course,  t h e  ' f ree  riders1 ( the  others)  were  under such domestic pressures t h a t  they 
could not .yield. Another problem was caused by t h e  s o  called 'Bresciani', a group of 
small  s t ee l  f i rms  in Brescia (It.) t h a t  specialized in part icular,  non-heavy s teels  and 
were  highly efficient. They were  not in t h e  Eurofer c a r t e l  as i t  was in their  
in teres t  - not t o  f r e e z e  the i r  (increasing) market  share. 
From this discussion i t  should be c lear  t h a t  positive coordination - imperfect ,  and 
much too  slow as i t  was - only worked in t h e  end because mutual in teres ts  (i.e. also 
t h e  f e a r  of damage, upon refusing agreement)  and strong powers of enforcements  
were  both present. Concessions had t o  be made, and, in t h e  final analysis, were  
made. The Commission has never hesitated t o  levy heavy f ines  If f i rms surpassed 
thei r  assigned production quota's, and i t  has threatened t o  c u t  f u t u r e  quota's in 
case of renewed defiance. 
However, i t  took another  two  years before basic agreement  could be  reached on an 
overall  programme of renationalization and restructuring. The  Council finally 
decided t o  pursue a capaci ty  reduction of approx. 30 million tons (which is st i l l  
barely sufficient  t o  obtain a capaci ty  utilisation t h a t  will bring profits), a country 
and enterpr ise  breakdown of the* reductions ( tha t  is, what plant closures, where!), 
a ECSC Subsidy Code  (saying t h a t  no public aid can be  given a f t e r  1 Janurai  1986, 
while all aids a r e  conditional and must be approved before 19841, a new s e t  of 
minimum prices coupled t o  ex  a n t e  deposits (so as t o  enable  a rapid fining system) 
and ex t ra  financial means for social measures. The external  t r a d e  policy measures 
have been maintained with some changes. Unfortunately, t h e  only strong export  
product of t h e  ECSC (specialty steels)  has been subjected by t h e  US t o  volume 
protection in t h e  form of a fixed US market  share. 
Now t h a t  t h e  Member S ta tes  a r e  actually implementing t h e  coordinated measures, 
resistance increases even further.  I t  is improbable t h a t  t h e  Subsidy Code  will 
r ema in  undamaged,  but  o therwise  governments  have  held f i rm,  especial ly with 
r e spec t  t o  capac i ty  reductions. Nonetheless,  th is  should not  only be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
ECSC powers but  also, t o  s o m e  e x t e n t ,  t o  t h e  enormous  d r a g  of public money t h a t  
t h e  s t e e l  c r i s i s  has given r i se  to. The  budgetary pressures  inside Member  S t a t e s ,  
and t h e  secundary  negat ive  e f f e c t s  on t h e  r e s t  of t h e  economy,  h a s  g rea t ly  helped 
t h e  posi t ive coordination process. 
The  conclusion i s  t h a t  t h e r e  is l i t t l e  reason to e x p e c t  posi t ive coordination t o  b e  
t h e  appropr i a t e  means  f o r  in ternat ional  management  of res t ruc tur ing  conflicts.  
The  requi rements  in  t e r m s  of ins t i tu t ional  powers and mutua l  economic  in t e re s t s ,  
a r e  so demanding t h a t  i t  c a n  only succeed in a unique uset-up such as t h e  EC, o r  
perhaps wi th  t h e  support  of subs tant ia l  side-payments (by whom?) to suppress f r e e  
riding and align domes t i c  decisions to a coordinated  package. 
3 Nega t ive  coordination: EC survei l lance  of ~ t i d  ai s 
The  negat ive  coor i ina t ion  of na t ional  industr ial  policies and regulat ions coriiprises 
a l l  ac t ion ,  appropr i a t e  under t h e  EEC Trea ty ,  to render  t h e  inf luence  of nat ional  
public a g e n t s  on industrial ac t iv i ty  and s t r u c t u r e  cons is tent  with t h e  In ternal  
Market  and t h e  Compet i t ion  Regime. The  coordination funct ion  is essent ia l ly  
r e a c t i v e  or preventive;  reading t h e  E E C  T r e a t y  o n e  would not  normally e x p e c t  a 
Communi ty  design of industrial s t r u c t u r e  to underl ie  it. Public subsidies c a n  b e  
just if ied on  t h e  basis of a l loca t ive  o r  redis t r ibut ive  arguments.  If m a r k e t  fa i lures  
c a u s e  prices to convey t h e  'wrong1 signals, or, prevent  t h e  product  m a r k e t  f r o m  
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coming in to  being (public goods being undersupplied), public a id  c a n  be  employed t o  
improve  t h e  al locat ion of resources  and r ea l i ze  higher ou tpu t  with g r e a t e r  
s a t i s f ac t ion  of preferences.  Such subsidies a imed  at t h e  improved functioning of 
m a r k e t  mechanisms a r e  not  sub jec t  t o  E C  surveillance. Art. 92.1, EEC, con ta ins  a 
genera l  prohibition of any public a i d  ". . . which d i s to r t s  or  t h r e a t e n s  to dis tor t  
compe t i t i on  . . .", which is precisely t h e  opposi te  e f f e c t  of such subsidies (when 
proper ty  implemented). 
Subsidies c a n  a l s o , b e  justified on  redis t r ibut ive  grounds, o r  on t h e  l a t t e r  combined 
wi th  a l loca t ive  reasons. Art. 92.2 E E C  recognizes  explici t ly t h e  following t h r e e  
redis t r ibut ive  aids: (non-discriminator y) "aid having a social  c h a r a c t e r ,  g r a n t e d  t o  
individual consumerst1,  a id s  in case of na tura l  d isas ters ,  and  a ids  fo r  a r e a s  suf fer ing  
f r o m  t h e  division of  Germany.  T h e  combinat ion  of red is t r ibut ive  and a l loca t ive  
reasons i s  espec ia l ly  of i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  regional  policies. O n  t h e  supply s ide  i t  may  
be  necessary  t o  employ  ( re la t ive ly  more )  public a ids  f o r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and  c e r t a i n  
public s e rv i ces  as well  as f inancia l  incent ives  f o r  industr ial  e s t ab l i shmen t s  t o  
compensa te  f o r  l oca t iona l  d isadvantages  be fo re  a l loca t ion  could b e  said t o  b e  
spa t ia l ly  optimal. O n  t h e  demand  side,  redistr ibut ion m a y  b e  necessary  - th rough 
t h e  a g g r e g a t e  t a x  a n d  soc ia l  s ecu r i ty  sys t em,  a n d  perhaps  even  by of fer ing  spec i f i c  
advan tages  as well  - f o r  pos i t ive  ex te rna l i t i e s  (such as avai lab i l i ty  of various ski l ls  
and  p r iva t e  serv ices)  t o  b e  gene ra t ed ,  s o  as t o  main ta in  compe t i t i veness  v i s - h i s  
f i r m s  bene f i t t i ng  f r o m  agg lomera t ion  ex te rna l i t i e s  elsewhere.  Both types  of a id s  
are no t  d is tor t ive ,  sub jec t  to t h e  proviso t h a t  t h e  m e a s u r e  of compensa t ion  i s  no t  
excess ive  (which i s  an e lus ive  proviso in  policy pract ice) .  
Art. 92.3, EEC, recognizes  t h a t  "aid t o  p romote  t h e  economic  development  of 
a r e a s  w h e r e  t h e  s t a n d a r d  of l iving i s  abnormal ly  low o r  where  t h e r e  i s  ser ious  
underemploymentl1 as subsidies t h a t  m a y  b e  compa t ib l e  wi th  t h e  common market .  
. . Hence; coordina t ion  a i m s  a t  a proper  Implementa t ion  of what,  in npin ,. .,.c:p!e, Is 
permi t ted .  T h e  E E C  T r e a t y  (art.  92.3.(c)) even  al lows d i s to r t i ve  regional  a i d s  ". . . 
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  deve lopmen t  of c e r t a i n  economic  ac t iv i t i e s  o r  of c e r t a i n  economic  
areast1, subjec t  t o  t h e  d iscre t ionary  policy condit ion t h a t  such a id  does n o t  
adverse ly  a f f e c t  t r ad ing  condi t ions  t o  a n  e x t e n t  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  common interest1'. 
Clearly,  E C  survei l lance  needs  t o  be based on an exp l i c i t  regional  policy at 
Communi ty  l eve l  b e f o r e  t h i s  condit ion c a n  be  appropr ia te ly  imposed. 
Public  a ids  a r e  much m o r e  d i f f izu l t  t o  justify when m a r k e t  f a i lu re s  are absen t ,  
because  t h e y  create dis tor t ions  t h a t  would o the rwise  n o t  exist.  In mixed economies  
with r ep resen ta t ive  gove rnmen t  and  fa i r ly  inflexible labour  markets ,  (nat ional)  
public a ids  t o  indus t ry  a r e  f r equen t ly  defended on  soc ia l  grounds -often combined 
wi th  regional  concen t r a t ion  of unemployment  - or wi th  budgetary  - poli t ical  
reasons  (when i t  i s  f inancial ly indi f ferent  t o  pay subsidies o r  unemployment  
al lowances,  t h e  f o r m e r  are pre fe r r ed  as t h e y  boost  employmen t  figures). 
These  a rgumen t s  a r e  economical ly  misleading, as t h e y  a r e  based on  pa r t i a l  and  
short-run analysis. Moreover,  t h e y  ignore  t h a t  t hey  a r e  normal ly  incons is ten t  with 
t h e  notion of compe t i t i on  in a Communi ty-wide  In terna l  Market .  
If a firm or  sector  in a Member S t a t e  is inefficient, markets  will tend t o  convey 
signals such as a falling market  share  and/or falling profits. The salutory e f f e c t  of 
competi t ion from apparently more  efficient  f i rms is precisely t h a t  i t  forces  t h e  
inefficient  ones t o  reduce their  X-inefficiencies, change their  product mix and t a k e  
other  managerial measures, or  otherwise be eliminated. The th rea t  of negative 
growth or bankruptcy of private f i rms is t h e  linchpin of competition: 
microeconomically, i t  ensures t h a t  t h e  drive fo r  more efficiency and innovation in 
dynamic f i rms  i s ' a  stimulus t h a t  will be rewarded (if o thers  reac t  la ter ,  o r  not at 
all); macroeconomically, i t  ensures t h a t  t h e  waste  of resources i s  kept t o  a 
minimum, hence resulting in higher o u t p u t  Public aids t o  noncompeti t ive f i rms 
f rus t ra tes  t h e  basic incentive of competi t ion and causes a waste  of resources. 
These arguments hold irrespective of whether one refers  t o  so-called 'domestic1 
aids or expor t  subsidies: t h e  fo rmer  could impede a f irm from another  EC country 
t o  build up a higher marke t  share  in t h e  country giving aid, t h e  l a t t e r  enables 
larger market  shares  elsewhere t h a t  a r e  not solely based on t h e  firm's internal  
efficiency and marketing performance. Furthermore,  non-aided f i rms (say, in o ther  
EC countries) could understandably ask for  'matching1 aid or border protection 
which wouid iead t o  additional waste of resources (-while neutralizing the e f f e c t s  of 
t h e  initial aids) as well as a stepwise destruction of t h e  Internal Market. 
The arguments cannot be saved by reference t o  (structural)  unemployment. If 
unemployment is s t ructura l  and substantial, public aids t o  one firm in one country 
must imply a reduction of t h e  turnover of o ther  f i rms  in t h a t  country and in other  
EC Member S t a t e s  t h a t  would have been achieved without t h e  aid. I t  might also 
induce such low prices as t o  endanger profit margins of o ther  f i rms necessary fo r  
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replacement investment,  fo r  R & D, or  indeed for  expansion (expecting t o  
consolidate o r  increase market  shares). In this sense, unemployment is  shifted t o  
o ther  firms, possibly in other  Member States. 
The  EEC Trea ty  (art. 92.1) prohibits aids precisely on these  grounds, t h a t  is, when a 
( th rea t  of) distortion of competi t ion arises and t h e  aid 'I. . . a f f e c t s  t r ade  between 
Member States". As noted above, t h e  prohibition is  not absolute, not even when aid 
can be considered t o  be distort ive but in t h e  l a t t e r  case t h e  'common interes t t  of 
t h e  EC should be overriding or  a 'serious disturbance in t h e  economy of a Member 
S ta te1  ought t o  be t h e  reason for aid. Unfortunately, t h e  actual  implementation of 
negative industrial aid coordination has proved t o  be problematic. 
Genera l  aid programmes a r e  not  specif ical ly mentioned,  e x  art .  93, a s  possible 
except ions  t o  t h e  rule,  e x  art .  92, 1, of incompatibi l i ty with t h e  E C  Treaty .  But  i t  
i s  not  a priori c l ea r  t h a t  t hey  would a lways  d i s to r t  compet i t ion  in such a way as t o  
b e  "incompatible with t h e  common market", as t h e  language  of ar t .  92 , l  has  it. 
This implies t h a t  t h e  Commission has  to exe rc i se  d iscre t ionary  power which is f a r  
f rom easy  in th is  politically sens i t ive  domain. T h e  Commissionls  position, r e j ec t ing  
a number of nat ional  a id  schemes ,  has  been endorsed by t h e  C o u r t  in t h e  Philip 
Morris case 5). T h a t  position i s  as follows: "state aids  a r e  in principle incompat ib le  
with t h e  common market .  T h e  d iscre t ionary  power of t h e  Commission should only 
be  exerc ised  when t h e  a ids  proposed by Member S t a t e s  con t r ibu te  t o  t h e  
ach ievemen t  of t h e  Communi ty  objec t ives  and in t e re s t  set o u t  in Art. 92  (3) EEC. 
T h e  nat ional  i n t e r e s t  of a Member  S t a t e  o r  t h e  benef i t s  obta ined by t h e  rec ip ient  
of aid in cont r ibut ing  to t h e  nat ional  i n t e r e s t  d o  no t  by themselves  justify t h e  
posi t ive exe rc i se  of t h e  Commission's d iscre t ionary  powers" (emphasis  added) 6). 
As to national  regional  aids, t h e  c o m p e t e n c e s  of t h e  Commission do  not  allow 
in te r f e rence  with t h e  prec ise  sec to ra l  distr ibution of aid,  o n c e  a regional  
p rogramme has  been agreed In Rrnssels. Given t h e  frcqr~ent over lap  betweeri 
s e c t o r a l  and regional  problems cumula t ion  c a n  occur  t h a t  may  have  d i s to r t ive  
ef fec ts .  
F o r  s e c t o r a l  aid, guidance and negat ive  coordination has  been f a r t h e s t  developed 
during t h e  1970s. Sec to ra l  a id  has  t o  b e  se lec t ive ,  t empora ry  and degressive ove r  
time. Pure ly  conserving aid, proping up f i r m s  wi thout  r e f e r e n c e  t o  r e s t ruc tu r ing  o r  
reconversion programmes has t o  be  abolished. In sec to r s  with ad jus tmen t  problems, 
a id  ought  not  t o  have  capac i ty  increas ing  e f f e c t  (of course,  t h i s  does  not  apply  to 
dynamic,  innovat ive  sectors).  Also, a id  ought  not  t o  hinder s t ruc tu ra l  industr ial  
change (EC, 1972). 
Thus on paper  negat ive  a id  coordination in t h e  E C  a p p e a r s  to aim t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
rat ionalisat ion processes in industry. Aid i s  s t r i c t ly  conceived so as t o  s t r eng then  
t h e  adap t ive  capac i ty  of f i r m s  and lower  t h e  tangible  and intangible social  costs of 
transition. T h e r e f o r e  t h e  problem of a possible d is tor t ion  of compet i t ion ,  both  fo r  
non-assisted f i rms  in t h e  country  and f o r  users  and consumers  would s e e m  t o  b e  
bearable. But t h e  prac t ica l  implementa t ion  ove r  t h e  1970s has proved t o  b e  qu i t e  
d i f ferent .  
Firs t ,  in t h r e e  sectors  (shipbuilding, synthet ic  f ibres  and s tee l )  serious s t ruc tu ra l  
overcapaci t ies  have led t o  a policy t o  f ac i l i t a t e  weathering crises,  r a the r  than 
imposing rationalisation. In some  measure  i t  is  accepted,  for  instance,  t h a t  cu r ren t  
operation cos ts  of f i rms  in these  crisis  sec to r s  a r e  reduced by aid. In shipbuilding a 
build-and-scrap programme was blocked in 1980. 
I t  follows t h a t  i t  is  diff icult  in t h e  socio-political p rac t i ce  of t h e  E C  t o  implement  
negative coordination fo r  sec to r s  in genuine trouble. As rat ionalisat ion occurs 
slowly through t h e  marke t  (natural  mobility of workers ou t  of a sector ;  induced job 
search e lsewhere  because of a lack of confidence in t h e  crisis sector;  mergers; 
technical  wearing ou t  of physical capital),  governments  hope t h a t  this  will yield 
such slimming s o  as t o  reduce aid in a fu tu re  cyclical  upswing. But due  to 
insufficient  d i f ferent ia t ion of wages with respect  t o  sec to r s  and skills, and reduced 
geographical mobility (especially f o r  social  reasons and housing problems), t h e  
natura l  sec to ra l  r a t e  of job change has tended t o  fall. And t h e  prolonged 
recessionary c i rcumstances  have  rendered induced job sea rch  much more  difficult. 
T h e  upshot has  been t h a t  'crisis aid has  taken on a l i fe of i t s  own, largely exempt  
x--  
~ t ~ r i i  t h e  negative coordination c r i t e r i a  rner,ticned abcve. !t has  !ed to perma.n.en? 
distort ions and to tendencies  of 'aid matching' among countries,  res t r ic t ing t h e  
expansion of t h e  more  ef f ic ient  firms. Note  f o r  ins tance  t h a t  between 1975 and 
1980 some f 40 Billion of national  aid t o  steel f i rms  has been disbursed (!) despi te  a 
comple te  prohibition in t h e  ECSC Treaty .  Important  a id  receivers  t h a t  a r e  subject  
t o  t h e  EEC regime include cars,  shipbuilding, text i les  and a i rcraf t .  
Of course  t h e  Commission is well a w a r e  of t h e  problem. F o r  instance, in 1982 i t  
warned against  a n  emerging "aid mentali tyu (EC, 1982, p. 11 11, Iti.e. t h a t  f irms,  
when they g e t  into difficulties, turn  immediate ly  t o  t h e  S t a t e  for  ass is tance  ra the r  
than rely on the i r  own resources and e f f o r t s  t o  overcome thei r  difficulties. This aid 
menta l i ty  i s  nurtured part icularly in cases where they s e e  thei r  compet i tors  
receiving aids in o the r  Member S t a t e s  and consequently f e e l  t h a t  they  have a right 
and a need t o  receive  aid themselves". The Commission has also developed t h r e e  
guidelines for  aid in (industrial) crisis  sectors: (1) national aid must  not  lead to  t h e  
expor t  of unemployment t o  t h e  res t  of t h e  EC; (2) aids must bring about  t h e  
res tora t ion of t h e  health of t h e  firm(s) within a "reasonablett period of t ime;  (3) 
aids  should be  "transparent", s o  t h a t  t h e y  can be controlled,  (EC, 1982; p. 114). T h e  
f i r s t  two  guidelines, if fai thfully applied, must lead t o  capaci ty  reduction in crisis  
sectors. 
A second problem with negative aid coordination is the  weak political legitimacy of 
the  Commission when i t  opposes aid. Although i t  has t he  ult imate stick of recourse 
to  t he  Court of Justice, it has no carrot  in the  form of less distortive Community 
aid or significant EC procurement and it suffers from a lack of political authority 
in requiring timely and accurate  notification enabling complete and ex an te  
evaluation. All too frequently notification is l a te  and all too rarely is i t  detailed 
and accurate  enough. One had the  impression, especially a f te r  the mid-1970's tha t  
Member S ta tes  did this on purpose so as  t o  postpone the  actual  adjustment t o  
Community cr i ter ia  as long as  possible 7). 
In t he  twelve years from 1970 t o  1981 inclusive, the  EC Commission's annual total  
of investigations of cases of S t a t e  aids increased from 21 (1971) t o  142 (1981); t h e  
three-year moving average increased with 412% (71173 t o  79/81). Until 1981, 
however t he re  were conspiciously few formal negative decisions (a to ta l  of 21 over 
11 year), which could mean tha t  t he  Commission had to  yield under political 
pressures, or, t ha t  t h e  member country changed i t s  laws or provisions ex post. On 
this crucially different interpretation, no statist ics have ever been presented. The 
impression is tha t  t h e  Commission has become more stringent a f t e r  1978, and 
especially af te r  1980. Infringement prccedures %ere epened !aid form either 
'settled' or formally forbidden) with an average of 12 a year between 1970-78. 
Thereafter,  the  annual figures differ markedly: 1979-54; 1980-33; 198 1-62; 1982- 
129 (with 13 negative decisions formally published) 8). 
As a general supposition i t  seems reasonable t o  maintain tha t  - although any 
genuine coordination is politically ambitious - negative coordination is relatively 
easy. After all, 'thou shall not' rules leave scope for  domestic autonomy, 'thou 
e 
shalt' rules do not. The EC form of negative cooridnation would seem to  be a 
favourable case because t he  aspect  of negotiated adaptation (in the Council of 
Ministers) is only relevant t o  distortive public aids where a "Community interest" 
has t o  be defined and operational cr i ter ia  established. Usually this does not happen 
on a case  by case basis (which would greatly impair the  effectiveness of the 
coordination by having t o  indulge in ad hoc package deals). Once such EC interests 
have been defined. i t  is t h e  Commission (and, if necessary, the  European Court)  
tha t  can implement the  policy, even against the public stance of the national 
government in question. 
Despite t h e  a t  t imes  doubtful political legit imacy of the  Commissionls 
implementation,  t h e r e  is no question t h a t  t h e  negative coordination in t h e  EC has 
succeeded in reconciling t h e  achieved market  integration with a sufficient  measure 
of national industrial policy autonomy t o  stabil ize t h e  European Community. 
Whether t h e  infinitely weaker GATT code on subsidies could ever accomplish a 
similar result  among t h e  developed, market-oriented countries seems  unlikely. 
What ought t o  be t h e  appropr ia te  mechanism in cases of very di f ferent  levels of 
developments or d i f ferent  socio-economic systems, is an even harder question: if 
domestic interventions a r e  far-reaching, how can they be made consitent  in such a 
way tha t  market  access is not  or not great ly  impaired during t h e  process of 
restructuring? 
4. Harmonization 
Harmonisation comprises e f fo r t s  t o  remove inconsistencies in laws and 
governmental  procedures hindering or distorting t rade  among interdependent 
ecofiornies, There  a r c  negative and positive aspec t s  t o  harmonisation, analogous to 
those in coordination, but it is not useful t o  t r e a t  them separate ly  since they tend 
t o  be  substitutes. 
Harmonisation is a highly technical  mode of cooperation, yet ,  this  property need 
neither imply t h e  absence of important economic e f f e c t s  nor t h e  lack of 
politicisation. In any event,  harmonisation is  much more suitable for worldwide 
application than various other  forms of Communtiy regulatory collaboration, be it 
t h a t  t h e  ambition and scope is likely t o  be more  modest. 
Discussing harmonisation in t h e  EC must be done in a t runcated form given t h e  
mere  scale  of t h e  many a t t e m p t s  ongoing. Moreover, harmonisation is also a 
'buzzword1 in t h e  Brussels parlance: r a the r  than referring t o  t h e  meaning as given 
above, it i s  employed loosely fo r  anything cooperative tha t ,  in soothing disputes or  
mitigating conflicting a t t i tudes ,  may c r e a t e  more  'harmony1. As interdependent,  
interventionist  economies cannot but maintain relationships of permanent  
negotiation, overall 'harmony1 serves  as a crucial  asset of diplomatic goodwill 
generating t h e  confidence and willpower t o  overcome differences in policies. Also, 
art.  2, EEC, mentions t h e  "harmonious development of activitiesI1 among Member 
S t a t e s  a s  a key objective,  a phrase t h a t  obviously can be used with a g r e a t  many 
diplomatic twists. While recognizing t h e  value of all th is  (and noting t h a t  t h e  need 
f o r  th is  asset is at l eas t  as g r e a t  in wider international  negotiations), I shall merely 
deal  very briefly with a narrow concept  of harmonization. 
Apar t  from t h e  harmonization of s ta t i s t ics  and of legal  techniques, t h e  E C  has 
displayed act iv i t ies  on t w o  fronts: f irst ,  on t h e  harmonisation of indirect  t a x  
sys tems  among Member S t a t e s  and second on t h e  harmonization of technical  
product regulations, norms, s tandards  and performance tests. In t h e  period of t h e  
E C  of Six, t h e  Member S t a t e s  decided t o  switch to t h e  value-added sys tem (=VAT) 
of indi rect  taxation,  al though only France  used th i s  system. In doing so, they 
great ly  fac i l i ta ted  t h e  (comparison of) calculat ions of t h e  t a x  burden in consumer 
prices and in t h e  prices of complex in te rmedia te  goods as well as reducing t h e  
f ront ier  'nuisance'. With due recognition of t h e  comprehensive adminis t ra t ive  
success, i t  i s  s t i l l  t r u e  t h a t  d i f ferences  in national VAT dut ies  have t o  be formally 
c leared at borders. A t  present  t h e  E C  is a t t empt ing  to copy t h e  Benelux example  
of tax clearance ,  - not at t h e  border, but  at t h e  origin and destination of t h e  good. 
For  prob!erns of internationa! industria! res t ructur ing th is  e i sbora te  harmonisation 
is hardly worth  t h e  trouble. 
Harmonisation of technical  specifications, however, acquires a n  increasing 
importance  in t h e  Community's industrial s t ra tegy,  and is also re levant  worldwide 
in a number of cases. If technical  specifications of products a r e  legally compulsory 
in one country,  they will a f f e c t  t h e  'physical marke t  access' fo r  imports  f rom any 
other  source, i r respect ive  whether  products from t h a t  source  will have  f r e e  
., 
f inancial  access (i.e. E C  products, and usually EFTA industrial  pruducts as well) or  
have t o  overcome a ta r i f f  barrier. 'Physical market  access1 i s  f r e e  if t h e  physical 
propert ies of t h e  product do  not have t o  be di f ferent  for  domest ic  production and 
fo r  export. In t h e  E C  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  a l t e rna t ive  ways t o  rea l ize  f r e e  'physical 
marke t  access': unificiaton (i.e. t h e  imposition of uniformity, via art .  235, EEC, o r  
derived legislation), harmonisation (i.e. ensuring sufficient  compatibil i ty t o  obvia te  
border controls) and judicial review by t h e  European Cour t  with respec t  t o  t h e  
legali ty of national specifications t h a t  block o r  hinder intra-EC trade.  Unification 
i s  rare ,  although parallel  Community options (for instance, in patents  and t r a d e  
marks) come t o  be  viewed as useful and accep tab le  al ternatives.  Harmonisation and 
judicial review a r e  explici t ly linked by t h e  Commission and t h e  Court .  
Harmonisation (ex. art .  100, EEC on 'approximation' of national laws) implies a 
negotiated c o r e  o r  range of specifications (thereby excluding o the r  possibilities) 
t h a t  is  formalized in a so  called EC 'directive', obliging Member S t a t e s  t o  insert  
this c o r e  or range in thei r  own laws without, however, prescribing t h e  
operationalisation o r  inforcement  methods. Crucia l  is  tha t  harmonization prevents 
a Member S t a t e  f rom relying on art.  36, EEC, t h a t  permits  t o  exerc ise  border 
controls on t r ade  fo r  such reasons as health,  public morality, public policy (in a 
res t r ic t ive  sense, but i t  does  include 'justified' consumer protection,  for instance) 
and public security. If products do not fal l  under a harmonisation directive,  
country-wise product specifications a r e  prohibited, ex. art. 30, EEC (on so called 
measures having equivalent  e f f e c t s  to quota's), e x c e p t  when t h e  Cour t  accep t s  
thei r  validity, following art. 36, EEC. However, t h e  burden of proof is  on t h e  
Member S ta te ,  and at any ra te ,  t h e  measure  should never b e  more  res t r ic t ive  (for 
t rade)  than i s  necessary f o r  (proportional to)  t h e  purpose of t h e  regulation 9). The  
ra ther  severe  judicial review by t h e  C o u r t  has forced Member S a t e s  t o  be  a l i t t l e  
more  forthcoming in t h e  t a rdy  harmonization process. 
-. 
1 he combination of harmonization and judicai review is a robust staSl!ize: cf 
marke t  integration in t h e  European Community. This s tands  in sharp con t ras t  with 
t h e  rising t i d e  of non-tariff protectionism and t h e  erosion of physical marke t  
access now t h a t  product regulation has  been great ly  intensif ied over  t h e  globe 
(think of food laws, environmental  laws,  anti-danger prescriptions). What is, more  
over, of special  importance  fo r  industrial restructuring i s  t h e  question of technical  
norms and standards, s ince  they play a dominant ro le  in advanced and new 
industries. Although t h e  International  Standards  Organisation (ISO) t r i e s  t o  obtain 
agreement  about  worldwide standards,  t h e  bulk of them in t h e  E C  der ive  f rom 
t h r e e  sources: 
- European standardization ins t i tu tes  (CEN and CENELEC) 
- national standardization ins t i tu tes  
- non-codif ied industrial norms 
The  f i rs t  one  gains in importance  now t h a t  t h e  E C  Commission has  decided t o  
de lega te  t h e  harmonization of technical  industrial s tandards  t o  them ra ther  than  t o  
t h e  luggish E C  machinery. A CEN/CENELEC s tandard is normally adopted in E C  
directives. The  l a s t  o n e  does not give r ise to  border protection but i t  implies t h a t  
foreign sellers have no chance if norms a r e  decided by national industry. In new 
products - especial ly in te rmedia te  goods and in case of technological changes of 
existing products -, investments in R & D, and in production lines may be wasted, 
or at leas t  misspecified, if markets  cannot be penetrated due t o  national norms. In 
computers,  telecom switching and terminal equipment, c a r  components, a i rc ra f t  
components, cer ta in  new consumer electronics (video-recorder; compact  disc), 
biotechnology, components for  numerical controlled machine tools or  robots, t h e  
se t t ing of standards and norsm can be decisive for  t h e  competi t iveness of a firm's 
product in t h e  short  run, and for  t h e  market position in t h e  longer run. 
If restructuring is going t o  shift  resources ou t  of low value-added, comparat ive  
disadvantageous l ines of industry t o  advanced and new industries t o  s t rengthen t h e  
fu tu re  expor t  position of t h e  country (and t h e  Community) in question, f lexible 
modes of harmonization a r e  indispensable for success. 
5. Unification: t h e  not-s+commm trade policy 
Unification is defined as t h e  combination of two  or more  national policy s t ruc tu res  
into a common one, backed by s o m e  form of sanctions. Unification is, of course, 
highly ambitious. T o  be successful at unification t h e  loyalty t o  cooperate  must not  
only be positive in spiri t  but indeed also self-denying in character.  I t  assumes t h a t  
ce r ta in  policy a reas  can be separated from t h e  national government without a loss 
of effectiveness, in o ther  words, i t  implies a fundamental  t ransfer  of political 
responsibility t h a t  must not be undermined by t h e  national competences  in 
functionally linked policy domains. This seems an almost prohibitive barrier  for 
modern nation-states, t h e  EC coyntries included, as they  have a s t rong inclination 
t o  maintain their  own power and reasser t  themselves. 
The present author does not suggest t h a t  unification could ever be a feasible 
solution for  international compatibility problems in industrial restructuring. 
Rather ,  I have chosen t h e  strongest  form of policy cooperation in t h e  EC and hope 
t o  show t h a t  t h e  internationally most conf l i c tud  instance of restructuring policy - 
t r ade  policy - has exceptionally strong tendencies t o  remain national (in par t )  so  as 
t o  be responsive t o  national desires of industrial autonomy. If this is c o r r e c t  it does 
not augur well for t h e  international compatibility of industrial restructuring 
programmes among countries t h a t  do not have such far-reaching degrees of 
commi tment  t o  a common cause. 
As art .  113, EEC, s t a t e s  'I. . . t h e  common commercia l  policy shall  be based on 
uniform principles" and t h e  implementation is a Communi ty  mat te r .  The  EC has 
the re fo re  exclusive powers in t h e  common t r a d e  policy; t h e  Member S t a t e s  have 
effect ively  t ransferred them and cannot claim concurrent  or parallel competences.  
But t h e r e  is  a t r a p  he re  t h a t  is  of g r e a t  economic importance.  Although EC powers 
a r e  exclusive once t ransferred,  i t  is  all but obvious what powers ac tual ly  have been 
transferred.  Without necessarily being exhaustive,  art .  1 13.1 l is ts  changes in tar i f f  
ra tes ,  t h e  conclusion of tariff  and t r ade  agreements ,  t h e  achievement  of 
uniformity in measures of liberalization, expor t  policy and anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties as falling under uniform pr inciples  But t h e  respect ive  
degrees  of l iberalization need not b e  equal  in t h e  EC, as a careful  reading of art .  
11 1.5 shows, and have not  been equal  in practice.  This has  t h e  curious consequence 
t h a t  a safeguard clause (art. 115, f i r s t  para.) is  inserted,  causing intra-Community 
border interventions and origin-controls in order  to prevent  t r a d e  deflection arising 
f rom differential  access to Member Sta tes '  marke t s  fo r  identical  third country 
imports. Fragi le  pre-federalism and a powerful political economy of sec to ra l  
pressures g e n e r a t e  this  ambiguous a t t i t u d e  that ,  while buying off domest ic  tensions 
for the  ~at iof ia!  politician, has  an erodirrg e f f e c t  on t h e  abi!i?y of t h e  EC to use its 
commercia l  power and to avoid fur ther  problems in t h e  Internal  Market. The 
unhappy choice  then becomes t h a t  between t h e  erosion of intra-EC f r e e  t r a d e  and 
t h e  erosion of E C  f r e e  t r a d e  with t h e  r e s t  of t h e  world. Where t r a d e  policy, o r  
subsidiary ins t ruments  such as t r a d e  credits ,  are ins t rumenta l  t o  foreign policy 
aims, t h e  problem is  fu r the r  compounded. Dispari t ies in economic foreign policy 
instruments are bound to have repercussions on m a r k e t  in tegra t ion -whether 
through t r a d e  deflection or (further)  distort ions of compet i t ive  conditions - and 
hence have to be constrained. 
In sketchy fo rm t h e  Community 's  t r a d e  policy looks as follows today: 
a )  t h e r e  is a common external  tar i f f  (as indeed GATT, art .  24 requires) and a l l  
t h e  (many) exceptions are joint exceptions with ident ica l  implication. The  
more  important  cases include. 71 so called Lom6-Convention countries 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific,  o r  A C P  countries)  t h a t  have  tar i f f - f ree  
access in industrial goods, t h e  EFTA countries (Nordic countries, Austria, 
Switzerland and Portugal)  t h a t  have an industrial f r e e  t r a d e  a r e a  with t h e  EC, 
all Mediterranean countries excep t  Albania t h a t  have  - varying -preferential  
access  for industrial products, and, finally, a l l  less developed countries, having 
a measure of preference in t h e  EC's Generalized System of Preferences  ( that  
is less generous than t h e  Lom6 regime). 
So, who actually pays the  common tar i f f  duties? Well, only t h e  non-European 
OECD countries, most (not all) of t h e  Comecon countries,  South Africa and 
Taiwan. At any ra te ,  EC tariff  duties a r e  low t o  very low, with hardly any 
exceptions. 
b) Where the re  is volume protection t h e  picture drastically changes. Although 
national quota's have been abolished (with t h e  curious exception of German 
coal quota), new forms of volume protection have arisen at t h e  Member S t a t e  
level  in various appearances and fo r  many products. 
Usually this volume protection is highly informal,  building on a technique f i rs t  
invented by US senators l a t e  1956 (when confronted with a flood of Japanese  
clothing imports  and refusing t o  defy GATT rules tha t ,  in 1955, had been 
fur ther  elaborated under US leadership) and taken over in 1957 by t h e  US 
administration. The idea is  t h a t  t h e  formal  t r ade  liberalization is an 
i r refutable  ;ommitment s o  t h a t  part ial ,  se lect ive  and - informal methods ought 
t o  be found t o  l ' r e ~ o n c i l e ' ~  t h e  national goal of protection with the 
maintenance of an  international trading order. This i s  what  'voluntary expor t  
restraintst  a r e  al l  about. 
Now, in t h e  EC, i t  is by na tu re  impossible t o  t ransfer  t h e  formal  competence 
of countries t o  t h e  Commission when t h e r e  is only a higly informal exchange 
of deterrence through th rea t s  and a promise t o  curb  expor ts  by t h e  source 
country. The cleavage between disposing of a formal  common t rade  policy 
competence and having t h e  q c t u a l  powers of negotiation and implementation 
( the  national customs!) has caused resurgent f r ic t ions  in t h e  EC's t r ade  policy 
fo r  reasons of industrial restructuring,  or, frequently,  for  reason of a refusal  
t o  adjust t o  t h e  emerging comparat ive  disadvantages. 
In addition, t h e  Council and t h e  Commission together  can formally author ize  a 
particular Member S t a t e  t o  install temporary protection in a particular 
product vis-h-vis a particular exporting country  ( the  ar. 115, EEC, procedure, 
as s ta ted  above). Usually these  a r e  cases where t h e r e  is a t h r e a t  of injury due 
t o  so called 'market disruptiont - a sudden flood of imports at much lower 
prices t h a t  leaves no t ime  for  adjustment,  rat ionalization and restructuring 
10). 
The las t  f e w  years t h e  Community is slowly trying t h e  regain t h e  'commonness1 of 
t r ade  policy, also in questions of formal  and informal volume protection. This move 
tends t o  be at t h e  expense of t h e  market  access  of emerging industrial exporters,  
especially t h e  NICs. 
The text i les  and clothing sector  is - t h e  big sec to r  where border protection has 
become overwhelmingly quanti tat ive.  Preceded by t h e  Short-term (1 96 1) and Long- 
t e r m  Cot ton Text i le  Arrangement (1962), t h r e e  Multi-Fibre Arrangements  have 
now been concluded (resp. 1973, 1977 and 198 1) with an  ever-increasing number of 
semi- or newly industrialized countries. Also t h e  coverage of 'fibre1-products has 
continuously been extended while t h e  r a t e  of permit ted  import  volume growth has 
been reduced in 1977. The US and t h e  EC dif fer  in thei r  emphasis of tariff  
protection and this c r e a t e s  a g r e a t e r  EC incentive t o  employ s t r ingent  quant i ta t ive  
l imits in t h e  four-yearly MFA negotiations. In addition, t h e  E C  has f e l t  it necessary 
t o  impose quota's p e r  Member S t a t e  in view of t h e  di f ferent  speeds (and 
willingness) t o  adjust  t o  text i les  and clothing import  competition. This is based on 
art. 115, EEC, enabling national measures t o  prevent t r ade  deflection in cases 
.--L w l ~ e r e  iiatioiid c o m m e r c i d  p ~ l i c i e s  s t i l l  vary. However, t h e  legali ty cf t h e  national 
quota  is  in doubt, because, in text i les  and clothing t h e  Community negotiates t h e  
MFA. Hence, a possible s e t  of national quota's can,  at best, be a guideline for  
negotiations among t h e  Ten, before agreeing t o  t h e  MFA. I t  seems  legally incorrect  
t o  use them as a justification fo r  national origin controls at t h e  border, e x  art. 115. 
Since overall EC quota's (and the i r  annual growth r a t e )  a r e  negotiated between t h e  
EC and (some 30) individual expor ters  of t h e  Third World and Southern Europe t h e  
upshot is a long l ist  of quota's per year per product per exporting country, broken 
down fo r  10 Member States.  With 126 product groups under t h e  EC interpreta t ion 
of t h e  MFA, (say) 30 suppliers and 8 internal  quota's (Benelux counting for one), t h e  
maximum number of quota's could be more  than 30 000 per  year! Since many 
product groups a r e  not in t h e  highest class of sensitivity, no internal  (or somet imes 
not even EC-wide) quota's a r e  established, although t h e r e  are strict monitoring 
schemes in case they show a too high import  growth rate.  Nonetheless, at present 
t h e  E C  has several  thousands (!) of Member-State-specific text i le  and clothing 
quota's, rendering t h e  internal  ' f ree  customs union' in th is  sec to r  ridiculous, whilst 
punishing industrial achievements  of LDC's. 
Also Japan  has been subjected t o  se lec t ive  but  increasing volume protection. Most 
of th is  protection is st i l l  imposed by EC Member Sta tes .  A common commercia l  
volume-policy vis-&is Japan is only slowly coming in to  existence,  s tar t ing from 
t h e  f i r s t  Multi-Fibre-Arrangement (1973) and t h e  common 'monitoring1 of E C  
imports of cars ,  tools and t.v. sets decided in 1981. Precisely in (certain) text i les  
and (all) clothing, however, Japan  has  turned f rom a ne t  expor ter  to a ne t  importer  
in t h e  course  of t h e  1970's. T h e  Communi ty  has subsequently liberalized t h e  import  
of Japanese  text i les  and clothing (except ce r t a in  natura l  silks). O n  12 Februar i  
1983 Japan  agreed t o  res t ra in  t h e  expor ts  of video-recorders and l a rge  t.v. tubes  t o  
t h e  E C  t o  negot ia ted  volumes while accept ing unspecified res t ra in t s  f o r  t e n  o the r  
products, including cars ,  c e r t a i n  robots  and t.v. sets. This fu r the r  s t e p  t o  a joint 
commercia l  policy vis-i-vis Japan  appeared only possible in a protectionist  
context. 
In ce r t a in  industrial products, 'voluntary expor t  restraints1 had been negotiated 
already before,  whether  among t h e  Member S t a t e  and Japan ,  among a Member 
Sta te ' s  group of f i rms  and Japanese  expor ters  o r  among t h e  four  'parties1 with 
various mixtures  of (legal) government  involvement on e i t h e r  side. T h e  !imbroglio'' 
in motor  c a r s  is  probably untypical  but  cer ta in ly  tel l ing (Bronckers, 1982). I taly 
appears  t o  have a miniscule quota  of 2200 Japanese  c a r s  per  year (under 
'automatic '  approval of t h e  EC), F r a n c e  has  made  i t  known by ex t remely  informal 
methods  t h a t  it would never a c c e p t  a Japanese  sha re  of French c a r  consumption of 
more  than 3% (and has  applied ingenious 'waiting' procedures in French harbours), 
G r e a t  Britain has an  unpublished 'voluntary res t ra in t1  agreement  between t h e  
British Socie ty  of Motor Manufacturers and t h e  Japanese  Automobile 
Manufacturers  Association t h a t  is  widely said t o  conta in  an  1 1 % market-share 
ceiling, while Germany and t h e  Benelux have obtained (different)  voluntary expor t  
restraints ,  with a n  ill-defined role of t h e  German government,  resp. t h e  Benelux 
governments in unison. Finally, G r e e c e  and Ireland have special t rans i tory  
provisions and Denmark has no volume c a r  protection. Given such divergent 
policies, and t h e  big in teres ts  behind them, virtually any  thinkable common policy 
of volume c a r  protection vis-i-vis Japan  would enta i l  substantial  (consumer, 
producer and labour) adjus tment  cos t s  for severa l  Member Sta tes .  Hence, a 
common policy beyond t h e  vague agreement  of 1983 i s  a r e m o t e  possibility and 
could only be realized in a heavy-weight package-deal. 
As repeatedly stressed before, divergent national t r ade  policies imply t h a t  t h e  
Internal Market of t h e  EC will be disrupted because t r a d e  deflection through more 
liberal Member countries has t o  be prevented for  t h e  national volume protection t o  
be effective.  TJnder heavy political pressure t h e  Commission is  frequently forced t o  
grant  permission, e x  art .  115 EEC, despite t h e  dubious legal nature  of some such 
approvals, and despite t h e  dangerous erosion of t h e  core  of t h e  Community's 
achievements: f r e e  access of al l  products, circulating in t h e  EC within t h e  union 
borders, t o  all domestic marke t s  of Member countries. 
Quant i ta t ive  border protection has increasingly become a form of industrial policy. 
I t  a ims t o  reduce or  regula te  t h e  speed of adjustment of domestic E C  industry t o  
socially o r  politically tolerable levels in t h e  importing country. For t h e  EC i t  
c r e a t e s  difficulties because speeds of adjustments d i f fer  among Member S t a t e s  and 
t h e  assignment of a l ternat ive  instruments t o  deal with industrial adjustment 
between t h e  Community and national t ier  of Government causes additional 
problems. 
Xational governments - being constrzlned by t h e  negztive aid cnordi.n.atinn oi the 
EC Commission, and t h e  Cour t  of Jus t i ce  - and national pressure groups - seeking 
relief from import  competi t ion so  as t o  maintain or  res to re  expected income levels 
and safeguard as much employment as possible - a r e  t e m p t e d  t o  se ize  upon every 
means available t o  re ta rd  or  avoid adjustment t o  world market  conditions. In this 
con tex t  it is worthy of note  t h a t  for  domestic pressure groups common protection 
has a property tha t  public a id  does not have. 
The point is t h a t  if national - aid would be  properly coordinated by t h e  EC, aid would 
be temporary,  degressive over t i m e  and would not tend t o  hinder s t ructura l  
industrial change. On t h e  other  hand, if quant i ta t ive  protect ionis t  instruments have 
t o  bring relief t o  EC industries with adjustment problems, t h e  Community is 
competen t  t o  provide t h a t  relief, but it has traditionally refrained from monitoring 
t h e  industry's e f f o r t  t o  adjust, r e s t ruc tu re  or  reconvert. The logic behind th is  lack 
of conditionality is  t h a t  competi t ion among EC f i rms and mutual access t o  t h e  
markets  of Member S t a t e s  cannot  be  distorted by a common commercial  policy. In 
other  words, t h e  t r ade  policy is not looked a t  as an industrial policy though i t  is 
one. As a consequence, t h e  competences  t o  make t h e  industrial policy, implicit in 
t h e  t r ade  policy, consistent  with negative aid coordination a r e  lacking. 
The failure t o  make t rade  protection conditional upon sectora l  adjustment will tend 
t o  lead t o  adjustment delays or t o  additional pressures t o  protect  t h e  level of 
production, income and employment. This would conserve t h e  inefficiencies calling 
for  adjustment. I t  may well induce a rapid dispersion of t h e  pract ice  t o  other  
sectors or  products, leading t o  ossified s t ructures  behind Community shelters. 
One  might conceive, in theory, t h a t  t h e  EC Council would adopt border protection 
in a similar fashion as adjustment aid: (say) volume protection would not only be 
l imited in t ime, but would be degressively severe  over  t i m e  as well and thei r  
renewal would be dependent on internal adjustment. Hopes t o  s e e  this happen 
should not be s e t  t o o  high! A closer look t o  t h e  Multi-Fibre Agreement may 
exemplify t h e  point. The Long Term Arrangement on Cot ton  Texti les (1962) and 
t h e  First  Multi-Fibre Agreement (1973) di f fer  in t h e  range of products covered and 
t h e  number of export  countries (both being considerably g rea te r  in t h e  l a t t e r  case), 
but do not differ  essentially with respect  t o  purpose. The  objective was t o  reduce 
import  growth ra tes  so as t o  render t h e  speed of adjus tment  socially acceptable.  I t  
was explicitly s t a ted  t h a t  t h e  temporary protection should bring t h e  necessary 
relief to implement adjustment (despite t h e  evident increase in t h e  scope of 
protection). By t h e  t i m e  of t h e  Second Multi-Fibre Agreement (end 1977), the  
scope in t e r m s  of products and countries was fur ther  increased while i t s  nature  had 
become much more  restrictive. The  Third Multi-Fibre Agreement has continued t h e  
previous one without any improvement. This raises doubts about t h e  expressed 
objective - i t s  'revealed' objective seems t o  c o m e  much closer t o  a desired level  of 
production by EC producers. A recen t  document (EC, 1980, p. l a )  confirms this: "In 
t h e  case of t ex t i l e  products imports with a particularly high penetration r a t e  . . . 
t h e  objective, subscribed t o  by t h e  Commission and all  Member Sta tes ,  consists in 
t h e  realization, for t h e  en t i re  duration (of t h e  MFA II), of stablization of t h e  
penetration r a t e s  . . . so  t h a t  Community producers may expec t  a reasonable share  
of t h e  market". 
Of course, one of t h e  serious problems of t h e  EC text i les  and clothing industry 
consists in t h e  continuous, sizeable job losses. But th is  has a t  leas t  as much, if not 
more, t o  do with stagnation of exports in third markets  (due t o  NIC competition), 
for  which protection does not help, with fac to r  substitution (which may only in pa r t  
be a t t r ibuted t o  import  pressures) and with demand stagnation. 
I t  is  c l e a r  f r o m  expe r i ence  t h a t  ne i the r  t h e  E C  Commission nor t h e  Counci l  is in a 
position t o  imp lemen t  a c t i v e  surve i l lance  over  a d j u s t m e n t  in t h e  t ex t i l e s  and  
clothing industry and  m a k e  t h e  F o u r t h  Multi-Fibre A g r e e m e n t  bel ievably 
condit ional  upon it. By i t s  na tu re ,  border  pro tec t ion  c a n  s e r v e  t h e  desired soc ia l  
pace  of t r ans fo rma t ion  by regula t ing  impor t  pressures, but  i t  is  incapable  of 
secur ing  s t r u c t u r a l  object ives.  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  necessa ry  in s t rumen t s  f o r  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  objec t ives  - such  as ra t ional iza t ion ,  reconversion - should b e c o m e  a n  
in tegra l  e l e m e n t  of E C  t r a d e  policy. 
& Indus t r ia l  strategy wi thou t  power and purse 
O n e  of t h e  m o r e  worrying a s p e c t s  of today's ongoing industr ial  r e s t ruc tu r ing  
policies i s  t h e  marked s imi l a r i t y  of industr ial  s t r a t e g i e s  in  m a n y  O E C D  count r ies ,  
and increasingly of o t h e r  coun t r i e s  as well. Eve ry  gove rnmen t  s e e m s  t o  rush t o  b e  
in t h e  f o r e f r o n t  of t h e  'big four1 indus t r ies  of t h e  future:  i n fo rma t i c s  (i.e. t e l ecom,  
t i ed  in wi th  da taprocess ing  and  o t h e r  informat ion  technology), robotics ,  
mic roe lec t ron ic s  and biotechnology. 3 n l y  slowly observers  Segi:: tc redize tha t  t h e  
possible incompat ib i l i t ies  could  wel l  l ead  t o  ser ious  r e s t ruc tu r ing  conf l i c t s  l a t e r .  
T h e  conce rn  of t h e  EC at present  i s  t h e  m o r e  i m m e d i a t e  o n e  of removing t h e  
incons is tenc ies  a m o n g  t h e  Ten,  preventing a wastefu l  ove r l ap  of R & D 
programmes and  real izing a t ru ly  open and in t eg ra t ed  "home" m a r k e t  ( t ha t ,  in  
advanced industr ies ,  i s  su re ly  n o t  a lways  t h e  case )  s o  as t o  r eap  t h e  indispensable 
economies  of scale while f ac i l i t a t i ng  t h e  r ecoupmen t  of deve lopmen t  costs.  
Eve r  s i n c e  t h e  Colonna  Memorandum (EC, 1970) t h e r e  h a v e  been  r e c u r r e n t  e f f o r t s  
by t h e  E C  Commission,  a n d  t h e  European Pa r l i amen t ,  t o  imp lemen t  an E C  s t r a t e g y  
in advanced indus t r ies  a n d  advanced technologies. I r r e spec t ive  of t h e  economic  
m e r i t s  of such  s t r a t eg ie s ,  i t  ough t  t o  b e  acknowledged t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  E C  in i t ia t ives  
in t h i s  domain  h a v e  t o  o v e r c o m e  enormous  problems. No posi t ive c o m p e t e n c e s  
ex is t ,  while  a nega t ive  surve i l lance  of state a ids  in advanced  s e c t o r s  would b e  
cont rovers ia l ,  t o  s a y  t h e  least. Moreover,  s eve ra l  advanced  indus t r ies  h a v e  s t rong  
l inks with - s o m e  are even  domina ted  by - t h e  d e f e n c e  industr ies  which are 
e x e m p t e d  in  t h e  E E C  T r e a t y  (ar t .  223). Final ly,  na t ional  gove rnmen t s  f r equen t ly  
a r e  engaged in national s t ra teg ies  for their  'own' advanced industries, whether for 
chauvinistic or  secur i ty  reasons, having led t o  exceptionally strong vested in teres ts  
-amalgamating public and pr ivate  ones - in resisting Europeanization. 
During t h e  ear ly  1980's t h e  emphasis in t h e  Commission's industrial s t r a tegy  for t h e  
EC has decisively shifted away f rom worrying too much about coordination of aid 
in tradit ional  or declining industries t o  extensive documentation of t h e  EC 
industry's declining competi t iveness in t h e  world market,  especially in advanced 
industries, and t h e  subsequent a t t e m p t s  t o  g e t  a ser ies  of ambitious programmes 
accepted. Aid coordination by no means decreased in intensity - qui te  t h e  contrary ,  
as shown before  - but t h e  Commission gave s t ra teg ic  prominence t o  an awareness 
campaign and boldly pushed f o r  R&D programmes and a few other  measures. 
The case fo r  subsidization entails  an informed judgement, not  only of t h e  risk and 
degree of uncer ta inty  of a particular R&D effor t ,  but also of t h e  'patentability' of 
t h e  f u t u r e  product and t h e  (in)sufficiency of t h e  pr ivate  means of appropriation. I t  
will be c lear  t h a t  this judgement is difficult  and must reckon with a larger margin 
of error. The question then  is whether public agents  ca? Se expected to have 3 
be t te r  judgement than private suppliers of risk capital ,  and if they have not, why 
public agents  would decide  t o  subsidize where pr ivate  agen t s  refuse t o  lend. In t h e  
EC context ,  t h e  fu r the r  question is whether joint subsidization is necessarily be t t e r  
than 'competi t ive subsidization1 in di f ferent  Member States. This question might 
well be  answered in t h e  aff i rmat ive  as it is  known t h a t  R&D competi t ion can be 
wasteful and lead t o  suboptimal solutions. 
There  is also a cost  component in public subsidies t o  advanced technologies and 
R&D. Once governments have decided t o  provide decisive R&D subsidies, i t  can 
somet imes be arbitrary,  if not  reckless, t o  s top  subsidizing in t h e  even t  of cos t  
rises due t o  miscalculation or longer duration of testing. 
This argument  is even more important in case t h e  EC would engage in joint 
international programmes fo r  advanced products, although t h e  inefficiencies t h a t  
would tend t o  ar ise  would likely be g rea te r  in joint production than in joint R&D. 
The nature  of international programmes is such t h a t  they imply multi-annual 
commitments ,  negotiated by a l l  par tners  (governments, o r  backed by thei r  
governments), usually for  a unique venture for which cos t  comparisons a r e  
diff icul t .  Overmanning,  c u m b e r s o m e  and e l a b o r a t e  adminis t ra t ions ,  and  
ove rpaymen t  of personnel  m a y  be  t h e  consequence.  In common  production 
programmes,  t h e  problem is  t h a t  a l l  pa r tne r s  wish t o  s h a r e  in much,  if not  all, of 
t h e  technology,  which r educes  t h e  potent ia l  f o r  t h e  division of labour  (Har t ley ,  
1982; 19831, while  a l so  desir ing 'national' va r i an t s  in c e r t a i n  cases of de fence  
technology. Hochmuth  (19741, in his de ta i led  s tudy  of public  i n t e rna t iona l  agenc ie s  
developing advanced weaponry,  a i rp lanes  and  sa t e l l i t e s ,  points  o u t  t h e  
ineff iciencies,  caused  by t h e  l ack  of h ierarchy (due t o  conf l ic t ing  na t ional  
i n t e re s t s )  and  t h e  a d  hoc, t h a t  is, f i n i t e  l i f e  of t h e  c o m m o n  ventures. 
La rge r  f inancia l  e n t r y  ba r r i e r s  need  n o t  b e  a problem f o r  well-functioning c a p i t a l  
markets ,  but,  in  t h e  EC,  f inanc ia l  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  a r e  segregated:  t h e  na t ional  
m a r k e t s  are usually f a i r l y  thin. Individually, t h e y  exh ib i t  subs tant ia l  openness  vis- 
h i s  t h e  Eurocapi ta l  m a r k e t ,  b u t  t h i s  m a r k e t  t r a d e s  only bonds (no c o r p o r a t e  s tock  
i s  f l oa t ed )  and  t ends  t o  b e  s e l e c t i v e  a n d  risk-averse. H e r e  t h e r e  is a def in i t e  case 
to organ ize  a common  European  secu r i t i e s  marke t ,  w i t h  t h e  possibility t o  f l o a t  
s tock  ove r  t h e  e n t i r e  Communi ty .  F o r  risky pro jec ts ,  requir ing l a r g e  f inancing,  a 
C o m m ~ n i t y - w i d e  secu r i t i e s  market migh t  bring clrif - at  least, in a number of cases 
- what  would b e  d i f f icu l t  in  na t ional  s t o c k  markets .  T h e  reason is t h a t  a su f f i c i en t  
number  of portfol io holders, desir ing only a very  s m a l l  s h a r e  of risky, high-yield 
s tock ,  have  t o  b e  found t o  r a i s e  enough funds  f o r  p roduc t  deve lopmen t  a n d  
in t roduct ion  o n  t h e  market .  F o r  sma l l  y e t  risky in i t ia t ives ,  t h e  C o m m u n i t y  t r i e s  to 
s t i m u l a t e  a ' venture  c a p i t a l  marke t '  to promote  innovation and  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  new 
ent ry .  
Of course ,  o n e  ought  n o t  e x a g g e r a t e  t h e  fa i lures  of t h e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t s  in t h e  EC. 
A refusal  t o  f i n a n c e  loss-making in i t ia t ives  c a n  hardly be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a m a r k e t  
failure. P rog rammes  l i k e  t h e  (Bri t ishIFrench) Concorde  and t h e  European Airbus 
consor t ium have  in  e f f e c t  been subsidized with enormous  s u m s  running in to  seve ra l  
billion ECU! T h e  f i r s t  o n e  has  been  a t echn ica l  success  but  a commerc ia l  fai lure,  
while  t h e  second  is commerc ia l ly  fa i r ly  successfu l  but  at very  high sunk c o s t s  t h a t  
a r e  d e  f a c t o  wr i t t en  off. Is  n o t  th is  a case of gove rnmen t  fa i lure?  
Large-scale economies  r e p r e s e n t  a fo rce fu l  a r g u m e n t  f o r  l ibera l iza t ion  of na t ional  
m a r k e t s  in advanced  industr ial  p roduc t s  in t h e  EC. T h e  theo re t i ca l  opt ion  of t h e  
world m a r k e t  is r a re ly  an a p p r o p r i a t e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s ince  f e w  impor t an t  m a r k e t s  
outside t h e  E C  a r e  truly open. Nonetheless, t h e  pract ica l  obs tacles  in a transit ion 
t o  a common marke t  in advanced products -with EC-wide ra ther  than national 
public procurement - should not  be  underestimated. A well-known example  is t h e  
Airbus programme where  a US engine was (and is) used while, a t  t h e  s a m e  t ime,  
British Rolls-Royce engines were  heavily imported by US a i rc ra f t  firms. The s t i l l  
dominant position of t h e  US ai r  ca r r i e r s  industry on t h e  world marke t  implied, f o r  a 
foreseeable period a t  least, a la rger ,  and relat ively secure ,  ou t l e t  fo r  Rolls-Royce 
than an insecure and merely  European, and merely civilian, project  t o  build a 
family of t h r e e  o r  four ca r r i e r s  for  commercia l  use, in t h e  f a c e  of tough US 
competition. T h e  l a t e r  success of Airbus with i t s  f i rs t  t w o  types  of airplane might 
help to fos te r  a demand growing t o  minimum eff ic ient  scale, with cos ts  possibly 
coming down over  t h e  learning curve  as well, rendering it a comparable  option t o  
t h e  major US f i rms (a t  least ,  in civilian a i r c r a f t  production). 
During 1982 and 1983 t h e  Communi ty  slowly c a m e  t o  t h e  realization t h a t  t h e  
competi t iveness in t h e  'newer1 industries was unsatisfactory and worsening. I t  has 
meanwhile agreed upon a number of R&D programmes in advanced industries, t h e  
larges t  in i t ia t ive  of which is t h e  ESPRIT project  i: informzticr! technc!ogy (a five- 
year programme of ECU 1 400 million, co-sponsored and co-managed with industry 
itself). There  a r e  also modest  programmes in biotechnology, m e t a l  engineering and 
'basic technology1. There  is also ins is tence  t o  c o m e  t o  EC s tandards  and norms in 
biotechnology before production processes have really become mature.  
The  problems of realizing a t r u e  EC product m a r k e t  - ra ther  than promoting 
product development - in advanced sec to r s  have hardly begun t o  be  tackled.  The 
role of public procurement  in advanced industries such as defence technology, 
telecom, new t ranspor t  equipment and l a rge  turbines fo r  e l ec t r i c i ty  f i rms  should be 
fundamentally al tered.  T h e  European Council of heads of state and government 
recommended in 1983 t o  open public te lecom marke t s  by reciprocal  buying between 
pairs  of EC Member S t a t e s  up to  10% of t h e  annual demand. Of course th i s  is an 
encouraging political signal but  with little economic significance, yet. 
In 1983 t h e  question has arisen whether advanced industries could obtain EC infant  
industry protection. The  case at issue was t h e  Icompact disc1, a Philips invention 
t h a t  had been licensed t o  Sony. I t  appeared t h a t  t h e  f i rs t  s t ages  of 
commercial ization and search f o r  large-scale production - ear ly  in t h e  product 
cycle  - took longer than anticipated,  and longer than the  Japanese  competi t ion 
needed t o  s t a r t  exporting t o  t h e  EC (a t  higher prices, though). The major economic 
argument fo r  infant industry protection was t h a t  t h e  compac t  disc was an  infant 
mass consumption good in need of a grace  period during which t h e  producer would 
move over a ' learning curve'  t o  extremely competi t ive costs, given t h e  s i ze  of t h e  
EC market. Get t ing over t h e  usual consumer resistance would t a k e  a f e w  years 
whereafter  t h e  infancy would be a thing of t h e  past. However, f r e e  access  for  a 
licensee's exports t o  t h e  EC would jeopardize t h e  realization of a cumulative 
'learning1 output and might f r u s t r a t e  t h e  recoupment of t h e  R&D expenditure for  a 
genuine European innovation. 
In principle, th is  argument  can be correct. If indeed the  negative slope of t h e  
learning curve  does not become negligible too  soon, i t  can  be decisive who is f irst  
on a big marke t  l ike  t h e  EC. The argument acquired part icular fo rce  because E C  
production of t h e  video-cassette recorders (also a Philips invention with slower 
commercialization than t h e  Japanese  competi tor)  suffered great ly  in 1980-1982 
from a flood of imports  f r o m  Japan, inducing t h e  E C  t o  'impose' a "voluntary" 
expor t  res t ra int  on t h e  (Japanese) product t o  g u a i a i i t e  a 20% market  share for EC 
producers. 
On t h e  other  hand, t h e  argument  has speculative elements,  because nobody can 
predict  t h e  learning curve  for  a new product. The  EC decision t o  raise t h e  tariff  
fo r  compact  discs ( temporari ly) f r o m  9% t o  19% is  nonetheless a breakthrough in 
t h e  use of t r ade  protection f o r  industrial policy. One  suspects that ,  above all,  i t  is 
a political signal t o  Japanese  t r a d e  policy-makers, r a the r  than a 'scientific' infant 
industry tariff .  Nevertheless, i t  sets t h e  precedence t h a t  t h e  EC is capable and 
prepared t o  employ i t s  t r ade  policy t o  promote industrial innovation and fac i l i t a t e  
t h e  f irst  years of marketing. 
Altogether,  t h e  Community's policy fo r  advanced industries does not look very 
impressive. There  is  a l o t  of consultation, some ad hoc cooperation, an  occasionally 
well-funded programme, and here  and the re  t h e  use of existing policies (trade; 
competi t ion) t o  fos te r  part icular ventures in high tech. The  EC has not really 
succeeded in genuinely opening up i t s  own internal market  for all advanced 
products, implying t h a t  t h e  restructuring shi f t  t o  high t ech  is still  a national 
decision! 
7. Final  r e m a r k s  
'The s t rong inclination of countr ies  t o  sh i f t  s o m e  of t h e  c o s t s  of industr ial  
res t ruc tur ing  t o  foreigners,  and t o  forec lose  a number of domes t i c  business 
opportunit ies  fo r  fore ign  compe t i to r s  has  ce r t a in ly  not  subsided in t h e  E C  wi th  t h e  
maturing of t h e  Community.  As  shown, i t  i s  diff icult ,  e v e n  with a n  a rmory  of 
coopera t ive  policies, suppor ted  by a n  au thor i t a t ive  common C o u r t  and, somet imes ,  
common funds, to ach ieve  compa t ib l e  industr ial  reconversion among t h e  Member  
Sta tes .  
If t h e r e  is o n e  lesson to be l e a r n t  f r o m  t h e  E C  exper i ence  i t  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  
condit ions f o r  e f f e c t i v e  coopera t ion  in th i s  domain: mutual  economic  
in terdependence  ough t  to b e  s o  s t rong  t h a t  " f ree  rider" behaviour c a r r i e s  s e v e r e  
c o s t s  (hence, coopera t ive  gaming i s  a serious a l t e r n a t i v e  option,  with posi t ive 
incentives), and, t h e  underlying ins t i tu t ional  (or cons t i tu t ional ,  nearly)  ass ignment  
of economic  policy c o m p e t e n c e s  ought  t o  be  such t h a t  coun t r i e s  a r e  cons t ra ined in 
the i r  f r eedom of in t e rp re t ing  and  implementa t ing  t h e  negot ia ted  ou tcomes  in the i r  
cwr! way !i?ence, ass ignments  t o  t h e  common level  of dec i s i cm ~ak i q ,  or  d i r e c t  
delegation t o  a supranat ional  organ ough t  to b e  of ma te r i a l  importance). Each of 
t h e  t w o  condit ions a r e  necessary  ones; only toge the r  a r e  t h e y  sufficient .  
T h e  f i r s t  one  i s  occasionally fulf i l led outs ide  t h e  E C  as well  (EC/US t r a d e  and 
mone ta ry  nexus i s  a good case )  bu t  t h e n  t h e  l ack  of t h e  second t h r e a t e n s  t o  c a u s e  
instabil i ty and conf l ic t ,  unless a permanen t  sys t em of conf l i c t  management  c a n  b e  
instal led (as indeed i t  o p e r a t e s  be tween  t h e  US and t h e  E C  - highly informally). 
Between t h e  NICs and t h e  EC,  o r  be tween Comecon  countr ies  and t h e  EC,  e v e n  t h e  
f i r s t  i s  lacking. 
T h e  only long run t r u m p  c a r d  t h a t  t h e  NICs and t h e  Comecon  countr ies  have  is t h a t  
t h e  ECfs  industr ial  t r a d e  surplus with them is  rapidly dwindling, which renders  
'market  access' - t o t h e  NICs and - to Comecon  countr ies  a negot iable  issue. Indeed 
th i s  could open a sound r o u t e  f o r  restructuring.  The  problem i s  how t o  c r e a t e  an 
inst i tut ional  r e g i m e  t h a t  c a n  g u a r a n t e e  suff ic ient  s tabi l i ty  f o r  such a long run 
industr ial  res t ruc tur ing  t o  b e  ca r r i ed  out. 
NOTES 
See, f o r  instance, Gordon and Pel kmans ( 1979), Keohane and Nye ( 1977), 
Cooper ( 1968) , etc  . . 
I n  the ECSC case t r a d i t i o n a l l y  c a l l e d  the 'High A u t h o r i t y ' ,  bu t  being 
exac t l y  the same group o f  C o n i s s i o n e r s  as f o r  t h e  EEC and Euratom. 
Although the  ECSC ( i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  the  EEC) has no.common-external t rade 
p o l i c y  i n  t imes of normalcy, a r t .  57, a r t .  71 and a r t .  74, ECSC, 
together  w i t h  a  judgement o f  t he  European Court o f  J u s t i c e  i n  1978 
empower the  Community t o  take such t rade  pol i c y  measures as t o  e f f e c t u a t e  
i n t e r n a l  measures w i t h  respect  t o  p r i c e s  and supply volumes. 
The so-ca l led  Solomon p lan  i n  the  US and the  ( f i r s t )  Davignonplan i n  t he  
EC i n s t a l l e d  (coordinated)  minimum import  p r i ces ,  be1 ow which au tomat i ca l l y  
a  case o f  dumping would be considered proven. These ' t r i g g e r  p r i c e s '  were 
the  lowest  cos t -p r i ces  f o r  s tee l  known on the wor ld  market ( u s u a l l y  
Japanese o r  c e r t a i n  EC p l a n t s  cos t -p r i ces ) .  
Case 730/79; European Court Reports, 1980, p. 2687. 
EC, 1981, p. 151. 
See Chard and Macmillan, 1979. I n  1980 the  EC Commission went so f a r  as 
t o  i ssue a  Comunica t ion  t o  the  i4ember S ta tes '  governments, s t a t i n g  t h a t  
"Cases o f  n o n - n o t i f i c a t i o n  o r  l a t e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  ... have ceased t o  be 
i so la ted .  Indeed, the  ex ten t  o f  the tendency . . . would appear i n  some 
cases t o  i n d i c a t e  the  poss ib le  ex is tence o f  a  general dec is ion  n o t  t o  
respect t h e  prov is ions '  i n  quest ion" .  O f f i c i a l  Journal , 30 Sept. 1980; 
no. C 252/2. 
A11 data f rom EC, 1983, p. 113. The f i g u r e s  exclude a i d s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
t ranspor t .  
More ex tens ive  l e g a l  t reatment  i s  i n  01 i v e r  (1982) and Mattera (1983). The 
reader i s  a1 so r e f e r r e d  t o  a  l e s s  techn ica l  d ig ress ion  i n  Pel kmans (1984, 
ch. 6 ) .  
L i k e  a r t .  19, GATT, except t h a t  t he  GATT procedure comprises more safeguards 
f o r  t he  expo r t i ng  country .  
See Keesing and Wolf (1981) and OECD (1979, Annex 11).  
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Post--i;ar a d v a n c e s  i n  computer  t e c h n o l o g y  have  f a v o u r e 2  t h e  i n t r o d u c -  
Zion  'znd u s e  o f  c o n p u t e r - b a s e 2  i i e c i s i o n  an2  c h o i c e  mo2els  i n  t h e  a r e a  
3f Sc? micro-  ami mac ro -econoz ic s .  T h i s  t r e n 2  h a s  been  f a v o u r e 2  by 
e - -  
-no c: rcumstances:  1)  t h e  enornous  p r o q r e s s  a a 2 e  i n  d e s i c ~ i n g  a s d  i m -  
? l e x e ; t i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  n o 2 e l s  k a s e c  o c  aZva5ceii rna tnemazica l ,  s t a t i s -  
t i c a l  an2 e c o n o n e t r i c  t o c l s ,  an5  2 )  t h e  p o t e n t i a i  o f f e r e e  5y r ,o<ern 
co?.s=rer  s o f t w a r e  a l l o w i r ~  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  r e  Z e a l  w i t h  cc:.slex and 
l a r c e - s c a l e  s y s t e m s .  
T h i s  z e v e l o p n e n t  h a s  e x e r t e c  a  deep-goinq i n p a c t  o n  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s .  
3 e c i s - o n  a n a l y s i s  a i n s  a t  j u e q i n g  a  r a n g e  o f  f s a s i b l e  o p z i o n s  cn  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  a  se t  o f  r e l e v a n t  e v a l u a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  s o  a s  t o  e l b . i n a t e  less  
d e s i r a b l e  o p t i o n s  a n 2  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  n o s t  f a v o u r a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e ( s ) .  - 
I n  macro-economic d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s ,  however ,  t h e  r e s e a r c h  i s  u s u a l l y  -: 
c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  i n t r u i g i n g  problems s u c h  a s :  a  macro-economic sys t em 
u s u a l l y  d i s p l a y s  a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l  c o m p l e x i t y ,  s o  t h a t  an  i n t e g r a t e d  -- 
v iew i s  v e r y  h a r d  t o  o b t a i n ;  t h e  sys t em i s  i n f l u e n c e d  by  m u l t i p l e  
- 
( f o r m a l  and  i n f o r m a l )  a c t o r s  w i t h  c o n f l i c t i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  and i n t e r -  
ests ,  s o  t h a t  a n  unambiguous macro-economic w e l f a r e  c r i t e r i o n i s l a c k -  - 
i n? ;  t h e r e  is a  w i 3 e  v a r i e t y  of  d i v e r s e  r e g i o n s  i n  a  n a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  
e a c h  o f  them i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n  a s  a whole and  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s .  
These  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  l e a d  u s  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  re- ' 
q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  macro-economic model f o r  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y -  - 
sis: 
. . 
- The model s h o u l d  - i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  ( s o c i o - ) e c o n o n i c  components  - 
also  i n c l u d e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  and  e n e r g y  components so as  t o  a l l o w  . -  .. ' 
o n e  t o  s t u d y  t h e  s y s t e m  a t  hand from a n  i n t e g r a t e d  v i e w p o i n t .  
- The model s h o u l d  a l s o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  set  f o r t h  by  - 
( fo rmal  and i n f o r m a l )  a c t o r s  s o  a s  t o  do j u s t i c e  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  d i v e r s i n g  i n t e r e s t s  i n  s o c i e t y  ( l e a d i n s  t o  m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e  
a n a l y s i s ) .  
- The model shou ld  a l s o  encompass d imensions  i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  ac- 
-. 
coun t  of t h e  r e g i o n a l  2 i v e r s i t y  of  a  complex n a t i o n a l  system. 
These requ i rements  imply a  p lea  f o r  an  in tegra ted .  n u l t i o b j e c t i v e  n a t i o -  
na l - reg iona l  ii,odel. Th i s  ?a?er z i n s  a t  - r e s e n t i n g  such a  model f o r  i n -  
t e g r : - r e d  ec~nonic-environrental-energy p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  i n  The Kether- 
l a n e s .  S e c t i o n  2 w i l l  d e s c r i b e  some g e n e r a l  m e t ~ o d o l o q i c a l  f e a z u r e s  
of  such  a  model. Next,  i n  Sect i .on .3  a  p l e a  Kill be na5e i n  favour  of  
i n t e r z c t i v e  2 e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p rov i2e  a  net502 f o r  COR- 
f l i c :  r e s o i u t i o n .  Then i n  Sec t ion  4 ,  a  c o n c e p t ~ a l  v e r s i c n  of a  so- 
c a l l e d  T r i p l e  Layer MoCel w i l l  be 7resentet2,  folioweC by a  s p e c l f i c a -  
t i o n  gf an o p e r a t i o n a l  :,o?el i n  S e c t i o n  5.  F u r t k e r  Z e t a i l s  an2 em- 
. .  . ?lr::zi r e s u l t s  w i l l  be E i scussee  i n  S e c z i c n s  5 a ~ 2  6 ,  res?eczi-:el?. 
2 .  T';TEGRA'TEC I.'iACRO-ZCOSGMIC FOLICY MODELS 
A c c : - , ~ l e t e  macro-eco~onic  p o l i c y  node l  p r o v i e e s  a  s t y l i s e e  ane ccz-  
s i s t e n t  p i c t u r e  of  ( a  p a r t  o f )  a  complex r e a l i t y .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  econmic, 
envi ronmenta l  and s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  models may be  regarded  a s  images o f  
- - 
t h e  r e a l  world c r e a t e d  by model-builders .  Models used i n  p o l i c y  analy- 
sis  shou ld  be a b l e  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  boundar ies  w i t h i n  which p o l i c y  de- - .  
c i s i c n s  a r e  t o  be ma2e, t h e  t r a 2 e o f f s  i n h e r e n t  i n  choosing a l t e r n a t i v e  
s o l u z i o n s ,  t h e  impacts  of po l i cy  measures on a  set of r e l e v a n t  p o l i c y  
t a r g e t s ,  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  a  com.un ica t ion  between e x p e r t s  ( o r  p lan-  
. - - - 
n e r s )  and d e c i s i o n  makers, and t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  f o r  changes i n  t h e  
s p a t l a 1  s c a l e ,  t h e  t i n e  hor izon o r  t h e  l e v e l  of nsasurement of v a r i -  
a b l e s .  Such methodoloqica l  c o n 2 i t i o n s  a r e  h a r d y  f u l f i l l e d  i n  model- 
l i n g  p r a c t i c e ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and t h e  judgement of - t h e  
un ique  o p t i m a l  s t a t e  of  t h e  system i s  f r a u g h t  wi th  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Con- 
s e q u e n t l y ,  many conven t iona l  programming approaches  have o n l y  a  l i m i t -  
ed v a l i d i t y  i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s .  That  i s  a l s o  t h e  
r e a s o n  why - i n s t e a d  of  o p t i m a l i t y  a n a l y s e s  - impact a n a l y s e s ,  e f f e c t - _  
i v e n e s s  a n a l y s e s ,  d e c i s i o n  suppor t  a n a l y s e s  and s t r a t e s i c  d e c i s i o n  
a n a l y s e s  have  r e c e i v e d  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e n t i o n  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  I n  such  -'- 
: a n a l y s e s ,  much emphasis i s  placed on t h e  e f f e c t s  of  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  - 
- .  -- - 
and p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  c o n f l i c t  management and t h e  meaning 
-. - . of  compromise p r i n c i p l e s .  -- 
Another  r eason  e x p l a i n i n g  why many conven t iona l  programming moeels 
have o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  r e l e v a n c e  i n  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  such 
models a r e  u s u a l l y  based on a  s e t  of s t r i n g e n t  assumpt ions ,  such a s :  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of one known d e c i s i o n  maker, comple te  in fo rmat ion  on a l l  
r e l e v a n t  o b j e c t i v e s  and instruments, p e r f e c t  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  impact 
o f  p c l i c y  measures on socio-economic o b j e c t i v e s ,  absence  of  e q u i t y  
problems and of  s p a t i a l  o r  s o c i a l  s p i l l o v e r  e f f e c t s ,  a  s t a b l e  ( o f t e n  
l i n e a r )  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  economy, and so  f o r t h .  I t  i s  conceivable  
t h a t  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  an  i n t e g r a t e d  econoaic,  
env i ronmenta l ,  enerqy and r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  a n a l q . s i s  ( s e e  a l s o  I s saev  et 
a l .  1982) .  
I n t e ~ r a t e d  economic-envi ronmenta l -energ  model l ing  h a s  become i n c r e a s -  
i n g l y  complicated. over  t h e  l a s t  decade. Systems t h e o r e t i c  concepts ,  
o p t i r a l  c o n t r o l  models,  game- theore t ic  approaches  and m u l t i d i s c i p l i n -  
a r y  . :nalyses have Secone necessa ry  t o o l s  f o r  e c o n o m i c - e n v i r o ~ n e - t a l -  
e n e r l y  a n a l y s e s .  There i s  a  s t r o n g  tendency tob:arcs a  more coherent  
and : 2 t e ~ r a t e ? .  a n a l y s i s ,  i n  which economic, e n v i r o n n e ~ t a l ,  e n e r q  an2 
r e g i z 2 a l  a s p e c t s  a r e  brought  t o g e t h e r  i n  one c o n s i s t e n t  f rmework (see 
Laksr.nanan and Kijkamp 1980) .  Th i s  need f o r  i n t e g r a t e 2  modeil ing i s  
mair.ly caused 3y t h e  f a z t  t h a t  t h e  post-war economic growth ~ a r a 2 i ~  
i n t e r t w i n e d  wi th  t e c h n o l o g ,  s c i e n t i f i c  and e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r e s s  and 
r i s i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  numbers, has  overlooked i n t e r  a l i a  t h e  s o c i a l  and 
- - 
e c o l o g i c a l  diinensions of  t h i s  p rocess  and hence h a s  l e d  t o  a  s e r i o u s  
- . t h r e a t  f o r  t h e  man-made and n a t u r a l  environment.  T h i s  development can-... 
n o t  o n l y  be  observed i n  t h e  developed. c o u n t r i e s ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  Third  
- Pzorlz c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h o s e  a r e a s  where a  r a p i d  i n d u s t r i a l  
expans ion  i s  n o t  accompanied by s u f f i c i e n t  n o n e t a r y  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  en- 
-. . 
v i r o c m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  and p o l l u t i o n  abatement .  I n t e g r a t e d  p lanning 
and p o l i c y  modelsAprovid.e  e s s e n t i a l l y  some n e c e s s a r y  means t o  r e s t o r e  
t h e  La lance  i n  f avour  of  more e ~ p h a s i s  on envi ronmenta l  Zinensions 
( c f .  a l s o  Guldman and S h e f e r  1981) .  
A s  env i ronmenta l  and energy  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  u s u a l l y  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  a  
complex f i e l d  w i t h  c o n f l i c t i n g  g o a l s ,  v a r i o u s  s o c i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  mul t i -  
p l e  d e c i s i o n  groups and power s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  shou ld  neces- 
s a r i l y  t a k e  accoun t  o f  t h e  mul t id imensional  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  environment 
-- . 
and  energy  problems (see Nijkanp 1980).  It i s  c l e a r ,  t h a t  a broader ,  . - 
. . 
- s o c i a l l y - o r i e n t e d  view o f  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  r e q u i r e s  an  i n t e g r a t i v e  
-.  
framework f o r  judging a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s .  T h i s    ill, i n  gen- 
eral ,  imply t h a t  - i n s t e a d  o f  o p t i m i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  sys tems outcones  - 
the attention has to be focussed on providing a rational basis for the 
policy decisions regarding the system, among others, by revealing con- 
fliczs among objectives or groups, or assessing tradeoffs amon9 2if- 
ferer.t choice options, by gauqing the distribution aspects of policy 
measures, by identifying efficient solutions and by desiqning appro- 
priate ane relevant methods and procedures for policy evaluation and 
for compromise strategies. The current interest in interactive multi- 
objective tiecision models shows clearly such new trends in eesicning 
and ~=xploying nodern tools for environmental policy making (see also 
Hafkxp an2 Xijkanp 1982a an6 Eafkanp 1983). 
The foregoing remarks lea2 us to the specification of the fol1ov:ing 
re<c:recents on a relevent ir.tegrate2 ?olic:? analysis (see also Ni j- 
kamr ar2 Spronk 1983 ) : 
- ~s~ropriateand reliakle assessnent of relevent inpacts of ~olicy 
. - 
::easnres or exoqencEs changes 
- cszplete re?resentz=ioc of =he policy areas ccncer-ee ; i z c l u d i z q  
-zs feasible Eecisi.3n space) 
- .-.~ltidimensional recresencation of the eiverse con2onents or 
.:ci!ules of the system at hand 
- flexible atijustnent of the policy analysis to new inforxation or 
new cir~~stances 
- comprehensible presentation of the results to responsible decision 
z,akers or actors 
- -- - appropriate use of available Sata (inclu2ing qualitative data) - - 
-. 
- eonsizeration of equity aspects and spillover effects 
~- 
- zreatment of tradeoffs and conflicts inherent in the choice prob- 
.. - lem at hand - 
- use of learninq strategies and decision air2 tools in a communica- 
tion between'all perticipants involved in the policy 2roblen at 
:?an2 
- integrated approach with much attention paid to compromise proce- 
dures an2 institutional dilemas 
- emphasis on 'satisficer'principles rather than on 'optimiser' 
principles. 
In the remaining part of the present paper we will make an attempt at 
. - 
developing an integrated approachto re~ional-economic-environmental- 
energy policy analysis by using the so-called Triple-Layer Model (TLMI- . 
(see'Iiafkamp and Nijkanp 1982b). It will be shown that recently de- 
. - .  
velopes interactive (integrated economic-environmental-energy) policy 
models  a p p e a r  t o  p r o v i d e  a  p r o m i s i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e  f o r  an  i n t e g r a t e *  
m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s .  Two e l e m e n t s  a r e  c e n t r a l  i n  such  
a p p r ~ a c h e s ,  v i z .  e f f i c i e n t  ( o r  P a r e t o )  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  c o n f l i c t i n g  ob- 
j e c t r v e s  and  i n t e r a c t i v e  s t r a t e a i e s  anong a n a l y s t s  and  p o l i c y  makers.  
I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  it w i l l  a l s o  b e  Cemons t ra ted  t h a t  m u l t i - r e g i o n a l  i n -  
p u t - o u t p u t  a n a l y s i s  is  a n e c e s s a r y  p a r t  o f  a  mean ing fu l  and c o n s i s -  
t e n t  framework f o r  t h e  abovenen t ioned  approach .  
3 .  IXTERACTIVE MULTIOEJECTIVE PROGRA."iLViNG MGDELS 
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  much work h a s  been  un2e r t aken  t o  f o r m u l a t e  o p e r a t i o n -  
a l  c 7 t i n i s a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  problems w i t h  m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e s  ( s e e  
ano-7 o t h e r s ,  Keeney and R a i f f a  1976; Cohon 1979; R i e t v e l *  1980; and  
N; &,.--...p 2- . :- an* Spronk 1 9 8 1 ) .  A t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  whole  s p e c t r m ~  o f  
d i f f s r e n t  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  r e t h o 2 s  a v a i l a b l e ,  b o t h  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of 
c c r -  ::sous p r o g r ~ r n i n q  a n a l y s i s  (see, e. c .  : ; i ?ka~ .p  1979 ) and I n  t h e  
C - -  
, i e ~ :  c f  -5.iscrete p l a n  an2  p r o j e c t  e v a l u a t i o r  n e t h o 2 s  (see e.5. 'Joocd 
1 9 8 2 , .  I t  s h o u l 2  be  n o t e 2  however,  t h a t  many of  t h e s e  ~ r o c e C u r e s h e v e  
n o t  neen s p e c i f i c a l l y  k e s i g n e k  f o r  macro-economic 2 e c i s i o n  r , ak ing .  
The , ~ s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e s e  d i v e r s e  methods and p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  nacro-  
ecor .=nic  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  v e r y  much depends  on t h e  way macro-orienteCi 
2ricr i t ies  and c o n f l i c t s  c a n  S e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o m t .  K i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h i s  i s s u e ,  i t  nay  b e  mean ing fu l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e s e  n e t h o d s  and pro-  
- -. 
c e d c r e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  c n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r ' s  
.- 
p r e f e r e n c e s  (see, e . g .  Hxang and  Masud 1 9 7 9 ) .  Three  cases nay  t h e n  b e  
. - 2 i s t x g u i s h e d :  1) f u l l  i n f o r n a t i o n ,  2 )  l i m i t e d  i n f o r n a t i o n ,  and  3 )  
no  i n f o r m a t i o n .  E s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  case o f  l i m i t &  o r  z e r o  informa-  
t i o n ,  i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  may b e  v e r y  h e l p f u l .  Many problems i n  
a n  i z t e g r a t e d  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s . d o  n o t  r e q u i r e  an  unambiguous s o l u t i o n  
t h a t  r e p r e s e n t s  once  and f o r  a l l  - t h e  o p t i m a l  s t a t e  o f  t h e  sys t em con- 
c e r n e d :  compromise s t r a t e g i e s  a p p e a r  t o  p r e v a i l .  I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
p r o c e s s  c h a r a c t e r  o f  many d e c i s i o n  p rob lems ,  a n  i n t e r a c t i v e  p o l i c y  
a n a l y s i s  may t h e r e f o r e  b e  a  r e a s o n a b l e  and o p e r a t i o n a l  app roach .  T h i s  
a p p r o a c h  i s  u s u a l l y  composed o f  a series o f  s t e p s  b a s e d  o n a s y s t e m a t i c  
exchange  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  (based  on  computer  e x p e r i m e n t s )  between de-  
c i s i o n  makers  and a n a l y s t s .  Such i n t e r a c t i v e  app roaches  are n o r m a l l y  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a i r  o f  s t e p s :  
- t h e  a n a l y s t s  p ropose  mean ing fu l  and f e a s i b l e  ( t r i a l )  s o l u t i o n s  on _ . 
t h e  basis o f  a w e l l - d e f i n e d  compromise p rocedure .  
- t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers respond t o  e a c h  ( t r i a l )  s c l u t i o n  by i n d i c a t i n g  
i n  which r e s p e c t  ( i . e . ,  i n  r e g a r d  t o  which e f f e c t s )  t h e  p roposed  
compromise i s  s t i l l  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  ( g i v e n  t h e i r  v iews  on  minimum 
achievement  l e v e l s ,  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s ,  e t c . ) .  
These p a i r s  o f  s t e p s  a r e  t h e n  s u c c e s s i v e l y  r e p e a t e d  u n t i l  a f t e r  a  
series of c o m p u t e r e x ~ e r k . e n t s , a  f i n a l  s a t i s f a c t o r y  compromise s o l u t i o n  
h a s  Seen i d e n t i f i e d .  A s  mentioned b e f o r e ,  a  l a r g e  number o f  i n t e r -  
a c t i y y e  models h a s  r e c e n t l y  been deve loped  ( s e e  among o t h e r ,  R i e t v e l d  
1980 and Spronk 1981) .  I n t e r a c t i v e  p o l i c y  a n a l y s e s  based  o n  m u l t i -  
o b j c z t i v e  programming methods have  a l r e a d y  demons t r a t ed  t h e i r  mean- 
i n g  Ln v a r i o u s  p o l i c y  problems,  a l s o  i n  a  macro-economic c o n t e x t .  
They may be  r ega rded  a s  h a v i n g  many s i g n i f i c a n t  a d v a n t a g e s  compared 
w i t h  t r a d i t i o n a l  methods (see Nijkamp and Spronk 1981) .  
I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  p a p e r ,  o n l y  one  s p e c i f i c  t y p e  o f  i n t e r a c t i v e  p o l i c y  
m e t ? . ~ a s  w i l l  d e a l t  w i t h ,  v i z .  t h e  method of  d i s p l a c e d  i d e a l s  (see 
Zele:.y 1976 and Nijkarnp 1 9 8 0 ) .  I t  i s  a  method which needs  no e x p l i c i t  
p r i o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t r a c i e o f f s  between t a r g e t s  e x p r e s s e d  by d e c i s i o n  
makecs i n  t h e  p rocedure .  I f  t h e y  a r e  o f f e r e d  a  f e a s i b l e  (and e f f i c i -  
e n t )  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  problem,  t h e y  o n l y  need t o  choose  
an c z j e c t i v e  which h a s  t o  be  improved i n  v a l u e  i n  t h e  n e x t  i t e r a t i o n  
o f  t.:e procedure .  T h i s  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  r e f e r e n c e  s o l u t i o n  ( t h e  ' i d e a l '  p o i n t ) ,  which is  
r e g a r d e d  h e r e  a s  t h e  p o i n t s  on t h e  main d i a g o n a l  o f  t h e  payof f  m a t r i x  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e  problem. F i g u r e  1 p r o v i d e s  a  
c o n c l s e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a g e s  o f  t h i s  i n t e r a c t i v e  o p t i m i s a t i o n  
p rocsdure .  
- 
1) s t a r t  
I 1 
f 
2 )  c a l c u l a t e  payof f  6 )  ad . ju s t  c o n s t r a i n t s  
n a t r i x  C set 
I 
d0 
3 )  g e n e r a t e  t e n t a t i v e  
comproa ise  s o l u t i o ~  
4 )  compromise s o l u t i o n  - 5 )  i d e n t i f y u n s a t i s f a c -  
s a t i s f a c t o r y ?  -NO- t o r y  v a l u e  o f  objec- - ' 
t i v e  (s) 
. - 
7 )  t e n t a t i v e  cornproraise 
i s  f i n a l  compronlse  + 
F i g u r e  1. S t e p s  o f  an  i n t e r a c t i v e  o p t i m i s a t i o n  p rocedure .  
More d e t a i l s  r e g a r d i n g  t h i s  method can  b e  found i n  Hafkamp and N i j -  
kamp (1982b) and Hafkamp ( 1 9 8 3 ) .  T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  can  a l s o  b e  d i r e c t l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  s c e n a r i o  a n a l y s i s  f o r  macro-economic p o l i c y  making. A 
s c e n a r i o  i s  a  c o n s i s t e n t  se t  o f  p r o s p e c t i v e  v a l u e s  o f  p l a n s ,  g o a l s ,  
i n s t r u m e n t s  and exogenous c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  Eoth s i n g l e  and compound 
may be  d e a l t  w i th .  Cho ices  among d i f f e r e n t  s c e n a r i o s  may a l s o  b e  gen- 
e r a t e d  by means o f  t h e  abovementioned m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  methods.  
4 .  A CONCEPTUAL TRIPLE-LAYER MODEL ( T W )  
TLM i s  a  model o f  a  s p a t i a l  sys tem x h e r e  economic,  env i ronmen ta l  and 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  are i n t e g r a t e d .  The s p a t i a l  e l emen t  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  t h e  sys tem i s  a n a l y s e d  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e g i o n s  i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  
t h e  z a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  Consequent ly ,  T W  is  a  n a t i o n a l - r e g i o n a l  economic 
e n v i r 3 n n e n t a l  model. TLM i s  a  r e s u l t  of p r o j e c t i n g  a complex r e a l i t y  
on C r e e  mutua l ly  i n t e r a c t i n g  p a r a l l e l  l a y e r s :  
- 23 economic l a y e r  
- - 3  employment l a y e r  
- environment l a y e r .  
Y . .  
S e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a  complex and m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l  sys t em c a n  t h u s  be 
d e p i c t e d  i n  v a r i o u s  submodels ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  d i f f e r e n t  
a s p e c t s  and consequences.  
The d s s i g n  s t r a t e g y  of TLM i m p l i e s  a  t h r e e  s t a g e  p r o c e d u r e ,  where 
f i r s t  a s i m p l e  model is c o n s t r u c t e d ,  s o  as t o  d e p i c t  t h e  t r i p l e  l a y e r  
s t r u c t u r e  and t o  a e l i n e a t e  t h e  s cope  and  d e t a i l  o f  t h e  model (see a l s o  
Hafkamp 1983) .  The second s t e p  o f  t h e  d e s i g n  p r o c e d u r e  i s  t h e  con- 
s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  c o n c e p t u a l  t r i p l e  l a y e r  model and is  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  
p r e s e E t  s e c t i o n ;  t h e  t h i r d  s t e p  a s sembl ing  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  t r i p l e  
l a t e r  model,  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
The c o n c e p t u a l  model p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  is  a m u l t i - r e g i o n a l  model o f  a n  
. . 
. . 
economy where economic, s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
a s o c i e t y  are o f  main impor tance .  P u b l i c  d e c i s i o n  making and  p l a n n i n g  -- ' 
i n  s u c h  a s p a t i a l  sys t em w i l l  be a n a l y s e d  i n  a way a n a l o g o u s  t o  al lo-  
, 
. -  
- -- 
c a t i o n  mebhanisms i n  f o r m a l i s e d  economies w i t h  p u b l i c  Goods and exter- 
n a l  e f f e c t s  (see a l s o  Ruys, 1975) .  W e  s h a l l  e x p l i c i t l y  d e a l  w i t h  -- - i :I . 
( g r o u p s  o f )  i n d i v i d u a l s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  a c e r t a i n  r e g i o n  o f  t h e  s p a t i a l  
21, 
.- - 
s y s t e m  and  t o  a c e r t a i n  i n t e r e s t  g roup  (e .g . ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ,  
labour unions). 
Conceptually, the model has the following structure. The spatial sys- 
tem consists of a set of regions: 
- 
R = (11 2, ..., R) (1) 
The individuals within the spatial system are denoted by: 
The set of individuals in a region is written as: 
R - - 
where Ir n Irl = $ for rfr' and ryl Ir = I . 
The elements which are of importance for individual decision naking 
are rzgional income, employment and environmental cuality. As nota- 
tion of attainatle outcomes in the system, we a2opt. 
s E B ; s is compact and convex] 
s is an R-tuple of vectors describing the state of the entire spatial 
system. s is a vector describing the state of the system for reqion 
-1: 
r where 
*: - ,- denotes regional income 
- 
lr denotes regional employment 
zr denotes regional environmental quality . 
Varioas policy mixes (combinations of regional economic policy, envir- 
onmental policy, and labour market policy) enable a central authority 
to 'control' the spatial system so as to reach, in principle, any sit- 
- 4 
uation b-hich is reflected by an element of S. 
Individuals in a region have a 'consumption' set which is denoted as; 
3 r : ( 5 )  ..a X =  {g I g =  (y,l,z) E R+l 
54 
_- ; 
As mentioned above, we may distinguish different interest groups. 
There are various Lays of incorporating such groups in individual wel- ---3 
fare functions. Here we suppose the existence of twice differentiable, , .  
2 0  i 
concave individual welfare functions: 
Thus, t h e  w e l f a r e  p o s i t i o n  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  r e g i o n  r is  o n l y  d e t e r -  
mined by i n c o n e ,  enp loynen t  and  env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  i n  r e g i o n  r. 
I n  a < d i t i o n ,  a  c h o i c e  se t  o f  C is  d e f i n e d  t h a t  serves a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
i n d i - ~ i z u a l s  t o  d e c i d e  which o b j e c t i v e  i s  t h e  most u r g e n t  one  and hence 
shou ld  be r a i s e d  f i r s t :  
( 7 )  means t h a t  d u r i n g  each  s t a t e  o f  t h e  c h o i c e  p r o c e s s  n o t  a l l  ob j ec -  
t i v e s  can  be  improved s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  b u t  t h a t  o n l y  one  o b j e c t i v e  c a n  
be i x c r e a s e d  i n  v a l u e  ( i n  o t h e r  words,  a  i s  a  zero-one v a r i a b l e ) .  . j 
The s p a t i a l  sys tem composed o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  now c o n c i s e l y  b e  cha r -  
a c t e r  i s e d  by: 
S p a t l a 1  sys t em EE c a n  - from t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e h  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  - b e  
r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  economy w i t h  e x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  o n l y .  The se t  o f  P a r e t o -  
o p t i r i a l  s t a t e s  PO i n  t h i s  sys tem can  now lie d e f i n e d  a s :  Y 
I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  i s  a n  e f f i c i e n c y  c r i t e r i o n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c r i t e r i o n .  The set o f  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l  s o l u -  
t i o n s  is  a l s o  known a s  t h e  set of  e f f i c i e n t  o r  non-dominated s o l u t i o n s .  
The p r e s e n c e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t  g roups  t h a t  want t o  m a x i n i s e r e s p e c -  
t i v e l y  r e g i o n a l  income, employment and  env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  makes it 
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  one s i n g l e  o v e r a l l  b e s t  s o l u t i o n .  Conseciuent- 
l y ,  f o r m a l l y  a m u l t i d e c i s i o n  maker,  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  problem h a s  t o  b e  
s o l v e d  so as t o  a c h i e v e  a s t a t e  o f  t h e  sys tem t h a t  is  a compromise f o r  
t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  anong g roups .  - . -. - . I
- - 
, 
T h i s  c a n  b e  done  by u s i n g  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  method based  o n  d i s p l a c e d  
. a .  i d e a l s  which w a s  d e s c r i b e d  41 S e c t i o n  3 .  liowever, t h i s  method d o e s  . . . *  
n o t  s p e c i f y  a d e c i s i o n  r u l e  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  a 'most u r g e n t '  o b j e c t i v e  • 
-. 
. -- i f  there are m n y  d e c i s i o n  makers i nvo lved .  T h i s  l a c k  may b e  overcome 
by u s i n g  a  v o t i n g  procedure based on a  m a j o r i t y  r u l e .  The p r e f e r e n c e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s s h o u l d  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  ' t a c i t  p r e f e r e n c e s '  ( p r e f e r e n c e s  
of  kl-.ich d e c i s i o n  makers themselves a r e  no t  e x p l i c i t l y  and e n t i r e l y  
a w a r e ) .  
The s t e p s  o f  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  compromise procedure a r e  a l r e a d y  con- 
t a i n e d  i n  F i g u r e  1. The s e l e c t i o n  i t s e l f  o f  an  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l u e  
o f  an o b j e c t i v e  t a k e s  p l a c e  choos ing  a  'most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y '  l e v e l  o f  
. . 
an c ~ 2 e c t i v e  by means of  a  democra t ic  v o t i n g  procedure ,  s o  t h a t  a  cen- 
t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  has  t o  count  t h e  v o t e s  concerning  t h e  most u n s a t i s f a c -  
t o r y  o b j e c t i v e s  and next  a d j u s t  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  s e t  a c c o r d i n g l y .  
A mors d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  way a  TLM i s  coupled w i t h  an  i n t e r -  
a c t i v e  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  procedure  'is c o n t a i n e d  i n  Eafkamp and EJijkamp 
5. .-.?; OPERATIONAL TRIFLE-LAYER MODEL (TLX) 
The : ; ?e ra t iona l  TLN i s  composed o f  t h r e e  submodels - one f o r  each 
l a y e r  - : an econcmic, an employment and an  envi ronmenta l  submodel. A - .  . 
d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  a l l  e q u a t i o n s ,  v a r i a b l e s  and d a t a  of  t h e s e  sub- 
modeis can be found i n  Hafkamp 11983).  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we o n l y  d i s -  
c u s s  t h e  main l i n e s  of  t h e  v a r i o u s  submodels. 
The economic submodel compromises a  n a t i o n a l - r e g i o n a l  economic model 
o f  t3.e Dutch economy. I t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  c o u p l i n g  t h e  so -ca l l ed  
Secmon model ( s e e  D r i e h u i s  1978) wi th  a  m u l t i r e g i o n a l  input -output  
model o f  f i v e  Dutch reg ions .  Various g o a l  v c r i e b l e s  a r e . k a s l u C e d -  ' 
i n  t h i s  submodel: '  i n f l a t i a n ,  c u r r e n t  and c a ? i t a l  accoun t s  an6 eca- 
nomic g rowth) .  P o l i c y  i n s t r u n e n t s  a r e :  t a x e s  and p u b l i c  expend i tu re ,  
monetary i n s t r u m e n t s ,  exchanqe r a t e ,  wage an6 g r i c e  c o n t r o l  ant2 l a b o u r  
market  p o l i c y .  Economic a c t o r s  are: households ,  f i m s ,  government ._ I 
an2 o t h e r  a g e n t s .  
- The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  components o f  t h e  economic submodel are ,, 
d e s c r i b e d  by means o f  10 modules: 
'2 4 
-4- 
- p r o d u c t i o n  (based on inpu t -ou tpu t  t a b l e s )  ; 
.. - f i n a l  demand (consumption, inves tmen t ,  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e  and ?5 
e x p o r t s )  q 
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- i m p o r t s  ( f i n a l  p r o d u c t s ,  r a w  m a t e r i a l s  and manufac tur ing  i n p u t s ) ;  
- product ion  c a p a c i t y ;  
- labour  market;  
- wages and p r i c e s ;  
- income; 
- government expend i tu re ;  
- s o c i a l  insurances ;  
- monetary systems. 
The employment submodel a n a l y s e s  p r i m a r i l y  t h e  demand f o r  l abour  a t  
bo th  a  r e g i o n a l  and s e c t o r a l  l e v e l .  For t h e  t i m e  be ing ,  t h e  supply 
s i d e  o f  t h e  labour  market is cons ide red  a s  exogenously determined by 
demographic and s o c i a l  developments.  It  would be worthwhile  however, 
t o  i n c l u d e  more d e t a i l e d  informat ion  on demographic developments,  edu- 
c a t i ~ n  and t r a i n i n g  endogenously i n  t h e  model. 
The 2nvironmental  submodel d e s c r i b e s  t h r e e  a s p e c t s  o f  environmental  
qua1 l t y :  
1. Zmission of  a i r  p o l l u t a n t s  caused by: 
3 .  combustion of  f o s s i l  f u e l s ;  
D. process  emiss ions ,  e t c .  
2 .  Zoncen t ra t ion  of  a i r  p o l l u t a n t s  ( v i a  d i f f u s i o n )  
3. Xeduction of emission by: 
a.  sav ing  energy,  s e l e c t i v e  growth, e t c . ;  
b.  a l t e r n a t i v e  c h o i c e s  of energy sources ;  
c .  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  technology.  
. ... 
P o l l u t i o n  o f  water  and s o i l  i s  n o t  taken i n t o  account  h e r e ,  nor  i s  any 
a t t e n t i o n  pa id  t o  t h e  phenomenon of s y n e r g e t i c  e f f e c t s .  The fo l lowing  - '' 
p o l l u t i o n  c a t e g o r j e s  a r e  taken i n t o  account:  su lphur  d i o x i d e ,  n i t r o g e n  , 
. - -  
o x i d e s  and d u s t  p a r t i c l e s .  
The c h o i c e  o f  energy source  a l s o  has  a n  impor tant  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  
.. . 
; I
emiss ion  o f  a i r  p o l l u t a n t s .  For example: SO2 emiss ions  i n  The Nether- - - 
l a n d s  d e c r e a s e d  d r a s t i c a l l y  a f t e r  a  l a r g e - s c a l e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  'i2 
n a t u r a l  g a s ,  b u t  s i n c e  a  swi tch  back t o  c o a l  o r  o i l  took p l a c e ,  a 
2 3 d r a s t i c  i n c r e a s e  occurred .  E s p e c i a l l y  t h e  s h i f t  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  pro- 
d u c e r s  from n a t u r a l  g a s  t o  o i l ,  c o a l  or  n u c l e a r  energy and t h e  f u r t h e r  ,, 
-
e x p l o r a t i o n  and i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  energy s o u r c e s  ( s o l a r  
' - energy ,  wind, etc. ) a r e  of  g r e a t  importance t o  environmental  q u a l i t y .  A 
2 6  
The way i n  which t h e  components o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  modules a r e  l i n k e d  is 
represented in Figure 2. 
I I 7 ECONOMIC SUB-MODEL 
- - 7 - - I - - - -  I b_y_Exp. ,Stocks 
e=n2 - 1 - - -, 
Governm S o c d  
Budget Insur. 
t Y P L O Y Y E k T  SUB-MODEL 
a 
I 
I 
I ~ o k d a n d '  
I Demographic 
, Factors 
I 
E N  VIRONMEN T A ~ ~ u O ~  
Energy 1 Energy 
-a demand -policy 
I l l  
J b  J L  J L . L L  Envkonmenrd policy 
Pollutanrr 
Figure 2. Representation of the T r i ~ l e  Layer Model and its 
submodels 
6.  INTERACTIVE MULTIOEJECTIVE PROGRAMMING KI T H THE TRIPLE LAYER MODEL 
Implementing t h e  opera t iona l  t r i p l e  layer  model of Section 5  has pre- 
sented us w i t h  a  number of computational problems. Solving vector  
op t imisa t ion  problems of  t h i s  s i z e  asks  f o r  powerful op t imisa t ion  
rou t ines .  
In  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  we w i l l  apply t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  compromise procedure 
intrc, juced i n  Section 3 ,  t o  t h e  opera t iona l  vers ion  of TLM. h'hile 
applylng t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  compromise procedure t o  t h e  conceptual ver- 
s i o n  of TLM focusses on choice aspec ts  f o r  i nd iv idua l s  and on coord- 
i n a t i o n  a spec t s  a s  t o  publ ic  decis ion making, i t s  app l i ca t ion  t o  t h e  
ope ra t iona l  vers ion is  primari ly  concerned w i t h  c o n t r o l l i n g  the  pro- 
cedure i t s e l f  and understanding the  r e s u l t s  obtained.  - - 
The r.sde1 is  comprised of f i v e  regions ( see  Appendix, Figure A l ) ,  w i t h  
t h r e e  ob jec t ives  i n  each region - income, employment and environmental 
q u a l i t y .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  compromise procedure produces compromises 
betwe+n r ea iona l  i n t e r e s t s  a s  well a s  between o b j e c t i v e s  a t  t h e  
r e g i c z a l  l e v e l .  Therefore, a  mult i tude of v e r s i o n s , o f  t h e  procedure 
could be designed so a s  t o  r e f l e c t  a  v a r i e t y  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrange- .  
ments under which socio-economic decis ion making t akes  place.  These . : 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements may imply t h a t  a  s i n g l e  au tho r i ty ,  v iz .  
- 
c e n t r a l  government, i s  t h e  s i n g l e  dec is ion  maker. They map a l s o  imply 
t h a t  dec i s ion  making is  e n t i r e l y  l e f t  t o  reg iona l  planners ,  whose - 
d e c i s i o n s ,  vo tes ,  wishes and ac t ions  a r e  added up only a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  
l e v e l .  Various intermediate  arrangements a r e  poss ib l e  a s  wel l ,  and 
can be descr ibed a s  mul t i l eve l  decis ion making procedures ( see  i n  par- 
t i c u l a r ,  Rietveld 1981). 
The b a s i c  vers ion of t h e  procedure impl ies  s epa ra t e  opt imisat ion of 
a l l  5x3 ob jec t ives  a t . eve ry  i t e r a t i o n ,  while a choice  can be made i n  . 
t h e  procedure between f a s t  convergence (JiI=l; t h i s  parameter w i l l  l a t e r  . ;  
be d iscussed)  and slow convergence ( 8 ~ 1 ) ) .  Simpl i f ied  vers ions  of 
, , 
- - .- .- 
t h e  procedure, opt imising separa te  ob jec t ives  only a t  t h e  na t fona l  
. l e v e l  i n  each i t e r a t i o n  and ad jus t ing  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  s e t  f o r  objec- - 2 ... 3
t i v e s  a t  t h e  na t fona l  o r  reg iona l  l e v e l ,  a r e  descr ibed i n  Hafkamp 
. . 
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Since  t h e  T r i p l e  Layer Model has approximately 500 endogenous va r i -  - 
2 i, ables, it would be very inconvenient  t o  presen t  t h e  r e s u l t s  of each 
s i m u l a t i o n  r u n  f o r  a l l  such  v a r i a b l e s .  Throughout t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  
s h a l l  e x p r e s s  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  v a r i a b l e s  a s  i n d e x  numbers. A s  
a b a s e  f o r  t h e s e  i n d e x  numbers, a f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  model i s  
used which i s  found by s e t t i n g  a l l  i n s t r u m e n t  v a r i a b l e s  a t  a f i x e d ,  
z e r o  v a l u e .  The s o l u t i o n  which r e s u l t s  i s  found i n  t h e  i n t e r i o r  o f  
t h e  s o l u t i o n  se t  ( i . e . ,  it i s  - n o t  an  e f f i c i e n t  s o l u t i o n ) .  T h i s  b a s e  
s o l u t i o n  i s  g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  1. 
Table  1 
E a s i c  moeel s o l u t i o n  o b t a i n e d  Ly f i x i n g  a l l - o o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  
a t  z e r o  v a l u e s  
1) m i l l i o n s  o f  Dutch g u i l d e r s  i n  p r i c e s  o f  1973 
2 )  m i l l i o n s  o f  man y e a r s  i n  f i r m s  
3 )  t h o u s a n d s  o f  t o h s  o f  ' compos i te  p o l l u t a n t s '  
b 
N a t i o n a l  
income 1) 
2 1 employment 
env.  q u a l .  3 1 
Region 1 
income 
employment 
env. q u a l .  
Region 2 
income 
employment 
env. q u a l .  
Region 3 
income 
employment 
env. - -qua1 . 
Region 4 
income 
employment 
env.  q u a l .  
Region 5 
income 
employment 
env. q u a l .  
* 
Va r 
YN 
lN 
Z~ 
Y 1  
l1 
z 1 
Y2 
l2 
z2 
Y3 
1 
z 
Y4 
l4 
=4 
Y5 
1 
= 5  
S o l u t i o n  
125572 
3244 
1033 
12653 
298 
1301 
19433 
5 6 1  
1448 
28473 
' 797 
2228 
31396 
748 
1687 
33615 
-837 
3633 
I n  o r d e r  t o  demonst ra te  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  compromise p rocedure  w e  w i l l  
now d i s c u s s  it s t e p  by s t e p  - u s i n g  f i g u r e  1 a s  a  g u i d e l i n e  - f o r  sev- 
e r a l  c o n s e c u t i v e  i t e r a t i o n s .  
1. S t a r t  
-
The ~ r o b l e m  i s  prepa red  f o r  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  o p t i m i s a t i o n  u s i n g  a  com- 
p u t e a  o p t i m i s a t i o n p a c k a g e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  APEX o p t i m i s a t i o n  pack- 
a g e  (by  CDC) was used.  
The s e l e c t i o n  o f  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l u e s  of o b j e c t i v e s  i s  t o  b e  done by 
t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers themselves .  For example,  t h e y  may f o l l o w  a  . . 
n e g o t i a t i o n  p rocedure  i f  t h e y  a r e  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s .  I f  t h e y  a r e  in-  
" 
- 
h a b i t a n t s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  sys tem,  t h e y  may u s e  a  v o t i n g  p rocedure ,  o r  
any  i n t e r m e d i a t e  between n e g o t i a t i n g  and v o t i n g .  Fo r  t h e  s a k e  o f  pre-  . t  
s e n t ~ z i o n ,  w e  w i l l  assume some p o s s i b l e  outcome o f  a  n e g o t i a t i n g  o r  
- > 
voti:..; p rocedure  t o  b e  g iven .  - 
-- 
The interactive compromise procedure  t h u s  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n l y  p r o v i d e s  a  
t e n t c z i v e  s c e n a r i o  f o r  a  s i m u l a t i o n  exper iment  i n  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  de- 
c i s i c x  making. The convergence speed pa rame te r  is  f i x e d  a t  a  v a l u e  
o f  fj = 0 . 5 0 .  
- 
I t e r a t i o n  I 
8 - 
- 
2 .  C a l c u l a t e  payoff  m a t r i x  
The payof f  m a t r i x  is  found by o p t i m i s i n g  c o n s e c u t i v e l y  a l l  15 ob jec -  --.- a b I 
t i v e s .  Every s i n g l e  o p t i m i s a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  l e a d s  t o  one 
. - 
c o l m n  o f  t h e  payoff  m a t r i x ,  which is shown i n  Table  2.  -- 
1 :, 
- - 
3. G e n e r a t e  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n  
I n  order t o  g e n e r a t e  t h e  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n ,  it i s  n e c e s s a q  I '  
t o  i d e n t i f y  i n  t h e  payoff  m a t r i x  t h e  maximum and minimum v a l u e  f o r  r - 
. - 
. . - 
e a c h  o b j e c t i v e .  Th i s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  and second column o f  Tab le  3. 
The compromise s o l u t i o n  i s  now found by minimis ing  a s t a n d a r d i s e d  dis-_.L! 
t a n c e  f u n c t i o n  which measures  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  
'i l 
- - 
and t h e  i d e a l ,  b u t  i n f e a s i b l e  maximum s o l u t i o n  which i s  g i v e n  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  column o f  t a b l e  3. 2 3 
-- 
Payof f  m a t r i x  o f  i t e r a t i o n  1 .  S e p a r a t e  o p t i m i s a t i o n  of o b j e c t . i v e s :  income, employment and 
e n v i ~  onmellttrl qua1 J Ly r ~ t  CI I ccj l o r r r l l  l e v e l  
kgian 1 '  
~XJIE 
-1aYrn- 
&.q~. 
---.- 
Region 2 
inccme y 2  128 131  132 133 131  99 127 332 131 
arpl- l2 115 115 1 1 4  115 116 112 114 115 111  
env.qu. 86  74 8 3  80 74 113  73  74 8 3  90 74 8 3  8  1 74 
--. . 
8 3  2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  ----------- ----------- 
Region 3  
, -  Y3 117 120 117 117 120 118 122 339 9  1  116 120 115 120 118 
~nplaym. l 3  116 116 115 116 116 113  115 117 112 116 116 111 116 110 
78 88 8 8  78 8 8  72 78 116 88  78 78 89 
Region 4 
incane y4  120 122 122 120 122 123  119 122 123  127 122 9  4  122 120 
enploym. l4 115 115 113  115  115 112 1 1 4  115 110 115 115 109 115 104. 
77 8 5  90 77 84 77 77 85  82  77 114 77 9  1 
Region 5  
in00me y5 119 118 119 120 118 119 116 118 120 94 
enpl~ym. l 5  116 117 115 116 317 113 115 117 112 
enV.qU. z 5  111 89  109 109 89 330 86  89 307 109 89 109 89  120 
- 
Pl 
:I1 
z 
nax y1 rtlax l1 m x  z ,  
127 116 95  
115 116 1 1 4  
-84 8 1  117 
nm y raw 1ynw z 2 2 
118 116 118 
116 116 112 
96 8  1 98 
mix y3 nux 1 r~ux z 3 3 
112 118 120 
114 116 111. 
8 3  8 1  9 6  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rux y4 p a  1, nlax z4 
116 116 120 
115 116 110 
96 8  1  98 
rraxy5 max 1 5 .  l~tlx z 5 
104 116 119 
110 116 110 
82 8  1  98 
8 
I t e r a t i o n  1 
Region O b j e c t i v e  t o  be Improved 
1 income Y l  
2 envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  
=2 
3 income Y3 
4 income Y 4  
5 envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  y5 
6.  A d j u s t  c o n s t r a i n t s  se t  
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n ,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  set  is  a d j u s t e d  
i n  s ~ z h  a  way t h a t  i n  t h e  n e x t  i t e r a t i o n  t h e  compromise v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  
o b j e c z i v e s  s e l e c t e d  under  t h e  p rev ious  s t e p  ( 5 )  w i l l  be  h i g h e r  t h a n  
t h e  a - t u a l  compromise v a l u e s  g i v e n  i n  Table  3. The g e n e r a l  formula- 
t i o n  ,3f r a i s i n g  lower bounds o f  o b j e c t i v e s  c a n  be  w r i t t e n :  
where : 
X L, i lower  bound on o b j e c t i v e  x i n  i t e r a t i o n  i 
XcI; compromise v a l u e  o f  o b j e c t i v e  x i n  i t e r a t i o n  i 
/a parameter  d e n o t i n g  convergence speed  
The convergence  speed parameter  i s  t o  b e  set  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  in: 
4 - 
t e r a c t i v e  procedure .  A h i g h  convergence speed  (8=1)  i m p l i e s  t h a t  f r o m -  - 
one  i t e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  n e x t  l a r g e  improvements a r e  found f o r  o b j e c t i v e s  
- !I 
s e l e c t e d  a t  s t e p  5 ,  w h i l e  a  f i n a l  compromise may be  r eached  i n  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  f e w  i t e r a t i o n s ,  a s  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  added i n  - I "  
e a c h  i t e r a t i o n .  For  t h e  p r e s e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p rocedure  t h e  con- , 
I - (  
v e r g e n c e  parameter  was set a t  .SO. Consequent ly ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  lower 
bounds f o r  o b j e c t i v e s  were added t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  set: 
L 1 2  
= 95 + 0+50 (117-95) = 106 * Y 1  
L '2  = 73 + 0.50 (88-73) = 80.5  2 2  
y i t 2  = 91 + 0.50 (115-91) = 103 
L 1 2  
= 99 + 0.50 (118-99) = 106 Y4 
T h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n  of  lower  bounds is  i l l u s t r a t i v e  on ly .  Rounded o f f  -2j 
f i g u r e s  )were used. 
. - 
Minimisa t ion  o f  (10) l e a d s  t o  t h e  compromise s o l u t i o n  u h i c h  i s  t h e  
t h i r d  column o f  Tab le  3. 
T a b l e  3 
I t e r a t i o n  1. Compromise s o l u t i o n ,  i d e a l  and leas t  i d e a l  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  
r e g i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  
A m o r e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  compromised i n  T a b l e  
3 i s  c h e  d iagram o f  F i g u r e  3. Such d iagrams c a n  be  more e a s i l y  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  by  d e c i s i o n  makers.  We w i l l  U s e  them f o r  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
o t h e r  compromise s o l u t i o n s .  
I 
4. Compromise s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f a c t o r y ?  
A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  s t e p  I o f  t h i s  p rocedure ,  w e  d i d  n o t  have  a c t u a l v o t i n g  
r e s u l t s  on  compromise s o l u t i o n s  r eached .  I n s t e a d  w e  assumed p o s s i b l e  - 
ou tcomes  of such  p rocedures .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  w e  assumed t h a t ,  NO, t h e  
s o l u t i o n s  
minimum 
95 
110 
81 
99 
109 
73 
91 
110 
72 
9 4 
109 
77 
94 
110 
7 1 
maximum 
127 
116 
117 
113 
116 
113 
112 
117 
116 
12 7 
115 
114 
127 
117 
12 0 
r 
Regisn  1 
income 
employment 
env. q u a I .  
Region 2 
income 
employment 
env .  q u a l .  
Reg i sn  3 
i n c  me 
employment 
env.  q u a l .  
R e g ~ ~ n  4 
inc2me 
employment 
env.  q u a l .  
Region 5 
income 
employment 
env.  q u a l .  
i 
- 
compromise s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n  w a s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
2 i 
5. I d e n t i f y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l u e s  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  
2 4 
W e  assumed t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e g i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  b e  most u r g e n t l y  im- 
compromise 
117 
115 
108 
131 
115 
88 
115 
116 
95 
118 
115 
96 
122 
116 
9 4 
Y1 
l1 
21 
Y2 
l2 
22 
Y3 
l3 
23 
y4 
1 4 
24 
Y5 
l5 
25 
proved:  L' 5 
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Compromise solution of Iteration 1, between minimum and 
maximum values for reqional objectives 
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Compromise solution of Iteration 2, between minimum and 
maximum values for regional objectives 
I t e r a t i o n  2 
2.  C a l c u l a t e  payoff m a t r i x  
The payoff ma t r ix  is ,  a g a i n  found by o p t i m i s i n g  c o n s e c u t i v e l y  a l l  15 
o b j e c t i v e s .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h i s  payoff n a t r i x  an? t h e  
p rev ious  one a r e  e n t u r e l y  Sue t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  lower bounds 8e- 
r i v e d  i n  s t e p  6 o f  t h e  ~ r e v i o u s  i t e r a t i o n  were added t o  t h e  con- 
s t r a i n t s  s e t .  
3 )  Tenera te  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n  
The second compromise s o l u t i o n  i s  found by minimising t h e  s t a n d a r d i s e d  
d i s t a n c e  between t h e  u n f e a s i b l e  i d e a l  s o l u t i o n  ( d i a g o n a l '  e lements  of 
t h e  new payoff m a t r i x )  and t h e  a d j u s t e d  c o n s t r a i n t s  set .  Figure  4 ,  
- 
which is  based on t h e s e  outcomes, can  be  used t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  changes 
which occur red  due t o  t h e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l u e s  of o b j e c t i v e s  iden- 
t i f e e  i n  s t e p s  of t h e  p rev ious  i t e r a t i o n .  
The comprcmise v a l u e s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  i t e r a t i o n s  1 and 2 
g i v e  a  rough approximation of  t h e  e x i s t i n g  t r a d e o f f s  i n  t h e  opera- 
t i o n - 1  v e r s i o n  of TLM, t h e  most n o t i c e a b l e  be ing t h o s e  between region- 
a l  i - come  and environmental  q u a l i t y :  An improvement of  one p e r c e n t  i n  
envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  of  r e g i o n s  1, 1, and 5 ,  roughly l e a d s  t o  a  0 . 5  
p e r c e n t  l o s s  o f  r e g i o n a l  income. Regional employment appears  t o  be 
q u i t e  i n v a r i a n t  under t h e  c h o i c e s  made, because employment p o l i c y  can 
b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  independent ly  from p o l i c i e s  t h a t  aim f o r  e i t h e r e c o n o m i c  
growth o r  environmental  q u a l i t y  (bo th  of which have f a v o u r a b l e  im-  
p a c t s  on employment). 
- .  
The compromise s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n  caused t h e  c h o i c e  o f  
p r i o r i t y  i n  region 1 t o  move t o  r e g i o n a l  income. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  
compromise s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  second i t e r a t i o n  shows t h a t  r e g i o n a l  income 
was i n c r e a s e d  by 8.5  p e r c e n t .  Along ~ i t h  t h i s  i n c r e a s e  o f  income came 
a s h a r p  dec rease  of t h e  envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  i n d i c a t o r  by more than 
18 p e r c e n t .  It is c l e a r  t h a t  t h o s e  people  who r e p r e s e n t  environ- . I . . 
m e n t a l  q u a l i t y ,  w i l l  be even more convinced o f ' t h e i r  c h o i c e  f o r  
-. I 
- 
- -- 
environmenta l  q u a l i t y .  There may be  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  number of people  - 
want ing  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  r e g i o n a l  income a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n ,  b u t  -2 
f i n d  t h e i r  d e s i r e s  o v e r - f u l f i l l e d :  t h e  i n c r e a s e  of income is too 
This . &  
s h a r p ,  w h i l e  t h e  d e c r e a s e  of  environmental  q u a l i t y  is too s t e e p .  
may r e s u l t  i n  a g e n e r a l  tendency t o  suppor t  t h e  envi ronmenta l  i n t e r e s t  .is 
-- 
i n  t h e  second i t e r a t i o n .  
I n  r e g i o n  2 a  r e v e r s e  t r a d e o f f  was chosen.  The f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n  i n d i -  
c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y .  The 
a c t u a l  outcome, an 18 p e r c e n t  improvement o f  t h e  env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  
i n d i c a t o r  a g a i n s t  a  more t h a n  6 p e r c e n t  d e c r e a s e  o f  income, may b e  
v e r y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  t h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  b u t ,  t o  many, 
t h i s  nay be a n  'over -exchange ' .  I n  t h i s  r e g i o n ,  t h e  tendency  may be  
t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  r e g i o n a l  income i n  t h e  second i t e r a t i o n .  
I n  r e g i o n s  3 and 4 ,  t h e  c h o i c e  f o r  r e g i o n a l  income r e s u l t e d  i n  a  s i x  
p e r c e n t  improvement o f  income which i s  p a i d  o f f  by a  d e c r e a s e  o f  en- 
v i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  o f  o v e r  10 p e r c e n t .  T h i s  c h o i c e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h a t  o f  r e g i o n  1. I n  r e g i o n  5  a  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  a r i s e n  
which is comparable  t o  t h a t  i n  r e g i o n  2. A c h o i c e  f o r  a  b e t t e r  en- 
v i ro rmen t  r e s u l t s  i n  a  s t r o n g  improvement o f  t h e  env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  
i n d i c a t o r  by 15  p e r c e n t  which is accompanied by a  seven  p e r c e n t  de- 
c r e a s s  i n  r e g i o n a l  income. 
4 .  C3mpromise s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f a c t o r y ?  
Assu re  t h e  second compromise s o l u t i o n  i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
5. Z a e n t i f y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l u e s  o f  o b j e c t i o n  
The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  compromise s o l u t i o n  a t  s t e p  3 a l l o w s  u s  t o  
assume t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  'most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y '  a t  t h e  
r e g i o n a l  l e v e l :  
I t e r a t i o n  2 
Region O b j e c t i v e  t o  be  improved 
1 envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  z 1 
2 env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  z2 
3 envi ronmenta l  q u a l i t y  z3 
4 env i ronmen ta l  q u a l i t y  z g  
5 income y5 
6. A d j u s t  c o n s t r a i n t s  set 
.' 2 
- . .  
The c o n s t r a i n t s  se t  is  now a d j u s t e d  i n  t h e  same manner as i n  t h e  pre-  
v i o u s  i t e r a t i o n .  New lower bounds,  t o  b e  added t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  - .  + 
sets are: 
- .  
- .- 
I I 21 I I I I V, 1.4 # 
REGION REGION REGION REGION REGION 
2 3 4 5 
- 
Figure 5. Compromise solution of Iteration 3, between minimum and 
maximum values for regional objectives 
V t h q  h 4 %  3 %  V.64 V 6 C Z 6  
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A 
Figure 6. Conpromise solutions of Iteration 4, between minimum and 
haximum values of regional objectives 
-- - 
- L--. --- ----  
- .  
Iteration 3 
2. C a l c u l a t e  payoff m a t r i x  
The payoff '  matr ix  is  d e r i v e d  i n  a  analogous way t o  t h a t  of  t h e  pre- 
v i o u s  i t e r a t i o n s ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  account  t h e  lower bounds on o b j e c t i v e s  
which were r a i s e d  i n  s t e p  6 of t h e  p rev ious  i t e r a t i o n .  
3. Generate  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n  
Generazion of  t h e  t h i r d  compromise c o l u t i o n  is analogous t o  t h a t  i n  
t h e  p r e v i o u s  i t e r a t i o n .  The diagram of F i g u r e  5 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e s e  out -  
comes. 
4 .  C c ~ p r o m i s e  s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f a c t o r y ?  
I n  o r c s r  t o  demonstrate  t h e  procedure t o  i t s  f u l l  e x t e n t  w e  aga in  
assume t h a t  NO, t h e  t h i r d  compromise i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
5 .  I d e n t i f y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  va lues  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  
W e  assume t h a t  environmental  q u a l i t y  i s  t o  be  r a i s e d  i n  r e g i o n s  1, 3,  
4 ,  and 5. I n  region 2 an improvement of  income i s  assumed t o  be  
n e c e s s a r y .  
6 .  Adjus t  c o n s t r a i n t s  s e t  
For t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  s e l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p rev ious  s t e p  o f  t h i s  i t e r a t i o n ,  
lower bounds a r e  a d j u s t e d  according t o  t h e  p rocedure  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
s t e p  6 o f  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n .  
I t e r a t i o n  4 
2. C a l c u l a t e  payoff m a t r i x  
The f o u t t h  payoff  ma t r ix  i s  aga in  c a l c u l a t e d  i n  a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  way. 
. 
3. Genera te  t e n t a t i v e  compromise s o l u t i o n  
The f o u r t h  compromise s o l u t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  new payoff m a t r i x  
- 
- - I 
w a s  t o  draw t h e  diagram i n  Figure  6.  C l e a r l y ,  from t h e  t h i r d  t o  t h e  
f o u r t h  i t e r a t i o n ,  t h e  adjus tment  o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  set by imposing - t) 
new lower bounds on s e l e c t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  has induced o n l y  marginal  
changes. 
5. Com~romise s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f a c t o r v ?  
Assume YES; of  course ,  t h e  procedure can e a s i l y  be  con t inued  through a  
number of  more i t e r a t i o n s .  However, we s h a l l  n o t  do so.  
7. T e n t a t i v e  compromise i s  f i n a l  compromise 
C l e a r l y  from i t e r a t i o n  t o  i t e r a t i o n  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  making 
procedure  n o t  only  g i v e s  in fo rmat ion  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers on t h e  
a c t u a l  t r a d e o f f s  between o b j e c t i v e s  ( a s  i n h e r e n t  t o  t h e  model ) ,  b u t  
a l s o  a l l o w s  t h e  a n a l y s t s  t o  deduce, from t h e  c h o i c e s  o f  (groups  o f )  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  t h e  a c t u a l  p re fe rences .  However, i n  o r d e r  t o  a r r i v e  a t  
an a c c u r a t e  assessment  of  t h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  it would b e  necessa ry  t o  
c a r r y  o u t  t h e  procedure over  a  l a r g e  number of  i t e r a t i o n s .  
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Theinteractivemultiobjective approaches t o  i n t e g r a t e d  economic- 
environmental  d e c i s i o n  making i n  a  s p a t i a l  system p r e s e n t e d  and i l l u -  
s t r z t e d  i n  t h e  previous  s e c t i o n s ,  have s e v e r a l  advantages  over  t r a d i -  
t i o n a l  approaches: 
- They r e f l e c t  t h e  p rocess  c h a r a c t e r  o f  complex economic-environ- 
mental  p o l i c y  problems; t h e y  c o n s t i t u t e  l e a r n i n g  a i d s  f o r  p o l i c y  
makers a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  mode l l e r s .  
- They emphasise an a c t i v e  r o l e  o f  p o l i c y  makers i n  s p e c i f y i n g  and 
s o l v i n g  cho ice  problems, i n t e r  a l i a  by making p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  
and t r a d e o f f s . m o r e  e x p l i c i t .  
- They a r e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  v a r i e t y  and t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
n a t u r e  of p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  o r  c r i t e r i a  wi thou t  r e q u i r i n g  a  p r i o r i  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  weights .  
- They p rov ide  an  i n t e g r a t i v e  framework f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  less rele- 
v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and f o r  choosing c o n s i s t e n t  compromise so lu t ions .  
. . 
2 b The s i m u l a t i o n  experiments  o f  S e c t i o n  6 i n d i c a t e  t h a t  it is p o s s i b l e  - .  
t o  a d a p t  t h e  i n t e r a c t i v e  compromise procedure  to  v a r y i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  2.! . -. 
ar rangements ,  even t o  m u l t i l e v e l  d e c i s i o n  making procedures  i n  which 
a n a t i o n a l  and r e g i o n a l  l e v e l  are d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  If . .- 
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STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN WORLD ECONOMY: 
REGIONAL ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES 
1. Introduction 
Economists, in their studies about world-wide economic situation 
generally agree that one of the main points of gravity are investiga- 
tions on atructural changes - their necessity and consequences. The 
overall structure of an economy determines the way it develops. 
That is why emphasis is laid upon structural change in order to find 
an appropriate one. 
In this paper we describe the mechanisms of structural changes 
which were found by structural analysis on a wide basis of empirical 
data. By structural changes we understand the changes in the 
structure of branches and technology in developing as well as 
industrially developed countries and, in connection with this, 
changes in the international division of labour. The principle item 
of the issue consists of measurement models for different measures 
of the qualification of labour in both, the home economy and the 
international trade. These measurements are based on empirical 
calculations of the marginal productivity of labour of different 
categories. The following is a short introduction to the way these 
calculations have been carried out and also to the results obtained. 
2. Formal Prior Condition 
2.1 Remarks Concerning the Method 
Our inquiries are based on a wide field of empirical data which 
include not only conventional economical variables, but also 
relevant data exceeding the frame of economical variables in its 
narrower sense. One major effort at STUDIA as far as mathematical 
and formal studies are concerned can be explained with what the 
Frankfurt School of Statistics (Flaskemper) called 'adequation'. 
This term refers to the quantification of theoretical variables 
by the use of the available statistical data. For this one has to 
develop a sophisticated model suiting the theoretical terms of 
economical science like the one that led to the quantification 
of labour as introduced further. A second endeavour consists of 
the further development of multivariate analysis as will be 
explained on examples of main-plain analysis and cluster 
inversion. Measurement models and the new application of multi- 
variate analysis help to structure the empirical data in a way 
which enables to deduct heuristic hypotheses for the development 
of theories. These theories can then be formalized in the 
conventional way. 
Our efforts for structuring data in a formal mathematical and 
theoretical frame is higher than that of other approaches, 
whereas modesty is persued as far as high sophisticated formalizations 
of theories, that are not sufficiently verified in an empirical way, 
are concerned. The high formal and mathematical investment within the 
empirical foundation of theories is worthwhile in so far, as prognoses 
which were based on it later proved valid as will be shown in the fol- 
lowing. 
2.2 The Marginal Productivity 
'Marginal Productivity' is a term often used in economic theory. 
The Study Group for International Analysis has widely applied this 
term in an empirical way and has obtained a new understanding of 
1) the mechanisms of structural changes . 
The starting point is a General Production function where 
beside capital and labour an indicator reflecting the educational 
attainment2) is also taken into consideration: 
where 
Y . . . value added 
p ... efficiency parameter 
L ... number of employees 
C ... capital stock 
B ... educational attainment indicator . 
a;B, k, are the parameters and b = B/L 
) 'rutw Structural Charqs in Austrian Industry ' , SIUDIA-report to ZWTm, 1979. 
CI\ 
L ' ~ c a t i o n  is dis-hed fran ather production factors by being introduced in 
an exponential function. Exaggeration of the mrginal productivity of opital is 
avoided by the applicatim of the production factor education. For mre see: 'Ma- 
terielle und ImMterielle F'aktoren der Enlxicklung - Ansatze zu einer allgeneinen 
produktiansfunktion', Zeitschrift fiir Nationalokonanie, 31, p.81-120, 1971. 
The partial derivation of equation (1) with respect to the factor 
labour (L) gives : 
2-1 
- (4 - kb) = Y (d - kb) 3L L ( 2 )  
The partial derivation with respect to the factor education gives: 
B Assuming - = constant, i .e. = 0 we again have L 3L 
We can interpret the mathematical terms as follows: 
- 'Y 
- marginal productivity of labour without the consideration of 3L 
education (related to '.skill ' ) 
- marginal productivity of education (related to 'social infor- 3: 
mation processing ' ) 
7 3Y 
JL (BY 'total marginal productivity of labour' which also depends on 
the education (related to the 'quality of labour') 
The concept of marginal productivities wit3 all its mathematical 
background can be used for each industrial sector by estimating sec- 
toral production functions3) . If marginal productivity of labour in 
one sector is higher than that of another sector, then we can say 
that each extra employee brings more value added in the first sector 
when ccmpared .to the -sector. In this sence one can define margi- 
nal productivities in different sectors of industry as the qualifi- 
cation of labour in respective sector. 
2.3 Qualification Indices of Domestic Industry and Foreign Trade 
Basing on this we can construct two different qualification indi- 
ces : 
i) the average qualification of labour index (Q1) for a country or 
a region calculated according to the formula: 
where: 
Li is the number of employee in the sector i and L is the total 
number of employee in all sectors of the industry. 
w is the weight of sector i reflecting the marginal productivity i 
of labour of that sector. 
n is the number of sectors. 
ii) the qualification - balance of foreign trade index (Q2) re- 
lating to the performance of a country in international trade4) : 
where : 
p. and qi are the value of exports and imports respectively for 1 
the sectors i 
w is the weight of sector i reflecting the marginal productivity i 
of labour of that sector. 
n is the number of sectors. 
High values of Q1 and Q2 indicate high qualification of labour in in- 
dustry as well as better position in international market. Q1 increa- 
ses with the increase of value added in highly qualified sectors 
while Q2 increases with relative increase of export of highly 
qualified goods over import of these goods. 
%or details see Stiive, M. : 'Zk (Mifiation of the Balance of B d e  I ,  STLDIA 
W o r m  Paper Nr. 4/1984. 
The va lues  of Q1 and Q2 have been c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  a l l  coun t r i e s  ac- 
cording t o  t h e  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  t o t a l  l abour ,  l abour  of t h e  higher  
educated and labour  without  higher  educa t ion .  These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
have been used f o r  a world wide comparison of c o u n t r i e s  toge the r  wi th  
o the r  v a r i a b l e s .  Furthermore a r e g i o n a l  s tudy  of Aus t r i a  has been ac- 
complished applying t h e  average q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of labour  of t h e  d i f -  
5 f e r e n t  f e d e r a l  s t a t e s  c a l c u l a t e d  by t h e  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s  . 
3 .  Resul ts  of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  wi th  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of Labour - Index 
I n  a world wide comparison of coun t r i e s  we found, a s  expected,  a 
d i s t i n c t  correla t ionbetween average q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of labour  and GDP 
per  c a p i t a  ( see  diagram 1) . 
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5 k l e n d a r f e r ,  J.: 'Kranke Riesen - Gesunde Zwerge?'. SNDIA,  Laxabg, 1983. 
W e  can a l so . . no t e  a s t r o n g  c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  q u a l i f i c a t k o n  
index and expend i tu re s  on r e s e a r c h  wi th  a t i m e  l a g  of s e v e r a l  y e a r s  
(diagram 2 ) .  This  proves  e m p i r i c a l l y  t h e  w e l l  known theo ry  of produc- 
t i o n  c y c l e ,  acco rd ing to  which - t o  express  it i n  our  terms - a high 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of  l abour  r e l a t e s  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  e a r l y  pe r iod  i n  t h e  pro- 
duc t ion  c y c l e ,  whereas a low q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i s  connected w i t h  t h e  l a t e r  
per iod  ok t h i s  c y c l e  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  s t a g e  of r o u t i n e  technology.  
USA 
Diag.2: Per capita expem3ture on research x-rcnss PO I€& 1-4s 
against qualification of labcnrr " - ~ . m . U . m u m U * ~ - m m U . I - m m m U y . m u  
There i s  one except ion  i n  t h e  diagram 2, which is  Great  B r i t a i n .  
Applying h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  one can e x p l a i n ,  why r e s e a r c h  expenses by 
themselves a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  i nnova t ion  development: 
G r e a t  B r i t a i n  has  been s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h e  19 th  cen tu ry  on t h e  b a s i s  
of t h e  technology of t h a t  t i m e ,  which depended on steam power, c o a l  
and gas .  Being t i e d  up t o  t h e  succes ses  of t h e  p a s t  t hey  adapted t h e  
new technology of e l e c t r i c i t y  on ly  i n  a moderate way. The ex tend ,  t o  
which they  changed i n  1929 towards t h e  new technology,  de f ined  - a s  
it d i d  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t o o  - t h e  t e c h n i c a l  development of t h e  nex t  
decades.  The de l ay  i n  under tak ing  necessary  s t r u c t u r . a l  change due t o  
impress ion of t h e  succes ses  i n  t h e  p a s t  have compelled England, t o  be 
f a r  away from t h e  l e a d i n g  economic p o s i t i o n ,  a l though  it has t h e  grea-  
tes t  r e s e a r c h  expenses i n  Europe. The reason of worse performance du r ing  
l a s t  decade of mining c o u n t r i e s  can be a very  s i m i l a r  one. Theirdepen- 
dancy and f a i t h  i n  minera l  r e sou rces  w a s  a c o n s t r a i n t  t o  adapt  neces- 
s a r y  s t r u c t u r a l  changes. To sum up one can s a y ,  t h a t  t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
of l abour  i s  dependend on t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  produc t ion  c y c l e ,  which 
i t s e l f  i s  def ined  n o t  on ly  by t h e  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s ,  b u t  a l s o  by t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  development of technology.  
From t h e  s t u d i e s  w e  have a l r e a d y  c a r r i e d  o u t  it 
fo l lows  t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of s e c t o r s  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  changes 
i n  t h e  way t h a t  s e c t o r s  w i th  low q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of l abour  a r e  ex- 
cluded.  Employment r a t e  and produc t ion  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r s  dec reases  
according t o  t h e  dec reas ing  va lue  of t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  index.  A pro- 
g n o s i s  about  development of s w i s s  manufacturing s e c t o r s  made by STUDIA 
based on t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  framework w a s  f u l l y  v e r i f i e d .  This  is  i l l u -  
s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  diagram 3 .  
Index of  Q u a l i 5 i c q t i o n  
05 Laboar 1970 
MA. 
P 
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M A - m a c h i n e r y  
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Diag. 3: The abcissa is the forecasts of developrent of anployment for Swiss industry 
basing on qualifiaation of labaa and plblished i n  'Wnturen einer zuldinftigen Industrie- 
£&&rung! Wirtschaftsberichte Nr. 6/1975, pp.5-13, w h i l e  the ordinate is the actual de- 
vel-t of ernplayment as shown i n  Schweizerisck BankgeseUschaft published 1977 in: 
Wirtschftsnotizen, July 1977. 
This result leads to an understanding of the fact, that since the 
midseventies capital intensity, though formerly a successful approach, 
is no more a sufficient strategy for competition in industrialized 
countries. And it is qualification of labour which accrue in impor- 
tance and significance for competetive strength and thus has become 
decisive criterion of structural change. 
The arguments based on the marginal productivity of total labour 
become even more valid, if we apply the marginal productivity of higher 
education. In a regional study of Austria we calculated the average 
qualification of labour in different regions. This was done for all 
three type of qualification of measures mentioned above. This compa- 
rison of the federal countries of Austria showed - apart from expec- 
ted results like the close connection of marginal productivity and 
wages in industry - one unexpected result: The GDP per capita of 
federal states, most strongly correlates with the marginal produc- 
tivity of social information processing (see diagram 4) . 
GDP (1981) 
je Bev. 1981 
B - Burgenland 
K - Grnten 
N - Niederijsterreich 
0 - OMterreich 
S - Salzhrg 
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T - Tirol 
V - Vorarlberg 
W - Wien 
Diag.4: Qualification of labour of- social in- Index 
formatim processing against gross darrestic ~ildungsgrenzprod. 
product of Aus-ian federal countries. 
The information-intensive labour before and after the actual act 
of production servesas a process of communication and learning both 
within the firms and in the external emironment of firms. The re- 
sult can be understood in that way, that these external processes of 
communication and learning have a positive effect on the whole region. 
The external communication of social information processing thus be- 
comes decisive for the regional development due to a social process 
of learning, whereas a high qualification of skill, though connected 
with a high average industrial productivity, does not seem to contri- 
bute so strongly to the development of a region. 
This leads to consequences as far as developmental strategies are 
concerned. If for example multinational firms establish factories with 
high technologies and high wages in a developing country, this will 
according to our results have no significant positive effects on the 
&vdopment of a region - apart from the common effects in the field of 
demand -, as long as social information processing stays outside the 
reach of the society in an isolation from sorroundings in the host 
country. 
A cross-section comparison of all countries since the seventies 
shows that in 1973 developing countries possessed a lower qualifica- 
tion of labour than industrial countries, though the best developed 
developing countries and the least developed industrial countries some- 
what mergeinto each other. 
For 1979 however due to lack of data for some threshold countries, 
at present, it can not be confirmed if there is an increasing Gap which 
&videsindustrial and developing countries as.far as qualification of 
labour is concerned: The international division of labour however more 
and more causes industrial countries to specialize in technologies 
with high qualified labour, whereas developing countries specialize 
in technologies with lower qualificatkon of labour. Both, the hypotheses 
of convergence and divergence become confirmed in a certain way, since 
developing countries accelerate their process of industrialization (con- 
vergence), though they have to specialize in technologies with a low 
qualification of labour, by which the gap between them and the indust- 
rial auntries m y  -increase (divergence). This gap is not so much deter- 
mined by the diverging level of the technological niveau within a sec- 
tor, but by the structure of sectors. 
4 .  Resu l t s  of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  w i t h  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  - Balance of Foreign 
Trade 
The explana tory  va lue  of t h i s  measure is  very  high.  This  measure 
l o g i c a l l y  c o r r e l a t e s  we l l  w i t h  terms of t r a d e  of r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s .  
But p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  much more t h a n  t h a t  of terms 
of t r a d e .  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  - Balance i s  connected withqual i t ies  that  promise 
t o  be s u c c e s s f u l  i n  long run.  It i s  t h u s  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  such 
v a r i a b l e s  a s  f o r e i g n  o r i e n t a t i o n  (diagram 5 )  and innova t ion  ( In t e rna -  
t i o n a l e  Wir tschaEt ,  January 1983) a s  w e l l  a s  investment  r a t i o ,  i n su rance  
d a t a  e t c .  It seems meaningful  t o  concen t r a t e  on t h e  fo l lowing  diagrams.  
AUS 
USA 
.............................................. D i a g .  5 : QuaLfication - balance of foreign trade 
against Eoreign orientation I-ACHSE II O U A ~ ~ O O l L  1977 
....... ....................*..**.. 
Diagram between both of these qualification measures (labour and 
foreign trade) shows (diagram 6) quite distinctly the bottle neck for 
the developing countries. 
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It is their lower position in international division of labour 
that ultimately hampers development process and even be responsible 
for any gap between the industrialized and developing countries (see 
diagramm 7) . 
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A s  fa r  a s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o u r  i s  concerned a s p e c i a l  
form of t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n - b a l a n c e  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  h i g h l y  i n t e r e s t i n g :  
measurements ob ta ined  w i t h  t h e  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of s o c i a l  informa- 
t i o n  p roces s ing .  One can unders tand t h e s e  measurements t o  be i n d i c a t o r s  
of t h e  so -ca l l ed  ' b r a i n  e x p o r t 1 .  Comparing t h e s e  measurements w i th  growth 
r a t e s ,  they  show a remarkable p a t t e r n  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r i e s  w i th  low growth r a t e s  more and more i n c l i n e  t o  ' b r a i n  e x p o r t s ' ,  
whereas developing c o u n t r i e s  occupy a low p o s i t i o n  as expected.  This  can 
be read  from diagram 8.  
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The observat ion of t h e  qual i f ica t ion-balance  of fo re ign  t r a d e  having 
a  s t rong c o r r e l a t i o n  with t h e  purchasing power p a r i t i e s ,  ca lcu la ted  o r i -  
g i n a l l y  by Kravis under a  p r o j e c t  ,of t h e  world-Bank and a l s o  by OECD i s  
of b a s i c  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  (compare diagram 9 ) .  
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A f t e r  w e  had ob ta ined  such a  high c o r r e l a t i o n  i n  j u s t  t h i s  s p e c i a l  con- 
t e x t ,  it could even be improved by adding f u r t h e r  v a r i a b l e s ,  whLch c o r r e s -  
pond w i t h  t h e  convent iona l  t h e o r y  of exchange r a t e s :  c a p i t a l  f low,  ad- 
d i t i o n a l  income by r e n t s  i n  o i l  e x p o r t s ,  development a i d  and o t h e r s .  The 
2 R of a  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  wi th  a sample of 70 c o u n t r i e s  equa l s  0 .94 .  
The v a r i a b l e  w i th  t h e  h i g h e s t  exp lana to ry  power i s . t h e  qua l i f i ca t ion -ba -  
l a n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  I f  w e  omit t h e  monetary v a r i a b l e s  and j u s t  exa- 
mine t h e  con tex t  g iven  by t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of t r a d e  and purchasing po- 
w e r  p a r i t i e s ,  w e  can f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  and b e f o r e  s t a r t i n g  t o  examine t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  monetary con tex t  on t h e  whole, e s t i m a t e  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  im-  
po r t ance  of t h e  new obse rva t ion .  
I f  the .ba lance  of payments i s  i n  equilibri.urn one can:deduce, t h a t  ce- 
t e r i s  par ibus a country has t o  provide more e f f o r t s  i n  regard t o  i t s  
6 
exports  comparing t o  imports,  t h e  l e s s  q u a l i f i e d  i t s  labour i s  . Na- 
t u r a l l y  t h e  unequal r e l a t i o n  of working t ime contained i n  exports  and 
imports given with an equi l ibr ium of t h e  balance of payments s i g n i f i e s  
disadvantages f o r  developing coun t r i e s ,  which e a s i l y  come through i n  
a d e f i c i t  of t h e  Mance of payments o r  a shor tage  of imported goods, 
which can lead  a l s o  t o  obs t ruc t ions  i n  production processes ,  i f  im- 
ported goods a r e  precondit ions f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  production. T r i a l s  
t o  overcome these  d i f f i c u l t i e s  by e s t a b l i s h i n g  a more e f f i c i e n t  and 
higher q u a l i f i e d  export ing indus t ry  however can lead  t o  a new dilemma, 
t h a t  of a ' d u a l i s t i c 1  economy. Economies s t r u c t u r e d  i n  t h a t  way br ing  
i n t o  opposi t ion export ing s e c t o r s  r e l a t i v e l y  wel l  equipped and h ighly  
developed .to the rest of the econmy which is poorly equipped and lw developed, the 
home population remaining undersupplied wi th  t h e  most necessary goods. 
According t o  t h e  r ecen t  s t a t e  of knowledge t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  may be 
overcome only by an equi l ibr ium of ex tens ive  growth (by increased inpu t  
of f a c t o r s ) ,  i n t ens ive  growth (by increased e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  f a c t o r  
inpu t )  and monetary growth which is  based on improving exchange r e l a -  
t i o n s  and follows t h e  mechanisms ou t l ined  i n  t h i s  paper. The f i r s t  two 
components can be obtained and examined by t h e  genera l  production func- 
t ion ' ) .  The monetary component has j u s t  been descr ibed.  Concepts of how 
t o  overcome t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  mentioned above w i l l  not  immediately re-  
s u l t  from t h e  new percept ions .  These however w i l l  hopeful ly  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  t h e  improvement of t h e  fundaments t h a t  w i l l  support  a development 
of new concepts. 
6)This problm h s  so far not been treated in  cross-secticns, but in  the -ral 
dwelopnent, i ,e. with respect t o  th change of exchange relations called the terms 
of trade. Difficulties are rendered by strong sbrt-term oscillations of prices, 
which impede the ertpirical and therefore also the theoretical inquiry into long- 
term mechanism of the process of exchange, In the discussion dealing with terms 
of trade the argmmt of 'exploitation' occasionally is braqht up, which Galtung 
tried t o  bring into action by help of an index of exploitation. Its set  up is too 
simple (ratio of exported raw materials wether with agricultural prod- and 
imparted processed goods) and doesn I t lead t o  m l i o a b l e  results (Canada far example 
b e l q s  t o  the group of 'exploited courrtries) . 
7, see footnote 2. W e  just concluded a estimation of the general production func- 
t im as w e l l  as a calculation of the extensive ard intensive growth for a l l  countries. 
The parameters of the general production function thereby stay, generally speakuq , 
tk same as in t k  estimtion 14 years ago- The efficiency zones, as expected, show 
l i t t l e  cl-mges. The exbasive ard intensive grawth rates are deteminated in  a dif- 
ferent way. The la t te r  are strongly connected with1 soft variables ' , (a m l i c a t i o n  
0311ce.rniq this topic is being prepand). 
5. Current Studies 
5.1 General Remarks 
The current study is applied to a combination of conventional 
economic variables and so-called 'soft variables', which describe 
values, patterns of behaviour and organizational forms, in order 
to find determinants of the structural change. Examples for soft 
variables are the motivation indices of David McClelland and Geert 
Hofstede. They in particular show clearly and understandably connections 
with economic variables, but so do also the indicators of price dis- 
tortions and state influence which are published by T he World B ank. 
It is not without interest, that even today a developing country's for- 
mer belonging to a special colonial power is of quantitative economic 
significance!) . Furthermore differences of developmental mechanisms bet- 
ween home economies and foreign trade for the wider regions, like La- 
tin America, South-East Asia and the arabic Orient, can be analysed. 
The essential points of these inquiries are the empiric perception of 
the laws of structural change with the help of sophisticated measurement 
models and the establishment of theories only on the basis of the com- 
plex mechanisms obtained in this empirical way. This way it is guaranteed 
that the measurement models of these inquiries and the mathematical 
models for formal presentation have a close and valid connection with 
reality. The relation to the empirical reality is furthermore secured by 
continuous discussions of the current results with experts in practice. 
(In our case, with Austrian trade delegates). 
The following introduces some present results of these inquiries. 
Apart from the measurement models mentioned above new methods of 
multivariate analysis have been applied, first and foremost the main- 
plane analysis and the cluster inversion. These methods structure the 
abundance of empirical data in a way, which makes possible theo- 
retical interpretations. Since other disciplines like the empirical 
research in medicine and biology are following similar tasks, it is 
not surprking, that in those fields similar methods have been developed 
by authors, we are in communication with. 
8 ) ~  paper ccmcernirg this matter is ncw bdrq prepared by Ch. Hcrrix &,the STUDIA. 
5 . 2  Main-Plane-Analysis 
In  a  q u i t e  new f i e l d  where t h e r e  i s  no mature theo ry ,  w e  have t o  be 
c a r e f u l  i n  de r iv ing  hypothesis  from empi r i ca l  d a t a .  The b e s t  way t o  
cope wi th  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  a redundancy i n  a  weal th  of empir ica l  ob- 
se rva t ions .  H e r e  a  d i f f i c u l t  ques t ion  a r i s e s :  How t o  handle t h e  mass 
of da ta?  STUDIA developed a  new formal method of m u l t i v a r i a t e  a n a l y s i s ,  
t h e  Main-Plane-Analysis, which f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  theory-bui lding on a  
l a r g e  empi r i ca l  d a t a  b a s e 9 ) .  The r e s u l t s  of M-P-Analysis p l o t t e d  gra- 
p h i c a l l y  show c l e a r e r  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between hard and s o f t  v a r i a b l e s .  
Long arrows r ep resen t  v a r i a b l e s  which a r e  expla ined  wi th  a  high corre-  
l a t i o n  by t h e  e igenvec tors  of t h e  p lane .  I f  two long vec to r s  a r e  p a r a l -  
l e l  then they a r e  c o r r e l a t e d .  Three long non p a r a l l e l  v e c t o r s  a r e  i n  a 
mul t i r eg res s iona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Shor t  v e c t o r s  have b igger  r e s i d u a l s  t o  
be explained by v a r i a b l e s  usua l ly  no t  i n  t h e  plane.  Knowing t h i s  formal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  it is  p o s s i b l e  t o  de r ive  from t h e  main-plane h e u r i s t i c  
hypothesis  wi th  a  high p r o b a b i l i t y  n o t  t o  be fa l s i f ied  i n  d e t a i l e d  inve- 
s t i g a t i o n s .  On t h i s  b a s i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  mechanisms between s o f t  and hard 
v a r i a b l e s  were found. 
There a r e  d i f f e r e n t  main-planes which a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  c e r t a i n  i s s u e s :  
One main plane i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i s s u e  p o l i c y  and s o c i a l  psychology, 
another  t o  t h e  i s s u e  of economy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  e t c .  The 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  main p lanes  needs spe- 
c i a l  s t u d i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  of canonical  c o r r e l a t i o n s .  These s t u d i e s  show 
10 t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i s s u e s  . 
9b~-Analysis can be described frun two approaches, factor analysis ard Qalese- 
factorization. F'actor analysis and KP-Analysis are loolung for (n-k) dimensional 
spaces in the n-space. KP-Analysis limits the m i a n  (n-k) t o  2 or 3 and is 
looking for different 2-0r 3-dimensional spaces. Each space respectively &-plane 
explains a  subgroup of the whole sample of variables. This subgraps and the inter- 
relations of m l e s  in  it can be uderstood as issues, it mans as sukgroblars. 
Cholese-factorizatim transforms the correlation natrix t o  find submatrices alaq 
the diagoral of a  matrix, w h i l e  KP-Analysis does nut transform the w b l e  correla- 
tion matrix but calculates the eigen values of subgroups of interdependent variables. 
Ahntages of KP-Analysis: The results plotted graphically stinnilate theory-Ml-; 
a  very flexible stepby-step approach in a dialogue w i t h  the clcmputer; w e l l  defined 
levels of significance. 
lo)- d e t 2 l s  see W. Baaske: 'Majn Plane Analysis - Simple Stmctures in a Wealth 
of Variables ' , in: J. Millendorfer : ' Wanke Riesen-Geflmde Zwerqe? , SNDIA, 
5 . 3  C l u s t e r  Inve r s ion  
The e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  of main p l ane  a n a l y s i s  a s  opposed t o  f a c t o r  
a n a l y s i s  and t h e  b i p l o t  method "I i s ,  t h a t  it s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  s e l e c t s  
groups of v a r i a b l e s  accord ing  t o  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of  a  maximum of l i n e a r  
dependency. A second method t h a t  STUDIA has developed i s  a l s o  based 
on a  sys t ema t i c  s e l e c t i o n  of v a r i a b l e :  t h e  so -ca l l ed  c l u s t e r  i n v e r s i o n .  
The c l u s t e r  a n a l y s i s  known s o  f a r ,  t o  d e s c r i b e  it i n  a  s imple  way, 
d i v i d e s  a  sample, w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  some set  of  v a r i a b l e s ,  i n t o  subgroups 
such t h a t  subgroups a r e  homogeneous w i t h i n  bu t  d i f f e r e n t  among them- 
s e l v e s .  means t h e  t a s k  i s  t o  f i n d  homogeneous subgroups bas ing  
on given set  of v a r i a b l e s .  
C lus t e r  i n v e r s i o n  r e v e r s e s  t h i s  approach and it s t a r t s  from g iven  
subgroups of  a  sample, and look f o r  v a r i a b l e s  which i n  consequence l e a d  
t o  t h e s e  subgroups. This  method i s  c u r r e n t l y  app l i ed  by STUDIA t o  exa- 
mine s t r u c t u r a l  changes, e . g .  t o  d e f i n e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  d i f f e r e n c e  be t -  
ween r e g i o n a l  groups l i k e  La t in  America, c o u n t r i e s  i n  North Af r i ca  and 
South Eas t  Asia. One can apply v a r i a b l e s  ob ta ined  by c l u s t e r  i n v e r s i o n  
a l s o  t o  a  mainplain  a n a l y s i s .  The r e s u l t  of such a  combination of c lu -  
s t e r  i n v e r s i o n  and main p lane  a n a l y s i s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by diagram 10. 
Diagram 10 i i l u s t r a t e s  main p lane  of v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  c l a s s i f y ,  r e s -  
p e c t i v e l y  d i s c r i m i n a t e  t h e  reg ion  of L a t i n  America, t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of 
t h e  Middle Eas t  and North Af r i ca .  The v a r i a b l e s  a r e  p a r t l y  of democra- 
p h i c  n a t u r e  l i k e  b i r t h - r a t e s ,  dea th - r a t e s ,  male-female r a t i o s ,  urbani-  
s a t i o n  e t c .  Others  a r e  monetary v a r i a b l e s  l i k e  e .g .  money c i r c u l a t i o n  
p e r  GDP, money supply p e r  currency r e s e r v e s  e t c .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  c o n s i s t s  
of convent ional  economical v a r i a b l e s  l i k e  growth r a t e  oS t r a d e  a s  per- 
centage of GDP, r a t i o  of p r i v a t e  andgovt. ~ m p t i o n  and o t h e r s .  With 
t h e  he lp  of mainplain  a n a l y s i s  w e  c u r r e n t l y  examine which 
v a r i a b l e s f r e l e v a n t  f o r  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  changesf l i e  i n  t h i s  mainplain .  
By t h i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  of d r i v i n g  and r e t a r d i n g  f o r c e s  f o r  s t r u c t u r a l  
changes i n  La t in  America and i n  c o u n t r i e s  of  t h e  Middle Eas t  i n  North 
A f r i c a  can be i n v e s t i g a t e d .  
see: K. R.Gabrie1. G.Rave and E. W e k r  : 'Graphisck =stellungen von Mtrizen durch 
das B i p l o t ' ,  EW in W z i n  und Biolcgie 1/1976. 
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diagr .lo: The main plane of variables dassifpng the Latin Anerican and 
Arabien countries as two different groups 
We also can investigate which variables signify typical differences 
that exist between industrial and developing countries. We then find 
that not only economical variables explain these differences, but also 
the so-called 'soft variables ' , measurements that do not suit immdia- 
tely to the notion of economical measurements but are of economical 
relevance. Specially the motivation factors measured by Geert Hofstede 
show great significance. In diagram 11 we show the relation of the 
qualification of exports and imports according to information intensive 
labour ('brain export') and motivation factor: lp~wer-distancel accor- 
ding to Geert Hofstede. Industrial countries and developing countries 
form a cluster. The group of countries that have a higher 'brain 
export' has a lower average power-distance-index, i.e. a lower distance 
between the hierarchical levels. This gives weight to the thesis, that 
a more efficient social information processing needs a somewhat more 
cooperative way of leadership than is applied in the old patriachical 
style. These belong to the driving and retarding forces of structural 
change, since they influence the possibility to specialize on 'brain- 
export' in the international division of labour. 
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Diag.11: Balance - Qualification of foreign trade based on social information 
processkg and pmer4istance-index of Hofstede reflecting dis&ces 
between hierarchical lwels. 
5.4 blainplane Reflecting the Structural Change 
Empirical investigations, which STUDIA has made into the structure 
of sectors of all countries have proved the fact, that developing 
countries specialize in low labour-qualified sectors, whereas indust- 
rial nations specialize in qualified labour sectors. We can des- 
cribe this structural change by the help of a mainplane. If we order 
the sectors according to the qualification of labour (see diagram3 ) ,  
we can represent the situation of developing countries, threshold- 
countries as well as industrial countries according to the structure 
of sectors in a mainplane, in which the different sectors are fixed. 
This has been illustrated in diagram 12 
Diag.12: Fainplane reflectiq the s ~ u r a l  change 
~he-rdeviakion of a c o u n t r y ' s  s t r u c t u r e  of s e c t o r s  from t h e  average 
s t r u c t u r e  of a l l  coun t r i e s  can be found by p ro jec t ion  of the  s e c t o r s  
onto t h e  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  r ep resen t s  t h e  country.  The p ro jec t ion  of sec- 
t o r s  onto t h e  v a r i a b l e  of an i n d u s t r i a l  country shows a s t r u c t u r e  i n  
which highly q u a l i f i e d  s e c t o r s  dominate. I n  case  of developing count r ies  
low q u a l i f i e d  s e c t o r s  dominate. Threshold coun t r i e s  have a s t r u c t u r e  
of s e c t o r s ,  i n  which not only low q u a l i f i e d  s e c t o r s  but  a l s o  medium 
q u a l i f i e d  s e c t o r s  have a bigger share .  S t r u c t u r a l  change is  demonstra- 
t e d  i n  t h e  mainplane by tu rn ing  t h e  vec tor  of a country i n  t h e  clock- 
w i s e  d i r e c t i o n 1 2 ) .  The speed of s t r u c t u r a l  change i s  s i g n i f i e d  by t h e  
speed of t h e  angle .  The s t r u c t u r a l  change of Switzer land,  presented i n  
diagram 3 corresponds with t h e  tu rn ing  of t h e  vec tor  of Switzerland i n  
t h e  mainplane descr ibed above. This tu rn ing  on t h e  o t h e r  hand corres-  
ponds with t h e  changes of t h e  above mentioned v a r i a b l e  ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
of labour of t h i s  very  s t r e t c h  of t i m e .  
The s t r u c t u r a l  change i n  i n d u s t r i a l  coun t r i e s  which can be repre-  
sented by tu rn ing  t h e  vec to r s  i n  t h e  mainplane of s t r u c t u r a l  change 
goes toge the r  wi th  a con t rac t ion  of t h e  s e c t o r s  with low-qualified 
labour  and constancy o r  growth of t h e  s e c t o r s  wi th  high-qual i f ied l a -  
bour. Inqu i r i e s  i n  which count r ies  have been compared show, t h a t  i n  
some i n d u s t r i a l  coun t r i e s  c e r t a i n  s e c t o r s  d e v i a t e  from t h i s  r u l e .  This 
can be ,explained by protect ionism i n  these  s e c t o r s ,  mainly steel and 
motor-car indus t ry .  The dev ia t ions  can be considered t o  be measure- 
ments of protectionism.1n developing coun t r i e s  s e c t o r s  with low-quali- 
f i e d  labour  grow, whereas t h e  highly q u a l i f i e d  s e c t o r s  a r e  not  y e t  de- 
veloped. Threshold coun t r i e s  which have advanced r e l a t i v e l y  f a r ,  record 
t h e  h ighes t  growth i n  s e c t o r s  of medium-qualified labour .  H e r e  a l s o  w e  
can f i n d  dev ia t ions  which s i g n i f y  a s t r u c t u r a l  po l i cy  below t h e  optimum. 
The s e c t o r s  wi th  t h e  h ighes t  and lowest q u a l i f i c a t i o n  d e f i n e  the  grea- 
tes t  d i f f e r e n c e  of growth wi th in  t h e  s e c t o r s ,  with oppos i te  s i g n s  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l  and developing count r ies .  Threshold coun t r i e s  may not  have 
d i f f e r e n c e s  of growth r a t e s  i n  these  extreme s e c t o r s :  low q u a l i f i e d  
s e c t o r s  may s t i l l  be growing, while s e c t o r s  wi th  a high q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
have a l ready s t a r t e d  t o  grow. 
l2lIhe m n g  of a mainplane hx, keen described for a different Conten- 
tional application in J. Millendorfer : ' L a q  Waves i n  a Larger Cantext ' , Procee- 
dings of the d e r e n c e  I lmg Waves, Depressiors and Innovati-011s , Flarence , O c t  . 
1983. 
The mainplane of s t r u c t u r a l  change can be app l i ed  t o  show t h e  t e m -  
p o r a l  development of a  country a s  we l l  a s  s i g n i f y  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  of 
coun t r i e s  i n  a  c ross -sec t ion .  Due t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  dev ia t ion  of a  
c o u n t r y ' s  development from t h e  gene ra l  r u l e ,  which depends on t h e  
c ross -sec t ion  of c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  
mainplanes which d e s c r i b e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of s i n g l e  c o u n t r i e s .  These 
d i f f e r e n c e s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  of c o u n t r i e s  regard ing  t h e i r  in- 
d i v i d u a l  process  of development. A s t r u c t u r a l  mainplane of a  country 
thus  enables  t h e  unders tanding of a  c o u n t r y ' s  s i t u a t i o n  wi th in  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  change a t  one g lance .  
The problem of ' d r i v i n g  and r e t a r d i n g  f o r c e s  of s t r u c t u r a l  change 
can now be understood i n  the way, t h a t  i n  m u l t i v a r i a t e  a n a l y s i s  such 
v a r i a b l e s  a r e  ga thered  t h a t  exp la in  t h e  change of t h e  angle .  One mea- 
surement expla in ing  t h i s  change i s  t h e  v a r i a b l e  ' t o t a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
of labour  of a  c o u n t r y ' ,  mentioned above. We posses  an abundance 
of s i n g l e  observa t ions  tending  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  which need y e t  t o  be 
i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  a  gene ra l  theory .  
- 
6 .  Recapi tu la t ion  and Outloo!; 
The empir ica l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  wellknown term of marginal  pro- 
d u c t i v i t y  renders  p o s s i b l e  t o  develop new measurements of t h e  q u a l i f i -  
c a t i o n  of labour  i n  home economy and f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  By he lp  of t h e s e  
measurements phenomena t h a t  a r e  known i n  a  q u a l i t a t i v e  way, l i k e  t h e  
r i s e  of a  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  gap between i n d u s t r i a l  and developing c o u n t r i e s ,  
can be represented  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  and new percept ions  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  change can be obtained.  These cover o b s t r u c t i o n s  of innova- 
t i o n  by f i x a t i o n  on technologies  which have been s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  
mechanisms of r e g i o n a l  development a s  w e l l  a s  a  new se t  up f o r  t h e  com- 
prehension of exchange r e l a t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  The measurements de- 
r i v e d  from t h e  marginal  p r o d u c t i v i t i e s  thus  show t o  be a  key v a r i a b l e  
t o  comprehend mechanisms of s t r u c t u r a l  change. 
Beyond t h e  i n d i c a t o r s  connected wi th  t h e  marginal p r o d u c t i v i t y  of 
l abour ,  new formal methods which a r e  mainly appl ied  t o  t h e  inves t iga -  
t i o n  of ' d r i v i n g  and r e t a r d i n g  f o r c e s  of s t r u c t u r a l  change' proved 
very success fu l .  The complex connections of t h i s  t o p i c  can be s t r u c -  
tured by these new methods, especially that of mainplane analysis and 
the cluster inversion, in such a way.as to find - according to the sim- 
plifying principles in the economy of thinking - access to possibili- 
ties of theoretical interpretation. It has already become clear that 
apart from the conventional economic- variables,so-called 'soft varia- 
bles' as structures of motivation, behavioural patterns and forms of 
organisation essentially contribute to a classification of 'driving 
and retarding'forces of structural change. 
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1. TRADE BETWEEN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are s m a l l  and r a t h e r  
open economies. Their s h a r e  of the  world t rade  is only 5 percent.  Hence i t  is  
usual to  think tha t  the  conditions of world t r ade  determine the  development of 
these economies while t he i r  own effects on the world economy are small. However, 
t he re  are close links through t r ade  flows of cer tain commodities between Nordic 
countries as w e l l  as between these and o ther  countries. Nordic countries also 
compete with each o ther  in the  markets of the  Third World Countries. Interdepen- 
dence between the  economies of Nordic countries is thus r a t h e r  strong. 
Bilateral t rade  flows can be considered as channels through which economic 
impacts move from one country to  another.  These impacts may be due t o  economic 
growth, development of economic s t ructures ,  different kind of disequilibrium, and 
economic policy measures. They have direct  effects and repercussions, which 
cause feedback from the  importing country to  t he  economy of the  country from 
which such developments emanate. 
The changes in industrial s t ruc ture  due t o  changes in the commodity composi- 
tion of foreign t r ade  are important development t rends in most economies today 
and in future. The adjustment process of industrial s t ruc ture  affects foreign trade 
and strengthens o r  weakens change in the  comparative advantage of nationzl 
economies o r  generally in the  international division of labor.  Their study..implies 
tha t  industries and trade flows are taken into consideration at a disaggregated 
level. 
Exports and imports are responsible f o r  between 25-30 percent  of GDP in the  
Nordic countries. In intra-Nordic trade the  sha re  of imports in total  trade varies  
between 16  and 27 percent  and of exports  between 1 5  and 24 percent  (Thage and 
Jakobsen, 1983). 
There are considerable variations between shares  of commodities exported t o  
t he  o the r  Nordic countries. Primary products have a r a t h e r  big s h a r e  in total 
Nordic exports. I t  involves gas and crude oil (Norway), o r e s  (Sweden), food (Den- 
mark), wood products and paper  (Finland, Norway and Sweden), iron and o the r  
metals (Sweden, Norway). These commodities are t raded only little between the  
Nordic countries (10 percent) ,  whilst manufactured commodities tend t o  dominate 
intra-Nordic trade (30 percent).  
Table 1. Distribution of Nordic foreign trade by country 1981 (current prices)  
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1 Denmark 
2 Finland 
3 Norway 
4 Sweden 
1-4 Nordic 
countries 
5 UK 
6 FRG 
7 Other EEC. 
countries 
8 USA, Japan, 
Canada 
9 Other OECD 
countries 
1 0  Eastern 
Europe 
11 OPEC 
countries 
1 2  Other 
countries 
Total 
Table 2. Exports 1981 from the Nordic countries. Current Prices.  Million US Dollars 
Commodity Total Export sha re  (Z) 
t o  the  o ther  
Nordic countries 
Non-electric machinery 
Paper  and Pape r  products 
Food products 
Crude oil 
Electric machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Iron and steel 
Other chemicals and plastic products 
Ships, oil r igs,  e tc .  
Petroleum products 
Other commodities 
Total 
2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
This description is based on a recently made comparative study on Economic 
Growth in a Nordic Perspective (DOR, Sekretar iatet ,  Copenhagen, ETLA, Helsinki; 
IFF, Copenhagen; IUI, Stockholm; 101, Bergen). 
Sweden w a s  industrially the  most advanced of t he  Nordic countries in the  
1950s. Finland w a s  least  advanced (measured according t o  the  p e r  capita output of 
t he  manufacturing sec tor )  but i ts  manufacturing output has  increased nearly twice 
as much as tha t  of t he  o the r  Nordic countries during the  30 postwar years.  
Even after t he  f i r s t  oil c r i ses  Finland managed t o  surge  ahead of the  OECD 
average. Denmark came close t o  the OECD average but Norway and Sweden came 
behind (oil and gas production is excluded from manufacturing output. 
Finland's export  earnings are obtained more from basic industries (such as 
fores t  industries) than is t he  case f o r  o ther  Nordic countries. The sha re  of 
engineering industries increases constantly. Denmark's exports  are based on 
agriculture,  food industries and specialized engineering. Norway has i ts  manufac- 
turing base in the production and exploiting of hydroelectric power. Sweden's 
base lies in diversified engineering industries and i t  also has substantial activity 
in crude s teel  and forest  industries. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been shift- 
ing away from the i r  dependence on r a w  materials and basic industries. 
Their dependence on an  internationally competitive manufacturing sec tor  is 
increasing. Norway is becoming increasingly dependent on i ts  oil and gas produc- 
tion (50 percent  of commodity exports).  Nordic countries have built large public 
service producing sec tors  (especially health, education, transport).  Their sha re  
of GDP lies above the  OECD average. These countries also have internationally 
high t ransfer  payments from the  public sector ,  which became prominent during the 
70s. Capital spending pat terns  changed substantially in each country during the  
70s. 
Norway has invested considerably in oil-related activities. The long-run 
problem is t o  transform i ts  oil wealth into a more diversified industrial s t ruc ture .  
The "crowding out effect" makes transformation difficult. 
Table 3. Nordic production s t ruc tures  in 1980 
The fgure tor Denmark IS included in d) 
" of which 15 percentage points are tn oil and pas 
Swrce: OECD. National Aceounts 
finlano! is  undergoing a transformation process from dependence on basic 
industries t o  t h e  development of engineering. Sweden went through this process  
ear l ier .  
flueden has, at one and the  same time, both cr is is  industries (basic industries) 
subsidized by government, which have been prevented by policy makers from clos- 
ing down, and o ther  industries tha t  have flourished o r  come t o  life (the technologi- 
cal  and commercia! base has  expanded strongly). 
Denmark has a broad base of sophisticated but r a t h e r  s m a l l  firms in expand- 
ing markets, moving the  industrial s t ruc ture  away from i ts  original dependence on 
agriculturally re la ted products. 
The adjustment needs in t he  manufacturing industry a r e  g rea t e r  in Norway 
and Sweden than in Denmark and Finland. Traditional expor t  industries a r e  located 
in stagnating markets are are subsidized considerably. But these countries have 
the  wealth t o  do  it .  Danish and Finnish industry, a t  least t o  some extent,  and a p a r t  
of Swedish industry have succeeded w e l l  in t he i r  post-oil cr is is  s t ruc tura l  adjust- 
ment. In Denmark and Sweden a significant reorientation of technologies and of 
markets fo r  existing firms occurred.  In Finland adjustments have been made within 
existing industries. 
A!1 the  Nordic countries except  Finland have reduced the i r  investment ra t ios  
in manufacturing relat ive t o  the  OECD average since t he  f i r s t  oil crises.  This is 
partly explained by t h e  shift  from t h e  basic industries t o  more sophisticated and 
less hardware-intensive industries, a t  least  in Denmark and Sweden. 
In the i r  growth s t ra tegies ,  Denmark and Finland have emphasized more than 
have Rorway and Sweden, economic growth in the  long term a t  the  cost of a higher 
r a t e  of open unemployment in the  sho r t  t e r m .  Norway and Sweden have kept  t he i r  
unemployment r a t e  !ow by subsidizing production in industries weakened by crisis.  
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Three policy s t rategies  may be observed in industrial policy and allocation 
efficiency: 
1. Wage and salary equalization with a consequent inability of the  labor  
market t o  move labor  by wage signals. 
2. Designing the  s t ruc ture  of industrial support programs. 
3. Switching the  consumption pat tern towards less import-intensive con- 
sump tion. 
A natural question i s  now whether t he re  is a local Nordic policy solution. The 
prospects f o r  growth in the  international market a r e  only very small. Can coordi- 
nated Nordic macro demand management c r ea t e  the  desired local effects in the  
Nordic countries? 
A re turn  t o  broad-based economic growth in manufacturing is currently not t o  
be expected in Norway and Sweden, should world demand happen t o  switch on t o  a 
fas te r  growth path than can be assumed. This suggests tha t  Nordic macro demand 
management alone is not efficient enough f o r  these two countries. Denmark and 
Finland have a slightly be t t e r  outlook f o r  the future.  
Inefficiencies in the  allocation processes and- slow international market 
growth may be considered as causes f o r  Nordic economic stagnation. The Nordic 
countries today face s t rong competition in international markets. The future 
development of markets is difficult t o  predict. 
Flexibility in s t ructural  adjustment is therefore  necessary. The Nordic labor 
market allows f r e e  movement between countries but the  Nordic capital markets a r e  
more regulated than in most industrialized countries. This may have led t o  an 
inflexibility of s t ructural  adjustment and lower intra-Nordic industrial coopera- 
tion. The regulated Nordic capita! markets may have a built-in bias in the alloca- 
tion process. Regulation t o  some extent may prevent intra-Nordic specialization 
and division of labor and d i rec t  industrial cooperation with non-Nordic countries. 
On the  o ther  hand the loosening of the  regulation of capital  markets may lead t o  
unexpected disturbances in national economies and t o  missed opportunities f o r  
making national economic policy. Analyses and studies should be  done tha t  take 
into consideration close links between the  Nordic economies. 
NORDHAND MODEL SYSTEM' 
The NORDIlAND model system consists of four  national models and a t rade  
model. All the national models a r e  different in s t ruc ture  and classification. Sirni- 
lar character is t ics  are the use of disaggregation of production activity and the  
use of an input-output framework as a co re  of the model. The t rade  model links 
national models together.  Classifications and estimates used in the t rade  model f o r  
commodities and countries must be adjusted with classifications and estimates of 
imports and exports  of the  national models when the  whole system is used f o r  ana- 
lyses. This adjustment system is described by Figure l.' 
National models a r e  at f i r s t  used to  estimate imports demanded by national 
economies. Exports a r e  then e i ther  exogenously evaluated o r  calculated by the  
models if they have expor t  functions. These estimates include intra-Nordic 
exports  and exports  t o  o the r  countries. The iterative process in the t rade  model 
 he model system i s  described in greater detail by Forssell and KlrrymBki,l984. 
'paal Sand and Cunnar Sollie? Technical description of the NORDHAND Model System. Paper 
presented t o  the Input-Output Task Force Meeting, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 29 
September-1 October 1983. 
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Figure 1: The NORDHAXD Model System 
is  s ta r ted  using import figures estimated by the  national models. The t rade  model 
calculates intra-Nordic exports  and these estimates a r e  compared with those ori- 
ginally used in the  national models. 
When discrepancies are unacceptably large,  the  estimates of intra-Nordic 
exports  calculated by the t r ade  model a r e  used fo r  recalculating imports by the 
national models. These figures are substituted fo r  those used in the  preceding 
iterative step. The iterative process continues until discrepancies between the  
estimates of the  t r ade  model and the  national model fo r  intra-Nordic exports  a r e  
sufficiently smal l .  
s e t - u p  o f  m o d e l  
N O R D -  
H A H D  
CASE 
STUDIES 
Figure 2: Scenario analysis in NORDHAND Model. The broken line describes the 
resul ts  of model calculations, the  continuous line shows the  specific assumptions 
and exogenous factors  in each analysis. 
Figure 2 includes t h r e e  techniques tha t  can be integrated in a multi- 
country-multi-commodity model system: economic modeling, case studies and 
scenario analysis. The scenarios form a super  s t ruc ture  of the  system. In 
scenarios the  r e sea rche r s  o r  national economic decision makers, planners, etc., 
can express  the i r  neutral,  conflicting o r  normative opinions about the  future 
development of the  whole economy o r  some specific sectors.  In connection with a 
detailed model system the  outcomes of different assumptions can be compared both 
a t  aggregate and disaggregated levels. 
Some important areas of application fo r  the NORDHAND mode! system a r e  
listed below: 
a )  The analysis and prognosis of the  effects on the  development of world 
economy of the  s t ructural  changes in intra-Nordic t rade  under different 
assumptions. 
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c r i p t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  
b)  Simulation of t h e  e f fec t s  on foreign t r a d e  flows due t o  various policv 
measures in one o r  more of t h e  Nordic countries.  
The t r a d e  model descr ibed h e r e  i s  t h e  f i r s t  version of t h e  NORDHAND model 
system. I t  i s  a p u r e  quantity model and i t  includes only t h e  b i l a te ra l  t r a d e  flows 
between Nordic countr ies  while t h e  rest of t h e  world i s  t r e a t e d  as a whole. The 
Model system is  planned t o  b e  expanded along t h e  following lines: 
a) The market s h a r e  functions and p r i c e  re la t ions  are incorporated in t h e  
t r a d e  model. 
b )  The t reatment  of t h e  rest of t h e  world is  developed f u r t h e r  in o r d e r  t o  
make t h e  model system more comprehensive. 
c )  The national models are harmonized in o r d e r  t o  get  a simultaneous solu- 
tion of t h e  t r a d e  model and all national models. 
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GBOWTH AND TECHNOLOGY: 
INTEXDEPENDENCE BETWEEN 
TAIWAN AND JAPAN 
Mitsuo Saito and Ryoichi Nishimiya 
1. MTBODUCTION 
It  is  well known tha t  Japan enjoyed a very high rate of economic growth dur- 
ing the  1960s; the  average annual growth rate of GNP was about 10  percent.  
Within a period of twenty yea r s  Japan rose  from being a developing country where 
the  p e r  capita GDP was 462 L'S dollars in 1960 to a developed country with a p e r  
capita GDP of 8,627 US dollars in 1979. I t  is interesting to note tha t  high economic 
growth of this s o r t  has  recently also occurred in several  o the r  East and Southeast 
Asian countries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. A s  
shown in Table 1, t h e  average  annual growth rate of real GDP of these newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) w a s  8.8 to 10.4 percent  before t h e  oil crisis,  and 
even a f t e r  t h e  oil cr is is  i t  w a s  7.3 to 9.6 percent;  only in t he  case of Japan w a s  i t  
significantly lower (3.6 percent).  I t  i s  important to note t ha t  all these countries 
have the  following t h r e e  features  in common: 
(1) They are relatively poor in natural resources,  such as oil, coal, and 
metal ores.  This implies that t he  advantage of natural resources is  not a 
necessary precondition f o r  high economic growth. 
TABLE 1. The Growth of GDP of E a d  and Southend Asian Countries. 
1960-73. 
Average growth rate Per  oapita GDP P e r  oapita GDP (percentage of 
of r e a l  GDP (Z) (US d o l l a r s )  US value) 
Hong Kong 9.0 8.6 348 3809 12.4 35.3 
Japan 10.2 3.6 462 8621 16.5 80.1 
Korea, Republlc o f  8.8 9.6 150 1613 5.4 15.0 
Singapore 10.0 7.3 430 3829 15.3 35.5 
Talwan 10.4 8.3 153 1868 5.5 17.3 
(2) They a r e  open t o  foreign countries, in the sense that  they a r e  able t o  
freely introduce scientific knowledge and techniques, and to  import and 
export  goods and services. 
(3) They can draw upon abundant and well-disciplined labor forces.  
One might a rgue  tha t  these th ree  features  have enabled the  countries con- 
cerned to realize high economic growth through two mechanisms: borrowed tech- 
nology on the  supply side and wide foreign markets on the  demand side.' I t  i s  quite 
natural tha t  the rate of technical progress  will b e  much f a s t e r  in a country tha t  
introduces existing technology from abroad than in one tha t  is exploring i t  f o r  the 
f i r s t  time. In a developing country, the  level of technology can be  high due t o  
imported o r  borrowed technology, while t he  wage level remains very low. If a 
developing country succeeds in introducing foreign high technology f o r  the  pro- 
duction of a given commodity, e.g. a textile, and in acquiring a certain level of 
capacity f o r  producing the  commodity using this technology, i t s  production costs 
will be very low compared with those in a developed country where the  wage level 
may typically be  ten times as' high as in t he  developing country. The foreign 
demand f o r  the  low-price commodity from the  developing country wil l  be  very 
' 5 .  Kuenets  emphasizes "the e x i s t e n c e  of a technological backlog, t h e  exp lo i ta t ion  of 
which could g e n e r a t e  a c c e l e r a t e d  advance elsewhere" in  d i scuss ing  condit ions f o r  s t r o n g  
economlc performance i n  a n  LDC. He a l s o  mites t h a t  "given t h e  power of modern technolo- 
gy and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of modern t r a d e  ties, t h e  po ten t ia l  growth of an LDC should only 
moderately be cons t ra ined  by s c a r c i t y  of n a t u r a l  resources ,  o r  by s c a l e  problema because 
of smallness  of t h e  i n t e r n a l  markets." S. Kusnets, Y o d a  Ecmmnic Growth and t k  L e s s  
h v e l a p e d  Count r ies ,  a paper  p resen ted  a t  t h e  Conference on Exper iences  and Lessons  of 
Economic Development i n  Taiwan, held i n  Taipei  i n  December, 1981. 
strong. Keeping pace with the increase in production capacity for the commodity, 
exports will continue to grow very rapidly, until the wage level of the developing 
country approaches that in the developed country. This sor t  of rapid growth in 
export demand will continue to be a strong driving force behind the economic 
growth of the developing country. It  is t rue that this pattern, which has been dis- 
cerned very generally in the so-called NICs during the last twenty years, has very 
important policy implications f o r  development strategy. But several negative 
aspects must also be noted: social and economic maladjustments accompanying very 
rapid industrialization, environmental deterioration, and t rade  frictions due to the 
rapid growth in the exports from developing countries to the developed ones. 
An example of the last type of problem arose between Japan and the United 
States during the 1960s and 1970s because of the rapid expansion in Japanese 
exports of textiles, steel, electronic appliances, and cars. Recently, similar t rade 
frictions have arisen between Japan and Taiwan, and between Japan and South 
Korea. 
The main purpose of this study is to make an  econometric analysis of the 
underlying pattern of high economic growth. More specifically, w e  attempt to make 
a quantitative assessment of the contribution of borrowed technology to the recent 
rapid growth of the Taiwanese economy, and also to analyze quantitatively the 
recent trade friction between Taiwan and Japan. The procedure followed is f i rs t  to 
construct an econometric model of Taiwan, then to make a comparison of growth 
patterns between Taiwan and Japan on the basis of econometric models of both 
economies12 and finally to  study the trade friction between the two countries by 
linking together the two econometric models through export and import functions. 
Section 2 describes the main features of the econometric model of Taiwan, and 
discusses the implications of i ts estimated results. Section 3 is devoted to testing 
Y 
the explanatory power of the model for the past performance of the Taiwanese 
economy and examining its dynamic properties. Section 4 links the Taiwanese and 
Japanese models and then tests the explanatory power of the linked models and 
examines their dynamic properties. Finally, Section 5 presents a simulation study 
econometric model of Japan is described in  e companion IIASA WorWng Paper, The 
Causes qf the High Economic Growth fl &an , published i n  1985 b y  t h e  International In- 
stitute f o r  Applied S y s t e m s  Analysis,  Laxenburg, Austria.  
of the impact of technological p rogress  within one country on the  economic perfor-  
mance of o t h e r  countries as well as t he  impacts on the  domestic economy. 
2. MAIN FEATURES OF THE TAIWANEXE MODEL 
The model i s  essentially an  annual aggregative model of t he  Keynesian type, 
whose sample period is  1960-81. The equations and variables of t h e  estimated 
model are listed in t he  Appendix. In general,  t he  method of estimation i s  ordinary 
least  squares. 9 i s  t h e  measure of goodness of f i t  adjusted f o r  degrees  of f ree-  
dom; and D.W. i s  t h e  Durbin-Watson statist ic.  The figure in parentheses  below 
each regression coefficient indicates i t s  t-value. Some of the  equations are 
estimated by t h e  Cochrane-Orcutt i terat ive method, where p is  t he  se r ia l  correla- 
tion coefficient of t h e  f i r s t  order in error terms. 
The f i r s t  important charac te r i s t ic  of t he  model is  t h e  disaggregation of 
exports  and imports, which enables us t o  deal with t he  t r ade  relationship between 
Taiwan and Japan. Imports are then disaggregated into imports from Japan and 
those from countr ies  o t h e r  than Japan. Imports from Japan are f u r t h e r  disaggre- 
gated into six items: (1) food and agricultural products,  (2) chemicals, (3) textiles,  
(4) metals, (5) machinery, and (6) others.  These imports are mainly explained in 
terms of the  GDP of Taiwan, re la t ive pr ices ,  and the  level of capacity output of 
Taiwan (see eqs. (2.1) t o  (2.6)) The level of capacity output, represent ing t h e  
effect  of import substitution, is calculated from the  estimated production function, 
as explained below. 
Imports from countries o the r  than Japan are disaggregated into (1) fuels and 
(2) nonfuels. These are also explained in terms of t h e  GDP of Taiwan and relat ive 
pr ices  (eqs. (2.11) and (2.12))- There is  a slight statist ical  discrepancy between 
the  sum of disaggregated imports from Japan and t h e  total import from Japan, 
MGJPMO, since t he  former i s  based on MITI t r a d e  s ta t is t ics  from Japan and the  
latter on t r ade  s ta t is t ics  from Taiwan. The two figures are intercorrelated 
through a statist ical  equation (eq. (2.19)). The sum of commodity imports from 
Japan and nonfuel commodity imports from countries o t h e r  than Japan is  t h e  total 
nonfuel commodity import, MO PMO, (eq. (2.18)), and the total commodity import 
and service imports add up to t he  imports of goods and services  derived from t h e  
national income account, M ,  (eq. (2.14)). 
Commodity exports are also disaggregated into exports to Japan and those to  
countries other than Japan. Exports to Japan are further  disaggregated into (1) 
food and agricultural products, (2) chemicals, (3) machinery, and (4) others. The 
main explanatory variables for  such exports a r e  the GNP of Japan, relative 
prices, and the level of the capacity output of Taiwan (eqs. (2.7) to (2.10)). The 
second of these variables is introduced to take into account the fact that the capa- 
city level may impose limits on the maximum amount of Taiwanese exports. A 
greater  par t  of item (4) is textiles. Therefore, in the estimation of eq. (2.10) w e  
used an estimate of 0.64 fo r  the long-run elasticity of exports of this item with 
respect to the GNP of Japan; this estimate is the result of the calculation 1.26 x 
0.79 x 0.64, where 1.26 and 0.79 a re ,  respectively, estimates of the elasticity of 
consumer demand fo r  textiles with respect to total consumption and the elasticity 
of total consumption with respect to personal disposable income, both of which 
were obtained from a cross-section study, and 0.64 is the rat io of personal dispos- 
able income to GNP. 
Exports to countries other than Japan are explained in terms of the world 
trade index, relative prices, and the level of capacity output of Taiwan (eq. 
(2.13)). In the same way as for  imports, eqs. (2.21) to (2.24) are identities and sta- 
tfstical discrepancy equations, by which individual export items add up to exports 
of goods and services derived from the national income account, X. 
The second significant feature of the model is the system of price equations 
that relates the growth of exports and imports to the cost structure of domestic 
Taiwanese products. Corresponding to the disaggregation of imports, industry as a 
whole is disaggregated into eight industries: (1) primary, (2) food, (3) textiles, (4) 
chemicals, (5) petrochemicals, (6) metals, (7) machinery, and (8) construction, util- 
ities, and services. 
Using the framework of input-output analysis, w e  may write the  price-cost 
relationship of industry i as: 
Here Pi ,  W, and PI are ,  respectively, the price f o r  industry i , the wage index, and 
the deflator for  investment goods; A ( j  , i  ), LC(% ), D(i  ), T ( i ) ,  and S ( i  ) are material 
input coefficients, labor input coefficients, the  depreciation ratio, the indirect tax 
ratio,  and the surplus ra t io ,  respectively. The coefficients, which represen t  the 
technical and institutional structure of each industry, are adopted f r o m  the  
Taiwanese input-output table  f o r  1976. By solving each equation with respec t  t o  
P i ,  w e  may express  the  pr ice  of domestic product i as a function of the  pr ices  of 
o the r  products and the  wage: 
where PiD is  t he  p r i ce  of t h e  domestic product. This equation implies tha t  the  
cost of product t consists of two parts:  t he  nonwage p a r t  (the f i r s t  term on the  
right-hand side) and the  wage p a r t  ( the second term). Let us denote t he  former by 
Pi 10, as shown in eq. (4.2). The elasticity of PiD with respec t  t o  Pi I0 in t he  base 
year ,  when Pi = 1.0, is  calculated as 
In eqs. (4.3). (4.6), (4.7), (4.9). and (4.10) the coefficient of h P i  I 0  is  s e t  at t he  
value given by formula (A.3) from the  1976 input-output table. On the  o t h e r  hand, 
taking into account t h e  distinct declining t rend in LC(i),  w e  introduced the  
reciprocal  of the  labor  productivity of industry as a whole into eqs. (4.3) to (4.10) 
as a variable representing the  secular movement of the l abo r  input coefficient of 
industry t .  In this procedure we assume tha t  t h e r e  exists a stable  relationship 
between the  growth rates of labor productivity in industry as a whole and in t he  
individual industry i . 
The pr ice  as a cost  item, o r  t he  purchasers '  p r ice ,  Pi ,  will be  defined as a 
weighted average  of the  pr ices  of t he  domestic product,  PiD,  and the  pr ice  of 
imported goods, Pi M (eq. (4.1)). The latter is also defined as a weighted average 
of the  import p r ice  from Japan, PMJi.R4ZE, and the impol-t p r ices  from countries 
o t h e r  than Japan, PAE and PMO (eqs. (4.27) to (4.34)). 
The deflators of individual components of final demands, PC, etc., a r e  related 
t o  a variable defined as a weighted average of the  individual industry prices,  
PCIO, etc.  (eqs. (4.12) to (4.16)), where the  weight i s  calculated from the  relative 
sha re  of each industry's output in the  relevant final demand (eq. (4.11)). 
Export prices,  mi, are explained in terms of the  pr ice  of t he  industry 
corresponding t o  each export  item (eqs. (4.17) to (4.20)). Import pr ices  from 
Japan, P W i ,  are determined by the  wholesale pr ice  index of industry as a whole in 
US dollar terms, PWHIJ-RATJ (eqs. (4.21) t o  (4.26)); w e  assume tha t  t he re  exists a 
'stable relationship between the  t rend of t he  pr ice  f o r  industry as a whole and 
those f o r  individual industries. Under the  same assumption, the  wholesale pr ice  
index f o r  each individual industry is re lated to tha t  of industry as a whole (eqs. 
(J.1) t o  (5.4)). 
The third important fea ture  of the  m o d e l  is  tha t  t he  supply side of the  econ- 
omy is represented by a production function of t he  CES type: 
where an  output variable, G P M ,  is the  total  supply, i.e., GDP plus imports, and L , 
MF, M E ,  and MO a r e  labor  input, capital stock, fuel imports, and o ther  imports, 
respectively; di and 9 are parameters and the  elasticity of substitution is 
1/ (1  + 3). Technical progress  of a laboraugmenting type is allowed f o r  by a 
trend variable T. W e  assume tha t  the level of technical knowledge is expressed by 
an index, exp (At), where t is a time trend, and tha t  the  level of embodied tech- 
nique in existing plant and equipment at time t ,  Tt, is  represented by a weighted 
average of exp (At) over  t he  preceding ten years ,  where the  weight is new invest- 
ment over  t he  same period (eq. (5.1)). Cost minimization under eq. (A.4) gives us a 
set of four  log-linear margind productivity relations, each of which has a dif- 
fe ren t  constant term but a common elasticity of substitution, u. Pooling the  pro- 
ductivity and pr ice  data  fo r  four  inputs yields the  estimated resul ts  in eq. (5.1), 
where the  whole sample period i s  divided into two periods: before and a f t e r  the  oil 
crisis. Eq. (5.1) has  t he  smallest residual sum of squares  among the  equations 
obtained by assigning to A various values within a plausible range. Estimated 
resul ts  show tha t  the  average annual rate of progress  in available technical 
knowledge, A, is 7 and 6 percent  p e r  year  f o r  the  years  1962-69 and 1974-81, 
respectively, while the  elasticity of substitution, about 0.4, is almost the  same f o r  
both periods. 
Capacity output i s  defined as the value of GDPM obtained by substituting labor  
force  W;E f o r  L in t h e  estimated version of eq. (A.4) (namely, eq. (5.2)). 
Since GDPM is t he  output of the  whole economy, labor  input must include self- 
employed and family workers, NU, as well as employees, NW. In view of the  large 
differential between the  productivities of these types of input, however, labor  
input is defined h e r e  as the sum of IYW and a discounted NU, where the discount 
r a t e  is the  income differential, Dn (eqs. (6.4) to (6.9)). The desired level of L ,  
1.e. L I ,  is calculated from the  marginal productivity fomula  fo r  labor  (eqs. (5.1) 
and (6.1)). The actual level of L is regressed on this desired level and a lagged 
value of L (eq. (6.2)). Finally, a version of the  Phillips curve is estimated to deter-  
mine the  wage level of employees (eq. (6.10)). 
3. THE FINAL TEST AND DYNAMIC PROPERl'IES OF TEIE MODEL 
The explanatory effectiveness of the model over  the period 1965-76 was 
examined by the  so-called final method of e t  post  f ~ r e c a s t i n ~ . ~  In this method fore- 
cast values of t he  endogenous variables fo r  t he  starting yea r  (1965) are obtained 
by using observed values of the  exogenous variables and the lagged endogenous 
variables, while those fo r  subsequent years  are obtained by using observed values 
of the  exogenous variables fo r  each sample yea r  and calculated values of the 
lagged endogenous varfables obtained by past forecast.  The results are presented 
in Table 2. In this simulation the  variables relating t o  Japan, such as GNP, whole- 
sale price indexes f o r  industries, and the  exchange r a t e ,  were t reated as exo- 
genous. In addition, t he  constant term of the  employment equation was raised by 80 
thousand persons, since t h e  equation turned out to be unsuccessful in explaining 
the  observed dynamic behavior of the  unemployment rate. 
Column (1) of t he  table shows the  average absolute percentage e r r o r  of 
selected endogenous variables. I t  can be  seen that  t he  e r r o r s  fo r  total supply, 
GDPM, and private consumption, C, a r e  small, while those fo r  exports,  imports, 
'See A. S. Coldberger, 1-ct Y u l t i p l t m  and m o r n t c  Propcrttes d t h c  KLetn-CoLdberger 
Yodel (Korth-Holland Publishing Co. I=@), pp. 49-51. 
TABLE 2. The Reaulta of Ex Post Forecasting, 1985-73 
(1 ) (2) (3 ) (4)  
Average Average Average Error: 
absolute growth growth (3) - (2) 
peraentage rate: rate: 
e r r o r  aotual oomputed 
(1)  GDP: CDP 3.45 10.99 10.67 -0.32 
(2) GDPM : total supply 3.23 13.11 12.18 -0.93 
(3) c: private aonsumptlon 2.82 8.53 7.53 -1.00 
( 4 )  I :  fixed investment 7.29 17.88 16.54 -1.34 
(5) x: exports 5.89 24.62 P.43 -1.19 
(6) Ad: imports 8.53 14.05 11.46 -2.59 
('7) P :  CDP deflator 6.87 5.16 4.20 -0.96 
(6) PC: consumption deflator 5.78 4.90 4.43 -0.47 
(9 )  W: wage earlngs 6.41 9.16 7.61 -1.55 
(1O)N: persons engaged 1.11 4.26 4.03 -0.23 
(11 )MGJPMO :imports from Japan 10.83 21.82 26.13 -1.69 
(12>XCJmG : exports t o  Japan 19.90 21.70 10.26 -11.44 
'The average absolute percentage error 
where jt - the calculated value of a variable in period t ,  
Xt - the actual value of a variable in period t ,  
T - the number of periods. 
and price variables are relatively large. Columns (2) and (3) present the  actual 
and forecast average growth rates of t he  variables over  t he  period 1965-73. By 
and large, the forecast  value of the average  growth r a t e  is  fairly close t o  t he  
observed value, implying tha t  the  general t rends in most of the  variables a r e  fol- 
lowed by the  model simulation. 
Table 3 examines the  multiplier effect of government expenditure. A dynamic 
path was calculated in which government consumption expenditure was raised by a 
one billion Taiwanese dollars (T$), o the r  exogenous variables being kept  at t he  
same level as in t h e  e z  post forecast  described above. The figures in Table 3 are 
t he  difference between t h e  e z  post forecast  solution (call i t  t he  "control" solution) 
and the  expansionary one. As shown in Row (I) ,  t h e  value of t h e  multiplier is  1.089 
in t he  f i r s t  yea r  and r eaches  a peak value of 1.657 in t h e  third year .  These values 
are lower than those f o r  Japan. The value of t h e  multiplier f o r  t he  Japanese model 
is 1.28 in Lhe f i r s t  yea r  and reaches  a peak of 1.92 in t h e  seventh year.4 The lower 
- - 
4 ~ e e  M. Saito and T. Oono. An Energy Bode1 of the k p a n e r e  Economy, 1962-2979. 
value of t h e  multiplier f o r  Taiwan may b e  asc r ibed  to t h e  f a c t  t h a t  "import leak- 
age'' i s  l a r g e r  in Taiwan than in Japan: t h e  r a t i o  of imports to GNP in 1975 was 0.30 
in Taiwan but only 0.11 in Japan. Other rows of Table 3 show t h e  e f fec t s  of t h e  
increase  in government consumption on se lected var iables  in t e rms  of t h e  percen-  
t age  change in t h e  level  of t h e  control  solation f o r  e a c h  var iable  (see  t h e  footnote 
t o  Table 3). 
TABLE 3. The Effect  o f  a Sustained Increase of  One Billion Taiwanese Dol- 
lars (TS) o f  Government Consumption. 1965-70 
- 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
(1) GDP (billion TI) 1.089 1.2S3 1.657 1.322 0.690 -0.746 
(1)' GDP (Z) 0.430 0.466 0.562 0.419 0.193 -0.187 
(2) GDPM (billion TI) 1.248 1.548 2.322 2.549 2.727 2.304 
(2)' GDpM 0 )  0.404 0.461 0.621 0.615 0.581 0.437 
(3) c (Z) 0.138 0.245 0.389 0.499 0.605 0.668 
(4) I (Z) 0.000 0.193 1.020 1.035 1.072 0.618 
(s) x (Z) 0.0'75 0.056 0.003 -0.132 -0.327 -0.583 
(6) M (Z) 0.290 0.443 0.853 1.255 1.854 2.395 
n) f' (Z) -0.319 -0.152 0.137 0.807 1.701 2.809 
(8 )  PC (Z) -0.209 -0.070 0.159 0.693 1.389 2.214 
(9) w (Z) 0.026 0.158 0.472 0.969 1.674 2.474 
(1o)N (Z) 0.016 0.041 0.073 0.108 0.139 0.162 
(11 ) M G m O  0.452 0.572 0.815 0.874 0.883 0.717 
( I 2 ) X W . G  -0.065 0.080 0.156 0.258 0.239 0.021 
where Xt - the solution of a variable in period t for the "expansionary" economy, 
ft - the "control" solution of a variable in period t .  
4. LCNKING THE TAIWANESE AND JAPANESE MODELS 
The Taiwanese and Japanese  models were linked t o g e t h e r  by making t h e  follow- 
ing var iables  common t o  both countries:  5 
PWHIJ: wholesale p r i c e  index of t h e  whole of Japanese  industry 
 or the purpose of linkage, exports from Japan were disaggregated into exports to 
Tatwan and those to other countries. Similarly, imports into Japan were disaggregated 
into import8 from Taiwan and those from other countries. 
PJ, : wholesale pr ice index of item i in Japan 
RATJ: exchange rate of Japan 
MGPMO: imports of commodities from Japan 
XG- : exports  of commodities to  Japan 
The explanatory effectiveness of the linked models over  the period 1965-1973 was 
tested by the  final method as described earl ier .  In Table  4 the  results of the 
linked models are compared with those of the  unlinked Taiwanese model. Columns 
(1) and (2) of the  table contain the average absolute percentage e r r o r  of the  
linked m o d e l s  and i ts  difference from that  of the  unlinked Taiwanese model,6 
respectively. I t  can be seen that,  by and large, the average absolute percentage 
e r r o r s  of the  linked models are fairly close to those of t h e  unlinked model. 
Columns (3) and (4) are the  e r r o r s  in the average growth rate f o r  the linked 
models and the  unlinked one, respectively. The figures are very close t o  each 
o ther ,  indicating that  linking the  Taiwanese model with the  Japanese one does not 
give r i se  to  any significant increase in e r r o r s .  Columns (5) and (6) present,  
respectively, the  average absolute percentage e r r o r  and the  e r r o r  in the  average 
growth rate of the  Japanese variables obtained from the  simulation of the linked 
models. Generally speaking, the e r r o r s  in the  real variables fo r  Japan a r e  l a rge r  
than those fo r  Taiwan, while the  e r r o r s  in the  nominal variables (prices and wages) 
a r e  smaller. 
Now we examine the interdependence between the economies by estimating the  
multiplier in the linked models. Table 5 presents  the  resul ts  of a simulation in 
which the government consumption expenditures of Taiwan a r e  raised by one bil- 
lion TS over  the period 1965-68. The f i r s t  four columns of the  table show the 
7 
effects of the  increase in government expenditure on the  Taiwanese economy. By 
comparing T a b l a  5 and 3 i t  can be seen that  t h e r e  i s  practically no change in the  
multiplier effect between the  unlinked and linked Taiwanese models. In addition, 
the  last four columns of Table  5, which present t he  impact multiplier of Taiwanese 
government expenditure on the Japanese economy, show tha t  a 0.4-0.6 percent  
increase in the GDP growth rate of Taiwan does not e x e r t  any significant influence 
6 ~ h e  r r o r s  in t h e  unlinked Taiwanese model a r e  presented in  Column (1) of  Table 2. 
 he solution o f  t h e  unlinked Taiwanese model is presented in  Table 5. 
TABU 4. The Eeaults (Percentages) of Ex Post Forecasting Using the 
Talwan , Japan 
(1 (2) (3) (4 (5 ) (6 
Average (1) - Error Error in the Average Error In 
absolute of unlinked growth rate  absolute the growth 
peroentage model peroentage rate  
error. Linked unllnked error. (linked) 
(linked) 
*See Table 2 
==In the case of Japan, CNP or CKPN.. 
on Japanese economic activities. 
On the o the r  hand, Table 6 presents the  results of a simulation in which the  
government consumption expenditure of. Japan is raised by one billion yen over  t he  
period 1965-68. The f i r s t  four  columns show the  effects of Japanese expansion on 
the Taiwanese economy. On average over  this four-year period a 1.813-percent 
annual increase in the  growth rate of Japanese GNP will give r i s e  t o  a 0.055- 
percent annual increase in tha t  of Taiwan; i.e. a one-percent r i se  in t he  growth 
r a t e  of Japanese GNP might be  expected t o  yield a 0.030-percent r i se  in tha t  of 
Taiwan. Therefore,  i t  may be concluded tha t  economic repercussions from Japan to 
Taiwan will b e  much la rger  than those from Taiwan to Japan. 
5. TEIE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL PBOGRESS ON ECONOMIC PERFORXANCE 
In this  section w e  attempt to make a quantitative assessment of the  effect of 
technical progress  on economic performance. The method adopted he re  is simula- 
tion using the  estimated models. The assessment is f i r s t  made on the  basis of the  
unlinked Taiwanese model, and then repeated using the  linked models. 
TABLE 5. The Effecta of a Sustained Increase of One Billion T a i w a n a e  Dol- 
Taiwan Japan 
1965 1W6 1967 1968 1965 1- 1967 1968 
(1) GDP@ilUon TS o r  yen). 1.089 1.264 1.660 1.328 4.781 -1.438 -2.547 -3.164 
(1)' GDP G). 0.430 0.466 0.563 0.422 4.001 4.002 4.003 4.003 
(2) GDPM(bf1Uon TS o r  yen). 1.247 1.547 2.323 2.552 4.919 -1.546 -2.734 -3.338 
(2)' GDPM (2). 0.404 0.461 0.622 0.617 4.001 4.002 4.003 -0.003 
0 )  c(rr) 0.138 0.245 0.389 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(4) I G )  0.006 0.192 1.020 1.037 4.002 4.004 4.005 4.006 
6) XCL) 0.0m 0.- 0.002 4.130 4.011 4.015 4.022 4.022 
(6) MCL) 0.290 0.443 0.854 1.255 4.002 4.001 4.002 4.002 
(7) p 4.319 4.152 0.136 0.805 4.000 4.001 4.001 4.001 
(8) 4.209 4.071 0.158 0.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(9) w 0.026 0.158 0.472 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1o)N f l  0.016 0.042 0.074 0.108 4.000 4.001 4.001 4.001 
(U)MGmlfoC*) 0.452 0.572 0.816 0.876 - - - - 
(12 )Xm?iG C* ) -0.065 0.077 0.152 0.255 - - - - 
*In the case of Japan, CNP or CNPb?. 
TABLe 6. The Effects of a Sustained Increase of One Billion Yen in J a p a n e s e  
Government Consnmp tion. 196548 (Linked Models) 
Taiwan Japan 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1965 1966 1967 1968 
(1) GDP(bi1Uon TS o r  yen). 0.086 0.144 0.199 0.207 1.303 1.404 1.494 1.594 
(1)' GDPG)* 0.034 0.053 0.068 0.066 1.852 1.841 1.m 1.748 
(2) GDPM(bi1lion TS o r  yen). 0.123 0.203 0.315 0.433 1.424 1.538 1.640 1.757 
(2)' GDPM (Z)* 0.040 0.061 0.084 0.1m 1.844 1.827 1.789 1.725 
(3) CCL) 0.019 0.038 0.039 0.083 0.224 0.380 0.558 0.734 
(4) I(Z) 0400 0.015 0.089 0.124 0.518 2.788 2.515 2.109 
0) x(rr) 0 . m  0.230 0.266 0.246 -0.097 4.m 4.28!5 4.334 
(6) A4 G) 0 . m  0.092 0.148 0.230 1.778 1.690 1.600 1.528 
0) p 4.001 0.Oii 0.049 0.141 4.178 4.140 4.039 0.072 
(8) PC 0.006 0.039 0.113 0.228 0.125 0.162 0.199 0.274 
(9) w 0.005 0.022 0.063 0.136 0.012 0.092 0.201 0.357 
(iO)N (Z) 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.016 0.313 0.597 0.740 0.002 
(11)MGJJM0 (Z) 0.110 0.135 0.177 0.236 - - - - 
(I2>XGJ'G (Z) 1.098 1.638 1.961 2.285 - - - - 
*In the case of Japan, ChT or C N W ,  
5.1. The U n l i i e d  Taiwanese Model 
In the  Taiwanese model t he  rate of labor-augmenting technical progress  was 
estimated as 7 percent  p e r  year  f o r  1961-73 in eq. (5.1) above. Suppose now tha t  
this r a t e  is 6 percent  p e r  year ,  i.e. one percentage point lower than the  initial 
estimate. A simulation f o r  1965-73 under this l a t t e r  assumption, o ther  things 
being kept unchanged, describes the growth path whose main features  a r e  
presented in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) of the  table give the average growth 
rates of selected variables f o r  the 6-percent path and the i r  difference from the  
"control" solution (see Columns (3) of Table 2). I t  can be seen tha t  a slowdown of 
one percent  in the rate of Taiwanese technical progress  will resul t  in a decrease 
of 2.10 percent  in the  growth rate of GDP, an increase of 5.70 percent  in the  infla- 
tion rate of the GDP deflator,  and an  increase of 0.13 percent  in the  growth rate 
of employment. The annual increase of 0.13 percent  in the average growth r a t e  of 
employment f o r  nine years ,  representing a fall of 1.18 percent  in the  unemploy- 
ment r a t e  in 1973 may be impossible, since the  labor market of Taiwan reached a 
s ta te  of full employment around 1971 and the  unemployment rate was 2.24 percent  
in 1973 .~  Therefore, if the  rate of technical progress  had been one percent  
slower, effective demand would have had to  be reduced. Let us suppose tha t  
government expenditures were cut down so  as t o  keep the  unemployment r a t e  a t  
the level of the control solution. Columns (3) and (4) present  the growth r a t e  fo r  
the simulated path and the  differences between this and the control solution, 
respectively. They show tha t  a one-percent slowdown in the rate of technical pro- 
gress  would lead to a fall of 1.04 percent  in the  average growth rate of GDP and an 
increase of 0.95 percent  in the  inflation r a t e  of the  GDP deflator. One might 
argue, assuming the causal relationship outlined above t o  be linear,  tha t  if the  
rate of technical progress  were zero percent,  the  Taiwanese economy would have 
T 
experienced a fall of 7.28 percentage points in the growth r a t e  of GDP. which is 
about tw-thirds of the total GDP growth rate. Column (5) presents  calculated 
values fo r  the  Japanese model corresponding to the Taiwanese figures of Column 
(4). The Japanese figures indicate t ha t  the  effect  on economic performance of the 
one-percent slowdown in the rate of technical progress  i s  somewhat weaker in 
Japan than in Taiwan. In fact,  a calculation showed tha t  in the  case of Japan, if the  
's.w.Y. Kuo, The Taituon Economy in Transition Westview Presrr, 1983, Chep.4). 
r a t e  of lechnical progress  were zero percent,  the Japanese economy would have 
experienced a drop of 6.12 percentage points in the growth rate of GNP, which is 
about 60 percent of the total GDP growth ra te .  
TABLE 7. The Effect of a OntPercent  Slowdown in the Bate  of Taiwanese 
Technical Progress. 1965-73 (Unlinked Hodel) 
(1) (2) (3) (4 (5 
1% fall in (1) - (1) and (3) - Japanese 
the rate of (oontrol slower growth (oontrol figure 
technical solution) of government solution) comparable 
P r V e s s  consumption to (4) 
(1) G W  8.57 -2.10 9.63 -1.04 -0.68 
(2) GDPM. ii.55 -0.63 11.31 -0.0'7 -0.66 
(3) c 7.77 +OZ4 6.95 -0.58 -0.46 
(4) 1 14.41 -2.13 14.85 -1.69 -0.94 
(5 )  x 22.05 -1.38 23.02 -0.41 -0.71 
(6) M 14.32 +3.06 11.11 -0.35 -0.48 
(7) I' 9.90 +5.70 5.15 +0.95 +0.61 
( 8 )  PC 8.39 +3.96 5.10 ~ 0 . 6 7  +0.52 
(9) H' 10.46 +2.W 7.55 -0.06 +0.10 
(1o)N 4.16 +0.13 4.01 -0.02 +0.02 
(11 )hfcLWo 23.07 -1.06 24.93 -1.20 - 
(12 )X#EYG 9.U -1.15 9.51 -0.75 - 
=In the case of Japan, CNP o r  CNPM. 
5.2. The Linked Models 
Let us now turn t o  the linked models .  Table 8 presents  the resul ts  of a simu- 
lation using the  linked models, in which the rate of Taiwanese technical progress  is 
s e t  a t  6 percent,  1.e. one percent  lower than the  initial estimate, and Taiwanese 
government consumption is reduced s o  as to keep the  unemployment rate at t he  
same level as in the control solution. Column (1) shows the  difference between the 
Taiwanese growth-rate values f o r  each variable and the  corresponding control 
solutions. I t  is c lear  tha t  the impact of a one-percent slowdown in Taiwanese 
technical progress is practically the same as tha t  obtained from the simulation of 
the unlinked Taiwanese model (see Column (4) of Table 7). Similarly, Column (2) of 
Table 8 shows the  difference between the Jbpanese growth rate values f o r  each 
variable and the  corresponding control solutions. W e  notice that  the one-percent 
slowdown of Taiwanese technical progress would have led t o  a slight stimulus favor- 
able to Japan, f o r  example, a 0.01-percent r i se  in GNP growth rate, a 0.03-percent 
r ise  in the  growth rate of exports ,  and a 0.85-percent fall in the  imports-from- 
Taiwan growth rate. These figures seem very small. One might argue,  however, 
assuming tha t  t he  causal relationship is l inear,  tha t  Japan would have experienced 
a 0.07 (= 0.01 x 7) percentage-point r iseg in GNP growth, 0.21 percentage points 
more export  growth, and 5.95 percentage points less growth in imports from 
Taiwan than if t he re  had been no technical progress  in Taiwan. The f i r s t  two of 
these might have had a n  insignificant effect on the  Japanese economy as a whole, 
but the  5.95 percentage-point change in imports from Taiwan would have had a sub- 
stantial impact on the  businesses concerned in both countries. 
Finally, Table 9 presents  t he  results of a simulation in which the  rate of 
Japanese technical progress  i s  set at 8 percent  (i.e., one percentage point lower 
than in t he  initial estimate) and Japanese government consumption is  reduced so  as 
t o  keep the  growth rate of employment at t he  same rate as in t he  control solution. 
Columns (1) and (2) a r e ,  respectively, t he  differences between the  Taiwanese and 
Japanese growth rates of each variable and those of the  control solution. The 
effect on the  Japanese economy of t h e  one percentage-point slowdown in Japanese 
technical progress is practically t he  same as tha t  calculated using the  unlinked 
Japanese model (Column (5) of Table 7), while i ts effect on the  Taiwanese economy 
is very small. A comparison, however, of Column (2) of Table 8 and Column (1) of 
Table 9 reveals tha t  t he  latter is  significantly l a rge r  than the  former,  implying 
tha t  the effect of Japanese technical progress  on Taiwanese performance is  much 
la rger  than the  effect of Taiwanese technical progress  on Japanese performance. 
According t o  ou r  estimates of t h e  production functions f o r  both countries, t he  
average annual rate of Japanese technical progress  fell from 9 percent  t o  3 per-  
cent  a f t e r  t h e  1973 oil crisis,  while t he  rate of Taiwanese technical progress  fell 
from 7 percent  t o  6 percent.  The former implies a 0.36 (= 0.06 x 6)-percent fall in 
t he  GDP growth rate of Taiwan, a 4.02 (= 0.67 x 6)-percent fall in t he  GNP growth 
rate of Japan, and a 5.94 (= 0.99 X 6)-percent increase in t he  rate of growth of 
Taiwan-to-Japan exports ,  while t h e  latter signifies a 0.85-percent decrease in the  
 he es t imate  f o r  t h e  r a t e  o f  Taiwaneee technical  progreee w a s  7.0 percent.  
TABLE 8. The Eflecta of a Onepercent Slowdm in the Bate of 
Taiwanese Technical Progrm. 1965-73 (Linked Podelr) 
- 
(1) (2 ) 
The effect on Taiwan 
 he effect on Japan 
(slower teohnical progress) (slower technical progress) 
- (oontrol solution) - (control solution) 
(1) G D P  -1.03 +O.Oi 
(2 )  GDP!dS -0.86 +0.01 
(3) c -0.58 +O.W 
(4) 1 -1.69 +0.01 
(5) X' -0.42 +0.03 
(6) M -0.36 -0.00 
(7) p +0.93 +O.OO 
(8) PC +0.66 +O.OO 
(9) w -0.07 +O.OO 
(10)N -0.02 +o.oo 
(11 )IdG JPIAO -1.20 - 
(i2 )XCJEYG -0.85 - 
=in the case of Japan, CXP or Chm.. 
TABLE 9. The Effects  of a Onepercent Slowdm in the Bate of 
Japanese Technical Progress. 1965-73 (Linked Xodels) 
- - 
(1) (2 ) 
The effect on Taiwan The effeot on Japan 
(slower teohni cal progress) (slower teohnical progress) 
- (control solution) - (oontrol solution) 
(1) GDP* -0.06 4.67 
(2) GDP!d8 +0.02 -0.70 
(3) c +0.04 -0.46 
(4) 1 -0.05 -0.96 
(5 )  N +0.02 -0.72 
(6) M +0.24 -0.48 
(7) p +0.61 +0.61 
(8) PC +0.5f +0.52 
(9) w +0.13 +0.09 
(l0)N +0.01 +o.oo 
(U )hfGJPM0 +0.34 - 
(12>xGJmG +0.99 - 
.In the case of Japan, ChT or C h m .  
respective rates. Therefore,  the  net effects a r e  a 1.39-percent fall in the  GDP 
growth rate of Taiwan, a 4.01-percent fall in t he  GNP growth r a t e  of Japan, and a 
5.09-percent increase in the growth r a t e  of Taiwan-tcdapan exports.  The first two 
effects explain the g r e a t e r  p a r t  of t he  fall in t he  GDP growth rates of both coun- 
tries.  The last  effect must have been the  main cause of the  subsequent t r ade  fric- 
tion between the  two countries. 
Lis t  of Variables 
Fiotation Explanation Unit 
exogenous 
p r i v a t e  consumption expendi tu re  
8 government consumption expendi tu re  
c a p i t a l  consumption allowances 
dividends 
g r o s s  domest ic  product 
g r o s s  domest ic  supply 
g r o s s  nat ional  product 
g r o s s  domest ic  cap i ta l  formation 
i n t e r e s t  on public deb t  
i n c r e a a e  i n  s t o c k s  
i m p o r t s  of goods and s e r v i c e s  
n e t  f a c t o r  income from t h e  r e s t  of 
t h e  world 
nat ional  income a t  f a c t o r  c o s t  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  g r o s s  domest ic  product  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  p r i v a t e  consumption 
expendi tu re  
def la to r  f o r  government consumption 
expendi tu re  
def la to r  f o r  g r o s s  domest ic  c a p i t a l  
f onna t ion  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  impor t s  of goods and s e r v i c e s  
population 
d e f l a t o r  f o r  e x p o r t s  of goods and s e r v i c e s  
s u b s i d i e s  
i n d i r e c t  business  t a x e s  
persona l  income t a x  and o t h e r  household 
t r a n s f e r s  
employee compensation 
e x p o r t s  of goods & s e r v i c e s  
c o r p o r a t e  income before t a x e s  
p r i v a t e  disposable income 
genera l  government income f r o m  
millions of 1976 hT5 
millions of 1976 hTS 
millions of c u r r e n t  hTS 
millions of c u r r e n t  hT5 
millions of 1976 hTS 
millions of 1976 h 3  
millions of c u r r e n t  hT5 
millions of 1976 h 3  
millions of c u r r e n t  hTS 
millions of 1976 h 3  
millions of 1976 WTI 
mlllions of c u r r e n t  h% 
millione of c u r r e n t  NTS 
1976 - 1.0 
1976 - 1.0 
1976 - 1.0 
thousands of persons  
1976 - 1.0 
mill ions of c u r r e n t  h 3  
millions of c u r r e n t  NTS 
millions of c u r r e n t  h% 
mill ions of c u r r e n t  NTS 
millions of 1976 NTS 
millions of c u r r e n t  h% 
millions of c u r r e n t  hTS 
millions of c u r r e n t  E;TE 
p r o p e r t y  & government e n t e r p r i s e s  
personal  income millions of c u r r e n t  WTI 
Y P  p r i v a t e  income f rom p r o p e r t y  millions of c u r r e n t  KT$ 
WI compound income millions of c u r r e n t  hTS 
Explana t ion  Uni t  
exogenous  
Ro ta t ion  
s exchange  r a t e  of J a p a n  
i m p o r t s  of  f u e l s  
i m p o r t s  of commodi t ies  
i m p o r t s  of commodi t ies  f r o m  J a p a n  
i m p o r t s  of commodi t ies  o t h e r  t h a n  
f u e l s  f r o m  c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  
J a p a n  
Yen/USS 
mi l l ions  of  1976 NTT 
mil l ions  of  1976 NTS 
mil l ions  of c u r r e n t  h T e  
mi l l ions  of 1976 h;IY 
i m p o r t s  f r o m  J a p a n  
i m p o r t s  of i t e m  i f r o m  Japan ;  
i - 1 (foods),  2 (chemicals) ,  
3 (textiles), 4 (meta ls) ,  5 (machinery) ,  
and 6 ( o t h e r s )  
i m p o r t s  of commodi t ies  o t h e r  t h a n  f u e l s  
i m p o r t s  of services 
p r i c e  i n d e x  of i n d u s t r y  i ;  
i - 1 (p r imary ) ,  2 (foods),  
3 (textiles), 4 (chemicals),  
5 (pe t rochemica l s ) ,  6 (meta ls) ,  
7 (machinery) ,  and 8 ( c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
u t i l i t i e s ,  and s e r v i c e s ) .  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  i n c r e a s e  i n  s t o c k s  
who lesa l e  p r i c e  i n d e x  of i t e m  i of 
b i l l i ons  of  c u r r e n t  Yen 
t h o u s a n d s  of 1976 US% 
mi l l ions  of 1976 NTS 
mil l ions  of 1976 h T e  
1976 - 1.0 
PJ 
PJi 
J a p a n ;  see XH f o r  e a c h  i t e m  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  i m p o r t s  of f u e l s  1976 - 1.0 
d e f l a t o r  f o r  commodi ty  i m p o r t s  1976 - 1.0 
i m p o r t  p r i c e  i n d e x  of i t e m  i f r o m  J a p a n ;  1976 - 1.0 (USS) 
see MJi f o r  e a c h  i t e m  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  i m p o r t s  of 
commodi t ies  o t h e r  t h a n  f u e l s  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  service i m p o r t a  
e x p o r t  p r i c e  i n d e x  of i t e m  i ;  
see XH f o r  e a c h  i t e m  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  commodi ty  e x p o r t s  
d e f l a t o r  f o r  service e x p o r t s  
p r i c e  i n d e x  of wor ld  t r a d e  
(US d o l l a r  b a s e )  
i n d e x  of exchange  r a t e  
( h l Y  p e r  one  U S )  
i n d e x  of exchange  r a t e  of J a p a n  
(Yen p e r  one  U S )  
i n d e x  of g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t  i n  
c o n s t a n t  p r i c e s  of J a p a n  
q u a n t x y  i n d e x  of wor ld  t r a d e  
e x p o r t s  of commodi t i e s  
e x p o r t s  of  commodi t i e s  t o  J a p a n  
e x p o r t s  of commodi t i e s  t o  
c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  J a p a n  
e x p o r t s  t o  J a p a n  
e x p o r t s  of i t e m  i t o  Japan ;  
1975 - 1.0 
mil l lons  of 1976 NTS 
mil l lons  of c u r r e n t  h T e  
mi l l ions  of 1976 NTS 
b i l l i ons  of c u r r e n t  Yen 
t h o u s a n d s  of 1976 USS 
i - 1 ( foods  and  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
product) ,  2 (chemicals), 3 (machinery) ,  
and  4 ( o t h e r s )  
x e x p o r t s  of services mil l ions  of 1976 NTS 
c o r p o r a t e  income b e f o r e  t a x e s ,  mi l l ions  of c u r r e n t  NTS 
exc lud ing  d i v l d e n t s  
Cotation Explanation Unit 
exogenous 
income d i t f e r e n t i a l  between employees - 
and nonemployees, defined by eq. (6.5) 
end-of-year s t o c k  of cap i ta l  mtllions of 1976 NTS 
ad jus ted  number of persons  engaged of thousands of persons  
t h e  whole economy 
des i red  leve l  o f t ,  defined by eq. (6.1) 
number of labor  f o r c e  of t h e  
whole economy 
number of persons  engaged of t h e  
whole economy 
number of ~ U a m p l o y e d  persons  
and family w o r k e r s  
number of employees 
p r i c e  index  of domest ic  product  
of i n d u s t r y  f 
p r i c e  index of import  product  
of i n d u s t r y  f 
c o s t  index  of i n d u s t r y  i , 
defined by eq. (4.2) 
weighted a v e r a g e  of i n d u s t r y  p r ices ,  
defined by eq. (4.11) 
weighted a v e r a g e  of i n d u s t r y  p r ices ,  
defined by eq. (4.11) 
d e f l a t o r  f o r  g r o s s  domest ic  supply 
weighted a v e r a g e  of i n d u s t r y  p r ices ,  
defined by eq. (4.11) 
weighted a v e r a g e  of i n d u s t r y  p r ices ,  
defined by eq. (4.11) 
p r i c e  index of cap i ta l  s e r v i c e s ,  
defined by eq. (4.35) 
whoiosale p r ice  index of o t h e r s  
weighted a v e r a g e  of i n d u s t r y  p r ices ,  
defined by eq. (4.11) 
wholesale p r i c e  index of t h e  whole 
i n d u s t r y  of Japan  
thousands of persons  
thousands of persons  
t h o u m n d s  of persons  
thousands of persons  
thousands of persons  
1976 - 1.0 
R maximum r a t e  of medium- and p e r  c e n t  p e r  y e a r  
long-term bank loan 
T index  of technology level ,  - 
defined by eq. (5.1) 
LR unemployment r a t e  percen t  
W C  c a p a c i t y  l eve l  of g r o s s  domest ic  millions of 1976 hTS 
supply, defined by eq. (5.2) 
W employw compensation per  employee thousands of NTS p e r  person 
W compound income per  person thousands of NTS p e r  person 
List of Coefficients 
Notation Explanation 
A (j ,i) material input coefficient; i.e., the amount of output j 
required to  produce one unit of output i 
D(i  capital consumption allowances p e r  unit of output in industry i 
F(j ,i ) the proportion of the value of the i th industry output 
which corresponds to the j th final demand and category; 
j = 1 (private consumption), 2 (government consumption), 
3 (gross domestic capital formation), 4 (increase in stocks), 
and 5 (exports); see P1 for  t = 1.2 ,..., 8. 
T ( i )  ' rat io of indirect taxes less subsidies to  output in industry i 
s(i mark-up ratio, o r  the normal rate of business surpluses to  
output in industry i 
m(i weight of domestic price in the price index of industry i 
WM (i ) weight of import price in the price index of industry i 
List of Dummy Variables 
Notation Explanation 
DUME = : when the explained variable in eq. (5.1) is In (LE / G P M ) ;  
= 0 otherwise 
mhfx = 1 when the  explained variable in eq. (5.1) is In (MF / GDPM); 
= 0 otherwise 
mML = 1 when the explained variable in eq. (5.1) is In (L /GDPM) .T; 
= 0 otherwise 
mM0 = i when the explained variable in eq. (5.1) is In (MO / GPfd) ;  
=O otherwise 
= 1 for  1951-59; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 fo r  1963 ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 fo r  1965- ; = (Totherwise 
= 1 for  1966- ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 f o r  1972 ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 fo r  1974- ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 for  1975- ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 for  1977- ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 for  1980- ; = 0 otherwise 
= 1 fo r  1981- ; = 0 otherwise 

Equation E2 D.W.  p sample 
period 
JI. The Foreign Sector 
h p o r t s  Jto rn Japan 
(Foods and  agricultural products) 
(2.1) In MJ1 = 1.634 In CDP - 0.803 In IPMJl / ( P 2  /RATE){ - 1.093 In W C - l  4.425 0.968 1.633 0.87 
(2.22) (3.46) (2.03) (0.61) 
(Chemicals) 
(2.2) In MJ2 = 1.738 Ir,  CDP - 0.107 In IPMJ2 / ( P 4  /RATE){ - 0.667 In W C - l  - 1.360 0.940 1.921 0.83 
(1.71) (0.16) (0.82) (0.16) 
(Textiles) 
(2.0) In MJ3 = 0.449 In CDP - 0.349 In IPMJ3 / ( P 3  /RATE){ - 0.24 1 In INC-, i 9.515 0.925 1.622 0.83 
(0.56) (0.53) *I (0.39) (1.49) 
(Metals) 
(2.4) In MJ4 = 1.251 Ir, CDP - 0.927 In IPMJ4 / P 6  /RATE){ - 3.812 0.987 2.574 0.67 
(9.35) (4.23) (2.13) 
(Machinery) 
(2.5) In MJ5 = 1.499 In CDP - 0.686 In IPMJ5 / P 7  / RATE) j - 6.227 0.974 2.313 0.70 
(5.67) (1.82) ( 1.76) 
(Others) 
(2.6) I r ,  MJ6 = 1.307 In CDP - 0.451 In IPMJ6 / ( P O  / RATE){ - 5.395 0.989 1.511 0.85 
(3.92) (2.10) (1. l e )  
Exports to Japcua 
(Foods and  agricultural products) 
(2.7) In XJl = 0.387 In VJ - 0.639 In IPXl /RATE) / ( P J l  /RATJ)J + 0.431 I r ,  XIl-l  -L 7.389 0.725 1.365 
(1.57) (1.81) (2.01) (2.67) 
(Chemicals) 
(2.8) In XJ2 = 1.013 In VJ - 0.557 In IPX2 / RATE) / (PJ2 / RATJ){ A 0.61 1 In X12-1 0.955 1.818 
(0.57) (1.51) (3.64) 
A0.3721n W C  - 1.083 
(0.27) (0.06) 
(Machinery) 
(2.9) In XJ3 = 4.737 In V J  - 0.777 In IPX3 /RATE) / ( P J 3  / RATJ){ + 0.221 In XJ3-, + 8.999 0.941 1.945 
(3.42) (0.66) (1.79) (6.49) 
(Others) 
(2.10) In XJ4 - 0.64 In V J  = 1.135 In IPX4 /RATE) / ( P J 4  / RATJ){ + 0.744 In XJ4-l + 3.518 0.920 2.024 
(1.14) (4.14) (1.52) 
E q. 
No. 
Equation F2 D.W. p sample 
period 
h p o r t s  Itom Countriss other t h a n  Japan 
(Fuels) 
(2.11) In ME = 1.379 In GDP - 0.971 In (PME / P )  - 0.271 In (PME / P)- l -  7.947 0.974 1.136 196 1-8 1 
(27.4) ( 1  1.5) (2.58) ( 1  1.7) 
(Commodities other than  fuels) 
(2.12) In MGR = 1.791 In GDP - 1.460 In (PMO / P )  - 12.192 0.982 1.078 1963-81 
(11.9) (5.07) (5.92) 
Exports t o  countriss otha t  t h a n  Japan 
(2.13) In XGR = 2.370 In WT - 0.193 Ln I(PAG /RATE)  / PWT] + 0.182 In VMC-l + 9.699 0.994 1.198 1961-81 
(5.2 1 )  (1.04) (0.58) (2.22) 
klenttties : Imports 
(2.14) if4 = MG + MS 
(2.15) M.PX = MGAPMG + MS-PMS 
(2.16) MG = ME + MO 
(2.17) MG.PMG = ME-PME + MO.PMO 
(2.18) MO-PMO = MGJPMO + MGR.PMO 
8 
(2.19) In MGJPMO = 1.021 In 137.95 RATE MJi.PMJi / lOOOj - 0.241 
(50.9) i = l  (1.12) 
(2.20) fdJ = 1 MGJPMO / (37.95 RATE) ] a  JRATET / 1000 
kientities : Exports 
(2.21) X = IYC + XS 
(2.22) X.PX = XG.PXC + XS.PXS 
(2.23) XG . PXG = XG JPXC + XGR. PXG 
I 
(2.24) In XGJPXG = 0.998 In 137.95 RATE XJt  PAT / lOCOl - 0.1 17 
(70.0) i = 1 (0.83) 
(2.25) XJ = 1 XGJPXG / (37.95 RATE) ].JRATET / 1000 
Eq. 
No. 
Equation R2 D.W. p sample  
period 
m. Distribution 
(3.1) TI = O.ld6 GNPP - 559.7 
(101.) (0.69) 
(3.2) SUB = 0.0023 GNPP - 308.5 
(5.49) (1.28) 
(3.3) DEP = 0.0782 GNPP - 1574.8 
(106.) (3.8 1 )  
(3.4)  1VI = 0.779 GNPP + 1826.0 
(428.) (1.78) 
h incorporated ,  Property and Corporate hacome 
(3.5) YUI = 0.0555 (NI + IBG - YG) + 11404.1 
(18.2) (8.80) 
(3.6) YRP- D N =  0.120 (NI + IBG - YG) + 821.1 
(96.2) (1.55) 
(3.7) YC = YCD - DIV 
(3.9) YPP = NI + lBG - YG - YCD 
(3.10) YDP = YPP - TRP 
E q. 
No. 
Equation 
W. The Price Sector 
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E q. 
No. 
Equation Z2 D . W .  p sample 
period 
Bpators for Final Demands 
(4.1 1 )  PFIO = F.P 
[PFIO] = 
lpcro 1 
PJIO 
PXGIO ""I 
F =  (PC) 0.0818 0.3087 0.0303 0.0253 0.0175 0.0031 0.0533 0.4801 
(PCG) 0.0001 0.0010 0.0087 0.0088 0.0542 0.0083 0.0118 0.9069 
(pl) 0.01 12 0.0000 0.0013 0.0002 0.0000 0.0072 0.4024 0.5777 
(PJ) 0.2191 0.1224 0.0709 0.1085 0.0286 0.0912 0.1637 0.1955 
(PXG) 0.0370 0.0815 0.2178 0.1051 0.0210 0.0387 0.2162 0.2827 
(4.13) In PCG = 0.882 In PCGIO + 0.080 
(9.37) (0.53) 
(4.14) In PI = 1.030 In PIIO - 0.058 
(17.2) (2.13) 
(4.15) In PJ = 1.264 In PJIO - 0.094 
(14.0) (0.58) 
(4.16) Ir,  PXG = 1.199 In PXGIO - 0.027 
(24.3) (1.36) 
E (4. 
No. 
Equation E2 D.W. p sample 
period 
Export A-ices 
(4.17)  In PXl = 1.0576 In P2 + 0.0621 
(18.0)  (2.12)  
bnport -A-ices fro m Japan 
(4.2 1 )  In PMJl = 1.118 In (PWHIJ-RATJ) + 0.0476 
(18.4) (1.37) 
(4.22) In PMJ2 = 0.754 In (PWHIJ-RATJ) + 0.0707 
(12.9) (2.12) 
(4.23)  In PMJ3 = 0.594 In (PWHIJ-RATJ) + 0.01 10 
(29.8) (0.96) 
(4.24)  In PMJ4 = 0.930 In (PWHIJ-RATJ) + 0.0029 
(25.2) (0.14) 
E q. 
No. 
Equation E2 D p sample 
period 
Wholesale price indez  
( 5 . 1 )  lr, PJ1 = 1.813 In PWHIJ + 0.0558 
(16.0) (1.37) 
(5.2) In PJ2 = 1.491 In PWHIJ t 0.C876 
(13.5) (2.22) 
(J.3) Ir, PJ3 = 1.C54 In PR'HIJ + 0.0708 
(13.2) (2.48) 
(5.4) In PJ4 = 2.176 In PWHIJ + 0.1255 
(22.9) (3.67) 
h p o r t  Prices, industry Ca tegoq  
(4.27) PlM = 0.07 PMJ6.RATE + 0.45 PME + 0.48 PMO 
(4.28) P2M = 0.09 PMJ1-RATE + 0.91 PMO 
(4.29) P3M = 0.86 PMJ3.RATE + 0.34 PMO 
(4.30) P4M = 0.45 PMJ2.RATE + 0.55 PMO 
(4.31) P5M = 0.07 PMJ6-RATE + 0.93 PME 
(4.32) P6M = 0.66 PMJ4.RATE + 0.34 PMO 
(4.33) P7M = 0.43 PMJ5-RATE + 0.57 PMO 
(4.34) P8M = 0.07 PMJ6.RATE + 0.93 PMO 
P)-ice of Capital Services 
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ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SMALL DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Prof. Dr. P. de Wolff 
1. INTRODUCTION* 
The subject of this paper is not a clearly limited one. Even if we re- 
strict ourselves to the group of small developed European countries we will 
find big differences between their economies. They differ considerably in 
size as far as their populations are concerned and still more with respect 
to the size of their territories and natural endowments. The latter factor 
in particular leads to large differences intheir economic structure., 
Moreover some of the differences are to a lesser extent due to size as 
to differences in economic policy, demographic factors, etc. In many re- 
spects the Netherlands occupy a special position, in particular with respect 
to its relations with the FRG. Therefore, conclusions may only be generalized 
with great care. Nevertheless, they seem to be of sufficient interest to 
contribute to a more general discussion. 
In the following paragraphs some remarks will be made on the role of 
foreign trade, investments, tfie development of new technologies and, finally , 
a few tentative conclusions will be drawn. 
2. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE 
2.1. Commodities 
Obviously, one of the main economic disadvantages of small countries as 
compared to bigger ones is the size of their home markets. In order to be 
able sufficiently to profit from the advantages of large scale production, 
*To a considerable extent this paper relies on studies carried out by 
and under the auspices of the Netherlands' Scientific Council of Governmental 
Policy, in particular on the work of Mr. C.W.A.M. van Paridon, see [I], [2] 
and [3]. 
they usua l ly  have t o  r e l y  more heavi ly  on fo re ign  t r a d e  than t h e  b igger  coun- 
t r i e s .  Moreover, experience shows t h a t  small  coun t r i e s  can only o b t a i n  a 
high l e v e l  of income per  c a p i t a  a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  sha re  of expor t s  of 
goods and s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  GDP. Therefore,  t h i s  sha re  tends nega t ive ly  t o  be 
wi th  popula t ion  s i z e  and p o s i t i v e l y  wi th  t h e  l e v e l  of p rospe r i ty .  This i s  
c l e a r l y  demonstrated by Figure  1, r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  OECD coun t r i e s .  However, 
i t  need not  s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  no t  very s t r o n g  and, consequently 
t h a t  l a r g e  d i f f e r ences  occur between coun t r i e s  of t h e  same s i z e  and roughly 
t h e  same l e v e l  of income per  cap i t a .  Many o the r  f a c t o r s  p lay  a r o l e ,  i n  par- 
t i c u a r  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  n a t u r a l  resources .  These exp la in ,  e .g . ,  t o  a consid- 
e r a b l e  ex t en t  why Swedens' sha re  i s  much lower than  f o r  Belgium o r  t h e  
Netherlands. 
A high l e v e l  of expor t s  i s  a s  economic disadvantage n o t  only a s  i t  usu- 
a l l y  i s  more expensive t o  ope ra t e  i n  a fo re ign  market than  a t  home, due t o  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  and c o s t s  of ob ta in ing  r e l e v a n t  information,  e t c . ,  b u t  
a l s o  due t o  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  of d i f f e r e n t  types .  These comprise i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p lace  import d u t i e s  b u t  even f o r  coun t r i e s  belonging t o  a f ree- t rade  a r e a  o r  
a customs union, a s  e .g . ,  t h e  EEC, where v i s i b l e  b a r r i e r s  a r e  of l i t t l e  im- 
portance,  t h e r e  u sua l ly  e x i s t  many i n v i s i b l e  ones,  e .g . ,  s p e c i a l  requirements 
wi th  r e spec t  t o  q u a l i t y ,  packing, i n spec t ion ,  t h e  preference  of governmental 
bodies  t o  buy n a t i o n a l  products ,  e t c .  These f a c t o r s  a c t  t o  t h e  disadvantage 
of importers  a s  compared t o  l o c a l  producers and they  tend t o  sharpen t h e  com- 
p e t i t i o n  between the  former ones. I n  add i t i on  t o  t h e s e  f a c t o r s ,  which mainly 
lead  t o  c o s t s  burdening expor ts  and which a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
measure, t h e r e  i s  of course t h e  high v u l n e r a b i l i t y  connected wi th  ex tens ive  
expor ts .  F luc tua t ions  i n  expor ts  tend s t r o n g l y  t o  be c o r r e l a t e d  t o  f luc tua-  
t i o n s  i n  GDP, be i t  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  u sua l ly  a r e  sma l l e r  than t h e  former. 
(This  i s  a l s o  v a l i d  f o r  b igger  coun t r i e s . )  I n  t h i s  paper a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be  
drawn t o  two o t h e r  a spec t s  which may lead  t o  disadvantages,  v i z .  t h e  r eg iona l  
and t h e  s e c t o r i a l  composition of small  country expor ts .  Th i s  w i l l  be i l l u s -  
t r a t e d  by t h e  economic r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  Netherlands and t h e  FRG. 
A s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  one, obviously,  t h e r e  i s  a s t r o n g  tendency t o  concent ra te  
export  a c t i v i t i e s  on neighbouring markets and i n  most cases  t h e i r  sha re  i n  
t o t a l  expor t s  i s  very high.  Trade between t h e  Netherlands and t h e  FRG has 
always been very important .  Between t h e  two world wars t h e  sha re  of Dutch 
expor ts  t o  t h e  FRG f l u c t u a t e d  around 25%, t h e  average f o r  imports was s l i g h t l y  
lower, i . e . ,  22%. During the  f i r s t  years  a f t e r  W . W . 1 1  t he se  sha re s ,  f o r  ob- 
vious reasons were much lower b u t  a l r eady  i n  1960 they were aga in  q u i t e  c l o s e  
t o  t h e i r  pre-war va lues  and, Zfterwards they r o s e  s t i l l  more. I n  1970, e .g . ,  
t h e  sha re  of imports amounted t o  27%, t h a t  of expor t s  32%: During t h e  r ecen t  
depress ion  they dropped a l i t t l e  b u t  a r e  s t i l l  very high.  The ensuing sur-  
p lus  of t he  t r a d e  ba lance  on cu r ren t  account i s  due t o  t h e  important expor t s  
of f u e l s  t o  t h e  FRG. I f  t h i s  i t em i s  l e f t  ou t  a d e f i c i t  r e s u l t s ,  j u s t  a s  
wi th  r e spec t  t o  t h e  FRG's t r a d e  wi th  i t s  o t h e r  small  neighbours.  I n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t he  N N I  t h e r e  is  a s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  between pre- and post-war years .  
Dutch expor ts  t o  t h e  FRG a r e  now of t h e  order  of 12 t o  15% t h e  N N I  and more 
than twice a s  high a s  be fo re  W . W . 1 1 .  This ,  of course,  expresses  t h e  very 
s t r o n g  upsurge of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade  i n  general  dur ing  t h e  post-war yea r s .  
These favorable  r e s u l t s ,  however, should no t  conceal t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
Dutch competi t ive p o s i t i o n  d e t e r i o r a t e d  dur ing  t h e  1970s and t h e  Netherlands '  
sha re  i n  t h e  FRG's imports dec l ined  from 14.1% i n  1975 t o  12.4% i n  1979, be 
i t  t h a t  a s l i g h t  improvement i s  t o  be observed i n  more recent  years .  A t  
t h e  same time, a cons iderable  s h i f t  i n  t h e  composition of t h e  expor ts  took 
p lace ,  a f a c t  t h a t  w i l l  be considered i n  more d e t a i l  l a t e r  on. 
F I G U R E  I :  RELATION BETWEEN SHARE OF EXPORTS I N  GDP, POPULATION AND GDP/CAP 
l IRE 
W NET A JAP 
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POPULATION I N  M I L L  
Before en t e r ing  i n t o  t h e  advantages and disadvantages of t h e  t r a d e  r e l a -  
t i o n s  r e f e r r e d  t o ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare t h e i r  s i z e  t o  s i m i l a r  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  elsewhere. A few i n t e r e s t i n g  examples a r e  given i n  Table 1, which 
shows t h a t  t h e  FRG-Dutch r e l a t i o n s  a r e  by no means e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  s t rong .  
On the  con t r a ry ,  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  cases  w i th  much higher  corresponding 
shares ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t he  top-ranking Canadian-USA one. (Table 1, by t h e  
way, a l s o  c l e a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  preponderant p o s i t i o n  i n  inter-European 
t r a d e  occupied by t h e  FRG.) Needless t o  say t h a t  t h e  number of f a c t o r s  de- 
termining t h e  shares  i s  very l a rge .  Some of them, however, can be analyzed 
t o  some e x t e n t .  A t  f i r s t  i t  w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  income of t h e  
importing country p lays  a c r u c i a l  r o l e .  The b igger  i t  i s  t h e  h igher  t h e  
sha re  i n  t h e  expor ts  of t h e  expor t ing  country may be expected t o  be. The 
membership of an economic community, a s  e .g . ,  t h e  EEC w i l l  be an important 
f a c t o r  too,  and t h i r d l y ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  cases  r e f e r  t o  contingu- 
ous coun t r i e s  o r  t o  coun t r i e s  l y i n g  c l o s e l y  toge ther  t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  widely 
d i f f e r i n g  d i s t ances  between t h e  var ious  couples.  
Table 1. Selec ted  l a rge l sma l l  country r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  showing t h e  r e l a t i v e  
s i z e  of GNP and t h e  percentage of small  country imports and ex- 
p o r t s  accounted f o r  by t h e  l a r g e  country (1978). 
GNP of t h e  small  
Rela t ionships  country a s  a per- Large country sha re  i n  
Large Small centage of t he  GNP imports expor t s  
country country of t h e  l a r g e  one of smal le r  country 
FRG 
FRG 
FRG 
FRG 
FRG 
FRG 
UK 
France 
USA 
Denmark 
Aus t r i a  
Netherlands 
Switzer land 
Belgium 
Sweden 
I r e l a n d  
Belgium 
Canada 
Sources: OECD, National  Account S t a t i s t i c s  and Trade by commodities. 
The a n a l y s i s  can be c a r r i e d  ou t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways bu t  t h e  so-cal led 
de l t a - coe f f i c i en t  o f f e r s  a convenient t oo l .  Let t o t a l  expor t s  of country i 
be a f r a c t i o n  x of t o t a l  world imports Y, and imports Mj of another  country 
j  be a f r a c t i o n  g of G. Now i f  t h e  t r a d e  between coun t r i e s  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
e n t i r e l y  independently from s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  between these  coun t r i e s ,  one 
would expect  expor t s  Xij from i t o  j  t o  be equal  t o  a f r a c t i o n  x.y of &. 
Therefore,  t h e  d e l t a  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  def ined  a s  t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  a c t u a l  f r ac -  
t i o n  t o  t h i s  expected one, v i s . :  
The formula shows t h a t  A can a l s o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  sha re  of i ' s  export  
t o  j  d iv ided  by t h e  sha re  of j ' s  import t o  world imports .  
The idea  under ly ing  A can be va r i ed  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways. Exchanging t h e  
r o l e  of expor t s  and imports a  c o e f f i c i e n t  w i l l  be obta ined  which can be used 
t o  s tudy t h e  in f luence  of j ' s  imports on i. It i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  compute 
a  c o e f f i c i e n t  s i m i l a r  t o  A based on t o t a l  t r a d e  ( imports  p l u s  expor t s ) .  And, 
i n s t e a d  of bas ing  A on world t r a d e  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  can be  computed from t h e  
t r a d e  wi th in  a  r e s t r i c t e d  a r e a  of which i and j  both form p a r t ,  e .g . ,  t h e  
EEC. F i n a l l y ,  i n s t e a d  of us ing  a c t u a l  t r a d e  f i g u r e s  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  may be 
based on da t a  co r r ec t ed  i n  some sense,  e .g . ,  f o r  d i s t a n c e .  
I n  order  t o  g ive  a  genera l  i dea  of t h e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  i n  world t r a d e ,  
Table 2 p re sen t s  a  few f i g u r e s  f o r  important t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  It  shows 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a tendency t o  block bu i ld ing  between t h e  USA, Canada and Japan 
on t h e  one hand and t h e  EEC coun t r i e s  on t h e  o t h e r .  However, a p a r t  from t h e  
couple USA-Canada, t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  not  very outspoken. However, more 
i n t e r e s t i n g  i n  t h e  p re sen t  contex t  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t s  presented  i n  Table 3. 
Table 2. The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  between a  number of c o u n t r i e s  r ep re sen ted  by 
t h e i r  d e l t a  c o e f f i c i e n t s  (averages f o r  1968, 1973 and 1978). 
Import ing a rea  Export ing 
country EEC-9 USA Canada Japan 
FRG 2.12 0.77 0.29 0.32 
Netherlands 2.88 0.37 0.16 0.16 
BLEU* 2.89 0.58 0.16 0.17 
....................................................................... 
USA 0.79 6.61 2.03 
Canada 0.42 6.11 1.31 
Japan 0.38 2.53 0.79 
* p e l g o - L u x e m b u r g i a n  Economic  Un ion  
Source: Computed by t h e  Netherlands '  S c i e n t i f i c  Council  f o r  Governmental 
Pol icy  
Table 3. The interrelationship between a number of country pairs (averages 
for 1968, 1973 and 1978).* 
Delta coefficients based on 
Intra-EEC a gravity 
World trade trade model 
Netherlands - FRG 
Netherlands - BLEU 
Netherlands - France 
Netherlands - Italy 
Netherlands - UK 
FRG - Austria 
FRG - Switzerland 
FRG - France 
FRG - BLEU 
FRG - Denmark 
FRG - Italy 
FRG - UK 
BLEU - France 
BLEU - Italy 
BLEU - UK 
France - Italy 
France - UK 
Italy - UK 
Sweden - Finland 
Sweden - Denmark 
Sweden - Norway 
Austria - Switzerland 
UK - Ireland 
Canada - USA 
*The figures refer to averages of exports and imports. 
Source: See Table 2. 
Although t h e  sha re s  i n  t h e  course of time do no t  show s t r o n g  f luc tua-  
t i o n s  t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  Table 3 a r e  averages f o r  1968, 1973 and 1978 and, there-  
fo re ,  may be considered a s  reasonably r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  recent  yea r s .  The 
f i r s t  column based on world t r a d e  confirms t h e  conclusion a l ready  derived 
from Table 1, i . e . ,  t h a t  t h e  Dutch-FRG t r a d e  i s  no t  excep t iona l ly  s t rong .  
The f i g u r e  f o r  the  t r a d e  between t h e  Netherlands and t h e  BLEU i s  s t i l l  h igher  
and is  s t i l l  exceeded by t h e  A f o r  t h e  Austrian-FRG t r ade .  Much h igher  f i g -  
ures  appear t o  e x i s t  f o r  t h e  inter-Scandinavian t r a d e  and a l s o  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  
between t h e  UK and I r e l and .  An e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p i c t u r e  appears  from t h e  
second column, r e l a t e d  t o  intra-EEC t r a d e  only. I n  t h i s  case  t h e  coe f f i c -  
i e n t s  a r e  much c l o s e r  t o  one, which proves t h a t  t h e  i n t r a - t r a d e  i s  much more 
homogeneously d i s t r i b u t e d  than the  EEC-country sha re s  i n  world t r ade .  A 
somewhat s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  emerges from t h e  t h i r d  column where t h e  var ious  t r a d e  
flows have been co r rec t ed  f o r  dis tance.* However, t he re  a r e  s t i l l  a number 
of d i f f e r ences .  For example, t h e  UK-Netheplands t r a d e  appears  t o  be s t ronge r  
than could be expected on grounds of d i s t ance .  
On t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  preceding d a t a  one may be i n c l i n e d  t o  conclude t h a t  
t h e  Netherlands-FRG t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  r a t h e r  favorable .  The sha re  i s  no t  
exceedingly h igh ,  t he  t r a d e  balance i s  p o s i t i v e  and t h e  r e l a t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  
one of t h e  s t r o n g e s t  economic pa r tne r s  i n  Europe. To a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  t h i s  
conclusion i s  c o r r e c t ,  bu t  t h e r e  a r e  a  number of underlying,  l e s s  favorable  
tendencies  which come t o  l i g h t  when looking a t  t h e  r eg iona l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
t h e  Dutch expor ts  w i t h i n  the  FRG, a s  we l l  a s  t o  t h e  composition of t h e  t r a d e  
wi th  r e spec t  t o  commodities. 
With r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  f i r s t  aspec t ,  i t  w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  t he  s t r o n g  ten- 
dency t o  concent ra te  expor t  a c t i v i t i e s  on neighboring coun t r i e s  i s  a l s o  v a l i d  
f o r  t h e  r eg iona l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  FRG. This  i s  demonstrated by Table 
4 which shows t h e  breakdown of expor t s  f o r  t h r e e  a r e a s  and f o r  a  number of 
t h e  FRG's t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  The f i g u r e s  r e f e r  t o  semi-manufactures and manu- 
f a c t u r e s  (excluding f u e l s )  a s  f o r  t hese  commodities t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  a r e  
of r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  importance. Correc t ing  t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  Table 4 f o r  dis-  
tance and f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  GDP of t h e  t h r e e  a r eas  leads  t o  small  changes 
bu t  does no t  change t h e  p i c t u r e  very  much and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  have 
no t  been mentioned. It i s  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  a  l a r g e  p a r t  of Dutch expor ts  go 
t o  the  Rhineland-Westphalia, t h i s  being t h e  a rea  c l o s e s t  t o  t h e  Netherlands.  
The share.even increased  over time a s  can be seen from Table 5. 
*The co r rec t ed  flow ?I.. i s  derived from t h e  a c t u a l  X. w i th  t h e  he lp  of 
an equat ion of t h e  followi?i& type 1 j  
log. Tij = l og .  X. + a . log .  D + b  
1 j  i j 
D .  i s  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between t h e  economic cen te r s  of g r a v i t y  of i and j ,  based 
& i n l y  on d i s t ances  f o r  sea-borne t r a f f i c .  The methodology used f o r  comput- 
i n g  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a  and b i s  described i n  [ 4 ] .  
Table 4 .  Breakdown of expor t s  f o r  t h r e e  FRG a r e a s  and f o r  a number of  ex- 
p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  percentages (1979). 
Country North* NRW* South* 
France 
BLE U 
I t a l y  
Denmark 
Nether lands 
*Comprised o f :  
North: Hamburg, Bremen, Be r l i n ,  Schleswig Ho l s t e in ,  Lower Saxony 
NRW: North-Rhine-Westphalia 
South: Baden-Wurttemburg, Bavaria  
Source: See Table  2.  
Table 5. D i s t r i b u t i o n  of  ( t o t a l )  Dutch expor t s  over FRG a reas .  Index num- 
b e r s  of t h e  growth of t h e s e  a r ea s .  
Exports  a s  a % of t o t a l  Growth of  GDP 
Year North NR W South North NRW South 
Source: See Table  2.  
The second p a r t  of Table  5 shows t h e  well-known f a c t  t h a t  t h e  FRG's 
economic c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y  i s  moving southward and t h a t  due t o  s t r u c t u r a l  
problems of t h e  a r e a ,  NRW's r a t e  of growth i s  lower than f o r  t h e  o t h e r  two 
a reas .  It need no t  be  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  Dutch expor t e r s  have t o  be  aware of 
t h e s e  tendenc ies  and i n  t i m e  must t a k e  s t e p s  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e i r  market pos i -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  South i f ,  i n  t h e  long run,  t h e  Nether lands a r e  n o t  t o  l o s e  an 
important  p a r t  of t h e i r  s h a r e  i n  t h e  FRG's imports .  Th i s  argument becomes 
more f o r c i b l e  when i t  i s  remembered what a l r eady  has  been pointed o u t ,  i . e . ,  
t h a t  t h e  recent  development of t h e  Dutch s h a r e  i n  t h e  FRG's imports is  no t  
very  favorab le  . 
With r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  s e c t o r i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Dutch expor t s  it i s  a w e l l  
known f a c t  t h a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  p lay  an important  r o l e .  But s t i l l  more 
important  is  t h e  expor t  of f u e l s .  Due t o  i t s  f avo rab l e  p o s i t i o n  a t  t h e  North 
Sea and a t  t h e  mouth of t h e  Rhine, Meuse and Sche ld t ,  t h e  Nether lands have 
been a b l e  t o  b u i l d  up an important  r e f i n e r y  i ndus t ry  based on t h e  imports of 
crude o i l  and expor t ing  r e f i n e d  products .  S ince  t h e  d i scovery  of b i g  gas 
d e p o s i t s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s t h i s  product  i s  a l s o  exported on a cons iderab le  
s c a l e .  Due t o  t h e s e  circumstances Dutch expor t s  a r e  r a t h e r  b i a sed ,  more than 
those  of most o t h e r  European coun t r i e s .  With r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  FRG, t h i s  skew- 
n e s s  i s  even more marked, a s  demonstrated by Table  6 .  
Table  6. R e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  of t o t a l  Dutch comrgodity t r a d e  i n  t o t a l  and w i t h  
t h e  FRG, 1980 (percentages)  . 
SITC Category 
Exports  Imports 
T o t a l  To FRG T o t a l  From FRG 
1 Food and l i v e  animals ,  
d r i n k s  and tobacco 
2,4 Non-edible raw m a t e r i a l s ,  
animal and vege t ab l e  o i l s  
and f a t s  
3 Mineral f u e l s  
5,6 Chemical p roducts ,  
8 manufactures 
7 Machinery and t r anspo r t a -  
t i o n  equipment 
9 Other commodities 
TOTAL 
Source: Foreign t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  Cen t r a l  Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s  
The t r a d e  flows between t h e  two coun t r i e s  a r e  t o  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  com- 
plementary t o  each o t h e r  i n  t h e s e n s e  t h a t  t he  Nether lands l a r g e l y  s u p p l i e s  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  and f u e l s ,  whereas t h e  FRG d e l i v e r s  chemical p roducts ,  
manufactures,  machinery and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  equipment. During t h e  1970s t h e  
skewness even increased  a s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  and f u e l s  roughly kep t  t h e i r  
sha re s  i n  t h e  FRG's imports and t h e  sha re s  f o r  manufactures,  machinery and 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  equipment dropped considerably.  Here appears  another  unfavor- 
a b l e  a spec t  of t h e  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  concerned, a s  t h e  p rospec t s  f o r  t h e  s t r o n g  
i tems a r e  no t  very  rosy  e i t h e r .  
Forecas ts  made a few years  ago by t h e  Agr i cu l tu ra l  Economic Research 
I n s t i t u t e  l e d  t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  volume of Dutch a g r i c u l t u r a l  
products probably w i l l  cont inue  t o  r i s e  i n  t h e  coming yea r s .  P u t t i n g  1975 
equal  t o  100, e s t ima te s  f o r  1985 and 1990 a r e  124 and 130, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  bu t  
t h e  corresponding f i g u r e s  f o r  expor t s  t o  t h e  FRG a r e  109 f o r  both yea r s .  
Obviously, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  is  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r s .  Prospec ts  f o r  
processed food a r e  r a t h e r  favorable  bu t  f o r  p i g  f a t t e n i n g  and f o r  s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  s e c t o r s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s t h e , o p p o s i t e .  On t h e  whole no progress  i n  t h e  
coming years  i s  t o  be expected i n  t h e  FRG. Moreover, t h e  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  based 
on a cont inua t ion  of t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  EEC a g r i c u l t u r a l  po l i cy  which a t  p resent  
i s  q u i t e  unce r t a in .  The prospec ts  f o r  t h e  Dutch d a i r y  indus t ry ,  i n  s p i t e  of 
i t s  high p roduc t iv i ty ,  a r e  r a t h e r  gloomy. The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s h a r e  of North 
Rhine-Westphalia i n  Dutch a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  t o  t h e  FRG i s  s t i l l  higher  
f o r  o the r  commodities i s  a l s o  an important f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  
The prospec ts  f o r  f u e l  expor t s  a r e  not  a t t r a c t i v e  e i t h e r .  A t  p r e sen t  
t hese  expor ts  a r e  no t  only low due t o  t h e  depression,  bu t  even under more 
prosperous circumstances i t  w i l l  t a k e  q u i t e  a long time be fo re  ove rcapac i t i e s  
i n  t h e  r e f i n e r y  indus t ry  and i n  t h e  FRG one i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i l l  have been 
absorbed. A t  t he  same time t h e  competi t ion of o the r  coun t r i e s  l i k e  t h e  
Arabian ones may be expected t o  grow. The expor ts  of n a t u r a l  gas a r e  r e s t r i c -  
t ed  by t h e  s i z e  of t h e  depos i t s  and although these  a r e  b i g  enough t o  cover 
t h e  n a t i o n a l  needs f o r  s e v e r a l  decades t o  come, i t  is  q u i t e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  they 
gradual ly  w i l l  t a p e r  o f f  a f t e r  1990. This  w i l l  l a y  a heavy burden on t h e  bal-  
ance of payments a s  t h e  va lue  added of t h e  gas i s  very high. I n  order  t o  
compensate f o r  one g u i l d e r  l o s t  i n  t h e  expor t  of gas ,  expor t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  about two and a ha l f  g u i l d e r s  w i l l  have t o  be found i n  o the r  s e c t o r s .  
2.2. Serv ices  
The Netherlands '  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i n  s e r v i c e s  i s  no t  a s  important a s  i t s  
commodity t r a d e  b u t  by f a r  no t  n e g l i g i b l e  a s  may be seen  from Table 7 .  It 
usua l ly  y i e l d s  a su rp lus  on t h e  balance of payments on c u r r e n t  account,  which 
i n  1980 amounted t o  1% of t h e  GDP. The sha re  of t h e  FRG i n  t h i s  t r a d e  i s  
a l s o  lower than f o r  c o m o d i t i e s ,  b u t  i t  produces a su rp lus  which i s  l a r g e r  
than  t h e  t o t a l  su rp lus  f o r  s e r v i c e s .  Of t h e  t h r e e  ca t egor i e s  presented  i n  
Table 7 ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  y i e l d s  a very h igh  su rp lus .  However, i t  i s  l a r g e l y  
wiped out  by t h e  d e f i c i t  on t r a v e l  expenditures ,  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
Dutch a r e  very fond of t r a v e l l i n g  abroad and spend more abroad than  v i s i t o r s  
t o  t h e  Netherlands do. This  ikbalance i s  due t o  t h e  c l ima te  and a l s o  t h e  
geographical  s t r u c t u r e  and h i s t o r i c a l  development; these  f a c t o r s  a r e  respon- 
s i b l e  f o r  t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Netherlands can o f f e r  l e s s  va r i ed  a t t r a c t i o n s  
t o  fo re ign  t o u r i s t s  than  s e v e r a l  o the r  c o u n t r i e s .  
Due t o  i ts  open cha rac t e r ,  t h e  Netherlands '  flow of imported and expart-  
ed commodities a r e  very  l a r g e .  But t h e  unique s i t u a t i o n ,  a l r eady  mentioned, 
enabled t h e  country i n  t h e  course of time t o  b u i l d  up an ex tens ive  t r a n s i t  
t r a d e  ( see  Table 8 ) .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s e a  borne a r r i v a l s  and depar tures  i n  
Dutch harbors  a r e  very l a rge .  I n  abso lu t e  terms t h e i r  volume i s  of t h e  same 
order  of magnitude a s  f o r  cons iderably  l a r g e r  coun t r i e s  such a s  France, I t a l y  
and t h e  UK, and it surpasses  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  FRGs harbor by a f a c t o r  
we l l  over two. The FRG's sha re  i n  Dutch t r a n s i t  t r a d e  i s  high, a s  shown i n  
Table 9 .  Two-thirds of t h e  s e a  borne t r a f f i c  went t o  t h e  FRG. The sha re  of 
t h e  FRG i n  land-sea t r a f f i c  i s  almost 100%; 
Table 7. Foreign t r a d e  i n  s e r v i c e s  (on a cash b a s i s ) ,  1980 ( i n  b i l l . g l d s ) .  
Export of Serv ices  Import of Serv ices  Balance 
Rece ip t s  Expendi tures  
Share Share Share 
T o t a l  of  ERG T o t a l  of ERG Tota l  of ERG 
Tr ave 1 3264 1402 9228 1583 -5694 -181 
Other Serv ices  10866 4987 9 704 1854 832 3133 
TOTAL 25297b 8715 2 2 0 3 0 ~  3868 3267 4847 
a .  Inc ludes  bunker s u p p l i e s  and s h i p  r e p a i r .  
b7.8% of t h e  1980 GDP. 
C 6.8% of t h e  1980 GDP. 
Source: The Nether lands '  Bank, Report f o r  1980. 
Table  8. Commodities loaded and unloaded i n  t h e  Nether lands (mi l l .  t o n s , ) a  
Loaded 
Expor t s  and T r a n s i t  
19 70 1978 
Unloaded 
Imports and T r a n s i t  
19 70 1978 
Sea borne 6 4 68 
In l and  Shipping 82 83 
Road 15 2 2 
R a i  1 6 5 
P ipe  Line 2 5 4 6 
TOTAL 19 2 224 
a Due t o  changed custom f o r m a l i t i e s  t h e  1978 imports from t h e  BLEU a r e  
included,  they  a r e  es t imated  a t  18.4 mi l l . t ons .  
Source: See Table  6. 
Table 9 .  Sea-borne t r a n s i t  t r a d e  ( i n  m i l l . t o n s ) ,  1978. 
A r r i v a l s  Remova 1 s 
To ta l  from FRG % T o t a l  t o  FRG % 
Sea - Land 110 7 2  65.5 28 14 50.0 
Sea - Sea 25 6  24 .O 15 -- ---- 
TOTAL 135 7 8  57.8 4  3  14 32.6 
Source: S t a t i s t i c s  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  goods t r a f f i c ,  Cen t r a l  Bureau of 
S t a t i s t i c s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  sea-borne t r a f f i c  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  very important i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  in land  sh ipping  and road t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  A cons iderable  p a r t  of 
t h e  t r a f f i c  shown i n  Table 9  is  c a r r i e d  out  by these  two means. Therefore,  
i t  w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  f o r  t h e s e  two t h e  r e l a t i o n  wi th  t h e  FRG i s  a l s o  pre- 
ponderant. Of 45 m i l l . t o n s  i n  1978 t r anspor t ed  by road ,  68.9% had the  FRG 
as  o r i g i n  o r  d e s t i n a t i o n ,  and t h e  sha re  of Dutch companies was two-thirds.  
Comparable f i g u r e s  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in land  sh ipping  were 126 m i l l . t o n s  and 
82.52, 58% by Dutch companies. 
The sea  - land t r a n s i t  i s  f o r  almost 70%, depending on o r e s ,  sc rap  
metals  and crude o i l .  A g r i c u l t u r a l  products ,  coa l  and o i l  occupy another  
13%. I n  land - sea  t r a n s i t  coa l ,  semi-finished products  and metals  a r e  im-  
por t an t  (73.9%), i n  s ea  - s e a  t r a n s p o r t  crude o i l  i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  almost 
50%. 
The composition, a s  we l l  a s  t h e  o r i g i n  and d e s t i n a t i o n  of t h e  flows i s  
very important f o r  t r a n s i t  a s  f o r  commodity t r a d e .  Despi te  t h e  d e t e r i o r a t e d  
competi t ive p o s i t i o n  of t h e  West European s t e e l  i ndus t ry ,  a s  compared t o  t he  
N I C ' s  and t h e  Eas te rn  European c o u n t r i e s ,  a  cont inuing  economic growth of 
t h e  FRG is  t o  be expected, and t h i s  w i l l  have a  favorable  e f f e c t  on Dutch 
t r a n s i t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a s  t h e  Rotterdam harbor  can accommodate 
large-type o r e  c a r r i e r s .  Never the less ,  t h e  t r a d e  has t o  be aware of growing 
competit ion. I t a l i a n  harbors  may be a b l e  t o  t ake  over a  p a r t  of t h e  t r a d e ,  
aga in  i n  connection wi th  t h e  move of t h e  FRG's southward movement of i t s  
economic p o t e n t i a l .  
For t h e  t r a n s i t  of mineral  o i l ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  r a t h e r  unce r t a in .  Many 
coun t r i e s  t r y  t o  become l e s s  dependent on o i l  supp l i e s  and t h e  FRG i s  no 
except ion.  I n  view of t h e  heavy oppos i t ion ,  a  r ap id  growth of t h e  use of 
nuc lea r  energy i s  n o t  very probable,  bu t  a  s h i f t  t o  coa l  i s  a  r e a l  p o s s i b i l -  
i t y .  Th i s  development could have a  s t r o n g  e f f e c t  on t h e  t r a n s i t  of o i l  
through t h e  Netherlands,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a s  a l s o  o t h e r  supply rou te s  may be- 
come more important .  Sea - land sh ipping  on t h e  o t h e r  hand might p r o f i t  from 
a  s h i f t  t o  coa l .  
A few remarks may be i n  p l ace  on d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  a f -  
f e c t i n g  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  It i s  Dutch o f f i c i a l  po l i cy  t h a t  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
j u s t  l i k e  commodity t r a d e ,  ought t o  be f r e e  and open t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  com- 
p e t i t i o n  i n  o rde r  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  t h e  most e f f i c i e n t  f i rms  w i l l  o b t a i n  t h e  
best opportunities. The extensive Dutch road transport has been developed 
on this principle. However, the EEC has not yet adopted a general policy 
in this field and the volume of road transport between member states is 
still based on bilateral agreements which usually take the form of annually 
permitted quota. These are often intended to protect national firms or even 
to achieve more general economic goals. There is, for example, in the FRG 
a tendency to restrict road transportation in order to improve the bad situ- 
ation of its railways. 
3 . INVE STMENT S 
With respect to foreign investments the Netherlands occupy a special 
position. The volume of foreign investments in the country is important but 
its own investments abroad are considerably higher. As far as direct invest- 
ments are concerned the Netherlands is a net exporter.* In relation to its 
GDP as well as to the total volume of its internal volume of investments in 
fixed assets the Netherlands rank very high (see Table 10). 
a Table 10. Direct investments of a number of important investors . 
Direct Investments 
As a % of gross investments 
Country As a % of the GDP in fixed assets 
Nether1 ands 
Denmark 
Japan 
UK 
Sweden 
BLEU 
FRG 
Canada 
France 
USA 
Italy 
a~verages for the years 1971 up to and including 1976. 
Source: H. Krggenau, Internationale Direktinvestitionen, Verlag Weltarchiv 
GmbH, 1979. 
"Investments conferring on the investor partial or complete control on 
the activities concerned. 
This situation has developed since the early 1970s. A large part of 
these investments is directed to industrial enterprises, mainly winning of 
minerals, oil- and chemical industry, and food processing. This share is 
higher than for most other countries investing abroad on a large scale. To 
a large extent this is caused by the direct investments of the big multi- 
nations having their seat in the Netherlands (Philips, Shell, Unilever, Akzo 
and a few others). 
Dutch investment behavior cannot be considered to constitute a problem 
typical for small countries. Nevertheless, it has clear disadvantages. 
Apart from the fact that a given anount of foreign investments does not cre- 
ate as much employment as the same amount invested at home, there are other 
problems. 
It is often argued that direct investments abroad lay a foundation for 
continuing trade in goods and services. However, a distinction must be drawn 
between foreign investments in the long run increasing the home level of 
economic activities and those which merely amount to a reallocation of cer- 
tain activities. Where the former will have a stimulating effect, the latter 
will have the opposite effect. That this latter effect actually plays a role 
can be illustrated again by the relation of the Netherlands to the FRG. A 
considerable part of Dutch direct investments goes to the FRG. In 1980 it 
amounted to 9.5 bill. DM (16.3% of total foreign direct investments). Table 
11 shows that the ratio of the turn over of Dutch manufacturing companies in 
the FRG to the exports from the Netherlands to it is considerably higher than 
the corresponding ratios for all foreign manufacturing companies in the FRG 
to total foreign exports to the FRG. 
Table 11. Production in the FRG of foreign investors to their countries 
exports to the FRG, (1) for the Netherlands, (2) for all countries. 
Types of 
Commodities 
Ratio of turn over 
of Dutch manufactur- Ratio of foreign manu- 
ing companies in the facturing companies in 
FRG/Dutch exports of the FRG/foreign exports 
goods to the FRG (1) of goods to the FRG (2) 
Manufacturing 136 
Chemicals 63 
0 il 172 
Brick, Clay, Asbestos, 
Plastics, Ceramics, Glass 3 7 
Iron, Steel 1269 
Mechanical Engineering 30 6 
Vehicles 274 
Electrical Engineering 205 
Instruments 42 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 34 
Source: H. Krggenau, Survey of Dutch-German direct investment relationship. 
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Governemtn Policy, working 
paper, The Hague, 1982. 
This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e  f o r  those  products  i n  which t h e  Dutch competi- 
t i v e  p o s i t i o n  on t h e  FRG's market is  r a t h e r  weak ( i r o n  and s t e e l ,  mechanical 
engineering,  veh ic l e s ,  and e l e c t r i c a l  engineer ing) .  This  s t r o n g l y  suppor ts  
t h e  assumption t h a t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s  t ak ing  p lace  and t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i -  
t i e s  a r e  be ing  d i sp l aced  t o  t h e  FRG, thereby adverse ly  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  Dutch 
f u t u r e  t r a d i n g  p o s i t i o n .  This  conclusion i s  r e in fo rced  by looking i n t o  the  
mir ror  image of t h e  phenomenon under cons ide ra t ion ,  v i z .  t h e  FRG's inves t -  
ments i n  t h e  Netherlands.  They a r e  considerably smal le r  and amounted t o  4 
b i l l .  DM i n  1980 (6.7% of t h e  FRG's d i r e c t  investment abroad) and i t  w i l l  be 
c l e a r  from t h e  proceeding t h a t  t h e i r  composition i s  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  from 
t h e  Dutch one. More than h a l f  of i t  r e f e r s  t o  metal- and e l e c t r o t e c h n i c a l  
i n d u s t r i e s .  A cons iderable  p a r t  of i t  i s  placed i n  s e rv i ces .  Table 12 shows 
from a break down s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of Table 11, t h a t  t h e  compar- 
a b l e  f i g u r e s  a r e  much lower. They a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  FRG's 
i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  much keener on expor ts  than on d i r e c t  investments abroad. 
Table 12. Product ion abroadof  FRG investors/FRG expor t s ,  (1) f o r  t h e  
Netherlands,  (2) f o r  a l l  coun t r i e s .  
Types of 
Comnodities 
~ a t i 2  of t u r n  over  of 
Dutch manufacturing Rat io  of t u r n  over of 
companies i n  t h e  FRG manufacturing 
Netherlands/export  of companies i n  t h e  world/  
goods t o  t h e  Nether- FRG expor ts  of goods 
lands (1) t o  t h e  world (2) 
Manufacturing 16 
Chemicals 5 3 
I ron ,  S t e l l  16 
Machinery 8 
E l e c t r i c a l  Engineering 10 
I r o n  See t  S t e e l ,  Metal 3 3 
T e x t i l e s  1-2 
Brick,  Clay 2 2 
Source: See Table 11. 
The tendency of n a t i o n a l  f i rms  t o  i nves t  abroad i s  usua l ly  due t o  higher  
expected r e t u r n s  than on comparable investments a t  home. Product ion c o s t s  
may be lower, i t  may a l s o  be more a t t r a c t i v e  t o  produce i n  a b i g  market. 
However, o the r  reasons may a l s o  p lay  a r o l e .  With a number of coun t r i e s ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  developing ones,  t r a d e  i s  only poss ib l e  i f  product ion i s  p a r t l y  
d isp laced  t o  t hese  coun t r i e s .  The Dutch P h i l i p s  concern o f f e r s  a case,  where 
both f a c t o r s  played a r o l e .  Due t o  a cont inuing inc rease  i n  labor-product iv i ty  
i t  has been ab le ,  from 1971 t o  1983, t o  cons iderably  inc rease  i t s  s a l e s  i n  
r e a l  terms. During t h e  same per iod  i t s  t o t a l  employment dropped from 267 000 
t o  343 000, i . e . ,  by 6.5%. Its personnel  i n  t h e  Netherlands went down from 
89 000 t o  71 200, o r  by 28%!* 
The investment behavior  r e f e r r e d  t o  may perhaps be s t ronge r  i n  an open 
very trade-minded country l i k e  t h e  Netherlands bu t  t h e  oppos i te ,  v i z .  t h e  
withdrawal o r  reduct ion02 f o r e i g n  investment i n  a  small country seems t o  be 
a  common r i s k .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  a  per iod  of economic r eces s ion  fo re ign  inves- 
t o r s  a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  home investments and s h i f t  t h e  burden t o  
t h e i r  fo re ign  hold ings .  A good example i s  o f f e r e d  by t h e  f a t e  of t h e  E s t e l  
concern i n  which t h e  Dutch s t e e l  company Hoogovens NV p a r t i c i p a t e d  toge ther  
wi th  t h e  FRG company Hoesch. When t h e  c r i s i s  i n  t h e  s t e e l  i ndus t ry  necesi-  
t a t e d  heavy support  f o r  t h i s  i ndus t ry ,  i t  r equ i r ed  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  
concern and a merger t o  Hoesch wi th  Krupp i n  order  t o  be s u r e  t h a t  only 
n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  would b e n e f i t  from t h i s  a id .  
4. NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Nowadays, t h e  convic t ion  i s  widely he ld  t h a t  t h e  developed coun t r i e s  
w i l l  only be a b l e  t o  improve o r  a t  l e a s t  maintain t h e i r  p re sen t  l e v e l s  of 
p r o p s e r i t y  i f  they succeed on a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  s c a l e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
t h e  development of new technologies .  And i n  t h i s  r e spec t  most European 
coun t r i e s  appear t o  l a g  behind t h e  USA and Japan. F igure  2 gives an i n t e r -  
e s t i n g  p i c t u r e  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  developments of i n d u s t r i a l  p roduct ion  and 
employment i n  t he  USA and i n  Europe of t h e  EEC [5]. 
During 1958 t o  1980 t h e  USA's product ion r o s e  on average only s l i g h t l y  
more than  i n  Europe (2.6% p.a.  versus  2.43% p . a . ) ,  b u t  whereas employment i n  
t h e  USA increased  by 1.3% p.a .  Europe showed a d e c l i n e  of 0.3% p.a.  This  
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of heavy investments i n  Europe and s t imu la t ed  by a  
h igh  r i s e  of l abo r  c o s t s .  Due t o  i t  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  gap between t h e  USA 
and Europe e x i s t i n g  during t h e  f i r s t  post-war years  now l a r g e l y  has disap- 
peared. But i t  i s  unmistakable t h a t  p a r t  of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  employment 
has t o  be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a  s t ronge r  development of new technologies  i n  t he  
USA. 
This  conclusion can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  fo l lowing  numbers. For a 
group of s i x  mature companies (Bethlehem S t e e l ,  Du Pont,  General E l e c t r i c ,  
General Foods, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Paper,  and P roc to r  and Gamble) s a l e s  during 1954 
t o  1974 on average went up by 7.8% p.a. ,  employment only by 1.9%. But f o r  
f i v e  s t rong ly  innovat ive  companies (Polaro id ,  3M, IBM, Xerox, and Texas In- 
s t ruments)  t h e  corresponding f i g u r e s  were 16.5% and 10.8%; For t y p i c a l  
young, h igh  technology companies, t h e  growth w a s  s t i l l  h igher  a s  can be seen  
from Table 13.  Although s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  lack ing  i t  i s  very probable t h a t  
t h e  Japanese development shows similar f e a t u r e s .  The ques t ion  t h e r e f o r e  
a r i s e s  as t o  t h e  chances of small c o u n t r i e s  t o  o b t a i n  a f a i r  s h a r e  i n  t h e  
development of new technologies .  It i s  a comforting f a c t  i n  t h i s  r e spec t  
t h a t  t h i s  development i s  not  t h e  p re roga t ive  of i n d u s t r i a l  g i a n t s  which usu- 
a l l y  a r e  t o  be found i n  t h e  b igges t  coun t r i e s  only. On t h e  cont ra ry ,  experi-  
ence shows t h a t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  USA s e v e r a l  innovat ions s t a r t e d  i n  small 
e n t e r p r i s e s  founded by a c t i v e  s c i e n t i s t s  coming from u n i v e r s i t i e s  o r  indus- 
t r i a l  f i rms  and prepared t o  t ake  t h e  r i s k  of e x p l o i t i n g  an i d e a  from t h e  
f i e l d  of t h e i r  own experience.  I n  t h e  course of time, succes s fu l  ones may 
*Data suppl ied  by t h e  Netherlands Cent ra l  Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s  

Table 13.  Average annual growth (percentages)  dur ing  1969 - 1974 of young 
h igh  technology companies. 
Date incorpora ted  N ame S a l e s  Employment 
1968 Data General 140.5 82.5 
1959 Nat iona l  Semiconductor 54.3 59.4 
1960 Compugraphi c 50.2 24 .O 
1957 D i g i t a l  Equipment 36.8 30.7 
1964 Marion Labs 24.5 25.4 
Weighted average 42.5 40.7 
Source: Reference 5 page 132. 
grow on t h e i r  own s t r e n g t h ,  through mergers o r  they may be bought up by 
l a r g e r  f i rms .  However, t h e  s t a r t  u sua l ly  t akes  p l ace  a t  a r a t h e r  modest 
s c a l e .  S i l i c o n  Val ley i n  C a l i f o r n i a  o f f e r s  a t y p i c a l  example. However, i n  
order  t h a t  s i m i l a r  s t a r t s  be p o s s i b l e  i n  small c o u n t r i e s ,  a number of con- 
d i t i o n s  have t o  be  f u l f i l l e d .  
A t  f i r s t ,  t h e r e  has  t o  be an app rop r i a t e  e f f o r t  i n  R & D. And i n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  s e v e r a l  small  coun t r i e s  is  not  very  f avo rab l e .  Big 
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  favored anyhow due t o  t h e i r  s i z e ,  bu t  they spend a l a r g e r  p a r t  
of t h e i r  GDP on R & D than  most smaller c o u n t r i e s ,  and t h e i r  sha re s  moreover 
a r e  dec l in ing ,  s e e  Table  14.  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t he se  governmental expendi tures  
t h e r e  a r e ,  of course ,  cons ide rab l e  amounts spent  on R & D by p r i v a t e  f i rms .  
For most coun t r i e s  comparable f i g u r e s  appear  not  t o  be a v a i l a b l e ,  bu t  it  i s  
q u i t e  probable  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  t o t a l s  w i l l  n o t  be 
much b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  small c o u n t r i e s .  
A second cond i t i on  i s  t h e  presence of a s t i m u l a t i n g  c l ima te  f o r  small 
e n t e r p r i s e s .  Here too ,  t h e  USA took t h e  lead  w i t h  i t s  so  c a l l e d  Small Busi- 
n e s s  Act bu t  nowadays s i m i l a r  p o l i c i e s  a r e  pursued i n  many o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
through suppor t  of va r ious  k inds  t o  f i rms  s t a r t i n g  up. A t h i r d  important 
cond i t i on  i s  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  ven ture  c a p i t a l .  I n  most ca se s  banks a r e  
no t  w i l l i n g  t o  g r a n t  c r e d i t s  t o  newcomers. They want t o  see r e s u l t s  be fo re  
opening t h e  c r e d i t  tap.  Therefore ,  o t h e r  sources  ought t o  be  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
overcome t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  f i r s t  yea r s .  And even i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  USA seems t o  be  more f avo rab l e  than  elsewhere.  
L a s t  b u t  n o t  l e a s t ,  t h e r e  ought t o  be a s u f f i c i e n t  supply of motivated 
and g i f t e d  persons prepared t o  t a k e  r i s k s .  This  is  l a r g e l y  a ques t i on  of 
men ta l i t y  and probably t h e  one most d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e  s t imu la t ed .  
Table 14. Government spending on R & D i n  a number of coun t r i e s ,  a s  a 
percentage of t h e i r  GDP 
Country 19 75 19 78 1981 
FRG 1.23 
France 1.17 
I t a l y  0.36 
Netherlands 0.96 
Belgium 
UK 
I r e l and  
Denmark 
USA 
Source: Government Financing of Research and Development, 1975 - 1982, 
Eurosa t ,  1983. 
The chances f o r  small  coun t r i e s  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  e n t e r  f i e l d s  of new 
technology, which have a l r eady  rea-ched a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  of ma tu r i t y  ( l a r g e  
s c a l e  computers, i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s )  o r  r e q u i r e  very b i g  investments ( coa l .  
g a s i f i c a t i o n )  a r e  small .  This  does no t  exclude t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of acqu i r ing  
product ion f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e s e  f i e l d s  through fo re ign  investments  o r  l i cen -  
ces ,  bu t  t hese  a r e  n o t  t h e  most app ropr i a t e  ones f o r  t h e i r  own e f f o r t s .  
However, t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  f i e l d s  where oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  small  coun t r i e s  
appear t o  be more favorable ,  o r  where s t a r t s  have a l r eady  been made, such a s  
bio-technology (biomass, b ioengineer ing) ,  energy r e l a t e d  technologies  (hea t  
pumps, s o l a r -  and wind energy) ,  advanced information technology, robot  tech- 
nology, e t c .  But i n  a l l  c a ses ,  c a r e f u l l y  designed p o l i c i e s  w i l l  be  needed 
i n  order  t o  o b t a i n  success .  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h e  preceding paragraphs a number of problems have been t r e a t e d  re- 
l a t e d  t o  small c o u n t r i e s  and mainly i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  Dutch experience i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n  i ts  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  FRG. Therefore,  a l ready  i n  t h e  introduc-  
t i o n  it  has been s a i d  t h a t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  have t o  be made wi th  g r e a t  ca re .  
Nevertheless ,  a few conclusions seem t o  be poss ib l e .  
Due t o  t h e  s i z e  of t h e i r  home markets,  small  coun t r i e s  t o  a l a r g e  ex- 
t e n t  have t o  r e l y  on expor t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t hese  e n t a i l  
h igher  c o s t s  than home s a l e s  they have t o  s p e c i a l i z e  i n  a r e s t r i c t e d  number 
of a r e a s .  Therefore,  they a r e  r a t h e r  vu lnerable  t o  sudden changes i n  fo re ign  
demand f o r  t h e i r  products .  The r e c e n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  Swiss watch indus- 
t r y  o f f e r  a s t r i k i n g  example. A s  a consequence of t h e  very rap id  penetra-  
t i o n  of e l e c t r o n i c  watches i t  had t o  c a r r y  through an ex tens ive  r econs t ruc t ion  
and a cons iderable  volume of h igh  s k i l l  became obsole te .  
Small countries are usually strongly dependent on exports to neighbor- 
ing markets and the same type of risks may occur as with respect to commod- 
ities. Even a displacement of the economic center of gravity of an impor- 
tant market may have unfavorable consequences as in the case of Dutch ex- 
ports to the FRG. 
The principles of free trade are less frequently adhered to in the case 
of services, such as transportation, than for commodities. Therefore, coun- 
tries specializing in such activities may be hit by policy changes in these 
fields from the part of their trading partners. 
A large volume of foreign direct investments has great advantages but 
they may be risky too as foreign investors easily can shift their activities 
if higher returns are to be expected elsewhere. 
A high volume of foreign investments may also restrict the room for 
adequate economic policies in the receiving country. For example, it is 
said that the composition of the Canadian industry is largely determined by 
the heavy direct investments from the USA. However, this does not seem to 
be an impediment to a high national income per capita! 
The entrance into new technologies is not entirely reserved for big 
countries. They often start on a scale which by no means surpasses the pos- 
sibilities of small countries. However, they will only come about provided 
a number of conditions is fulfilled. In this respect, big countries are 
again in a more favorable condition. 
Finally, there is of course the possibility of political pressure of 
big countries on smaller ones, in particular their neighbors. However, this 
paper is entirely restricted to economic aspects and the political problem 
has not been touched upon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The case study presented h e r e  has  the following objectives: 
To examine the  behavior of a sample of foreign controlled companies in 
the  field of technology t r ans fe r  in Greece for the  period 1977-1983 dur- 
ing which Greece experienced unfavorable economic conditions; 
to present  methodological issues in t he  field of technology t ransfer  from 
Multinationals (YNC) into small developing o r  per ipheral  countries; 
t o  discuss t he  complexity of forces  and fac tors  which determine Greece's 
position in t he  international division of labor.  
The study is  based on interviews (with questionnaires) with managers of 28 
foreign controlled manufacturing companies in Greece which had been under 
foreign shareholding in t he  range of 1 5  t o  100 percent .  There were two 
exceptions-one which established production in 1981, t he  o the r  acquired foreign 
control in 1981. Foreign shareholding dates  f r o m  five t o  twenty years .  Interviews 
were held in Aupust 1982. The list  of companies w a s  taken from the  Financial 
Directory of Greek SA manufacturing companies in 1979 (ICAP 1982). In 1979, t he  
total  assets of the  respondents amounted to US $ bn 1.1, and represented 36 per -  
ceot of the  assets of t h e  foreign controlled sector in t he  Directory, and 7.1 per- 
cent of the  total  assets of all  manufacturing SA in t he  Directory. In 1979 the  
respondents had 16,500 employees, which represented 29.5 percent  of t he  employ- 
ment of the foreign controlled manufacturing sec tor ,  and 5 percent  of the  manufac- 
turing SA in t he  Directory. Some ten respondents were included, in 1979, amongst 
t he  top 100 by assets and sales;  only one employed 50, 11 between 100 and 499, and 
17  between 500 and 1,700. 
THE CASE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN SMALL D m L O P I N G  COUNTRIES 
The question of technology t r ans fe r  into t he  manufacturing industry of the  
small developing countries presents  us with intractable issues when it  is set in a 
period of unfavorable conditions, slow growth t rade ,  reversa l  of the  high rates of 
growth of the  1960s and ear ly  1970s, as is  t he  case in Greece; besides, t he re  has  
been a growing consciousness f o r  more socially responsive models of development. 
.:
This paper was not presented orallv a t  the meeting b u t  was prepared especially a s  a con- 
tribution. 
The f i r s t  issue concerns t he  technology gaps between advanced and develop- 
ing countries; these have become more marked with t he  achievements and the  high 
rates of growth in profit  in t he  high research  intensity industries during the  1960s 
and 1970s (Porat ,  1976; and Dunning and Pearce ,  1980). Second, t h e r e  is a weak 
technological infrastructure  in small developing countries. Third, developing 
countries spend few resources  on activities which could increase t h e  amount of 
technology t r ans fe r  and have a potential f o r  developing and upgrading t h e  living 
standard: For  example, r e sea rch  on minerals and agriculture,  investment in 
environmental protection and modernization of public corporations,  spending on 
R&D, in both t he  pr ivate  and t h e  public sec tors  in Greece during 1960-80, 
represented annually less than 0.2 percent  of t h e  GNP, while persons employed on 
R&D were less than 2,500 in 1981 (CERP 1972, 1983). Fourth, t he  production of 
science based technology is  concentrated in t h e  industrially advanced countries 
and related t o  the i r  own requirements, while few resources  are devoted t o  t h e  
problems of t h e  less developed ones (Pavit, 1971). 
Transfer of technology has  been an essential p a r t  of t h e  industrialization 
s t ra tegy of t h e  developing countries which compete f o r  t he  at t ract ion of MNC as 
they were considered the  reposi tor ies  of advanced technology; but they are prone 
to receive t h e  latest stages  of t h e  product cycle (Vernon, 1966), fragmented 
processes which are labor  intensive and have l ow  value added and investment with 
low capital intensity compared t o  t ha t  in advanced countries and with limited 
economic potential (Helleiner, 1973). The s t ra tegy of small developing countries is  
constrained by the  small size of the i r  market and t h e  legacy of t h e  import substitu- 
tion policy and protectionism which c rea ted  an  unflexible manufacturing s t ruc ture .  
They have t o  become outward looking and competitive in t he i r  manufacturing by 
introducing advanced technology and expanding t o  exports ;  as t he i r  comparative 
advantage of low cost labor  diminishes - as is t h e  case in Greece - t h e r e  is  a case 
f o r  t h e  rest ructur ing of manufacturing toward more advanced processes. 
The political decision-makers in small developing countries have to face  two 
questions related to t h e  t r ans fe r  of technology from MNC. First ,  making the  r ight  
choice of technological field in relation t o  t he  existing manufacturing s t ruc ture  
and the  s t ra tegy f o r  t h e  future;  second, t o  evaluate t h e  ro l e  of MNC in shaping 
the i r  position in t h e  international division of labor.  
I t  has been suggested tha t  intermediate technology is more suited to t he  
means of t he  small developing countries because i t  is labor  intensive, favors  small 
scale  and costs less than t h e  inflexible highly capital  intensive technology of t h e  
modern industry (Schumacher, 1974). Also, appropriate  technology is  considered 
as t h e  r igh t  choice as i t  meets resource  endowments of t he  poorer  countries 
(Schumacher, 1974). Opposite arguments (Emanuel, 1983) support  t ha t  developing 
countries should favor  advanced technology and capital  intensive processes in 
o r d e r  to improve t h e  mix of fac tors  of production, t o  increase social output, wel- 
f a r e  and private profitability. Two facts support  this premise: f i r s t ,  labor  inten- 
sive processes have a l ow  value added, and second, t he  developing countries are in 
s h o r t  supply of manufacturers whose demand is  covered by imports. 
With regard  t o  t h e  second question, MNC overprices  technology and t h e r e  are 
several  ways to do so: t r ans fe r  pricing, royalties on licenses of outmoded tech- 
niques, overpricing of inputs delivered to  subsidiaries from old stocks of outmode 
technology, and commission charges on exports  paid to sales subsidiaries abroad. P 
Technological achievements of MNC can yield them an  oligopolistic position in one 
field, s e rve  f o r  survival and for t he  exploitation of world resources .  One example 
is  t he  aluminum industry. In a study by the  UN (1979). i t  w a s  considered tha t  t he  
cost of undertakinp the  investment in a n  aluminum smelter outside t he  MNC by local 
organizations w a s  prohibitive - t h e  technology fee  of US $50 p e r  metric tone being 
one of the reasons. The political decision-makers can play a role  in the  final 
impact of t he  location of MNC subsidiaries; they ascertain incentives t o  diminish 
the  r isks  of investments, such as subsidies t o  exports  and to  production, protec- 
tion of t he  home market, high depreciation rates and concessions. But MNC are in 
a position t o  res t ra in  reactions of governments in developing countries which a r e  
designed t o  e i ther  reduce MNC profi ts  o r  t o  increase MNC contribution t o  t h e  
social cost of the  host country. Evidence is  given from the  case  of t he  taxation of 
bauxite exports  from Jamaica; t he  imposition of tax has led MNC t o  relocate  the i r  
production t o  o the r  countries with vast bauxite deposits, and has  not caused any 
lasting damage t o  t he  profit  position of t he  companies (Francis, 1981). 
THE CONDITIONS IN THE GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN THE EARLY 
1980s 
The socio-economic s t ruc ture  of Greece typifies a country of t h e  south Medi- 
terranean periphery and h e r  problem of social and economic backwardness. 
Regional imbalances were recognized and reported in t h e  memorandum of t he  
Greek government submitted t o  t he  Commission of t he  European Communities in 
1982. Along with many o the r  per ipheral  countries, Greece has since 1975, experi-  
enced a slowdown in economic growth, in public and private  consumption, high inf- 
lation, and a deterioration in h e r  balance of payments. Besides t he  unfavorable 
international environment, t h e r e  a r e  s t ructural  domestic constraints tha t  prevent 
t he  development of the  manufacturing industry and t h e  improvement of produc- 
tivity. This also contributes t o  t h e  weakining of Greece 's  position in t he  interna- 
tional division of labor.  
A s  recently as 1981 the  agricultural sec tor  employed 31 percent  of Greece's 
work force,  and contributed 1 6  percent t o  the  gross domestic product (GD?). Com- 
pa re  this t o  t he  manufacturing industry, employing 1 9  percent  of t he  work force  
and contributing a l i t t le more than 25 percent  of t he  GDP (NSSG, 1981; OECD? 
1982). 
Since the  mid-1970s t h e r e  has been a significant shift  in t h e  pat tern of growth 
in Greece: 
from 1976-1981 the  average annual growth rate of manufactured output 
and investment w a s  half of that  fo r  t he  preceding 10  year  period. The 
traditional manufacturing sec tors  (SIC 20-29), and the  basic processing 
sectors ,  (basic metals, petroleum, petroleum productst  and non meta!lic 
minerals), exhibited higher growth rates relative t o  t he  advanced ones 
which developed more recently.  Manufacturing investment shows a con- 
centration in branches with low profitability internationally, (cotton 
yarns and fabrics ,  garments and food processing); 
t h e  deteriorating competitive position of Greek manufacture is  reflected 
in the  slowdown of productivity gains; taking 1974 as a base year ,  t he  
productivity index in 1979 w a s  113, and i t  fell t o  109 in 1980; 
a f a i r  proportion of social needs f o r  consumer goods and capital goods 
a r e  covered by imports, which' also displaced outmoded and expensive 
homemade manufacturing; in 1974 manufactured imports were 250 per-  
cent more than the  value of manufactured exports ,  in the  late 1970s this 
ra t io  trebled, and imports represented 50 percent  of Greece's manufac- 
tu res ,  (NSSG Bulletin, OECD, 1983 CERP, 1983). 
Constraints to the Transfer of Technology 
A number of international and domestic forces have limited the  competitive 
position of Greece in both the  home and export markets. The Greek industry has 
t o  overcome the constraints of the small size of the home market? and the level of 
exports that  a r e  required t o  increase efficiency in the  cost s t ructure,  and the 
introduction of innovations feasible. Technological innovations a r e  essential t o  
gain an advantage in the home and export markets vis-6-vis rivals because Greece 
has lost h e r  advantage in cheap labor. 
1. The slowdown in world t rade  since the r i se  in oil prices in 1979 intensi- 
fied competition from East and West European Countries and the develop- 
ing world f o r  export  markets where Greece had a competitive advantage 
(Middle East and EEC countries); 
2. The decline of home and export markets fur ther  deteriorated the capa- 
city utilization and accentuated the falling productivity rate; 
3 The cost of production owes i t  increase t o  the  reduction of the  working 
hours p e r  week, the r ise in wages, and the increase in the cost of raw 
materials, minimum wage levels a t  the end of 1982 were 250 percent more 
than those of 1978; 
4 There is a deterioration in labor relations with respect  t o  the  demands of 
the employers f o r  higher productivity - labour in Greece is not remun- 
erated according t o  productivity scores, but r a t h e r  by a flat wage ra t e ,  
and annual increases, which compensates only f o r  the loss of purchasing 
power. 
5 The rising cost of borrowing money, in the  short- and long-term, absorbs 
a great  proportion of the gross profit (more than 25 percent in 1980). 
Greek manufacturers have found competition in export markets from 
West European manufacturers who a r e  able to  give credit  t o  their  clients 
at lower interest rates; 
6 The slowdown in new investment w a s  exacerbated by the  deterioration of 
the financial position of many large firms - in 1982 the assets of the 50 
largest manufacturing companies showed a net loss of 8.67 bn Dr, com- 
pared t o  a net profit of 5.72 bn Dr in 1981; 
7 Investment and technological innovations are also inhibited by the  s m a l l  
size of manufacturing establishments, and the dominance of family owner- 
ship in the  control and decision making of the firms. The 1976 census of 
manufacturing establishments showed that  some 85 percent a r e  artisan 
units, each employing 1-4 persons. 
In the early 1980s manufacturing establishments with over  50 employees 
represented 1 percent of the total, and contributed 60 percent t o  the  manufactur- 
ing output. Small artisan units concentrated on the traditional sectors - furni- 
ture ,  garments, footwear, bakeries, and repa i r  shops, - and are registered as 
productive units. Large Greek owned establishments specialize on traditional pro- 
ducts - fertilizers, cement, iron fittings and pipes, paper,  cotton textiles, ship- 
building and ammunition. Domestic industrialists, with the  exception of the plastics 
sector ,  exhibit a limited potential and experience in the design and organization of 
productive units in the modern sector.  They mostly copy foreign products t o  low 
standards and specifications f o r  the protected home market; they a r e  absent in 
those branches which could form a potential platform f o r  the development of 
advanced products which could generate multiple effects, f o r  example, scientific 
instruments, electronic components and electrical machines. 
Policy on Technology Transfer in the Manufacturing industry 
Since the  postwar years  the  government has opted f o r  technology t ransfer  
with the aid of foreign d i rec t  investment, regarding this  as the  shortest  path t o  
modernization and s tructural  change in the  Greek manufacturing industry. Two 
important laws in 1953 and 1961 (2687/1953, 4171/1961) institutionalized the  pro- 
tection of foreign d i rec t  investment and the t ransfer  of technology, and provided 
for:  
constitutional protection from nationalization of rights; 
reduction of taxation in the  income of imported capital; 
relief from duties, indirect taxes and tar i f fs  on the  imported equipment 
and r a w  materials; 
subsidies on exports;  
concessions agreed  individual!^ according t o  t he  importance of invest- 
ment; 
protection of licenses and patents. 
According t o  the  respondent subsidiaries the  major shortcomings of this legis- 
lation have been the  bureaucrat ic  procedures t o  secure  the benefits, the  low lev- 
els  allowed f o r  exports  of profits (12 percent  on imported capital annually); and 
the  taxation of the  exports  of profits by the difference created from the  initial 
exchange r a t e  and the  revaluation of the  currency. 
The objectives of t he  Economic Development Plans since the  association of 
Greece with the  Common Market in 1962, gave priority t o  the development of the 
manufacturing industry f o r  t h r e e  reasons: 
1 to  take full advantage of i ts  entry into the  EEC; 
2 t o  substitute f o r  imports; 
3 to  improve the  balance of payments with exports.  
The 1983-1987 Economic Development Plan does not depar t  from the  ear l ie r  
industrial s t rategy,  and considers tha t  an additional ro le  of the manufacturing 
industry i s  t o  contribute essentially t o  the creation of jobs, and t o  the  t ransfer  of 
p a r t  of the economically active population from less productive activities t o  more 
productive ones. In the  postwar Plans this role  had been assigned t o  the  construc- 
tion industry, which at present is in a deep decline. 
The 1983-1987 draf t  Plan f o r  Economic Development (CERP 1983), accepts  
tha t  the basic means f o r  economic competition is the  technological upgrade of the 
manufacturing industry, and the  enrichment of the  human infrastructure in the  
enterprises.  The main points in the  Plan concerning the  t ransfer  of technology fo r  
the  promotion of industry include: 
promotion of a modern and competitive industrial system which will 
exploit the  advantages of Greece, a shift from the traditional sec tors  t o  
advanced technologies, (information, biotechnology and electronics); 
in the  sho r t  and medium term, sectoral  projects  and programs will assist 
with the  defensive restructuring of those traditional sec tors  which are 
important in exports ,  and employ a significant p a r t  of the  working popu- 
lation (textiles, drinks, fur ,  cement, and food), t o  t o  overcome the i r  
problems in international competition, these programs will include pro- 
tection measures against cheaper  imports from Third World Countries; 
shift to  modern processes with a potential f o r  exports ,  and the  ability t o  
generate multiplier effects and external  economies; 
measures to  assist  with technology t ransfer  a "competitive import substi- 
tution" in activities with a substantial home market; 
upgrading of t he  human infrastructure in enterprises.  
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES IN GREECE 
Until 1970, with the  exception of the  aluminum, cotton yarns and frui t  canning 
industries, the  main avenue t o  the  establishment of productive units of Multina- 
tional Companies (MNC) w a s  t he  protected home market. This w a s  reflected in t he  
m o d e  of entry: 
takeovers of large local units; 
development from a sales subsidiary; 
joint ventures; 
agreements with the  Public Corporations fo r  supplies with locally made 
components, capital  goods, finished products, and drugs. 
The main volume of foreign direct  investment in Greece took place between 
1957 and 1969 when Greece experienced the highest postwar growth r a t e s ,  and w a s  
directed into la rge  capitally intensive units, and into processes established in 
Greece f o r  the  f i r s t  time: aluminum, oil refining, petrochemicals, detergents,  
telecommunication equipment, and tin plates. In 1963 some 68 percent  of the  
foreign cash flow into Greek manufacturers w a s  in chemicals, t ransport ,  electrical 
equipment; in 1966, 60 percent  had come from t h r e e  multinationals, EXXON, Pechi- 
ney, Ethyl, and an  international holding which invested in shipyards (Roumeliotis 
1977). 
yter 1970 the  growth r a t e  of foreign direct  investment in manufacture slowed 
down, the  size of foreign controlled establishments became smaller than tha t  in 
the  1957-1969 period. and t h e r e  had been a shift in t he  sectoral  orientation toward 
more labor intensive processes: packaging and formulation of drugs, and toward 
labor intensive processes f o r  exports  to  EEC countries - clothing on subcontract- 
ing, f rui t  canning, and electr ical  appliances. Labor costs took more than 30 per-  
cent  of the  product cost in these processes. 
Another important development of the  1970s concerned a major shift of the  
two largest  subsidiaries in the  aluminum and steel industry toward the  home 
market. 
The proportion of aluminum output sold in Greece increased from 15 percent  
in 1972 to  50 percent  in 1980, the  figures corresponding t o  the  s teel  plant are 48 
and 69 percent.  1 
This suggests multiplier effects in the  home market industry, f o r  example, 
aluminum output sold in t he  home markets increased from 20,000 t in 1972 t o  83,000 
t in 1980; the  s teel  plant, a subsidiary of Japanese Nippon, sold 13,000 t of s teel  
products in 1970, and 225,000 t in 1982. 
Throughout t he  1970s the  s h a r e  of exports  of the  foreign controlled sec tor  in 
Greece's exports  decreased, i t  fell from 18.8 percent  in 1973 t o  16  percent  in 1980 
(Confederation of Greek Industries); this t rend w a s  most discernible in t he  two 
largest  exporters ,  the  aluminum and the  s teel  plant - the  s h a r e  of the  aluminum 
plant in Greece's expor t  fell from 7 percent  in 1973 t o  3.9 percent  in 1980, and the  
s h a r e  of the s teel  plant fell from 2 percent  t o  0.9 percent .  
In 1983, MNC were t he  exclusive makers in t he  home market of a number of 
products requiring know-how, organization and advanced technology, without 
meaning that  they t ransfer red  updated technology and the  latest equipment. These 
products include, margarine, baby food, packaging materials, drugs, hygienic 
materials, detergents,  petrochemicals, industrial dyes, rubbe r  t i res ,  tinned and 
galvanized pates, tin, aluminum, transformers, TV sets ,  telecommunication equip- 
ment, electrical materials, power meters, and t ransport  equipment. 
Table 1 presents  an  estimate of the  sha re  of t he  foreign controlled sec tor  in 
total  assets and employment in t he  5,000 manufacturing companies of t he  Greek 
financial directory in 1979 (ICAP, 1982). The f i r s t  column includes the  s h a r e  of 
companies with a shareholding of over  36 percent ,  ( there  are 184 subsidiaries), 
with total  assets US $ bn 2.40, and 43,000 employees, and represent  15.3 percent  
of assets and 13.3 percent  of employment. There were 72 foreign controlled com- 
panies with a shareholding from 10  t o  35 percent,  total  assets of manufacturing 
companies in the  1979 Directory, and 4 percent  of employment. In 1979 the  foreign 
controlled sec to r  represented 8.2 percent of Greece's manufacturing workforce. 
An ea r l i e r  estimate (Gianitsis, 1978) f o r  t he  yea r  1975 showed manufacturing com- 
panies with a foreign shareholding of over  50 percent,  represented some 17.6 per- 
cent  of the  assets of the  Directory of tha t  year .  
A s  shown in Table 1 ,  t he  foreign controlled sec tor  favors  modern branches 
and has a weaker representation in the  traditional markets. A t rend t o  disinvest- 
ment w a s  suggested by the  respondents in the  1970s, in plastics, veneered boards, 
and ceramic tiles. In the  1980s this trend extended t o  the  oil refinery and petro- 
chemicals subsidiaries of EXXON, i t  coincided with the  expiration of t he  contract  
which concluded concessions f o r  20 years ,  and which the  government refused to  
renew. 
IETHODOLOGICAL IS SUES 
This section suggests tha t  t o  understand the  behavior of t he  foreign con- 
trolled sec tor  in the  t ransfer  of technology i t  should be  put into the  perspective of 
the  interaction of several  variables and the i r  parameters.  Three of the  main vari- 
ables include: 
technical fea tures  of the  recent  changes in products and processes 
t ransferred;  
size of output in relation t o  the  home market; 
the degree of standardization of the  product and processes in relation to  
the  home market. 
I t  is  likely tha t  t he  density of variables and parameters in technology 
t ransfer  in the  small markets of developing countries i s  g r e a t e r  in comparison to  
tha t  of the markets of l a r g e r  developed economies. This is likely because subsidi- 
a r i e s  of MNC in developing countries do not specialize in a narrow range of pro- 
ducts and processes,  but, engage in a wider range of modern and traditional pro- 
ducts and processes required by the  social needs, the  size of the  market cannot 
support a reasonable cost, such a variety of products requi res  an  immense techno- 
logical infrastructure,  non existent in small developing economies. Such i s  the 
case f o r  consumer chemicals, - detergents and cosmetics, food products and 
household appliances. Small developing countries may have t o  choose the i r  stra- 
tegy of development between "specialization according t o  comparative advantage" 
and diversification of t he  existing s t ruc ture  which formerly w a s ,  and is t  based on 
the i r  resource endowments, f o r  example, cotton based textiles in Greece. The 
f i r s t  option will increase dependence and imports of manufactures, and the second 
conflicts with the  required economies of scale and the  size of the  home market. 
Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment in Greek Manufacturing (includes SA), percen- 
tage sha re  of total  assets, and employment by sec tors ,  1979. 
% in total  assets 
shareholding 
X in employment 
shareholding 
food 
drink 
tobacco 
textiles 
clothing 
wood 
furni ture  
p a p e r a n d p a p e r p r o d u c t s  
printing and publishing 
lea ther  
rubbe r  and plastics 
chemicals 
oil? oil products and coal 
non metallic minerals 
basic metals 
metal products 
non electr ical  machines 
electrical appliances 
t ranspor t  equipment 
miscellaneous 
total  manufacture 
Source: Figures a r e  based on the  Financial Directory of Greek Companies, ICAP 
1981, and o the r  interviews. 
The Change of Technical Features of Products and Processes 
Among the  most important fea tures  of this r e p o r t  t he  following can be  listed: 
1 Changes in t he  inputs of t he  product and/or a substantial change of t he  
product itself. The l a t t e r  requires  s t ruc tura l  changes in the  u se r  domain 
and is consequently re la ted t o  t he  institutional framework and possibly t o  
increased public spending. Such is t he  case of f iber  optics which may 
replace t he  conventional telecommunications network, and required a 
new technology environment based on digital technology. 
2. Modernization of t h e  processing equipment where the  inputs and t h e  pro- 
ducts undergo minor changes, such as in the  cases of spray  drying and 
extruding of cerea ls ,  which replaced the  older technology of ro l le r  dry- 
ing, changes in t he  technology of the  reversing mills of cold rolled coils, 
hot dipped galvanizing. The m a j o r  objective of this  change is the  
increases in productivity with the  reduction of working time. This is a 
feasible a l ternat ive f o r  small countries but i t  can be  questionable when 
the incentives may increase the  social cost (for exampie, increased 
amortization ra te ) .  
3 Reorganization of the  workplace and training - this may achieve be t te r  
labor relations and a pleasant diversity of tasks,  respondents consider 
tha t  t he re  can only be  negligible gains in productivity compared t o  the 
gains from spending f o r  new equipment. 
4 Changes in objective management decision making. This technology 
t ransfer  aims t o  reduce the  cost of sales and the  state induced bureau- 
c ra t ic  cost. This is an  important innovation, widely adopted by the 
respondents. 
Scale of Production 
The size of assets has  been accepted as a cri ter ion f o r  economies of scale,  
automation and technological advance. There has been an  association between the 
substitution of capital f o r  labor  and the  size of Greek manufacturing plants (Niko- 
laou, 1980). The respondents had been asked t o  compare the  size of the i r  plants 
with the i r  affiliates in West Europe, o r  t o  similar units. None of t he  respondents 
considered the i r  plant t o  be  la rge  o r  above medium size, respondents considered 
tha t  the se t  of c r i te r ia  regarding the  size of a plant should include the following: 
optimum scale of plant may be  revised over  time. A respondent, manufac- 
turing margarine replied tha t  the  optimum scale  of margarine plants of 
the  affiliates had been revised downwards because the re  is a t rend t o  
decentralization of cer tain processes out of t he  plant; 
comparisons of productivity between affiliates - some Greek managers 
doubted the  assertions of the  parent  company f o r  the  low productivity at 
the Greek piants, because such statements have political cost. 
the  range of products - f o r  example, t he  subsidiary of Unilever pro- 
duces a far g r e a t e r  diversity of margarines and oils than do affiliated 
plants in Europe; 
vertical integration and the  amount of work left  f o r  subsidiaries - it is  
not always the  case  tha t  subsidiaries a r e  supplied from the  parent  plant 
the  full range of inputs. In cosmetics, drugs, dyes, and part ly  in petro- 
chemicals, f o r  example, intermediate materials a r e  processed one o r  two 
stages before the  final one. Subsidiaries may integrate production of 
components at the  fac tors  when local suppliers who are oriented t o  the 
local market fail t o  supply in sufficient quantities and t o  the  required 
technical specifications, such is the case in circuit  b reakers ,  sockets 
and switches; 
excess capacity relative t o  t he  market size; 3 
imports of the  technologically advanced manufactures tha t  may o r  may 
not originate from the  parent  plant and substitute f o r  the  outmoded and 
costly locally produced. 
Standardization and Automation 
Standardization and automation permit production on a m a s s  scale as i t  
reduces the  number of parameters  involved in the  production process,  the  la t te r ,  
in small countries increases in relation to  the  volume of output, f o r  example, 
number of clients, standard inputs and r a w  materials, storage, and deliveries. 
Respondents commented, during the  interviews, tha t  t he  use of automation in small 
developing countries primarily concerns the  cost of substitution of capital  fo r  
labor.  The use of advanced equipment precludes inappropriate standards of local 
supplies of inputs, and this problem is overcome by imports, as is  the  case of pack- 
aging material f o r  drugs. There is a case then t o  upgrade the  standards of local 
suppliers t o  harmonize with European specifications. 
Third, automation may be  introduced in most labor  intensive processes of a 
productive unit only when wages are rising, as f o r  example, in the  handling of 
inputs, s torage and packaging. 
Fourth, the  makers of custom made goods, some 18 respondents, said tha t  the  
major constraints t o  modernize all the  processes in t he i r  plant had been the  shift 
in the  emphasis of o rde r s  each year.  Twelve of them supplied public corporations, 
and this w a s  t he  reason f o r  establishing production in Greece, six plants had sub- 
contracting agreements and o rde r s  varied. 
In the  18 enterprises  p a r t  o r  whole of t he  production w a s  from stocks, and 
p a r t  of t he  product w a s  unstandardized, f o r  example, t he  stamping of tins changed 
with the  client, and this  represented more than 10 percent  of the  cost of produc- 
tion. The reason f o r  t he  highly unstandarized praduction is t he  mode of establish- 
ment of the  foreign controlled companies which primarily aimed at t he  small Greek 
market and the  o rde r s  from the  State.  This dependence has been a constraint fo r  
t he  t ransfer  of technology and modernization in the  long term. 
INVESTMENT OF THE SAMPLE OF FOREIGN CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
1977-1983 
Table 2 presents  a breakdown of the  investment objectives of t he  28 foreign 
controlled companies f o r  t he  period 1977-1983. A s  shown in the  table,  the  primary 
concern for  investment w a s  the  modernization of t he  existing equipment and the  
expansion of capacity fo r  t he  existing products. There w a s  little concern fo r  
technologically new products, and even less for  the  introduction of traditional 
ones o r  f o r  product differentiation. 
Table 2. Distribution of a sample of 28 foreign controlled 
companies in Greece by the  objective of new investment 
completed between 1977-1983 and planned f o r  1984 
I I 
I Objective 
I N 1 
Modernization of the  existing equipment 19 
Expansion of capacity (new products excluded) 18 
Pollution 9 
Replacement and renewal of existing equipment 
w a s  the  single reason . 8  
Technologically new product f i r s t  introduced 
in Greece 13 
Traditional product f i r s t  introduced in Greece 3 
Modifications and differentiation of 
existing products 7 
Restructuring of product mix 3 
Source: Interviews, August 1983. Some companies had several  objectives, there-  
fo re  the  number of objectives exceeds the  number of companies. 
Investment of 19 respondents (two thirds of all), had aimed at the  moderniza- 
tion of the existing equipment fo r  higher productivity gains and reduction of t he  
working time; i t  included increase in the  speed of the  processing equipment, the 
introduction of numerically controlled machine tools in one case, automation in the 
handling of components and materials, in packaging and storage and standardiza- 
tion of factory space. It is  most important that 12 of the 19 respondents m o d e r -  
nized primarily a s  a response t o  the growth of their  exports (freezer trucks, fruit  
canning, power meters, cables, switches, circuit breakers,  asbestos/cement pro- 
ducts, aluminum, plastic distribution panels). Some 18 respondents increased the 
capacity with new investment where older products were produced, but only 10 of 
them said that there  had been an increase in employment levels of over 5 percent 
from the levels of 1977. 18 respondents said that employment a t  the office and fac- 
tories had either remained the  same o r  was reduced since 1977. 
Some 8 respondents replied that their investment concerned spare  par ts  and 
renewal only but not significant increases in productivity, working time savings, o r  
automation, the reasons had been - the small scale of production, irreplaceable 
hand working for  the export garments sector,  already automated processes, and 
the small potential fo r  essential improvements, for  example, petrochemicals and 
fertilizers. 
Some 13 respondents introduced a technologically new product (Flufene, 
radial t ires,  distribution panels, microswitches mini circuit breakers, fiber optics, 
drugs, tub margarines, welded beer  cans, malaminated veneered boards, and pro- 
fessional products fo r  baking confectionery, and transport equipment); 11 of these 
respondents had a t  the same time expanded their capacity fo r  their  older pro- 
ducts. Only 4 from the 13 respondents had introduced their  technologically new 
product as a response t o  export markets exclusively. Three companies introduced 
traditional manufactures mainly fo r  exports: cereals and baby foods, marmalade, 
and structural asbestos/cement materials. This suggests that foreign controlled 
companies a r e  more likely to  introduce a traditional product for  exports than a 
technologically new one. There were 7 respondents (with modification) in the type 
of product, and only 3 had substantially restructured their  product mix: one case 
involved a change from bus chassis assembly t o  freezer  truck assembly because of 
changes in export markets, and two cases cases concerned phasing out engines 
production and household appliances because products were displaced by cheaper 
EEC imports. 
Anti-pollution equipment inside and outside the factory has been a minor 
source of investment. Only one third of the respondents devoted funds for  this 
purpose, - this w a s  either  because of the heavy fines imposed on environmental 
pollution o r  it  was necessary in order  to  increase productivity, such w a s  the case 
in cotton yarns and aluminum industry. 
Age  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  
Twelve of the thirteen respondents that completed investment in a new techno- 
logically product between 1977-1983 were asked to  assess the age of the technol- 
ogy of their product a t  the  time of its introduction in Greece and the years  since 
this technology had been used a t  the factory. The results are listed in Table 3 for  
1 4  products. Only one product, mini circuit breakers, was  designed in Greece in 
1982. The company used imported components which made up for  the most 
advanced par t  of the product. In 13 products technology w a s  between 3 to  10  
years old a t  the time of the introduction. Methods of production currently used a t  
the factory date from the 1970s. Finally, two of the products, plastic distribution 
panels and welded beer  tins, were said to  be outmoded and replaced in Europe. 
Table 3. Age of technology in products f o r  which investment was 
completed between 1977-1983 o r  planned t o  1984, in by 12 
foreign controlled companies. 
! Product 1 age  of product when da t e  of production 
I introduced, yea r s  technology used 1 [ 
I in 1983 
! i 
I Cereals ( rol ler  dryed)  I Plastic distribution 
j panels 
I Military transportation 
I equipment 
I Military transportation 
I 
I equipment 
I Professional materials f o r  bakeries  e tc .  
I Fibre optics 
! Welded bee r  cans 
, Tub margarines 
1 Radial t i res  
' Welded open top tins 
I Miniature c i rcui t  ) breakers  
1 Electrical switches 
1 Melaminated veneered j boards 
traditional 
own design 
5 
outdated 
outdated 
Source: Interviews with a sample of foreign controlled manufacturing companies, 
Aupust 1993. 
NOTES 
1. The Greek  aluminum plant paid FOB prices  of aluminum fo r  exports  t o  a trading 
subsidiary of the  present  plant. 
2. The table below gives the  amount of foreign d i rec t  investment in mil. of US $ 
from the  approved applications f o r  manufacturing investment: 
Statement US 3 mil. 
Source: Unpublished list  from the  Ministry of Planning and Coordination. 
3. For example, the  capacity of all plants in Greece manufacturing asbestos- 
cement products and veneered boards is  nearly double the  market size. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last 30 years the volume of world trade expanded 
faster than the average growth rate of real GNP of the different 
countries. This means that in the average the percentage of GNP 
which is exported as well as the percentage of imports in GNP was 
growing. Each country depends economically more and more on the 
state of the economy of other countries: mankind is becoming one 
interdependent economic system, eventually. But this means struc- 
tural adjustment on the part of each country: the more open the 
economy, the more adjustment to the world market demand and to 
world market prices is needed. Structural change is painful, in 
general: some people lose their working places, have to change 
their profession and have to move to other places; capital invested 
in shrinking industries declines in value, and rises in expanding 
industries. Thus the investment flows will change and capital 
will be re-allocated. On the other hand, there might be a sub- 
stantial gain from trade for the country in the long run. 
Our problem is: what kinds of structural change are to be 
expected if a country which is relatively small compared to the 
world as a whole gives up autarchy and opens herself to the world 
market? How does the situation after the opening up compare to 
* 
Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent 
those of IIASA or its National Member Organizations. 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  be fo re ,  o r  i n  o t h e r  words: a r e  t h e r e  ga ins  from 
t r a d e ?  
This problem i s  wel l  t r e a t e d  i n  a l l  t e x t  books on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e  i n  t h e  s t a t i c  con tex t ,  i . e .  i f  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  and l abor  i n  
t h e  country a r e  given and w i l l  only be r e -a l loca ted  between indus- 
t r i e s  a f t e r  t r a d e .  Compare, f o r  example, t h e  books of Mundell 
(1968) ,  Takayama (1972) ,  Sohmen (1973) ,  S c h i t t k o  (1976) ,  D i x i t  and 
Norman (1982) and o t h e r s .  But t h i s  can only be considered a s  a  
f i r s t  approximation. We have t o  look a t  t h e  growth pa ths  of t h e  
economy be fo re  and a f t e r  t h e  opening up of t h e  economy t o  t h e  world 
market. This dynamic problem i s  n o t  so we l l  t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a -  
t u r e .  But t h e r e  a r e  some books (o r  chap te r s  i n  books) on t h i s  
problem, see Gabisch (1976) ,  Gehrels (1975) ,  Nobel (1982) ,  
Ramanathan (1982) ,  and, of course ,  t h e r e  a r e  a r t i c l e s  on t h i s  sub- 
j e c t ,  some of them a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  bibl iography.  But t h e r e  i s  
no complete s o l u t i o n .  I s h a l l  o f f e r  t h i s  f o r  the two commodity 
case ,  where each commodity i s  produced under a  neo-c l a s s i ca l  pro- 
duct ion func t ion ,  under t h e  assumption of f l e x i b l e  exchange r a t e s  
without  c a p i t a l f l o w s ,  i . e .  t h e  savings of t h e  country a r e  always 
inves ted  i n  t h e  country though the c a p i t a l  goods may ( p a r t i a l l y  o r  
t o t a l l y )  come from o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  Labor i s  a l s o  supposed t o  
s t a y  wi th in  t h e  country.  
W e  compare t h e  asymptotic behavior of t h e  economy under t h e  
two regimes, i . e .  w e  compare t h e  equi l ibr ium growth p a t h s ,  bu t  no t  
t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from one pa th  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  This i s  admiss ib le  s i n c e  
t h e  growth on t h e  equi l ibr ium pa th  i s  s t a b l e :  t h e  system reaches  
t h e  equi l ibr ium p a t h  by au tomat ica l ly .  W e  s h a l l  show t h i s  a t  t h e  
end of t h e  paper.  
I n  a  dynamic s e t t i n g ,  it i s  no t  s e l f e v i d e n t  what is  meant by: 
"ga ins  from t r a d e " .  These "ga ins"  may be measured i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
Thus we s h a l l  cons ide r  d i f f e r e n t  measures. 
1 .  THE MODEL 
A s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  country has  two i n d u s t r i e s :  
i = 1 : product ion of investment goods I 
i = 2 : production of consumption goods C. 
Each indus t ry  produces under a  neo-c l a s s i ca l  product ion func t ion  
Y = n e t  o u t p u t ,  L = l a b o r ,  IT = l a b o r  e f f i c i e n c y  ( e q u a l  i n  b o t h  
i n d u s t r i e s ) ,  K = c a p i t a l ,  Fi homogeneous of  d e g r e e  o n e ,  q u a s i -  
concave.  Thus ( 1 . 1 )  may b e  r e w r i t t e n :  
1 
yi = T * ~ ~ ( K ~ )  Yi  : = - = n e t  o u t p u t  p e r  worker  
Li 
1 K ' = - -  
i ' L  . .rr - c a p i t a l  l a b o r  r a t i o ,  ( 1  . 1  a )  
I. l a b o r  i n  e f f i c i e n c y  
u n i t s ,  i n  i n d u s t r y  i 
W e  f u r t h e r  assume t h a t  t o t a l  l a b o r  and l a b o r  e f f i c i e n c y  grow 
exogenously a t  a  c o n s t a n t  nonnega t ive  r a t e :  
T o t a l  l a b o r  and t o t a l  c a p i t a l  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  two i n d u s t r i e s :  
11 0 3 )  
K = K1+K2 = L T ( ~ ~ K ~ + ~  K ) 2 2  a  = p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i l a b o r  employed 
i n  i n d u s t r y  i 
W e  d e f i n e  
( a  K t  = - - a  K +a K = t o t a l  c a p i t a l  l a b o r  r a t i o  L;rr 1 1  2 2  
- 
I i yi:= = r a . g .  ( K ~ )  = n e t  o u t p u t  p e r  c a p i t a l  i n  
1 1  i n d u s t r y  i 
( c )  y :  = pT1+f2 = r e a l  GNP i n  consumption u n i t s  
(d l  p1 p: = - = p r i c e  r a t i o  of  i n v e s t m e n t  goods t o  consump 
P2 t i o n  goods ,  pi = c u r r e n t  p r i c e  o f  commodity i 
L e t  R b e  the nominal wage r a t e ,  z t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  Assume 
t h a t  workers  have the s a v i n g s  r a t e  sL and c a p i t a l  owners t h e  
s a v i n g s  r a t e  s where 0 < sL, s < 1 .  Thus w e  g e t  f o r  nominal  K '  K 
investment i t  nominal consumption C, and nominal GNP ?: 
Real GNP (measured in consumption goods) is defined by 
- 
Y: = ylp + Y2 , and we get: Y = RL + ZK. 
- R - 2 
where R = - , z = -  , and 
p2 p2 
= ji + ZTK Y: = E 
In the closed economy total real saving determines the pro- 
duction of the investment goods industry: 
and per capita, since K = Y,: 
In the open economy equation (1.6b) holds also, but not 
equation ( 1 . 6 ~ ) ~  since investment goods may be exported or imported. 
Imports and exports will be determined later. 
We assume that the producing firms minimize cost and have to 
take the output prices and factor prices as given. Then the 
marginal productivity equations hold, i.e. we get for the nominal 
wage rate G, which is equal in both industries: 
R = n-pi[gi ( K ~ )  - K ~ ~ ; ( K ~ )  I > 0, (1.7a) 
i = 1,2, if both commodities are produced in the 
country, and gi(~.) = K = 0, if commodity i is 
1 i 
not produced in the country. 
Similarly, we get for the interest rate (equal in both industries): 
The wage-profit rate X (where the wage rate relates to labor in 
efficiency units) follows immediately: 
Thus the inverse function exists: 
The price ratio p follows from (1.7) : 
Figure 1 shows p as a function of ul and u2 in the Cobb- 
4 \ 
Douglas case". This price ratio is determined endogenously in 
the case of a closed economy. But in a small open economy price 
ratios adapt to those in the world market which are exogenously 
given : 
Thus, since the domestic and foreign goods are supposed to be 
qualitatively equal: 
Pi - 
- - i = 
e Piw ' 1,2, e = exchange rate (1 .lob) 
Equation (1.10b) shows that the absolute purchasing power parity 
theory holds in the model which, in the absence of capital flows 
1 )  For this figure and for the following numerical illustrations 
Y (1'~~) we assume Yi = (L. T) i-K - -8, sL = -1, 
1~ i I Y1 = '7 r Y 2
sK = -2, wy: = w +wT = '02, Plw L - - = 075 (to be explained later) . 
Note that in this case y, < y2 c yl some of the following 
relations change. This will be indicated below. I want to thank 
Dipl.math. Alfons Kirchen, Bonn University, for carrying out the 
numerical computations. 
K 
0 '  L I p 2 10 20 
capital-labor ratio in 
the consumption goods 
Figure 1. industry 
p=p1/p2 = price ratio of investment goods to 
and with homogeneous commodities without transportation costs 
is rather self-evident. 
A 
2 - 
1 - 
From the definitions above we may express the labor propor- 
consumption goods 
K = 3  
capital labor ratio 
in the investment 
~ ~ = 2  goods industry 
- 
tions a by the capital-labor ratios: i 
The K~ are functions of A, see equation (1.9). But K is also a 
function of A . 
2 ) .  A. For t h e  c l o s e d  economy we g e t  . 
Thus, i f  i s  determined,  a l l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  determined i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  a  c l o s e d  economy. Unfo r tuna t e ly ,  f i b )  might n o t  be 
monotone. I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e r e  might be s e v e r a l  s o l u t i o n s ,  s e e  
3  F igure  2 . 
Figu re  2 .  
2 )  Inada (1965) w a s  t h e  f i r s t  t o  d e r i v e  t h i s  formula.  From 
- - 
equa t ion  ( 1 . 4 ~ )  and (1 .6b)  one g e t s :  y l p ( l - s L )  = sLy2 + (sK -s ) *  
~ a g i .  S u b s t i t u t e  7 from equa t ion  ( 1 .4b) , p  from ( 1 . l o )  and a i  i 
from ( 1 . 1  1 ) and d i v i d e  by ng i  t o  g e t  
K - K 2  gi K 1 - K  
- = s  
92 
- S ) K  . 7 + (sK L 
2 91 L K 1 - K 2  g2  
g2 
-1 From e q u a t i o n  (1 .8 )  --r = X + K~ . By s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  i n t o  equa- 
g  
t i o n  ( * )  and s o l v i n g  ?or K w e  g e t  ( 1 . 1 2 ) .  
3)  - Thi s  p i c t u r e  is t aken  from Inada ( 1  963) , p. 1 2 2 .  
Sufficient conditions for 6'  > 0 are 
- (a) K1 - K2 In that case we are back at a one commodity 
economy. 
(b) K2 > K 1 and sK 2 s the capital intensity of production L 
in the consumption goods industry is larger than that in 
the investment goods industry and the propensity to save 
out of the capital income is not smaller than that out of 
labor income. These are the famous Uzawa stability condi- 
tions for a two-sector growth model, see Uzawa (1962); 
Uzawa derived them for sL = 0 and sK = 1. 
(c) c 2 <  K and s K <  s 1 L  his is the Anti-Uzawa case. 
There are still more sufficient conditions. They all may be 
derived from 6'  0 ) > 0, (A ) according to equation (1 .12) . We 
assume that one of these conditions holds and that > 0. Then 
A A 
the solution X is unique. Let p be the resulting price ratio 
under autarchy. 
B. For the open economy we have to consider the case of exports 
of investment goods and the opposite case. 
(a) Exports of investment goods. This case arises if pw > 6, 
i.e. if the prices of investment goods on the world market 
are relatively higher than the investment goods prices under 
autarchy. All domestically used investment goods come now 
from own production. ThusI if Iij are the deliveries of 
investment goods of country i to country j and if wedenote the 
country considered by 1 and the rest of the world (= the world 
market) by 2, we get: 
Illpl = sLeRL + sK z K and 121 = 0 (1 . 13a) 
Total production of investment goods consists of that part 
I1 which is invested within the country and the part I1 
which is exported: 
Thus ' 2 ~ 1  = p l L 1 ~ * g l  ( K ~  1 - sLRL - sKzK I or 
The consumption demand of the country will be satisfied 
partially by domestic products Cll,partially by imports C from 2 1 
the world market. Consumption goods have to be bought-at world 
market prices p and at the current exchange rate., Thus: 2w 
and 
Therefore we get, similarly as in equation (1.13b): 
and C12 = 0 
p1 Because of pw = - in the open economy equation (1 .13a) may 
be rewritten: p2 
Since I1 = k and since on the equilibrium growth path 
- - - 
- :wy (i.e. : the capital coefficient is constant, wv - iT-Y 
.I. 
real rate of growth of GNP) we get 
Solving this equation for K: = K/Lr we arrive at 
T.has we see that in the open economy the capital labor ratio 
K depends not only on the wage-profit ratio A ,  but also on 
the growth rate wy and the price ratio pw on the world 
market. We again assume ah/M > 0 in order to get a unique 
solution. 
(b) Export of consumption goods(or: import of investment goods). 
A 
This case arises if pw < p, i.e. if the consumption goods are 
relatively more expensive on the world market than under autarchy. 
After some calculations we arrive at the same expression (1.15). 
Thus, for the determination of the capital-labor ratio it does 
not matter whether the country exports investment or consump- 
tion goods. Nevertheless, we shall give the formulae. Total 
investment (in value terms) is determined by: 
Illpl + 12,eplw = sLRL + sKzK , and (1.16a) 
Therefore: 
The total production of consumption goods (in value terms) is 
determined by 
Consumption demand is 
Therefore 
c P R 
= p2a2g2 ( K ~ )  - I s L  - (I-sK) ZK and C = 0. (1.17b) 2 1 
From (1.16) we get for capital accumulation: 
From this equation (considering = K wy in equilibrium and 
p = pw) equation (1.15*) and ( 1.15) follow immediately. Thus 
as far as the capital-labor and the wage-profit ratio is con- 
cerned, we need not care which types of goods are exported or 
imported. 
The corner solution of perfect specialization of the country 
occurs if p = g; (r2)/gi (rl) for rl = 0 or r2 = 0. W 
We still have to determine the exchange rate. It follows 
from equalization of demand and supply on the market for 
foreign currency. If investment goods are exported, this 
amounts to 
Considering equations (1.13~) and (1.14~) and pi = eopiw 
this relation may be transformed to 
If consumption, equation ( 1.18) has to be 
substituted by 
Considering equations (1.16~) and (1.17~) and pi = e0plw 
this may be transformed to the same equation (1.19). Thus 
the exchange rate also depends on K 1 lK2 and K. , but in addition 
also on the domestic price level 
as well as on the world market price level: 
~ l l  variables of the model are determined, if X is deter- 
mined: K,K,,K~ are functions of X and all other variables 
are functions of r,ul and K ~ .  X follows from capital 
accumulation. For the closed economy we have k = Y and 
thus : 
Y1 K - - _ - -  
K w , where wy: = w + w K Y L 71 
and w, = equilibrium growth rate of 
L 
-. 
the economy 
Y1 - since - =  sLy + (sK-sL)~*gi , see (1.6b)t y = + z n ~ t  
K 
- z - 
see (1.8), and z = - - pg; , see (1.7a) , we may rewrite 
p2 
equation (1.16) as: 
where K and g; are functions of A .  In equilibrium growth-, 
I; = 0. Thus the equilibrium value X^ of X in the closed 
economy is determined by 
; f h )  = w , where fb): = Y + 
In the open economy there is no direct relation between cap- 
ital accumulation and the production of investment goods, 
since investment goods may be imported or exported. Instead 
of equation (1.16) we get the more general relation: 
In equilibrium, K = const. , thus k = 0 and from equation 
(1.19) 
The four variables K,A , K ~ , K ~  are determined by the four 
equations 
The world market price ratio pw and the equilibrium growth 
rate wy = w + wT are given. Figures 3 and 4  show the solu- L 
tions for A, rl and r2 as a function of the world market price 
4  
ratio pw If the investment goods become more expensive 
on the world market relative to consumption goods, the 
capital-labor ratios in both industries will decline. This 
results in a decline of the real wage rate relative tothe 
real profit rate. 
4 )  The assumption on the production function and on other para- 
meter values are the same as in note 1, i.e. yl < y2. The sign 
of dPw is not always the same. For Cobb-Douglas production 
dX dpw X functions we get --- - y1 - y2. Thus for y > y2 the graph in 
d X  Pw 1 
Figure 4  will be rising, not falling. If y, and y are not con- 2 
stant as in the Cobb-Douglas case, the phenomenon of factor price 
reversal may occur. 
capital-labor ratio in industry i 
w 
= ratio of investment goods 
prices to consumption goods 
prices on the world market 
Figure 3. 
wage-profit ratio 
P" = ratio of investment goods prices to consumption goods 
prices on the world market 
Figure 4. 
2. STABILITY OF THE MODEL 
It only makes sense to look to equilibrium growth paths if 
the system converges to these paths. We shall show that our sys- 
tem does converge if some not very restrictive conditions are 
fulfilled. If the country exports investment goods we get from 
( 1  - 1 3 )  : 
fi 1 
and considering (1.7a) and (1.7b): = sL(.gl-K gl)*- + s g' 1 1  K K 1 
Considering (1.8) we thus get from equation (1.19): 
I; 
- - 
i 
 f(A) - wy , where f0): = -(sLX + s K) , 
K K K (2.2) 
as in the case of the closed economy, see equation (1.18). 
The equilibrium solution of X is determined by 
The necessary and sufficient condition for local stability is 
HICK) < 0 , where H(K): = K~(X) - w K = Y 
= g' (S + S ~ K )  - W K 1 L  Y (2.3) 
at the point f (A ) 
= wy 
We get 
d K l  dX a' (K) = g; (sLh + S ~ K )  + 9; (S E X +  sK) - W L ~ K  Y (2.4) 
We assumed d~/dX > 0.  Thus the first expression on the right hand 
side of equation (2.4) is negative. The last two terms become 
dX X g's (- - -) at the point f (A) = w 1 L d ~  K Y Thus a sufficient condition X for stability is $:< - or 
K 
< 1. This implies X I' < 0 and thus TK ff 
K" > 0. Another sufficient condition is that sL is small enough. 
For sL = 0 stability is guaranteed. Since equation (2.2) is iden- 
tical to equation (1.18), the same stability condition applies for 
the closed economy. 
If the country imports investment goods (i.e. exports con- 
sumption goods), equation (2.1) changes to: 
cf . equation (.I. l6a) 
But this does not alter the foregoing derivation. Thus the same 
results appear again. Equations (2.2) and (2.2a) determine the 
general solution to the problem, and the stability conditions are 
generally applicable. We assume that they are met. 
3. SOME RESULTS: ECONOMIC CEANGES INDUCED BY FOREIGN TRADE 
We now compare the situation on the equilibrium growth paths 
of an economy before and after opening up to the world market. 
a) The growth ratesin both sectors of the economy are equal and 
do not change by foreign trade as long as the growth rate of 
the labor force and of labor efficiency stay the same. We get 
Of course, it may be expected that by the opening of the 
country to world trade also technical knowledge will be trans- 
ferred to the country. In this case wT would rise and thus . 
also the growth rate. But this is not considered in the model. 
b) The level of GNP, the amount of commodities which are avail- 
able within the countries and consumption per capita will 
change. As a rule, all of these aggregates will rise which 
means that the country has an advantage from foreign trade. 
But there may be exceptions. In a two- and more sector- 
economy there is no unequivocal measure of the aggregate. 
Prices change by foreign trade as well as the production 
structure. Which price system should be chosen? Should we 
measure GNP in consumption or investment units? We deal 
with these problems in the next paragraph. Here we may say, 
that as a rule the level of GNP and of consumption per capita 
rises. Thus Figure 5 is representative for almost all cases. 
But, as already said, there are exceptions. 
268 
Y = GNP measured in consumption units 
time 
Figure 5. 
C) Foreign trade induces structural change in the sense, that 
some industries expand, others shrink. In our 2-sector 
economy this follows immediately from the equation derived 
in the last paragraph. the ratio pw of investment to 
consumption goods prices on the world market differs from 
the price ratio 6 of these two commodities under autarchy, 
that good whose price is relatively higher on the world 
market will be partly exported and its production expanded; 
the production of the other commodity will shrink. Figure 6 
shows the size of production per capita in both industries 
as a function of the world market price ratio. 
The graphs are derived from numerical solution of the system 
(1.15), (1.8), (1.10a) and by substituting the resulting total 
capital-labor ratio K, wage profit ratio X and the sectoral 
capital-labor ratios K~ into the equations (1.11) for ai and 
into the equation (1.4b) for f i .  The production functions 
and parameter values are indicated in note 5; pw has 
been changed parametrically. 
Production per capita 
I 
I 
production of con- I 
production of 
investment goods 
(per capita) 
I 
- 
- 
Y1 Y2 Plw 
4 >P 
=- 
1,20 P2w 
price ratio of investment 
to consumption goods on 
the world market 
Figure 6. 
From Figure 6 we see that there are three regimes. At very 
low price ratios p (between 0 and C) the investment good will 
W 
not be produced by the country. It is so cheap on the world 
market, that the country totally specializes in the production of 
consumption goods which have a relatively very high price on the 
world market. The production level of the consumption good will always 
rise if the investment goods become cheaper (or the consumption 
good sells at higher prices), since the capital-labor ratio goes 
to infinity if the price of the investment goods goes to zero. 
5 )  The numerical calculations have been done by Dipl-math. Hermann 
Ross of Bonn University. I thank him for his help. The production 
elasticities y1  = * g ,  y2 = 07 have been used, cf. note 1 ;  other 
parameters are as in note 1). 
If the investment goods become more expensive (to the right 
of point C in Figure 6), the domestic production of the invest- 
ment goods starts. In the second regime (between the points C 
and D) both commodities are produced. The production of the , 
consumption good declines and that of the investment good rises, 
if the world market price ratio moves from C to D. At point D 
the consumption good is so cheap on the world market and the 
investment good so expensive that the production of the consump- 
tion good is stopped. In regime three (to the right of point D) 
all factors of production are allocated to the production of the 
investnent good. The capital-labor ratio depends on the domestic 
savings ratios. All investment goods not used for domestic 
capital accumulation will be exported. With rising world market 
prices of the investment goods more consumption goods will be 
imported and available in the country. But this does not influence 
production and thus is not visible in Figure 6. 
The graphs in Figure 6 may be put into the form of a long- 
run transformation curve. From the solution of the system we 
- 
get (.as illustrated in Figure 6) : 
Since $2 (pw) is strictly monotone in 0 < pw < D we nay form the 
-1 - inverse function pw = $2 (y2). Substituting this into equation 
(3.2) for i = 1 yields the analytic expression for the long-term 
transformation curve: 
Figure 7 (solid line) shows the long-term transformation 
curve dersved from Figure 6.   his curve is still concave. But 
this need not be the case (see the dotted line transformation 
curve). Each point on the long-term transformation curve indi- 
cates an equilibrium value. The case of a convex long-run trans- 
formation curve is exceptional. We do not consider it. 'There is 
a one-to-one correspondence between each. point.on th.e transforma- 
tion curve and the price ratio pw on the world market such that 
higher pw values are situated more north-west on the curve (see 
the arrow in Figure 7). 
- 
f l  
s c a l e  f o r  p 
long-term t ransformat ion  curve 
- / s c a l e  f o r  < 
- 
015 - 
0 , 4  .. 
s c a l e  f o r  5 
0 1 1  - 
1 
Figure 7 . 
Unfor tunate ly ,  t h e  long-run marginal  r a t e  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  
i s  not  equa l  t o  t h e  p r i c e  r a t i o  a t  t h e  production p o i n t  a s  it is  
t h e  case  f o r  t h e  short-run t ransformat ion  curve.  The short-run 
t ransformat ion  curve is def ined  a s  t h e  set ( F1 of production 
pe r  c a p i t a  which w i l l  be produced a t  a  p r i c e  r a t i o  p ,  i f  t o t a l  
l a b o r  and t o t a l  c a p i t a l  a r e  f i x e d .  On t h i s  curve w e  have 
such t h a t  
and under cost minimization 
The second derivative is also negative: 
Thus we get the wellknown Figure 8 for the short-run transforma- 
tion curve. 
Figure 8. 
But the short-run . and the long-run transformation curvesalways 
cut at the production point, P, if the production function for 
the two sectors are different. 5 ,  Figure 9 shows the situation. 
The economy moves on the expansion path. The fact that the 
long-run transformation curve is not tangent to the exchange 
line of the two commodities on the world market has important 
5) To see this, compare the two derivatives attheproduction 
point P. 
1 expansion path 
/ 
/ 
.\ / 
/ 
\ 
\ T i n g e  \ line / / /  1 / 
short& trans- long-term transformation 
/ 
/ 
/ 
- 
/ Y2 
Figure 9. 
consequences for the optimality of foreign trade. We shall 
come to that later. 
d) What is the impact of a change of world market prices on factor 
prices? The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941) states that a 
relative price rise of a commodity induces a relative price rise 
of that factor which is more intensively used at the production 
of that commodity which became relatively more expensive and a 
relative fall of the price of the other factor. Thus, if the 
price of investment goods rises relatively on the world market 
(i.e. if dpw/dt > 0) and if the capital-labor ratio is smaller 
in the investment goods industry than in the consumption goods 
industry, then the wage rate will rise with respect to the rate 
of interest. 
This theorem holds only under certain conditions which become 
clear when we derive the theorem from the system of paragraph 1. 
We assume that 
g; ( K ~  (A) 
p,(h = cf. equation (1.10a) , gi(K1(A)) 
is a monotonous function of A. Thus 
From (1.8) we get 
i dgi Lri U 1 Qi gi = - . Thus g y * ~ '  - = - X + K ~  i - d X  (A +K:i ) 2 
1 
and therefore (after some manipulations) : 
We assume that there is no reversal of factor intensities, i.e. 
r2(1 ) - r l U )  does not change its sign in the admissible region 
of X .  NOW the Stolper-Samuelson theorem follows immediately from 
where - a/.rr 1: - - - -  rlw 2 Pw p2w 
This result may be graphically illustrated by looking at the shifts 
of the wage-profit curves of the two sectors which are induced by 
relative price changes on the world market. We first derive the 
wage profit curves. From (1.6) , (1.7b) and from p=pw we get 
where 
- Z 
= - = real interest rate 
P2 
From ( 1 .6 , ( I  .7a) and from P=Pw we get for the investment goods 
industry : 
for the consumption goods industry: 
The graph of npwGl ' is the wage-profit curve for the investment 
goods industry, rG2 for the consumption goods industry. These 
curves have a negative slope and are convex: 
The real wage rate and the real interest rate must be equal in 
both industries, that means that the two curves must intersect. 
We assume that there is only one point of intersection, otherwise 
there would be a reversal of factor intensities, and the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem does not apply. Figure 10 shows the wage-profit 
curves for the two industries. 
In case of technical progress (dn/dt > 0), both curves move 
upwards proportionately. Or: measured in efficiency units z/n and 
- 
z/n both curves stay constant. Since 
L= for industry 1 W 
apw I o for industry 2 
the wage-profit curve for sector 1 moves upwards if the pw rises, 
i.e. if the price of commodity 1 rises relatively on the world 
- 
4 g = real waye rate 
profit - curve for industry 1 
I curve for \ n p  G (L) industry 2 h7 1 Pw 
1 nG2 (;I - 
lL z = real rate of interest 
Figure 10. 
market. Since the wage-profit curve for industry 2 does not 
change, the point of intersection of both curves moves from Po to 
PI. Therefore, the real wage rate rises relative to the real 
interest rate. But the slope of the wage-profit curve is propor- 
tional to the capital-labor ratio: 
since 
In Figure 10 the slope of the wage-profit curve of the con- 
sumption yoods industry (= industry 22 is (in absolute value) 
larger than that of the investment goods industry (= industry 
1). Thus r2 > K * the investment goods industry is 1 ' 
more capital intensive than the consumption goods industry. 
Therefore, a price rise of investment yoods on the world market 
raises the wage rate at the expense of the interest rate. 
e) The impact of changes of other parameters on the open economy 
will be stated only shortly. We have to look at the system of 
equations (1 .15) , 1 8 , Cl .I Oa) . From that we infer: 
(aa) the impact of higher savinqs ratios sL out of labor 
income and sK out of capital income consists in raising the 
total capital-labor ratio K and to shift labor from produc- 
tion of consumption goods to production of investment goods. 
The factor prices stay the same. This follows from 
au 
aK 
-
- aK i - 0, i=1,2, > 0 (see equation (1.15)) - -  - -  > 0, - 
as L K as L 
(see equation (1 .8) and (1.10a) ) and therefore 
(see equation (1.11)). 
Cbb) Higher growth. rates wy = w + w depress the capital L w 
labor ratio K. Given the savings ratios, growth will be 
more extensive than intensive. 
f) There are two other theorems in the theory of international trade 
which may be found in each text book of international trade but 
are purely static and not applicable for growing economies. 
(aa) The Rybczynski theorem (1 955) states that if one factor 
of production is relatively expanded whereas the commodity 
price relations stay constant, the production of that sector 
which uses this factor more intensively will relatively rise. 
This theorem states only short-term reactions, i.e. conse- 
quences of changes of the short-run transformation curve if 
t h e  p r i c e  r a t i o s  a r e  c o n s t a n t .  I n  o t h e r  words: it g i v e s  
p a r t i a l  r e s u l t s  which do no t  apply f o r  long-term equ i l i b r ium 
growth. For example, i f  t h e  t o t a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  suddenly 
becomes l a r g e r  b u t  t h e  r a t e  of growth of t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  s t a y s  
t h e  same a s  b e f o r e ,  a l l  pe r  c a p i t a  va lues  s t a y  t h e  same ( t h e  
system i s  l i n e a r  homogeneous i n  l a b o r ) ,  and t h a t  means: t h e  
s e c t o r  p ropor t ions  s t a y  unchanged on t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  pa th .  
The Rybczynski theorem does n o t  apply.  Neve r the l e s s ,  it i s  
a p a r t i a l  a s p e c t  of t h e  system i n  paragraph 1 above and may 
be de r ived  from it by looking on ly  t o  some equa t ions .  
S ince  t h e  world market  p r i c e  r a t i o  s t a y s  c o n s t a n t  th-e c a p i t a l  
l a b o r  r a t i o s  w i t h i n  each i n d u s t r y  a r e  n o t  changed by changes 
i n  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  and t o t a l  l a b o r .  
' - 1 W e  g e t  from (1 .1Oa) : ( . * 1 ~ ~  = g2 (pw-g;  ( K ~  1 )  = : K~ 1~~ ,pW) 
and from (1.71 : pw[gl ( K ~  - ~ ~ g ;  k l )  1 = g2 ( K 2  ( K ~  I P ~ ) )  - 
- K~ ( K ~  ,pw) 9; ( K ~  ( K ~  ) ) wi th  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  back i n t o  equa t ion  ( * )  w e  g e t  
Thus K~ and K~ s t a y  c o n s t a n t  i n  t h e  Rybczynski ca se .  
L e t  K~ > K ~ .  Then from ( 1 . 1 1 )  
and from (1.4b) : 
For K~ < K a l l  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n s  change. Equat ions  (3.11) 2 
and (3 .12)  a r e  t h e  Rybczynski theorem: i f  c a p i t a l  i s  expan- 
ded r e l a t i v e  t o  l a b o r  and t h e  investment  goods i n d u s t r y  
(.= i n d u s t r y  1 )  is more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  than  t h e  consumption 
goods i n d u s t r y  (= i n d u s t r y  2 ) ,  l a b o r  w i l l  be s h i f t e d  from 
consumption t o  i n v e s t m e n t  goods i n d u s t r y  and t h e  inves tment  
goods i n d u s t r y  w i l l  expand,  the consumption goods i n d u s t r y  
w i l l  s h r i n k .  But t h i s  is  a s i t u a t i o n  of  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m .  
Other  e q u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  sys tem are n o t  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  way: 
t h e  s a v i n g s  r a t i o s ,  i . e .  t h e  demand s i d e  is  l e f t  o u t .  
(bb)  The Eeckscher-Ohl in  theorem, (.see Heckscher , 1 9  19 ; O h l i n ,  
1933) d o e s  n o t  a p p l y  e i t h e r .  I t  c a n n o t  even b e  d e r i v e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  o u r  model,  s i n c e  it c o n s i d e r s  two c o u n t r i e s  
p roduc ing  two commodit ies  under  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n s .  Our model c o n c e n t r a t e s  on one  c o u n t r y  (assumed t o  
b e  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l )  and  c o n f r o n t s  it w i t h  a world  m a r k e t ,  
t h e  p r i c e s  o f  which c a n n o t  be  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  c o u n t r y .  The 
p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  f a rming  t h e  wor ld  
marke t  are n o t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  o u r  model. Moreover,  t h e  Heckscher- 
Ohl in  theorem i s  p u r e l y  s t a t i c .  I t  s a y s :  
Even i f  two c o u n t r i e s  would have the same p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n s  and t h e  same s a v i n g s  r a t i o s  and t h u s  t h e  
same demand f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e r e  would be  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  T h a t  
c o u n t r y  w i t h  a r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h e r  amount o f  l a b o r  
would e x p o r t  t h e  l a b o r  i n t e n s i v e  good, and tha t  w i t h  
a r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h e r  amount o f  c a p i t a l  would e x p o r t  
t h e  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  good. 
But t h i s  is  o n l y  a t r a n s i t o r y  phenomenon s i n c e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e  s i z e  of t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a l l  v a l u e s  p e r  c a p i t a ,  
a l l  p r i c e  r a t i o s  and r e a l  wages and i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  be e q u a l  
i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  on t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a t h .  Thus t h e r e  w i l l  
be  no t r a d e  between t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
I n  conc lud ing  w e  n a y  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  are t r a n s i t o r y  as w e l l  
as l a s t i n g  s t r u c t u r a l  e f f e c t s  o f  f o r e i g n  trade on a c o u n t r y ' s  
economy. W i l l  t h e y  b e  t o  t h e  advan tage  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ?  T h i s  i s  
t h e  problem o f  t h e  n e x t  pa ragraph .  
4 .  ADVANTAGES FROM FOREIGN TRF-DE 
Is t h e r e  an advantage f o r  t h e  country t o  open i t s  borde r l ines  
f o r  fo re ign  t r ade?  T h i s  i s  an o l d  ques t ion  a l ready considered by 
Ricardo i n  the s t a t i c  context  and answered a f f i r m a t i v e l y .  Almost 
a l l  t e x t  books fol low t h a t  l i n e .  I n  t h e  dynamic context  t h e r e  
a r e  some a r t i c l e s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  bu t  not  many. I mention Togan 
(1975) ,  Bertrand (1975) ,  Smith ( 1 9 7 6 )  , Gabisch (1976) and (3981) . 
Togan (-1975) cons iders  t h e  case  of t h e  savings r a t i o  s 
(-i.e. - S~ - S~ = : s i n  o u r  n o t a t i o n )  and measures t h e  advantage 
from t r a d e  by consumption per  c a p i t a  (.C/L i n  our  n o t a t i o n ) .  L e t  
be t h e  optimal savings r a t i o  f o r  t h e  c losed  economy ( g  = produc- 
t i o n  e l a s t i c i t y  of c a p i t a l  i n  a  one-sector economy) and 6 t h e  
p r i c e  r a t i o  of investment t o  consumption goods i n  t h i s  case .  He 
shows thatconsumption per c a p i t a  is l a r g e r  wi th  fo re ign  t r a d e  than 
A 
under au tarchy ,  i f  s < and pw < 6 o r  i f  s > s and pw > 6. That 
means: i f  t h e  country saves "not  enough" and t h e  investment goods 
on t h e  world market a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  cheaper than they a r e  under 
au tarchy ,  fo re ign  t r a d e  i s  advantageous. The same a p p l i e s ,  i f  t h e  
country saves " too  much" and i f  t h e  consumption goods a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
cheaper on t h e  world market than they a r e  under autarchy.  Smith 
(.1976) showed t h a t  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  under more genera l  con- 
d i t i o n s .  
But t h e s e  a r e  only  l o c a l  condi t ions  which do not  t e l l  t h e  
whole t r u t h .  Moreover, consumption per c a p i t a  is  only one c r i t e r i o n  
f o r  advantages from fo re ign  t r a d e .  Thus it is worthwhile t o  look 
i n t o  t h i s  problem again.  
W e  r e s t r i c t  ou r se lves  t o  advantages o r  disadvantages which 
fol low from our model. There might be o t h e r  advaptages connected 
wi th  fo re ign  t r a d e  ( f o r  example, t r a n s f e r  of t e c h n i c a l  knowledge 
which r a i s e s  t h e  r a t e  of growth of t e c h n i c a l  progress  i n  t h e  count ry ,  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  0.5 goods which f o r  one reason o r  another  a r e  n o t  
a v a i l a b l e  wi th in  t h e  country,  advantages from economies of s c a l e  
and from t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r ,  e t c . ) .  Thus our  
r e s u l t s  may be thought of  a s  t h e  lower l i m i t  of advantages from 
6 )  Actua l ly ,  Togan cons iders  gross  product ion,  n o t  n e t  production 
a s  we d i d  i n  paragraph 3 .  But t h i s  i s  no t  e s s e n t i a l .  
trade. As an introduction, we start with the usual textbook argu- 
ment for foreign trade under static conditions. 
a) Advantage from Foreign Trade Under Static Conditions and 
Under the Assumption of a Social Utility Function 
Assume that the country has a fixed amount of labor and 
capital which can be allocated to the production of consumption or 
investment goods. The short-run transformation curve of Figure 8 
demonstrates the production possibility set of the economy in this 
case. Assume further that there exists a social utility function 
which reflects the preferences of the society (or of the planning 
board) and that the market mechanism or the planning board succeeds 
in guiding the economy to the optimal point. In this case, foreign 
trade is always advantageous. Figure 1 1  shows the situation. $ is 
the optimal production point for the closed economy. It maximizes 
social utility under the constraint of the transformation curve. 
Assume that the consumption good has a relatively higher price at 
the world market: the exchange line touches the transformation 
2 curves 
indifference 
Figure 1 1 .  
curve at point P*. Thus the production of investment goods will 
h 
be reduced from yl to v* and the production of consumption goods 
h 1 
- * - * -** 
will be expanded from y2 to y2. Now the amount (y2 - y2 ) of 
- * *  - * 
consumption goods will be exported and the amount (yl - yl) of 
investment goods imported. The actual situation of the country 
is indicated by P**, and P**liesnecessarily on a higher indif- 
ference curve. In this example the country has even more of both 
commodities; but this need not be true. This result appears 
however the price ratio pw of investment to consumption goods may 
be provided it is different from the price ratio under autarchy. 
In this case there would be no foreign trade. T ~ U S  the result is: 
foreign trade is always advantageous. 
b) Advantage from Foreign Trade Measured by the Potential Amount 
of Consumption Goods 
The arguments of the foregoing section (.a) have two drawbacks: 
1. they only consider the static re-allocation of resources but 
not the different growth. paths under autarchy and under foreign 
trade, 2. there might not be such a thing as a social utility 
function, or if it exists, it is not observable. Thus we should 
look for other welfare measures. In this section we consider three 
different measures which give three different answers as to the 
advantage of foreign trade. In this paragraph we define as "advan- 
tage" from foreign trade the additional amount of consumption 
goods per capita which the country could buy on the world market 
if it would keep the same amount yl of investment goods which were 
available under autarchy. 
Thus we do not ask: which amount of consumption goods are 
actually available with foreign trade compared to the amount under 
autarchy (this amount may be smaller), but which amount could be 
made available (e.g., by interventions of a planning board) by 
trading additional investment goods ("additional" compared to the 
situation under autarchy) for consumption goods. But we still 
retain the short-term view, i.e. we consider the short-run trans- 
formation curve. 
Let yi(.pw) be the amount of commodity i per capita with foreign 
trade, if the world market price ratio is pw The set {yl (pw) , 7; (Pw) 1 
is graphically represented by the short-run transformation curve 
A 
i n  F igure  8 .  L e t  y; be t h e  product ion p e r  c a p i t a  under au ta rchy .  
A. 
Then t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a d d i t i o n a l  amount of  consumption goods - 
which i s  now our  measure f o r  t h e  advantage of  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  - i s  
def ined  by 
- 
yi = $ (Y2) , $ '  < 0 ,  $ "  c 0. According t o  t h e  mean v a l u e  theorem 
w e  have (changing t h e  n o t a t i o n s )  : 
1 Under f o r e i g n  t r a d e  w e  g e t  from ( 1  .10a) $ ' (y;) = - - . Thus 
1 1 0 + y: and t h e r e f o r e  pw y1pw + Y 2  1 Y1PW 
Thus f o r e i g n  t r a d e  measured i n  t h i s  way i s  always advantageous,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of any s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
F igure  1 2  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  r e s u l t .  6 i s  t h e  produc t ion  p o i n t  
A 
under au ta rchy .  The amount Y 1  of  investment goods produced under 
au ta rchy  should be r e t a i n e d  a l s o  under f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  I f  pw is  t h e  
p r i c e  r a t i o  on t h e  world market ,  P* w i l l  be t h e  produc t ion  p o i n t  
under f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  E i n d i c a t e s  t h e  amount of  consumption goods 
which can be ob ta ined  on t h e  world market by t r a d i n g  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
investment  goods. 6~ measures t h e  advantage from f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  
This  i s  always p o s i t i v e  i f  t h e  world market p r i c e  r a t i o  i s  d i f f -  
e r e n t  from t h e  p r i c e  r a t i o  under au ta rchy .  
A 
Figure  13 shows t h i s  r e s u l t  i n  another  form: p  i s  t h e  p r i c e  
r a t i o  under au ta rchy .  I t h i n k  t h e  f i g u r e  i s  se l f - exp lana to ry .  
Unfor tuna te ly ,  t h i s  n i c e  r e s u l t  does n o t  c a r r y  over  t o  t h e  
dynamic ca se .  I f  we s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  long-run t r ans fo rma t ion  curve 
f o r  t h e  shor t - run  curve ,  t h i n g s  change. We only  cons ide r  t h e  
normal ca se  of  a  concave long-run transf-ormation curve wi thout  
f a c t o r  p r i c e  r e v e r s a l ,  s e e  F igure  7 ,  s o l i d  l i n e .  
foreign trade 
1 
1 
I 
0 
I 
, 
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6 
, 
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Figu re  1 4  shows t h e  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  t h e  produc- 
t i o n  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  l a b o r  i s  l a r g e r  i n  t h e  inves tment  goods indus-  
A 
t r y  t h a n  i n  t h e  consumption goods i n d u s t r y .  I f  t h e  amount y l  of 
inves tment  goods which i s  a v a i l a b l e  under au t a r chy  (= produc t i on  
p o i n t  $) should  be r e t a i n e d  ( o r  a c q u i r e d )  under c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e  and an a d d i t i o n a l  amount of consumption goods shou ld  be  
a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  p o i n t s  A , B , C  of  t h e  exchange l i n e s  
w i th  t h e  l i n e  g ,  n u s t  l i e  t o  t h e  r i g h t  of  ;. But t h i s  is  only  
1 
t r u e  f o r  t h e  p o i n t  C .  That  means t h a t  on ly  i f  t h e  exchange l i n e  
A 
i s  s t e e p e r  a s  t h e  exchange l i n e  E under a u t a r c h y ,  i . e .  i f  t h e  
inves tment  goods a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  cheap on t he .  world marke t ,  t h e  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  advantageous .  I n  t h i s  case on ly  some more pro- 
d u c t i o n  o f  consumption goods i s  neces sa ry  t o  g e t  t h e  same 
amount o f  inves tment  goods on t h e  world market  and t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  
more consumption goods l e f t .  
Th is  r e s u l t  i s  n o t  ve ry  convincing.  The measure w e  used was 
a h y p o t h e t i c a l  amount of  consumption goods. Perhaps  it i s  more 
inclination of 
long-run trans- 
transfomatio 
curves 
- 
Y2 
Figure 14. 
appropriate to use actual, observable variables as measure. This 
will be done in the following paragraphs. 
c) Advantage from Foreign Trade Measured by the Amounts of Com- 
modities Available Within the Country 
The problem with this measure is that it depends on the 
valuation of commodities. We have consumption and investment goods. 
They cannot be sinply added up. Thus we have to make a decision. 
We evaluate all commodities in consumption units at the price ratios 
which are actually used in the country. Consider first the case 
* 
P < Pw , which means that the country exports investment goods. The 
amount 9 of commodities per capita available in th.e country in units 
of consumption goods is (cf. equations (1.13a), (1.14a): 
where p = pw under foreign trade, K = K~ (pw) , ai = ai ipW) , see i 
equations 1 .  , (10a), (-1 .15) and (.I. 11). 
If $ > pw the country exports consumption goods. The amount 
of goods (in consumption good units) available in the country is 
now (cf . equations (1 .16a) and ( 1  . I  7h). ). : 
- 
Thus = F. We do not have to care which type of commodities are 
exported and which are imported. 
Figure 15 shows the graph of F(p,) for Cobb-Douglas functions 
and parameter values indicated in note 1. The function F.(pw) of 
equation (4.3) is valid between points C and D. Beyond these 
points, when full specialization occurs, other functions are valid 
which are not reproduced here. But their graph is given in Figure 
15. 
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h h 
Again, p is the price ratio under autarchy, is the amount of 
commodities available within the country under autarchy. 6 is the 
autarchy point. 
As may be seen, there is a small region AB where foreign trade 
is disadvantageous for the country. This disadvantage is small 
and stems from the fact that we measure the advantage in units of 
consumption goods. If the investment goods are only a bit cheaper 
on the world market than under autarchy, then not many more 
investment goods can be bought by selling consumption goods. But 
since their value (in units of consumption goods) has fallen, the 
total value may also fall. But this effect is small and probably 
not of practical importance. "In general" there is an advantage 
in foreign trade for the country, measured in commodities avail- 
able in the country. 
d) Advantage from Foreign Trade Measured by Consumption per Capita 
This measure seems to be more natural than others since con- 
sumption is the ultimate goal of production. It is also prominant 
in the literature. For the open economy we get from (1 .5) for 
real consumption per capita: 
R z K By substituting - from(l.7a), - from (I.%) and i; = from 
p2 9;. p2 
5 Pw = --r from (1.10a) we'get after some manipulations: 
91 
since K~ = K~ (pW) , see equation (1.10a) . 
ale 
In general, the sign of is undetermined. For the Cobb- 
OPw 
Douglas functions and parameter values used in-Figure 4 we get 
For t h e  c l o s e d  economv equa t ion  ( 4 . 6 1  a p p l i e s  f o r  t h e  ca se  
6 = Pwt where f5 i s  t h e  p r i c e  r a t i o  under au t a r chy .  I n  t h i s  ca se  
w e  g e t  from (1.18) 
From (1.12) and (1.8) w e  g e t  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (4.8) i n t o  (4 .7 )  and t h i s  i n t o  ( 4 . 6 )  y i e l d s  t h e  con- 
sumption p e r  c a p i t a  ?/L under au ta rchy :  
9; ( K 2 )  
where K = K ~ ( @ ) ,  @ = i . K~ = O i O \ )  ( c f .  equa t ion  ( 1 . 9 ) )  g-; ( K  
and X determined by (1 .18 ) .  i . e .  by ( 4 . 7 ) .  where K = c ( ~ ) t  see 
equa t ion  ( 1 . 1 2 ) .  
I f  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  advantageous under t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  
C/L must be  l a r g e r  t h a n  e / L  f o r  a l l  pw # . But t h i s  is n o t  t r u e ,  
i n  g e n e r a l .  The d e r i v a t i v e  of  C/L wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  pw is  n o t  ze ro  
a t  t h e  p o i n t  t / L ,  i n  g e n e r a l .  I t  may have any s i g n .  W e  g e t :  
where 
Never the less ,  m o r e d e f i n i t e r e s u l t s  may be reached i f  w e  s p e c i f y  
t h e  produc t ion  f u n c t i o n s  o r  make some o t h e r  assumptions.  E s p e c i a l l y  
we s h a l l  assume t h a t  C/A i s  a  convex f u n c t i o n  of p,. This  i s  t r u e  
f o r  Cobb-Douglas p roduc t ion  f u n c t i o n s .  Now t h r e e  c a s e s  may occur  
(see Figure  1 6 ) .  
C/L consumption per capita 
I I I 
I I 1 
h 
4 pw price ra t io  on 
pw pw2 
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F igure  16. 
I n  ca se  A (see t h e  d o t t e d  l i n e  i n  F igure  15) f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  
always advantageous.  This  occurs :  
a )  i f  t h e  sav ings  r a t i o s  sL and sK a r e  op t imal  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  
t h e  maximal consumption was reached under au t a rchy .  I n  t h e  
case  of Cobb-Douglas p roduc t ion  f u n c t i o n s  ( s e e  no te  1 )  above) 
t h i s  means: i f  
where y l :  = produc t ion  e l a s t i c i t y  of  l a b o r  i n  t h e  investment  
goods i n d u s t r y ,  y 2  t h e  same i n  t h e  consumption goods indus t ry ;  
b )  if t h e  s av ings  r a t i o s  keep s p e c i f i c  r e l a t i o n s .  They fo l low 
from t h e  c o n d i t i o n  - a C/L = 0 f o r  pW = @ and may be w r i t t e n :  
*w 
1 -Y 2 
aa .  s = -  L Y 1  ( 1 -sK) 
This  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  equa t ion  (4.11) , o r  
- 
1-y2  
bb. s L - -  - q 
where 
F igure  17 shows t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  ( 4 . 1  I ) and ( 4 . 1 2 )  . 
* * 
The op t imal  s av ings  r a t i o s  s and sK a r e  i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  l i n e  L 
S~ 
according t o  ( 4 . 1 1 ) .  I n  F igure  17 w e  used t h e  parameter va lues  
y 1  = -8, y 2  = - 7  a n d w y =  -02 ,  c f .  no te  1 )  above. For y 2  > y l  a  
s i m i l a r  graph comes up, on ly  t h e  "grooves" a r e  s i t u a t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y .  
A 
I n  c a s e  B t h e r e  is  a  "groove" between pw and p  where f o r e i g n  
w2 
t r a d e  reduces  t h e  consumption p e r  c a p i t a  (= groove t o  t h e  r i g h t  i n  F igs .  
1 6  and 1 7 ) .  Investment goods w i l l  be expor ted ,  b u t  t h e i r  p r i c e  
i s  o n l y a  b i t  h ighe r  t han  under au ta rchy .  The a l l o c a t i o n  of addi-  
tional factors to the investment goods industry reduces the con- 
sumption goods industry and this reduction is not overcompensated 
for by the import of consumption goods since these goods are 
scarcely less expensive than under autarchy. 
h 
In case C there is a "groove" between pwl and pw. Consumption 
goods are exported but the world market price of th.ese goods is 
not high. enough to compensate for th.e re-allocation of factors 
from the investment goods industry to the consumption goods 
industry. 
savings ratio fran wage-profit 
groove to the 
groove to the left 
/ grwve to the right 
O I 4  savings ratio 
fran capital 
incam2 
Figure 37. 
These grooves a r e  r a t h e r  smal l  and f l a t .  Thus d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e  
op t imal  s av ings  r a t i o s  do n o t  ma t t e r  very much.'if they  a r e  n o t  
extreme. 
I n  concluding t h i s  paragraph.we may s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
induced by f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  advantageous f o r  t h e  count ry  i n  t h e  
long run i f  w e  measure t h e  advantage by consumption p e r  c a p i t a  
and i f  t h e  p r i c e  r a t i o s  on t h e  world market a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from those  under au t a rchy .  T h e  economy moves t o  a h ighe r  
growth p a t h ,  see Figure  5 .  T h i s  advantage i s  s t i l l  l a r g e r ,  i f  w e  
t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of knowhow, economies of s c a l e  and 
o t h e r  advantages from t h e  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r  which a r e  n o t  taken 
i n t o  account i n  t h i s  model. 
The r e s u l t s  apply t o  any count ry ,  be it developed o r  n o t ,  i f  
it i s  s m a l l  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  r e s t  of  t h e  world.  I f  th.e count ry  i s  
abundant i n  l a b o r  bu t  has  on ly  a very s m a l l  sav ings  r a t i o ,  a very  
low p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t e  and ou tda ted  produc t ion  methods such t h a t  
t h e  produc t ion  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  i n f e r i o r  t o  t h o s e  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  
product ion and consumption pe r  c a p i t a  w i l l  be very  low. So w i l l  
be t h e  r e a l  wage r a t e .  A s  a r u l e ,  w e  may assume t h a t  a count ry  
l i k e  t h i s  w i l l  expor t  consumption goods and import  investment  goods 
and t h a t  t h e  domestic p r i c e  r a t i o  between investment  and consump- 
t i o n  goods i s  f a r  away from t h e  a c t u a l  world market  p r i c e  r a t i o  pw. 
Thus consumption pe r  head w i l l  r i s e  by f o r e i g n  t r a d e  ( s e e  l i n e  B i n  
F igure  1 6 ) .  Af te r  a wh i l e  t h e  sav ings  r a t i o  w i l l  fo l low,  t h a t  
means: c a p i t a l  accumulation and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  s t a r t s .  T h a t  
is  t h e  l i n e w h i c h  Mexico, B r a z i l ,  Argent ina ,  Taiwan, Hongkong, 
Singapore and o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  pursued.  The t h e s i s  of Emmanuel 
(1972) t h a t  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i t s e l f  means e x p l o i t a t i o n  of developing 
c o u n t r i e s  i s  simply wrong. There  a r e  s o  many i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and 
e r r o r s  i n  h i s  arguments t h a t  they  do n o t  deserve  any a t t e n t i o n ;  c f .  
S t e i n  (1984) ,  p.143 i f .  Moreover, why do t h e  developing c o u n t r i e s  
n o t  simply c l o s e  t h e i r  bo rde r s  i f  they  f e e l  e x p l o i t e d  by f o r e i g n  
t r a d e ?  Why do they  complain about  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  i f  t r a d e  is 
d e t r i m e n t a l ?  Thus we can f o r g e t  t h i s  op in ion .  
Ac tua l ly ,  w e  have t o  make a l l  e f f o r t s  t o  keep world t r a d e  f r e e  
and t o  r e s i s t  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p r e s su re  which comes from those  
i n d u s t r i e s  which have t o  s h r i n k  under f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  
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